A study of selected principles of international environmental law in the light of 'sustainable development' by Fellrath, Isabelle
Fellrath, Isabelle (1998) A study of selected principles of 
international environmental law in the light of 
'sustainable development'. PhD thesis, University of 
Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/10983/1/285462.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
DEPARTMENT OF LA W 
ýýVER 
ý-: 
im: 
-n 
+ uni 
\T\TI NG 
A Study of Selected Principles 
of 
International Environmental Law 
in the light of 
'Sustainable Development' 
ýýSTINGH 
c 2, ` FRSITY 
I. ýßPPQ 
Submitted by Isabelle Fellrath 
for the Degree ofi Doctor of Philosophy 
May 1998 
We're gettin to close to the edge 
too many times I wake up scared 
About a world that's out of hand 
See the water turnin' black 
You smell the air its gettin' hard to breathe 
We ought to get down on our knees 
and beg forgiveness for our greed 
Proud, proud we've been so proud 
of our advancement in the human race 
Pushin' Pullin' Nature Down 
Never worried we'd run out 
even at this deadly pace... "(1) 
(1) The Havalinas, 'Good for nothin' rag', from Havalinas, Elektra, 1990; spelling as in original. 
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Abstract 
Since the late 1980s, the terms of 'sustainable development' have been frequently 
referred to both in international environmental law instruments and in the doctrine. In 
spite of such references, however, sustainable development has remained poorly 
developed in terms of its meaning and of its practical and normative implications. 
This thesis purports to come out with a partial picture of what sustainable development 
means (or does not mean) in the restricted context of international environmental law. 
To do so, it will try to identify in which respect and how far sustainable development 
has influenced and has been reflected in the evolution of some selected principles of that 
law. Each principles is considered in an evolutionary perspective, from the time of its 
inception to the time of its 'association' to sustainable development. 
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from 1 April 1985; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 3, IV/A/18-11-83. 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 'Jamaica, 10 
December 1982, in force 16 November 1994, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 and Corr. 1 to 
11; Misc. 11 (1983); 982 IELMT 92; 21 ILM(1982), 1261 (1982 UNCLOS). 
1983 
Convention on the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the 
Wider Caribbean Region, Cartagena de Indias, 24 March 1983, in force 11 May 1987; 
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Misc. 19 (1983); Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 2, II/A/24-03-83-a; 22 ILM (1983), 221 
(1983 Cartagena Convention on the Marine Environment in the Wider 
Caribbean Region). 
Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Oil Spills in the Wider Caribbean 
Region, Cartagena de Indias, 24 March 1983, in force 11 October 1986; Röster & Simma 
2nd, Vol. 2, II/A/24-03-83-b. 
Vienna Convention on States Succession in Respect of State Property, Archives and 
Debts, Vienna, 8 April 1983, not in force; UN Doc. A/CONF. 117/14; 22 ILM (1983), 
306. 
1985 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22 March 1985, in force: 22 
September 1988; 985 IELMT 22; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 4, VI/A/22-03-85; 26 ILM 
(1987), 1529 (1985 Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer). 
Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the East African Region, Nairobi, 21 June 1985, not in force; OJ 
EC C253, of 10.10.1986,10; 985 IELMT 46; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 2, II/A/21-06- 
85-a; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 2, Doc. 52 (1985 Nairobi Convention on 
the Marine Environment in East Africa). 
Protocol Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African 
Region, 21 June 1985, not in force; OJ EC C253, of 10.10.1986,18; Röster & Simma 
2nd, Vol. 2, II/A/21-06-85-b; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 2, Doc. 52b. 
Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution in Case of Emergency, 
Nairobi, 21 June 1985, not in force; OJ EC C253, of 10.10.1986,26; 985 IELMT, 48; 
Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 2, IUA/21-06-85-c; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 2, 
Doc. 52a (1985 Nairobi Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating 
Pollution in Case of Emergency). 
Convention of the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition, The Hague, 1 
July 1985, in force 1 January 1992; UKTS 14 (1992); draft text adopted unmodified by 
the parties at 23 ILM (1985), 1389 (1985 Hague Convention of the Law Applicable 
to Trusts and on their Recognition). 
Protocol to the 1979 ECE Convention on the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 
on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 
Per Cent, Helsinki, 8 July 1985, in force 7 September 1987; 27 ILM (1988), 698. 
Association of South East Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources, Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 1985, not in force; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 
1, I/A/09-07-85; 15 EPL (1985) 64 (1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of 
Nature). 
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1986 
Single European Act, Luxembourg, 17 February 1986, The Hague, 28 February 1986, in 
force 1 July 1987; UKTS 31 (1988); 25 ILM (1986), 503; 23 Common Market LR 
(1986), 813 (1986 SEA; 1957 EEC Treaty as modified by 1986 SEA is referred to as 
1986 EC Treaty) 
Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents, Vienna, 26 September 1986, in 
force 27 October 1986; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 5, VIVA/26-09-86-a; 25 ILM (1986), 
1370,16 EPL (1986), 162 (1986 Early Notification Convention). 
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South 
Pacific Region, Noumea, 25 November 1986, in force 22 August 1990; Röster & Simma 
2nd, Vol. 2, II/A/24-11-86; 26 ILM (1987), 38. 
Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution Emergencies, Noumea, 25 
November 1986, in force 22 August 1990; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 2, II/A/24-11-86a; 
26 IL1v! (1987), 59 (1986 Noumea Protocol Concerning Co-operation in 
Combating Pollution Emergencies). 
1987 
Action Plan for the Mediterranean, Athens, 4 June 1987; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 2, 
II/B/04-06-87. 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer Montreal, 10 
September 1987, in force 1 January 1989; 985 IELMT 22/A; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 
4, VI/A/16-09-87; 26ILM (1987), 1541; 17 EPL (1987), 256 (1987 Montreal Protocol 
on the Ozone Layer). 
1988 
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, Wellington, 2 
June 1988, not in force; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, I/A/02-06-88-B; 27 ILM (1988), 
281; 18 EPL (1988), 115 (1988 CRAMRA). 
Protocol to the 1979 ECE Convention on the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes, 
Sofia, 31 October 1985; 28 ILM(1989), 212. 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, San Salvador, 14 November 1988, not in force; 28 
ILM(1989), 156. 
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1989 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal, Basel, 22 March 1989, in force 24 May 1992; 
UN. Doc. UNEP/WG. 190/4; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 5, IX/A/22-03-89; 28 ILM 
(1989), 657; 19 EPL (1989), 68 (1989 Basel Convention on Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Wastes). 
Convention No 169, Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, adopted by ILO at its 76th Session, Geneva, 27 June 1989, in force 5 
September 1991; 72 ILO Official Bulletin (1989), 59; 28 ILM (1989), 1382 (1989 HA 
Convention on Indigenous Peoples). 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York, 20 November 1989, in force 2 
September 1990; UN Doc. A/Res. /44/25; 281LM(1989), 1448. 
Protocol for the Conservation and Management of the Protected Marine and Coastal 
Areas of the South-East Pacific, Paipa, Colombia, 21 September 1989, not yet in force; 
989 IELMT 71. 
Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, 
Wellington, 24 November 1989, in force 17 May 1991; 989 IIELMT 87; 29 ILM (1990), 
1454 (1989 Wellington Convention on Long Driftnets). 
African, Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic Community, Fourth Lome 
Convention, Lome, 15 December 1989, in force 1 March 1990, for a ten year period; 
EEC Treaty Series 96 (1990); 989 IELMT 93; 29 ILM (1989), 783 (1989 ACP-EEC 
Lome 1V). 
1990 
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife to the Convention for the 
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean 
Region, Kingston, 18 January 1990, not in force; 990 IELMT 85; 1 Yb1EL (1990), 441; 
Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 2, Doc. 51b. 
Adjustments and Amendments to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, London, 29 June 1990, in force 10 August 1992; 
UN. Doc. UNEP/03L. Pro. 2/3; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 4, VI/A/29-06-90; 30 IL/vI 
(1991), 537 (Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer as amended/adjusted in 1990). 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 
London, 30 November 1990, in force 13 May 1995; 990 IELMT 88; 30 ILM (1991), 
733; 1 Yb1EL (1990), 561 (1990 Oil Pollution Preparedness Convention). 
xxxiv Treaties & Conventions 
1991 
Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary 
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Bamako, 21 January 
1991, not in force; 991 IELMT 74; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 5, IX/A/30-01-91; 30 
ILM (1991), 775; 31 ILM (1992), 164; 2 YhIEL (1991), 632 (1991 Bamako 
Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes). 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 
25 February 1991, in force 10 September 1997; Doc. E. ECE. 1250; 991 IELMT 15; 30 
ILM (1991), 800; 2 YhIEL (1991), 697 (1991 ECE Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment). 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Madrid, 4 October 1991, 
in force January 1998; 30 ILM (1991), 1461; 2 YbIEL (1991), 531 (1991 Antarctic 
Treaty Environmental Protocol). 
Protocol Amending the 1961 European Social Charter, adopted by the Council of 
Europe, 21 October 1991, Turin, not in force; 31 ILM(1992), 155. 
Convention on the Protection of Alps, Salzburg, 7 November 1991, in force 6 March 
1995; 991 IELMT 83; 31 ILM(1992), 767 (1991 Alps Convention). 
Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
Concerning the Control of the Emmissions of Volatile Organic Compounds of their 
Transboundary Fluxes, Geneva, 18 November 1991, not in force; 
UN. Doc. ECE/EB. AIR/30; 31 ILM(1992), 573; 2 YhIEL (1991), 720. 
1992 
Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992, in force 1 November 1993; 
UKTS 12 (1994); 311LM(1992), 247 (1992 EUTreaty). 
UN/ECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes, Helsinki, 17 March 1992, in force 6 October 1996; UN 
Doc. ENWA/R. 53 and Add. 1; 992 IELMT 20; 31 ILM (1992), 1312; 3 YhIEL (1992), 
703 (1992 ECE Watercourses Convention). 
UN/ECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 
17 March 1992, not in force; Doc. ENWA/R. 54 and Add. 1; 992 IELMT 22; 31 ILM 
(1992), 1330; 3 YbIEL (1992), 722 (1992 ECE Industrial Accidents Convention). 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 
Helsinki, 9 April 1992, not in force; 992 IELMT 28; 22 Law of the Sea Bulletin (1993), 
54 (1992 Baltic Sea Convention). 
Agreement on the European Economic Area, Oporto, 2 May 1992, in force 1 January 
1994; EEC Treaty Series 7 (1992) (1992 European Economic Area Agreement). 
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in 
force 21 March 1994; UN. Doc. A/AC. 237/18(Part II)/Add. 1 and Corr. 1; 992 IELMT 
35; 31 ILM(1992), 849; 3 YHEL (1992), 684 (1992 Climate Change Convention). 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 
1993; UN. Doc. UNEPBio. Div. /N7-INC. 5/4; 992 IELMT 42; 31 ILM (1992), 822; 3 
YHEL (1992), 664 (1992 Biodiversity Convention). 
Adjustments and Amendment to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Copenhagen, 23-25 June 1992, in 1 January 1994; 
UN. Doc. UNEP/O3L. Pro. 4/15; 32 ILM (1993), 874; 3 YHEL (1992), 805 (Montreal 
Protocol on the Ozone Layer as adjusted/amended in 1992). 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 
Paris, 22 September 1992, not in force; 992 IELMT 71; 32 ILM (1993), 1069; 3 YHEL 
(1992), 759; 8 IJMarine & Coastal L (1993), 50 (1992 OSPAR Marine Environment 
Convention). 
North American Free Trade Agreement, Washington/Ottawa/Mexico City, 8,11,14 and 
17 December 1992, in force 1 January 1994; 32 ILM (1993), 289 and 605 (1992 
NAFTA). 
1993 
ECE Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to 
the Environment, Lugano 21 June 1993, not in force; 993 IELMT 19; 32 ILM (1993), 
1228; 4 YbIEL (1993), 691. 
North American Agreement of Environmental Cooperation, Washington/Ottawa/Mexico 
City, 13 September 1993, in force 1 January 1994; 993 IELMT 68; 32 ILM (1993), 
1480; final draft in 4 YbIEL (1993), 831. 
1994 
International Tropical Timber Agreement, Geneva, 26 January 1994, opened for 
signature 1 April 1994; 994 IELMT 07; 33 ILM (1994), 1016; 5 YbIEL (1994), 832 
(1994 Tropical Timber International Agreement). 
Instrument Establishing the (restructured) Global Environmental Facility, Geneva, 16 
March 1994, formally adopted by the three implementing Agencies in accordance of 
Para. 1 of the Instrument in 1994: UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board, Doc. DP/1994/9, 
New York, 13 May 1994; UNEP Governing Council, Res. SS. VI. 1,18 June 1994; World 
Bank Executive Directors, Res. 94-2, and World Bank Board of Governors, Res. No. 
487,7 July 1994 ; 33 ILM (1994), 1273; extracts in 24 EPL (1994), 192; for the formal 
ratification of implementing bodies, consult GEF Web Site at 
[http : //www. worldbank. org/html/gefl 
. 
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Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Marrakech, 15 April 1994, and 
Annex IA, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; 33 ILM (1994), 1144 (1994 WTO 
Agreement, and 1994 GATT). 
Protocol to the 1979 Transboundary Air Pollution Convention, on Further Reduction of 
Sulphur Emissions, Oslo, 14 June 1994, not in force; 33 ILM (1994), 1542; 5 YbIEL 
(1994), 743. 
Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Drought and/or 
Desertification, in Africa, Paris, 17 June 1994, in force 26 December 1996; 
UN. Doc. A/AC. 241/15/Rev. 3; 994 IELMT 76; 33 ILM (1994), 1332; 5 YbIEL (1994), 
685 (1994 Desertification Convention). 
Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, 
Sofia, 29 June 1994, not in force; 994 IELMT 49 (1994 Danube River Convention). 
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations of the Laws 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982, annexed to UNGA Res. 48/263, New York, 28 July 
1994, in force 16 November 1994; 994 IELMT 56; 33 ILM (1994), 1309; 5 Yb1EL 
(1994), 905 (1994 UNCLOS Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part 
XI). 
Energy Charter Treaty, Lisbon, 17 December 1994, not in force; 994 IELMT 93; 34 
ILM(1995), 373 (1994 Energy Charter Treaty). 
Protocol for the Implementation of the Alpine Convention in the Field of Town and 
Country Planning and Sustainable Development, Chambery, 20 December 1994, not yet 
in force; 991 IELMT 83b (1994 Planning and Sustainable Development Alpine 
Protocol). 
1995 
Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River 
Basin, Chang Rai, 5 April 1995, in force upon signature; 5 Asian YbIL (1995), 591. 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the 
Mediterranean, Amendments to the 1976 Convention on the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, 10 June 1995, not yet in force; 
UNEP(OCA)/MED IG. 6/7 (1976/95 Barcelona Convention on Mediterranean 
Sea). 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 August 
1995, open for Signature 4 December 1995; 34 ILM (1995), 1542; 6 YbIEL (1995), 841 
(1995 Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement). 
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1996 
Treaties & Conventions 
European Social Charter, Strasbourg, 3 May 1996, not in force; 36 ILM (1997), 31 
(1996 European Social Charter (revised)). 
Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, London, 7 November 1996, not in force; 36 ILM 
(1997), 7 (1996 Protocol to 1972 London Convention on Dumping of Wastes). 
Treaty between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the 
People's Republic of Bangladesh on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, 
New Delhi, 12 December 1996, in force 1 January. 1997; 36 ILM (1997), 523 (1996 
Treaty on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka) 
1997 
UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, New 
York, 21 May 1997, opened for signature 21 May 1997, not yet in force; 
UN. Doc. A/51/869; 361LM(1997), 700; 37EPL (1997), 233. 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties, Third session, Kyoto, 1-10 December 1997, 
FCCC/CP/1997/L. 7/Add. 1 10 December 1997, not in force; 37 ILM (1998), 32 (1997 
Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention). 
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European Social Charter, Strasbourg, 3 May 1996, not in force; 36 ILM (1997), 31 
(1996 European Social Charter (revised)). 
Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, London, 7 November 1996, not in force; 36 ILM (1997), 7 (1996 Protocol to 1972 London Convention on Dumping of Wastes). 
Treaty between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the 
People's Republic of Bangladesh on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, 
New Delhi, 12 December 1996, in force 1 January 1997; 36 ILM (1997), 523 (1996 
Treaty on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka) 
1997 
UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, New 
York, 21 May 1997, opened for signature 21 May 1997, not yet in force; 
UN. Doc. A/51/869; 361LM(1997), 700; 37EPL (1997), 233. 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties, Third session, Kyoto, 1-10 December 1997, 
FCCC/CP/1997/L. 7/Add. 1 10 December 1997, not in force; 37 ILM (1998), 32 (1997 
Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention). 
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Declarations, Resolutions and Other Relevant Documents. 
1940s 
Declaration on the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour organization, 
adopted by International Labour Conference at its Twenty-sixth Session, Philadelphia, 
in April-May 1944, and later incorporated in the 1946 ILO constitutive Charter; 
reprinted in 38 AJIL (1944) Suppl., 203. 
American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, Res. XXX, adopted by the 
International Conference of American States, Bogota, 2 May 1948; Final Act of the 
Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, 30 March 
-2 May 1948 (Pan American Union, 1948), 38, reprinted in 43 AJIL (1949), 133. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, UNGA, A/Res/217 (III) A, 
GAOR, 3rd Session, Part 1; reprinted in Brownlie (ed. ), Basic Documents on Human 
Rights, 3rd edn, 21. 
1950s 
Principles of the Law Governing the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 
adopted by ILA at its forty-seventh Conference, Dubrovnik, 1956; ILA, Report of the 
forty-seventh Conference, Dubrovnik, 1956,241. 
1960s 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
UNGA, A/Res/1514 (XV), 14 December 1960, GAOR 15th Session, Supplement No. 
16 (A14684); Brownlie (ed. ), Basic Documents on Human Rights, 3rd edn, 298 (1960 
Decolonisation Charter). 
United Nations Development Decade: A Programme for International Economic Co- 
operation, UNGA, A/Res/1710(XVI) and A/Res/1715 (XVI), 19 December 1961, 
GAOR 16th Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/5100) (1961 Strategy for the First 
Development Decade). 
xxxix Relevant Declarations & Resolutions 
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, landmark Resolution, 
UNGA, A/Res/1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962, GAOR 17th Session, Supplement No. 
17 (A/5217); 2 ILM (1963), 223 (1962 landmark Resolution on Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources). 
Declaration of the Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, UNGA A/Res. /1962 (XVIII), 13 December 1963, GAOR 18th 
Session, Supplement No. 15 (A/5515); 3 ILM (1964), 160; 58 AJIL (1964), 477. 
Rules on the Use of Waters of International Rivers, adopted by ILA at its fifty-second 
Conference, Helsinki, 1966; ILA Report of the fifty-second Conference, Helsinki, 1966, 
484; 11 Röster & Sinuna 4741; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 12 (IIA 
1966 Helsinki Rules on the Use of Waters of International Rivers). 
Charter of Algiers on Co-ordination of G77 Policies in UNCTAD, adopted by the 
Ministerial Meeting of 77 Developing Countries, 24 October 1967; 7ILM(1968) 177. 
European Water Charter, adopted by the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 6 May 1968; 
Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 32. 
Proclamation of Teheran, adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights, 
Teheran, 22 April 
- 
13 May 1968; 63 AJIL (1969), 674. 
Declaration on Social Progress and Development, UNGA, A/Res/2542 (XXIV), 11 
December 1969, GAOR 24th Session, Supplement No. 30 (A/7630); reprinted (in 
French) in Dupuy (ed. ), The Right to Development at the International Level, Hague 
Academy of International Law Workshop, 1979 (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), at 58 (1969 Declaration on Social Progress). 
1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co- 
Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
UNGA, A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, GAOR 25th Session, Supplement No. 
28 (A/8028); 65 AJIL (1971), 243 (1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations). 
International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development 
Decade, UNGA, A/Res/2626 (XXV) Annex, 24 October 1970, GAOR 25th Session, 
Supplement No. 28 (A18028) (1970 Strategy for the Second Development Decade). 
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil 
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, UNGA, A/Res. /2749 (XXV), 17 
December 1970, GAOR 25th Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/8028) (1970 Declaration 
of Principles Governing the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, 
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction). 
xl Relevant Declarations & Resolutions 
1972 
Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental 
Policies, OECD Council Recommendation C(72)128,26 May 1972; 11 IL1v! (1972), 
1172; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 25 (OECD Recommend. 
C(72)128, on Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of 
Environmental Policies). 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, and attached 
Action Plan for the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, 
A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1; 1 Röster & Simma 118; 11 ILM (1972), 1416 (1972 Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment & Action Plan for the Human 
Environment). 
Resolution on Co-operation Between States in the Field of the Environment, UNGA, 
A/Res/2995 (XXVII), 15 December 1972, GAOR 27th Session, Supplement No. 30 
(A/8730) (1972 UNGA Resolution 2995 (XXVII) on Co-operation Between States 
in the Field of the Environment). 
1973 
Resolution on Co-operation in the Field of the Environment Concerning Natural 
Resources Shared by Two or More States, UNGA, A/Res/3129 (XXVIII), 13 
December 1973, GAOR 28th Session, Supplement No. 30 (A/9030); 11 EPL (1975), 
103 (1973 Resolution 3129 (XXVIII), on Co-operation in the Field of the 
Environment Concerning Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States). 
1974 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UNGA 
A/Res/3201 (S-VI), 9 May 1974 and attached Programme of Action, A/Res/3202 (S- 
VI), 16 May 1974; 13 ILM (1974), 715; 70 Department of State Bulletin (1974) No. 
1822,572 (1974 NIEO Declaration and NIEO Programme of Action). 
Analysis of the Environmental Consequences of Significant Public and Private Projects, 
OECD Council Recommend. C(74)216,14 November 1974; 1 Röster & Simma 297 
(OECD Recommend. C(74)216, on Analysis of the Environmental Consequences 
of Significant Public and Private Projects). 
Declaration on Environmental Policy, OECD, adopted by Member Governments during 
the Meeting of Environment Committee at Ministerial Level, 14 November 1974; 1 
Röster & Simma 326; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 25 (1974 OECD 
Declaration on Environmental Policy). 
Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, OECD Council Recommend. C(74)223, 
14 November 1974; 14 ILM (1975), 234; Burhenne & Jahnke, International 
Environmental Soft Law 974: 9525; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 25b 
xli Relevant Declarations & Resolutions 
(1974 OECD Recommend. C(74)233, on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays 
Principle). 
OECD Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, annexed to OECD Council 
Recommend. C(74)224,14 November 1974; 1 EPL (1975), 44. 
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, UNGA, A/Res/3314 (XXIX), 14 December 
1974, GAOR 29th Session, Supplement No. 31 (A/963 1); 69 AJIL (1975), 480. 
1975 
Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA, A/Res/3281 (XXIX), 15 
January 1975, GAOR 29th Session, Supplement No. 31 (A/9631); 14 ILM (1975) 251, 
72 Department of State Bulletin (1975), No. 1558,147 (1975 Economic Charter). 
Resolution on Development and International Economic Cooperation, UNGA, 
A/Res/3362 (S-VII), 16 September 1975; 14ILM(1975), 1524. 
Final Act, adopted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, 
30 July 1975; 14 ILM (1975), 1292; relevant extracts on the environment in 1 EPL (1975), 108 (1975 Helsinki Final Act of CSCE). 
1976 
Equal Right of Access, OECD Council Recommend. C(76)55,11 May 1976; Burhenne 
& Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 976: 3605; 2 EPL (1976), 104; 15 
ILM (1976), 1218. 
Bern Criteria for the Addition of Species and other Taxa to [CITES] Appendices I& II, 
and for the Transfer of Species and Other Taxa from [CITES] Appendix II to Appendix 
I; adopted at the First Meeting of Conference of the Parties to CITES, Proceedings of 
the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, 2-6 November 1976 (IUCN, 1977), 
31; 2EPL (1976) 189. 
1977 
Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and Non Discrimination in 
Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, OECD Council Recommend. C(77)28,17 May 
1977; 18 Röster & Simma 9344; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 29b. 
Water Action Plan, adopted by UN Water Conference, Mar del Plata, Argentina, March 
1977; extracts in 3 EPL (1977), 92 (1977 Mar del Plata Water Action Plan). 
1978 
Declaration universelle des droits du peuple, adopted by the Conference de Juristes, de 
sociologues, de politologues, de philosophes et d'economistes sous 1'egide de la 
Fondation Internationale LELIO BASSO pour le droit et la liberation des peuples et de la ligue internationale pour le droit et la liberation des peuples, Alger, 1978; reproduced 
xlii Relevant Declarations & Resolutions 
in A. Cassese & E. Jouve, Pour un droh des peuples, Essais sur la Declaration d'Alger 
(Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1978) (1978 Declaration d'Alger des droits du peuple). 
Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States 
in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilisation of Natural Resources Shared by two or 
More States, UNEP Governing Council Dec. 6/16, Nairobi, 19 May 1978; 4 EPL 
(1978), 48; 17 ILM (1978), 1098 (1978 UNEP Draft Principles on Shared Natural 
Resources). 
1979 
Declaration of Anticipatory Environmental Policies, issued by the Governments of 
OECD Member Countries and Yugoslavia, 8 May 1979; OECD and the Environment (OECD, Paris, 1986), 17; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, I/F/08-05-79-a; 5 EPL (1979), 
157 (1979 OECD/Yugoslavia Declaration of Anticipatory Environmental 
Policies). 
Recommendation on the Assessment of Projects with Significant Impact on the 
Environment, OECD Council Recommendation C(79)116,8 May 1979; OECD and the 
Environment (OECD, Paris, 1986), 29; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, I/F/08-05-79-b; 5 
EPL (1979), 154; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 28 (OECD 
Recommend. C(79)116, on the Assessment of Projects with Significant Impact on 
the Environment). 
1980 
Belem Declaration on the Amazonian Cooperation Treaty, issued by the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs from the Signatory Countries of the Amazonian Cooperation Treaty, 
Belem, Brazil, 23-24 October 1980; unofficial translation from Portuguese in 7 EPL (1981), 46. 
Resolution on the Historical Responsibility of States for the Preservation of Nature for 
Present and Future Generations, UNGA, A/Res/35/8,30 October 1980; Röster & 
Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, I/C/30-10-80; 7 EPL (1981) 93 (1980 Resolution on the 
Historical Responsibility of States for the Preservation of Nature for Present and 
Future Generations). 
Salzburg Declaration, prepared at the Second European Conference 'The Environment 
and Human Rights, Salzburg, 2-3 December 1980; 7 EPL (1981), 94. 
International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, 
appended to UNGA, A/Res/35/56,5 December 1980 (1980 Strategy for the Third 
Development Decade). 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, considered by the UN International Law 
Commission at its 32nd Session; 1980 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 2,30 (1980 ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility). 
xliii Relevant Declarations & Resolutions 
1981 
Program for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law, drafted by 
Ad Hoc Meeting of Senior Government Officials Expert in Environmental Law, 
Montevideo, 6 November 1981, adopted by UNEP Governing Council Decision 10/21, 
31 May 1982; 1 Röster & Sinum 123 (1981 Montevideo Program for the 
Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law). 
1982 
Nairobi Declaration on the State of World-wide Environment, UNEP, Nairobi, 18 May 
1982, GAOR 37th Session, Supplement No. 25 (A/37/25); Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, 
I/D/18-05-82-b; 21 ILM(1982) 676 (1982 Nairobi Declaration). 
The Environment in 1982: Retrospect and Prospect, UNEP, Nairobi, 18 May 1982, 
GAOR 37th Session, Supplement No. 25 (A/37/25); Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, 
I/D/18-05-82-a (1982 UNEP decision on The Environment in 1982 
- 
Retrospect and 
Prospect). 
World Charter for Nature, annexed to UNGA, A/Res. / 37/7,28 October 1982, GAOR 
37th Session, Supplement No. 51 (A137/51); Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, I/C/28-10-82; 
Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 982: 8005; 221LM (1983), 
455; 6EPL (1980), 45. 
Rules on Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin, adopted by ILA at its 
Sixtieth Conference, Montreal, 1982; ILA, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, Montreal, 
1982,1; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 13 (ILA 1982 Rules on Water 
Pollution in an International Drainage Basin). 
Rules of International Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, adopted by ILA at its 
Sixtieth Conference, Montreal, 1982; adopted by ILA at its Sixtieth Conference, 
Montreal, 1982; ILA, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, Montreal, 1982,535; 10 EPL 
(1983), 27 (ILA 1982 Montreal Rules of International Law Applicable to 
Transfrontier Pollution). 
1983 
Cooperation in the Field of the Economics of Science and Technology and the 
Environment, extracts from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
1989 Concluding Document of the Second Follow-up Meeting, Madrid, 11 November 
1980-9 September 1983; 22 ILM (1983), 1395 (1983 Madrid Concluding Document 
of CSCE Second Follow-up Meeting, Cooperation in the Field of the Economics 
of Science and Technology and the Environment). 
1984 
Draft Rules on Legal Aspects of Long-Distance Air Pollution, adopted by 
. 
ILA at its Sixty-first Conference, Paris, 1984; ILA, Report of the Sixty-first Conference,, Paris, 
AN Relevant Declarations & Resolutions 
1984,383; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 14a (ILA 1984 Draft Rules 
on Legal Aspects of Long-Distance Air Pollution). 
1985 
Guidelines on the Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution from Land- 
Based Resources, UNEP Governing Council Dec. 13/18/11,19 April 1985; Röster & 
Simma 2nd, Vol. 2, IUD/24-05-85; Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental 
Soft Law, 985 : 3905; 14 EPL (1985), 77 (1985 UNEP Montreal Guidelines on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution from Land-Based 
Source). 
Economic Declaration Towards Sustained Growth and Higher Employment, adopted by 
the Seven Major Industrialised Democracies, Bonn, 4 May 1985 (1985 Bonn 
Economic Declaration of the G7). 
Declaration on Environment: Resource for the Future, issued by the Governments of 
OECD Member Countries and Yugoslavia, 20 June 1985; OECD and the Environment 
(OECD, Paris, 1986), 19; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, I/F/20-06-85-a; 14 EPL (1985), 
34 (1985 OECD/Yugoslavia Declaration on Environment). 
Assessment of Development Assistance Projects and Programmes, OECD Council 
Recommend. C(85)104,20 June 1985; OECD and the Environment (OECD, Paris, 
1986), 30; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, I/F/20-06-85-b; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic 
Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 28a. 
Nairobi Forwards Looking Strategy for the Advancement of Women, adopted at the 
World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations 
Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Nairobi, 15-26 July 1985, 
UN/A/CONF. 116/25/Rev. 1,2-90; extracts in The United Nations and the Advancement 
of Women, 1954-1995, Doc. 84. 
1986 
Rules on the Law of International Groundwater Resources, adopted by ILA at its Sixty- 
second Conference, Seoul, 1986; ILA, Report of the Sixty-second Conference, Seoul, 
1986,383 (1986 ILA Rules on the Law of International Groundwater Resources). 
Restatement of the Law of the Foreign Relations of the US, American Law Institute, 
Restatement of the Law of the US, Vol. 2 (American Law Institute, Saint Paul/Minn., 
1987), 99; reproduced in Hohmann, Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 39 (1986 US Third 
Restatement of the Law). 
Tunis Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by the Arab League, 
Tunis, 13-14 October 1986; Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 
886: 7605; 16 EPL (1986), 218. 
Declaration on the Right to Development, UNGA, A/Res/41/128,4 December 1986, 
GAOR 41st Session, Supplement No. 53 (A/41/53); reproduced in Harris, Cases & 
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Materials, 690 (1986 Declaration on the Right to Development). General Principles 
Concerning Natural Resources and Environmental Interferences, adopted by WCED- 
EG, 1986; reproduced in full in Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, Environmental Protection and 
Sustainable Development (Graham & Trotman/Nijhoff, 1987), 25; Hohmann (ed. ), 
Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 40; summarised version 16 EPL (1986), 168 (1986 
WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development). 
1987 
Guideline on the Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment, UNEP 
Governing Council Dec. 14/25,17 January 1987; Burhenne & Jahnke, International 
Environmental Soft Law, 987: 4405; 17 EPL (1987), 36 (1987 UNEP Guideline on 
Environmental Impact Assessment). 
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
considered by the UN International Law Commission at its 39th Session; 1987 YbILC 
Vol. II Pt. 2,32 (1987 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses). 
Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous 
Wastes, adopted by UNEP Governing Council Dec. 14/30, Cairo, 17 June 1978; 
Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 7; draft of UNEP ad hoc Working Group 
in 16 EPL (1986), 31 (UNEP 1987 Cairo Guidelines on Hazardous Wastes). 
Mediterranean Action Plan, adopted by the fifth meeting of the Contracting Parties to 
the 1976 Convention on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea, Athens, 7-11 
September 1987; 18 EPL (1988), 38. 
Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond, adopted by UNEP, annexed 
to UNGA, A/Res/42/186,11 December 1987, GAOR 42nd Session, Supplement No. 
49 (A142/49); Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, I/C/11-12-87-b; Burhenne & Jahnke, 
International Environmental Soft Law, 987: 9205 ; 18 EPL (1988), 37. 
1988 
Guidelines on Intergenerational Equity, prepared by UNU Experts Group, Goa, 15 
February 1988; 18 EPL (1988), 190 (1988 Goa Guidelines on Intergenerational 
Equity). 
Regional Strategy for Environmental Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources 
in ECE Member Countries Covering the Period up to the Year 2000 and Beyond, UN 
Economic Commission for Europe, Dec. E(431), 5 March 1988; E/ECE/1171, 
ECE/ENVA/5; Röster & Sinuna 2nd, Vol. 1, I/F/08-05-79-a; Burhenne & Jahnke, 
International Environmental Soft Law, 988: 1805; 18 EPL (1988), 175 (1988 ECE 
Environmental Strategy to the Year 2000 and Beyond). 
Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts 
not Prohibited by International Law, considered by the UN International Law 
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Commission at its 40th Session, 1988 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 1,254 (First (1988) ILC Draft 
Articles on International Liability). 
Resolution on the Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of 
Mankind, UNGA, A/Res. /43/53,6 December 1988, GAOR 43rd Session, Supplement 
No. 49 (A/43/49); Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 4, VI/C/06-12-88; 28 ILM (1989), 1326 
(1988 Resolution Res. /43/53, on the Protection of Global Climate for Present and 
Future Generations of Mankind). 
Regional Strategy for Environmental Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources 
in ECE Member Countries Covering the Period up the Year 2000 and Beyond, ECE 
Dec. E(431); 18 EPL (1988)175 (1988 Regional Strategy for Environmental 
Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources in ECE Member Countries 
Covering the Period up the Year 2000 and Beyond). 
1989 
Cooperation in the Field of the Economics of Science and Technology and the 
Environment, extracts from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
1989 Concluding Document of the Third Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 15 January 1989; 
Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 989: 0505; 28 ILM (1989), 
527; relevant extracts in 19 EPL (1989), 31 (1989 Vienna Concluding Document of 
CSCE Third Follow-up Meeting, Section on Cooperation in the Field of the 
Economics of Science and Technology and the Environment). 
Recommendation Concerning an Environmental Checklist for Development Assistance, 
OECD Council Recommendation C(89)2,22 February 1989; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 
1, I/F/22-02-89; 28 ILM (1989), 1314 (OECD Recommend. C(89)2 Concerning an 
Environmental Checklist for Development Assistance). 
Hague Declaration on the Environment, adopted by the Hague Summit on Global 
Environmental Issues, the Hague, 11 March 1989; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 4, 
VI/B/1 1-03-89; 28ILAI(1989), 1308; 19 EPL (1989), 78. 
Brasilia Declaration on the Environment, adopted by the Latin American and Caribbean 
Summit, Brasilia, 31 March 1989; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, Iß/31-03-89; 28 ILM 
(1989), 1311; 19 EPL (1989), 135. 
Recommendation on Water Resource Management Policies: Integration, Demand 
Management, and Groundwater Protection, OECD Council Recommendation C(89)12, 
31 March 1989; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 30e (OECD 
Recommend. C(89)12, on Water Resource Management Policies). 
Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts 
not Prohibited by International Law, considered by the UN International Law 
Commission at its 41st Session, 1989 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 1,134 (1989 Revised Draft 
Articles on International Liability). 
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Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
adopted by the UN International Law Commission at its 41st Session; 1988 YbILC 
(1988) Vol. II Pt. 2,35 (1988 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of the Non- 
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses). 
Amazon Declaration, adopted by Amazon Basin States, Manaus, 6 May 1989; Röster 
& Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, I/B/06-05-89; 28 ILM (1989) 1303. 
Declaration on Sustainable Development in Africa, adopted by the First African 
Regional Conference on Sustainable Development in Africa, Kampala, 12-16 June 1989; 
Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, I/B/16-06-89-b; Burhenne & Jahnke, International 
Environmental SoftLaw, 989: 4505; 19 EPL (1989), 222 (1989 Kampala Declaration 
on Sustainable Development in Africa). 
Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution, OECD Council 
Recommend. adopted at its 712th Session, 7 July 1989; Burhenne & Jahnke, 
International Environmental Soft Law, 989 : 5105; 28 ILM (1989), 1320; 19 EPL (1989), 1984. 
Paris Economic Declaration, issued by the Economic Summit of the Arch of the Seven 
Major Industrialised Democracies, Paris, 16 July 1989; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, 
I/B/16-07-89; 28ILM(1989), 1293; section on the environment in 19 EPL (1989), 183 (1989 Paris Economic Declaration of the G7). 
Belgrade Declaration, adopted by the 9th Conference of the Heads of State or 
Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Statement on the Environment, 7 September 
1989; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, UB/07-09-89 (1989 Belgrade Declaration of the 
G77). 
Langkawi Declaration on Environment, adopted by Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting, Langkawi, 21 October 1989; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, I/B/21- 
10-89; Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental SoftLaw, 989: 7805; Churchill 
& Freestone, International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham & 
Trotman/Nijhoff, 1991), 311; 5 American University JIL & Policy (1990), 589 (1989 
Langkawi Declaration of the Commonwealth Heads of Governments). 
Recommendations on the Protection of the Environment, drafted at the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Meeting on the Protection of the Environment, 
Sofia, 16 October 
- 
31 December 1989; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, Iß/03-11-89; 20 
EPL (1990), 107 (1989 Sofia Recommendations on the Protection of the 
Environment). 
Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, adopted by the Ministerial 
Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, 5-7 November 1989, 
Noordwijk; 19 EPL (1989) 229; 5 American University JIL & Policy (1990), 592 (1989 
Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change). 
xlviii Relevant Declarations & Resolutions 
Draft American Declaration on the Environment, prepared by the Inter-American 
Juridical Committee, Doc. CJI/Res. II-2/89; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vo1.1, 
Doc. 40a. 
Resolution on United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UNGA 
Res. A/44/228,22 December 1989, GAOR 44th Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/44/49) 
(1989 Resolution 44/228, on United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development). 
Resolution on International Cooperation in the Field of the Environment, UNGA Res. 
A144/229,22 December 1989, GAOR 44th Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/44/49) 
(1989 Resolution 44/229, on International Cooperation in the Field of the 
Environment). 
1990 
Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts 
not Prohibited by International Law, considered by the UN International Law 
Commission at its 42nd Session, 1990 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 1,105 (1990 ILC Draft 
Articles on International Liability). 
Conclusion of the Siena Forum on International Law of the Environment, Siena, 21 
April 1990; 20 EPL (1990), 232; 1 YbIEL (1990), 696. 
Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development and Bergen Joint Agenda 
for Action, adopted at UN Economic Commission for Europe Regional Conference on 
`Action for a Common Future', Bergen, 14-16 May 1990; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 1, 
I/B/16-05-90; Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 
- 
990 : 3605 
and 3 705; 20 EPL (1990), 100; 1 YbIEL (1990), 429. 
Code of Conduct on ý Accidental Pollution of Transboundary Inland Waters, UN 
Economic Commission for Europe Dec. C(45), 1 June 1990; Burhenne & Jahnke, 
International Environmental Soft Law, 990 : 4105 (1990 ECE Code of Conduct on 
Accidental Pollution of Transboundary Inland Waters). 
Kuala Lumpur Accord on Environment and Development, issued at the Fourth ASEAN 
Meeting for Ministers for the Environment, Kuala Lumpur, 19 June 1990; 21 EPL 
(1991), 267. 
Formulation of a European Charter on Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Development, Council of Europe, Recommend. 1130,28 September 1990; Röster & 
Sinuna 2nd, Vol. 1, I/G/28-09-90-a; 1 Yb1EL (1990), 484; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic 
Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 40d. 
Draft European Conservation Strategy, Council of Europe, Recommendation adopted at 
the Sixth of the European Environment Ministers of the 23 Member Countries of the 
Council of Europe, Brussels, 11-12 October 1990; Röster & Simma 2nd, Vol. 4, 
VI/B/07-11-89; 20 EPL (1990), 243 (1990 Draft European Conservation Strategy). 
xlix Relevant Declarations & Resolutions 
Bangkok Ministerial Declaration on Environmentally Sound and Sustainable 
Development in Asia and the Pacific, adopted by Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and Pacific, Bangkok, 15-16 October 1990; reproduced in Hohmann (ed. ), Basic 
Documents Vol. I, Doc. 38a (1990 Bangkok Ministerial Declaration on 
Sustainable Development). 
Ministerial Declaration, issued by the Second World Climate Conference, Geneva, 29 
October-7 November 1990; Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 
990: 8405; 20 EPL (1990), 220; 1 KIEL (1990), 473. 
International Development Strategy for the Fourth United Nations Development 
Decade, UNGA, A/Res/45/199,21 December 1990, GAOR 45th Session, Supplement 
No. 49 (A/45/49) (1990 Strategy for the Fourth Development Decade). 
1991 
Use of Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy, OECD Council Recommend. 
C(90)177,31 January 1991; Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 
991: 0916; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 25d. 
Bamako Commitment on Environment and Development, made by the Ministers of the 
Environment of the Member States of the Organization of African Unity, Bamako, 28- 
30 January 1991; 21 EPL (1991), 99. 
Recommendation on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, OECD Council 
Recommend. C(90)164,31 January 1991; Burhenne & Jahnke, International 
Environmental Soft Law, 991 : 0905; Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 30f, 
21 EPL (1991), 91 (OECD Recommend. C(90)164, on Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control). 
Tlatelolco Platform on Environment and Development, adopted by the Regional 
Preparatory Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean ECLAC, Mexico City, 4-7 
March 1991; Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental SoftLaw, 991 : 1805; 21 
EPL (1991), 181; Hohmann, Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 38b. 
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
adopted by the UN International Law Commission at its 43rd Session; 1991 YbILC 
(1991) Vol. II Pt. 2,66; Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 991 
3205 (1991 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses). 
Beijing Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted at the 
Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environment and Development, 
Beijing, 19 June 1991; Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 991 
4605; 21 EPL (1991) 267. 
. 
The Hague Recommendations issued by the International Conference on Environmental 
Law, The Hague, 16 August 1991; relevant extracts in 21 EPL (1991), 276) 
Relevant Declarations & Resolutions 
Draft Charter on Environmental Rights and Obligations, adopted at the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe Experts Meeting, Oslo, 29-31 October 1990, and presented to 
UN Economic Commission for Europe Senior Advise in 1991; 21 EPL (1991), 81; 
Hohmann (ed. ), Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Doc. 40b (1991 ECE Draft Charter on 
Environmental Rights and Obligations). 
Environmental Policy Statement, issued by OECD Ministers of Environment and 
Development Cooperation, 3 November 1991, Paris; Burhenne & Jahnke, International 
Environmental Soft Law, 991: 9085 (1991 OECD Environmental Policy Statement). 
Good Practice For Country Environmental Surveys and Strategies, endorsed by OECD 
Ministers of Environment and Development Cooperation, OECD/GD(91)199, Paris, 3 
December 1991; Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 991 : 9005 
(1991 OECD Guidelines on Environment and Aid). 
Good Practice For Country Environmental Impact Assessment of Development 
Projects, endorsed by OECD Ministers of Environment and Development Cooperation, 
OECD/GD(91)200, Paris, 3 December 1991; Burhenne & Jahnke, International 
Environmental Soft Law, 991 : 9015 (1991 OECD Guidelines on Environmental 
Impact Assessment). 
1992 
Declaration on Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation, issued at Second Ministerial 
Conference on Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation on the Environment in the 
Mediterranean Basin, Cairo, 28-30 April 1992; 22 EPL (1992), 193. 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development and attached Agenda 21, Rio de Janeiro, 
3-4 June 1992, A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. 1 (Vol. I); Burhenne & Jahnke, International 
Environmental Soft Law, 992: 4405 to 4979; 31 ILM(1992), 876; 3 YbIEL (1992), 835 
(1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development & 1992 Agenda 21). 
Non-Legally-Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for Global Consensus on the 
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Type of Forests, Rio de 
Janeiro, June 13,1992, A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. I (Vol.! ); Burhenne & Jahnke, 
International Environmental Soft Law, 992: 4435; 31 ILM(1992), 882; 3 YbIEL (1992), 
830 (1992 Forestry Principles). 
Decision VIII on the Environment, taken at the Summit of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, 10 July 1992; 31 ILM (1992), 1416 (1992 CSCE 
Decision VIIIon the Environment). 
Resolution establishing the Commission on Sustainable' Development, UNGA 
A/Res. /47/191,22 December 1992; Birnie & Boyle, Basic Documents on International 
Law and the Environment, 658. 
li Relevant Declarations & Resolutions 
1993 
Lucerne Declaration, issued by the Ministers of the Environment of the Region of UN 
Economic Commission for Europe and the Member of the Commission of the European 
Communities Responsible for the Environment, Lucerne, 30 April 1993; Burhenne & 
Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 993 : 3205; 23 EPL (1993), 185 (1993 
ECE Lucerne Declaration). 
Declaration on Human Rights and attached and Programme of Action, adopted by the 
World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 25 June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23; 
32 ILM (1993), 1661 (1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, and Vienna 
Programme of Action). 
Delhi Declaration on Forests, adopted by the First Ministerial Conference of the 
Forestry Forum for Developing Countries, New Delhi, 1-3 September 1993; Burhenne 
& Jahnke, International Environmental SoftLaw, 993 : 6605; 24 EPL (1994), 201. 
European Energy Charter, concluding document of the European 
- 
Energy Charter 
Conference, the Hague, 16-17 December 1991. 
1994 
Ministerial Declaration on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, adopted at a Special Session of the Executive Body for the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution, 13-14 June 1994; Burhenne & Jahnke, International 
Environmental Soft Law, 993: 4505. 
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
adopted by the UN International Law Commission at its 46th Session, 24 June 1994; 
Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 994: 4705; 5 YbIEL (1994), 
891; 24 EPL (1994), 335 (1994 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of the Non- 
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses). 
Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by UN 
Sub-Commission on the Prevention and Protection of Minorities, 26 August 1994; 34 
ILM (1995), 541. 
Tunis Declaration for Sustainable Development in the Mediterranean Basin, adopted by 
the Conference `Med 21' on Sustainable Development in the Mediterranean, held in 
Tunis, on 1 November 1994; the full text of the Declaration is reproduced in 4 ICCOPS 
Newsletter (1995), at 7. 
Policy Statement on Sustainable Development, issued by Ministers of Environment and Development Co-operation, Heads of Agencies and a Commissioner of the E. C., OECD 
Paris, 2-3 December 1994; 22 EPL (1995), 56. 
Iii Relevant Declarations & Resolutions 
Budapest Declaration on a Genuine Partnership on a New Era, issued by the Summit of 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Budapest, 6 December 1994; 34 
ILM(1995), 767 (1994 CSCE Budapest Summit Declaration). 
Miami Declaration of Principles, Partnership for Development and Prosperity: 
Democracy, Free Trade an Sustainable Development in the Americas, adopted at the 
Summit of the Americas, Miami, 11 December 1994; 34 ILM (1995), 810; 6 Department 
ofStateDispatch (1995), Suppl. 2 (1994 Miami Declaration of Principles). 
1995 
Declaration for Social Development, and attached Programme of Action, adopted by the 
World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, 6-12 March 1995, UN 
Doc. A/CONF. 166/9; extracts in 36/1 Indian JIL (1996), 104 (1995 Copenhagen 
Declaration/Programme for Social Development). 
Declaration on the Sustainable Development in Mediterranean, Tunis, 22 April 1995; 
Burhenne & Robinson (eds. ), International Protection of the Environment: Conservation 
in Sustainable Development, booklet 22-04-95/1; 4 ICCOPS Newsletter (1995), 7 (1994 
Declaration of Tunis on the Sustainable Development of the Mediterranean). 
Declaration for the Advancement of Women, and attached Platform for Action, adopted 
by the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 15 September 1995, UN 
Doc. A/CONF. 177/20; 35 ILM (1996), 401 (1995 Beijing Declaration/Platform for 
Action for the Advancement of Women). 
Guidelines on Access to Environmental Information and Public Participation in 
Environmental Decision-Making, drafted by ECE Working Group of Senior Officials, at 
the Ministerial Conference on Environment for Europe, Sofia, Bulgaria, 23-25 October 
1995; Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 995: 8005. 
Sofia Declaration, issued by the Ministers of the Environment of the Region of UN 
Economic Commission for Europe and the Member of the Commission of the European 
Communities Responsible for the Environment, Sofia, 23-25 October 1995; Burhenne & 
Jahnke, International Environmental SoftLaw, 995: 8011. 
Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land- 
based Activities, adopted by an Intergovernmental Conference, Washington, D. C., 23 
October-3 November 1995; Burhenne & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, 
995: 8231. 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries Management, drafted by the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation, version as to the 1 November 1995; Burhenne & Jahnke, 
International Environmental Soft Law, 995 : 8205. 
IUCN Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, prepared by the 
Commission on Environmental Law of the IUCN in co-operation with the International 
Council of Environmental Law, Environmental Policy and Law Paper No 31 (IUCN, 
Gland, Switzerland, 1995). 
liii Relevant Declarations & Resolutions 
1996 
Environment Policy Communique, issued by OECD, February 1996; extracts in 26 EPL 
(1996), 130. 
Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts 
not Prohibited by International Law, considered by the UN International Law 
Commission at its 48th Session; in UNGA, Report of the ILC on Its Work of its 48th 
Session (May 6-July 26,1996), GAOR Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/51/10), 238 (1996 ILC Draft Articles on International Liability). 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, considered by the UN International Law 
Commission at its 48th Session; in UNGA, Report of the ILC on Its Work of its 48th 
Session (May 6-July 26,1996), GAOR Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/51/10), 125; 37 ILM (1998), 442 (1996 ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility). 
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1. Introduction 
When a topic of research in the area of international environmental law was chosen, 
over three years ago, sustainable development imposed itself quite naturally. 
Increasingly frequently referred to both in international environmental law instruments 
and in the doctrine, sustainable development has nonetheless remained poorly 
developed in terms of its meaning and practical implications('). The point has been 
(1) Reference to sustainable development in international environmental law instruments are worded in 
generic terms, without any further indication being given as to an interpretation or understanding of the 
expression; see infra 2/i. Conceptual Framework. In the doctrine, the various books and contributions 
devoted to sustainable development have cautiously avoided to elaborate the expression in depth 
-other 
than merely referring to the now classic work of the World Commission on Sustainable Development 
(see infra 3/iii. Sustainable Development)-, and focus instead on other (related) developments of 
international environmental law contemporaneous to the introduction of sustainable development in the 
international legal order; see for instance Campiglio et al. (eds. ), The Environment after Rio, 
International Law and Economics (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994); Canrado Trindade, (ed. ), Human Rights, Sustainable Development and Environment (Instituto Interamericano de Desarrollo, 
1995); Ginther et al. (eds. ), Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995); 
Lang (ed. ), Sustainable Development and International Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus NijholZ 
1995); Saunders (ed. ), The Legal Challenge of Sustainable Development, Essays from the Fourth Institute Conference on Natural Resources Law, (Canadian Institute of Resource Law, 1990); UNEP (ed. ), UNEP's New Way Forward : Environmental Law and Sustainable (UNEP, 1995). See also Bates, 
`The Legal Implications of Sustainable Development', 108 Science of the Total Environment (1991), 97; (continued) 
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reached where it is a commonly used expression, yet an extremely ill-defined expression 
with no clear normative implications 
-if any- attached thereto. The lack of consistency 
in the qualification of sustainable development is but an illustration of the state of 
confusion surrounding the expression(2). 
The original ambition of the thesis was to shed some light on a poorly understood 
expression at the heart of contemporaneous international law of the environment. The 
proposed research soon proved as vain as Donnelly's search for a'non-existent black cat 
in a dark room on a moonless night'(3). Sustainable development has not been introduced 
into international environmental law as a well defined expression, associated with 
specific implications susceptible of strict application and enforcement. Accordingly any 
specific international legal construction of sustainable development would necessarily be 
based on assumptions and hypotheses, and might fail to reflect reality. In fact, 
international law cannot define 'sustainable development'; it can but reflect how 
sustainable development was integrated, more particularily into the area of the 
environment, and what was the impact of this notion on its evolution(4). 
Abandoning the idea of a deduction of the meaning and implications of sustainable 
development, we opted finally for a more inductive approach, and tried to identify 
certain facets and some limits of sustainable development from the detailed study of 
arbitrarily selected principles of international environmental law often associated with 
Brundtland, 'Sustainable Development: the Challenge Ahead', in Stokke (ed. ), Sustainable Development 
(Frank Cass, 1991), 32; Epiney & Scheyli, 'Le concept de developpement durable en droit international 
public', 7 Schweizerisches Zeitschrift fier Internationales & Europäisches Recht (1997), 247; Hoelting, 
'After Rio: The Sustainable Development Concept Following the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development', 24 Georgia JICL (1994), 117; Hohmann, 'Environmental Implications 
of the Principle of Sustainable Development and their Realization in International Law', in Chowdhury et 
al. (eds. ), The Right to Development in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), Chap. 3.4; Jositsch, 
'Das Konzept der nachhaltigen Entwicklung (Sustainable Development) im Völkerrecht und seine 
innerstaatliche Umsetzung', 11 Umweltrecht in der Praxis (1997), 93; Schrader, 'Sustainable 
Development 
- 
Ausgleich zwischen Umwelt und Entwicklung als Gestaltungsaufgabe der Staaten', 34 
AVR (1996), 251; Yusuf, `International Law and Sustainable Development : The Convention on 
Biological Diversity', 2 African YbIL (1994), 109. Other scholarly contributions follow a similar 
approach as that taken in this thesis, and decompose sustainable development into a series of basic 
principles of law, without offering a really global perspective of sustainable development as such; 
Dommen, Fair Principles for Sustainable Development (Edward Elgar, for UNCTAD, 1993); Hossain, 
'Evolving Principles of Sustainable Development and Good Governance', in Ginther et al. (eds. ), 
Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), Chap. 1; Sands, 'International 
Law in the Field of Sustainable Development', 65 British YbIL (1994), 303. 
(2) See infra 2/i. Conceptual Framework. 
(3) Donnelly, 'In Search of the Unicorn : The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development', 
15 California Western ILJ (1985), 473. 
(4) Boyle, 'Economic Growth and Protection of the Environment: the Impact of International Law and 
Policy', in Boyle (ed. ), Environmental Regulation and Economic Growth, (Clarendon, 1994), Chap. 8, 
at 179. 
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sustainable development(s). Some of them are classic principles of international 
environmental law(6), others have been introduced more recently and developed 
essentially in relation to sustainable development(7). 
The final goal of the thesis is to come out with a partial picture of what sustainable 
development means (or does not mean) in the restricted context of international 
environmental law. To do so, it will try to identify in which respect and how far 
sustainable development has influenced and has been reflected in the evolution of some 
selected principles. Each principles is thus considered in an evolutionary perspective, 
from the time of its inception to the time of its 'association' to sustainable development. 
2. General Framework of Research 
i. Conceptual Framework 
Before embarking on the subject matter of the thesis, a number of practical and 
theoretical points that have shaped both the form and the content of the research, or 
influenced the general approach, call for some remarks. 
1) First, it is important to underline that sustainable development was not 
originally embedded in law, nor was it embedded in environmental discourse(s); it 
initially emerged in the politico-economic discourse(9) and was subsequently applied to, 
(5) On the rationale behind the principles selected, see infra 2/ii. Approach and Methodology; on the 
legal significance of these principles, infra 2/i. Conceptual Framework. 
(6) See Chap. 2, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, and Chap. 3, Prevention and 
Precautionary Principles. 
(7) See Chap. 4, Intergenerational Equity, and to a certain extent, Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership, and 
Chap. 6, Principle Pertaining to Public Participation. 
(8) Although it is sometimes suggested that the notion of 'sustainable utilisation' was first employed by 
scientists of forestry as early as in the second part of the eighteenth century; Beyerlin, The Concept of 
Sustainable Development', in Wolfrum (ed. ), Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic 
Mechanisms as Viable Means ? (Springer, 1996), 95, at 96 n. 4; Jositsch, supra n. 1, at 96. 
(9) Infra 3. Evolving Perspective of Sustainable Development. For an economic perspective of 
sustainable development, consult for instance Munasinghe, Environmental Economics and Sustainable 
Development, World Bank Environment Paper No. 3 (World Bank, 1994); Pearce & Warford, World 
Without End, Economics, Environment and Sustainable Development (The World Bank, 1993); Pearce 
et al., Sustainable Development: Economics and Environment in the Third World (E. Elgar, 1990); see 
also Dubourg & Pearce, 'Paradigms for Environmental Choices: Sustainability versus Optimality, in 
Faucheux et al. (eds. ), Models of Sustainable Development, New Horizons in Environmental Economics (Edward Elgar/Brookfield, 1996), Chap. 2; Pearce, 'An Economic Perspective on Sustainable 
Development', 2 Development, Journal of SID (1989), 17; see also more briefly Hammond, 'Is There 
Anything New in the Concept of Sustainable Development 7', in Campiglio, et al. (eds. ), The 
Environment after Rio, International Law and Economics (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), Chap. 13. For a comparison of the understanding of sustainable development between economists and 
ecologists, see Tisdell, 'Sustainable Development: Differing Perspectives of Ecologists and Economists, (continued) 
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and developed in the most diverse legal and non legal(10) matters. The complexity of 
sustainable development is more particularily epitomised by the variety of issues 
pertaining to social development and human welfare, to economics, politics, as much as 
to environmental protection, considered under the set 'international agenda to promote 
sustainable development in the twenty-first century'(11). In the legal context, it was 
more particularly used with respect to economic development, human rights and social 
development(12), and the environment(13); the assumption must be abandoned however, 
that sustainable development is exclusively about the environment. Even though the 
various dimensions are closely interrelated and the core meaning of sustainable 
development remains invariably the same, viz. continuity and self-perpetuation(14), 
sustainable development still means different things in different contexts(15). 
This thesis contemplates essentially the environmental dimension of sustainable 
development, under the restrictive angle of international environmental law. The author 
and Relevance to LDCs', 16 World Development (1988), 373. On a general conception of sustainable 
development in environmental politics, see Carley, & Christie, Managing Sustainable Development 
(Earthscan, 1994); Dobson, Green Political Thought (Routledge, 1990), Chap. 3; and selected writings 
in Kirkby, et al. (eds. ), The Earthscan Reader in Sustainable Development (Earthscan, 1995). For more 
critical perspective, see authors infra n. 37. See also bibliography of Marien, 'Environmental Problems 
and Sustainable Futures, Major Literature from WCED to UNCED', 24 Future (1992). 
(10) Such as architecture, see for instance Popovic et al., 'Sustainable Roundwood Reciprocal Frame 'RF 
Structures', in Emmitt (ed. ), Detail Design In Architecture, Proceedings of the International Conference 
held in North Hampton, 1996 (BRC, 1996), 175; geography, see for instance Manshard, `New Global 
Environment Programmes and Sustainable Development. A Geographical Perspective', 20 Geographical 
Journal (1990), 151. Sustainable development has also a certain currency in relation to health, as 
illustrated by a the paper delivered by B. S. Polla, from Paris V and Geneva University, on Le 
developpement durable et la sante', at the seminar organised by the Centre d'Ecologie Humaine et des 
Sciences de l'Environnement/Geneva University, Developpement durable, First Part, Geneva, 12-13 
March 1998. 
(11) 1992 Agenda 21, Para. 1.6. 
(12) See most notably Cancado Trindade, Relations Between Sustainable Development and Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Recent Developments', in Al-Nauimi & Meese (eds. ), International Legal 
Issues Arising Under the Decade of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 1051; Singh, 
'Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law', in De Waart et al. (ed. ), International 
Law and Development (Martinus Nijhoü; 1988), Chap. 1.1. 
(13) ILA sub-division of its International Committee on Legal Effects of Sustainable Development into 
three sub-committees respectively on sustainable development and the environment, Sustainable 
Development and Good Governance (that includes human rights) and sustainable development and 
international economic order, epitomises particularly clearly the complexity of sustainable development 
and its relevance in the area identified in the text; see ILA, Report of the sixty-sixth Conference, Buenos 
Aires, 1994,111, at 113. See also McGoldrick, 'Sustainable Development and Human Rights : An 
Integrated Conception', 45 ICLQ (1996), 796, for a particularly clear, temple-like presentation of the 
three main legal dimensions of sustainable development and their close inter-relation. 
(14) See definitions infra. 
(15) Saunders, (ed. ), The Legal Challenge of Sustainable Development, Essays from the Fourth Institute 
Conference on Natural Resources Law (Canadian Institute of Resource Law, 1990), Part. I. 
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is well aware of the paradox, perhaps even the contradiction of isolating on one 
dimension only of a notion which is essentially about integration and globalisation. Such 
focus, needless to say, was commanded by pure reason of manageability of the research. 
Sustainable development is indeed at the cross-road of science, politics, economics 
and law; in law, it straddles human rights law, economic law and environmental law. 
Sustainable development confronts any potential researcher with a complex web of 
endless interrelations. In order not to go astray in our study of sustainable development, 
it seemed imperative to narrow down our scope as much as possible. Unavoidable 
references are made throughout the thesis to the economic dimension of sustainable 
development in relation to the specific needs of developing States with respect to 
environmental protection, and are elaborated upon only insofar as required for a clear 
evaluation and understanding of the environmental dimension(16). Certain aspects of the 
human rights dimension are touched upon in the chapter addressing the public 
participation in sustainable development(17). This focus has both conditioned the 
structure of the thesis and influenced the selection of the bibliography. 
It is also important to bear in mind that the conclusions reached in this research 
apply only to this specific dimension viewed under this specific perspective, and do not 
necessarily apply by analogy to the other dimensions(18). It is probable that completely 
different conclusions would have been reached under a different perspective. To human 
rights lawyers for instance, sustainable development might be perceived as promising, 
insofar as it offers an opportunity to expand a new dimension of classic human rights, 
or to invoke classic human rights in relation to environmental pollution and degradation. 
Lawyers more particularly concerned with economic development and trade issues 
might well find the reference to sustainable development in recent trade instruments as a 
worrying intrusion of environmental values into economic relations and a potential new 
threat to free trade. 
Again for pure reasons of manageability of the work, the major focus within the 
environmental dimension was put upon the substantive, as opposed to the 'institutional' 
dimension of sustainable development. It was rightly underlined however, that «the legal 
implications of sustainable development are as much about process and institutional 
arrangements, as they are about substantive norms»(19). Without prejudice to the 
(16) Most particularly Chap. 2,3 and 5. 
(17) Infra Chap. 6. 
(18)This remark concerns more particularity to the conclusions reached under Chap. 6.4 and 6.5. 
(19) 
'Sustainable Development: the Challenge to International Law', Report of A Consultation Convened by the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development with the support of the Ford (continued) 
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importance of the institutional dimension, the thesis concentrates on the substantive 
norms, and shall refer to institutional implications only when the coherence of the thesis 
requires it(20). 
2) Sustainable development is designated in the doctrine and in international 
environmental law instruments alternatively, and with little consistency, inter alia, in 
terms of strategy(21), approach(22), policy(23>, goal(24), objective or'meta-objective'(25). 
Foundation, St. George's House, Windsor Castle, England, 27-29 April 1993; reproduced in 2 RECIEL 
(1993), r. 1, at r. 6. 
(20) Specifically on the institutional dimensions of sustainable development, see for instance Report 
supra n. 19, r. 6 et sequ.; Handl, 'Controlling Implementation of and Compliance with International 
Environmental Commitments: The Rocky Road from Rio', 5 Colorado JIELP (1994), 305, at 317 et 
sequ.; Jordan, 'The International Organisational Machinery for Sustainable Development: Rio and the 
Road Beyond', Centre for Social and Economic Research of the Global Environment Working Paper 93- 
11, University of East Anglia, Norwich, 1993; Tinker, 'Making UNCED Work: Building the Legal and 
Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development at the Earth Summit and Beyond', United Nations 
Association of the United States of America Occasional Paper No. 4, UNA-USA, 1992; see also Lang 
(ed. ), Sustainable Development and International Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 
Part IlI; Sands, 'International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development', 65 British YbIL (1994), 
303, at 348 et sequ. 
(21) 1994 Tropical Timber International Agreement, preambularParas. 2 and 5; 1995 Miami Declaration 
of Principles. 
(22) 1994 Desertification Convention, Art. 9. 
(23) 1994 Planning and Sustainable Development Alpine Protocol, Art. 3. 
(24) 1992 EU Treaty, Art. 2; 1993 North American Agreement of Environmental Cooperation, 
preambularPara. 1 and Art. 1(b); 1994 Desertification Convention, preambular Para. 8 and Art. 2; 1994 
Planning and Sustainable Development Alpine Protocol, Arts. 1 and 8(1); 1994 Danube River 
Convention, Arts. 2 and 6; 1976/95 Barcelona Convention on Mediterranean Sea, Art. 4(2); 1994 
Declaration of Tunis on the Sustainable Development of the Mediterranean, Para. 20; 1994 WTO 
Agreement, preambular Para. 1. See also 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable 
Development, Para. 10; 1991 Bamako Commitment on Environment and Development, preambular 
Para. 10; 1992 Forestry Principles, Preamble (b); Statement of Conclusions of the intermediate 
Ministerial Meetings on the Protection of the North Sea, Bergen, March 1997, Princ. 3.1 and 3.2; the 
Statement of Conclusions is posted on the North Sea Conference website @ 
<http: //odin. dep. no/md/publ/conf/soc. html>. The 1986 EC Treaty refers to the sustainable economic and 
social development of developing countries without referring to the environment however. In the doctrine, 
see Handl, 'Environmental Security and Global Change', in Lang et al. (eds. ), Environmental Protection 
and International Law (Graham& Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), Chap. 2; Hoelting, supra n. 1, at 
133; McGoldrick, ibid. supra n. 13; Simon, 'Sustainable Development: Theoretical Goal Construct of 
Attainable Goal ? ', 16 Environmental Conservation (1989), 41; Report of A Consultation Convened by 
the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, supra n. 19, at r. 6. Rest refers to 
sustainable development as a 'Zielbegriff, thus combining the idea of goal (Ziel) and concept (Begrill); 
'Die rechtliche Umsetzung der Rio-Vorgaben in der Staatenpraxis', 34 AVR (1996), 145, at 148. 
(25) Ebbesson, Compatibility of International and National Environmental Law (Kluwer Law International, 1996), at 233. 
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Other frequent qualifications of sustainable development include that of a challenge(26), 
requirement(27), constraint(28), concept(29), framework(30), or process(31). 
Sustainable development is also labelled as an ethic(32), an ideal(33) or ideology(34), a 
policy paradigm(35), a myth(36), an inoperable self-contradictory theoretical 
(26) 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, Para. 6; Brundtland, 'Sustainable 
Development: the Challenge Ahead', in Stokke (ed. ), Sustainable Development (Frank Cass, London, 
1991), 32; Stokke, 'Sustainable Development: A Multi-Faceted Challenge', in Stokke (ed. ), ibid., 8. 
(27) 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Art. 10(c). 
(28) Handl, ibid. supra n. 24. 
(29) 1989 Resolution 44/229, on International Cooperation in the Field of the Environment, Para. 11; 
1990 The Hague Ministerial Declaration on the North Sea, Preamble, reproduced in are reproduced in 
Freestone & Ijlstra (eds. ), The North Sea; Basic Legal Documents on Regional Environmental Co- 
operation (Graham& Trotman/Martinus Nijhog 1991); E/CN. 17/1995/21,30 March 1995, § 2. In the 
doctrine, see Beck, Die Differenzierung von Rechtsplichten in den Beziehungen zwischen Industrie- und 
Entwicklungsländern. Eine völkerrechtliche Untersuchung für die Bereiche des internationalen 
WirtschaJts-, Arbeits- und Umweltrechts (Peter Lang, 1994), at 209; Beyerlin, supra n. 8; Birnie & 
Boyle, 123; Boer, 'Implementation of International Sustainability Imperatives at the National Level', in 
Ginther et al. (eds. ), Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Martinus Nijhof 1995), Chap. 8; 
Epiney, `Das "Verbot erheblicher grenzüberschreitender Umweltbeeinträchtigungen" : Relikt oder 
konkretisierungsfähige Grundnorm? ', 33 AYR (1995), 309, at 351; Epiney & Scheyli, supra n. 1; 
Hammond, supra n. 9; Hoelting, supra n. 1; see Hossain, 'Evolving Principles of Sustainable 
Development and Good Governance', in Ginther et al. (eds. ), Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance (Martinus Nijhof 1995), Chap. 1; Mann, 'The Rio Declaration', in `Issues Relating to the 
1992 Brazil Conference on the Environment', 86 ASIL Proc. (1992), 401, at 405 et sequ.; Matsui, 'The 
Road to Sustainable Development: Evolution of the Concept of Development in the UN', in Ginther et 
al. (eds. ), ibid., Chap. 3; Sands, Principles, Vol. I, 199, and 'International Law in the Field of 
Sustainable Development', 65 British YbIL (1994), 303; Pallemaerts, 'La Conference de Rio: Grandeur 
ou decadence du droit international de 1'environnement ? ', 28 RBDI (1995), 175, at 221; Primrosch, 'The 
Spirit of Sustainable Development within Authoritative Decision-Making Processes', 47 Austrian JPIL 
(1994), 81; Salter, 'Environment, Sustainable Development and the Responsibilities of the Legal 
Profession', 16 International Legal Practitioner (1991), 75; Saunders, 'The Path to Sustainable 
Development: A Role for Law', in Saunders (eds. ), The Legal Challenge of Sustainable Development, 
Essays from the Fourth Institute Conference on Natural Resources Law (Canadian Institute of Resource 
Law, 1990), 1; Tisdell, 'Sustainable Development: Differing Perspectives of Ecologists and Economists, 
and Relevance to LDCs', 16 World Development (1988), 373, at 375. 
(30) 1994 Desertification Convention, preambularPara. 10 and Art. 5(b). See also WCED, Our Common 
Future (Oxford University Press, 1987), at 40. 
(31) 1994 Tropical Timber International Agreement, Art. 1(c); 1976/95 Barcelona Convention on 
Mediterranean Sea, preambularPara. 7; see also McGoldrick, ibid supra n. 13. 
(32) Davidson & Barns, `The Earth Summit and the Ethics of Sustainable Development', I Current 
Affairs Bulletin (1992), 4. 
(33) Munn, 'Toward Sustainable Development', 26 Atmospheric Environment (1992), 2725; Primrosch, 
'Das Vorsorgeprinzip im internationalen Umweltrecht', 51 ZÖR (1996), 227, at 236. 
(34) Report of A Consultation Convened by the Foundation for International Environmental Law and 
Development, supra n. 19, at r. 6. 
(35) Handl, supra n. 24, at 43; Robinson, 'Comparative Environmental Law: Evaluating How Legal 
Systems Address "Sustainable Development"', 27 EPL (1997), 338, at 339; in a more economic 
perspective, see also Dubourg & Pearce, Paradigms for Environmental Choices: Sustainability versus (continued) 
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construction(37), a'simplistic formula'(38), a'catchphrase'(39), a slogan(40) or a model(41), 
or simply a 'new era'(42). More frequently, sustainable development is referred to as a 
mere issue(43), or a matter of interest(44), concem(45) or necessity(46). Sometimes 
regarded as a purely political umbrella(47), it is more often assimilated to an emerging(48), 
founding(49) or customary(50) legal principle, or simply to a legal principle(51) or 
Optimality', in Faucheux et al. (eds. ), Models of Sustainable Development, New Horizons in 
Environmental Economics (Edward Elgar & Brookfield, 1996), Chap. 2. 
(36) Lipschutz, 'Wasn't the Future Wonderful? Resources, the Environment and the Emerging Myth of 
Global Sustainable Development', 2 Colorado JJELP (1991), 35. 
(37) Dovers & Handmer, 'Contradictions in Sustainability', 20 Environmental Conservation (1993), 217; 
Lipschutz, supra n. 36, at 40 et sequ.; O'Riordan, 'The new Environmentalism and Sustainable 
Development', 108 The Science of the Total Environment (1991), 5, at 13; Redclift, Sustainable 
Development, Exploring the Contradictions, (Routledge, 1987), Chap. 2 and 4; Simon, 'Sustainable 
Development: Theoretical Goal Construct of Attainable Goal ? ', 16 Environmental Conservation (1989), 
41. 
(38) Primrosch, The Spirit of Sustainable Development within Authoritative Decision-Making 
Processes', 47 Austrian JPIL (1994), 81, at 82. 
(39) X16, 'Sustainable Development: A critical Review', 19 World Development (1991), 607. 
(40) Anand, 'A New International Economic Order for Sustainable Development ? ', in Al-Nauimi & 
Meese (eds. ), International Legal Issues Arising Under the Decade of International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1995), 1209, at 1238. 
(41) 1991 Tlatelolco Platform on Environment and Development, Para. 2; in the doctrine, see 
Goldenberg, 'Current Policies Aimed at Attaining a Model of Sustainable Development in Brazil', I 
Journal of Environment and Development (1992), 105. 
(42) M'Gonigle, Developing Sustainability and the Emerging Norms of International Environmental 
Law: the Case of Land-Based Marine Pollution Control', 28 Canadian YbIL (1990), 169, at 171. 
(43) 1990 Formulation of a European Charter on Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Development, Council of Europe, Recommend. 1130, preambular Para. 4. 
(44) 1989 Amazon Declaration, Para. 1. 
(45) 1991 Beijing Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Development, preambular Para. 2, goes 
even as faras to consider sustainable development as a matter of common concern of mankind. 
(46) 1989 Langkawi Declaration of the Commonwealth Heads of Governments, Para. 6. 
(47) 1994 Declaration of Tunis on the Sustainable Development of the Mediterranean, supra n. 24, Para. 
15; in the doctrine, Beyerlin, supra n. 8, at 107; Timoshenko, 'From Stockholm to Rio : the 
Institutionalization of Sustainable Development', in Lang (ed. ), Sustainable Development and 
International Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhofg 1995), Chap. 10, at 143 et sequ. 
(48) Birnie & Boyle, 123; Sands, Principles, Vol. I, 128 and 208, and `International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development', 65 British YbIL (1994), 303. Such understanding of sustainable development 
was endorsed by Dominice, in his paper on 'Les Principes: leur portee et leur signification', delivered at a 
seminar organised by the Centre d'Ecologie Humaine et des Sciences de l'Environnement/Geneva University, Developpementdurable, First Part, Geneva, 12-13 March 1998. 
(49) See Singh, ibid supra n. 12. 
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principles(52); in other instances, sustainable development is considered as a 'legal 
institution'(53). 
Sustainable development is understood as expressing alternatively an obligation of 
conduct(54), an obligation of result(55), or even a subjective, inalienable and peremptory 
right conferred upon States(56) or individuals, by the 'modem natural law of mankind' 
transcending customary and treaty law(57). It is more cautiously argued that the element 
of 'sustainability' in the expression of 'sustainable development' figures as a candidate 
for jus cogens with erga omnes effects(58). The neutral expression of 'promotion, 
achievement, pursuit of, or support for sustainable development' is most commonly 
used(59), which gives little indication as to the actual nature, let alone the normativity 
and legal qualification, of sustainable development. 
(50) Hohmann, 'Ergebnisse des Erdgipfels von Rio', 12 Neue Zeitschrift fur Verwaltungsrecht (1993), 
311, at 312; Jositsch, 'Das Konzept der nachhaltigen Entwicklung (Sustainable Development) im 
Völkerrecht und seine innerstaatliche Umsetzung', 11 Umweltrecht in der Praxis (1997), 93, at 112. 
(51) 1991 Alps Convention, Art. 2(1); 1992 European Economic Area Agreement, Preamble; see also 
Statement of Conclusions of the intermediate Ministerial Meetings on the Protection of the North Sea, 
Bergen, March 1997, supra n. 24, Princ. 2.2. In the doctrine, see Hunt, Bobeff & Palmer, 'Legal Issues 
Arising from the Principle of Sustainable Development: Australia, Canada and New-Zealand', 9 Journal 
of Energy and Natural Resources Law (1991), 1; McGoldrick, supra n. 13, at 818; Tinker, 'Making 
UNCED Work: Building the Legal and Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development at the 
Earth Summit and Beyond', United Nations Association of the United States of America Occasional 
Paper No. 4, UNA-USA, 1992, Chap. I. 
(52) 1995 Sofia Declaration. In the doctrine, see Hossain, ibid supra n. 29; Panjabi, 'From Stockholm 
to Rio :A Comparison of the Declaratory Principles of International Environmental Law', 21 Denver 
JILP (1993), 215. 
(53) Luff, 'An Overview of International Law of Sustainable Development and A Confrontation Between 
WTO Rules and Sustainable Development', 29 RBDI (1996), 90, at 91. 
(54) See 1990 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife to the Convention for the 
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Art. 3; 1992 
ECE Watercourses Convention, preambular Paras. 4 and 6, and Arts. 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(i); 1992 
Biodiversity Convention, preambular Paras. 5,13,20-23, and Arts. 8(g), 10(a), 11,12,13(b), and 19 
(3); 1992 OSPAR Marine Environment Convention, preambularPara. 3. 
(55) 1994 Desertification Convention, Art. 9. 
(56) 1992 Climate Change Convention, Art. 3(4); see also 1992 Forestry Principles, Preamble (a). 
(57) Singh, ibid. supra n. 12. 
(58) Riedel, 'International Environmental Law 
-A Law to Serve the Public Interest? - An Analysis of the 
Scope of the Binding Effects of Basic Principles (Public Interest Norms)', in Delbrück (ed. ), New Trends 
in International Lawmaking 
- 
International 'Legislation' in the Pubic Interest (Duncker & Humblot, 
1997), 61, at 94-95; also Handl, 'Environmental Security and Global Change', in Lang et al. (eds. ), 
Environmental Protection and International Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), Chap. 2. 
(59) 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature, preambular Para. 3, and Art. 4; 1986 
Noumea Convention on the Environment in the South Pacific, preambular Para. 6, and Art. 5(4); 1990 
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife to the Convention for the Protection and 
Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, preambular Para. 5; 1991 ECE (continued) 
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Considering the open texture of sustainable development, and the lack of 
comprehensive elaboration of the terms since they were introduced in the international 
legal vocabulary, it can safely be concluded that any of the above qualifications is 
potentially appropriate to define sustainable development. 
Borrowing from Dupuy's two-fold distinction between the various principles 
emerging in international environmental law(60), the thesis assimilates sustainable 
development to a principe inspirateur' of international environmental law, that 
formulates less concrete obligations, and more a state of mind, or a general orientation of 
that law. It is 'fleshed out' by various principes directeurs', setting forth more specific 
rules. The assimilation of sustainable development to aprincipe directeur, to a new rule 
or set of rules, or to obligation or set of obligations, in international law, is dismissed 
from the outset. It is virtually impossible to construe such a multi-faceted and open- 
textured expression as sustainable development with a sufficient degree of precision and 
clarity that would satisfy the too often neglected requirement of 'norm-creating 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, preambular Para. 2; 1992 EU Treaty, Art. B; 1992 
Climate Change Convention, preambular Para. 22, and Arts. 2 and 3(4); 1992 Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, preambular Para. 1; 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents Convention, 
preambular Para. 2; 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Art. 8(a); 1992 OSPAR Marine Environment 
Convention, preambular Para. 3; 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, Art. 19(1); 1994 Desertification 
Convention, Art. 18(1); 1994 Protocol to the 1979 ECE Transboundary Air Pollution Convention, on 
Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, preambular Para. 14; 1994 Instrument Establishing the 
(restructured) Global Environmental Facility, preambular Para. 4; 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for 
the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, introductory Para. 
, 
preambular Para. 3, and 
Art. 1; 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention, Arts. 2(1), 10, and 12(2). See also 
1975 Economic Charter, preambular Paras. 1 and 2; 1987 UNEP Guideline on Environmental Impact 
Assessment, preambular Para. 1; 1989 Hague Declaration on the Environment, Para. 9; 1989 Paris 
Economic Declaration of the G7, Sect. 2 and 37; 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable 
Development, Paras. 17 and 21; 1990 Bangkok Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, 
Paras. 7,10,19,24 and 30; 1991 Tlatelolco Platform on Environment and Development, Paras. 4,9 and 
14; 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Princ. 1,4,11,20,21; 1992 Forestry 
Principles, Princ. 1,3(a), 5(b), 6,9,10,13(c), 14; 1993 Lucerne Declaration, Sect. 3; 1995 Policy 
Statement on Sustainable Development, Paras. 1,3 and 5. 
(60) Dupuy, 'Le droit international de 1'environnement et la souverainete des Etats', in Dupuy (ed. ), The 
Future of International Law of the Environment, Hague Academy of International Law Workshop 1984 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), 29, at 39. Similar terminology was previously used inter alia by Sperduti, 
who referred to 'principes informateurs' (or 'inspirateurs' or 'directifs') to designate basic principles of a 
legal order, and 'Principe formateur' or 'normatif to qualify more specific principles; 'L'individu et le 
droit international', 90 RdC (1956-II), 727, at 750-751. Dupuy's two-fold division has clearly inspired 
Kamto, 'Les nouveaux principes du droit international de 1'environnement', Revue Juridique de 
1 Environnement (1993-1), 20. One should note however, that Dupuy considers the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the principle of solidarity and co-operation and that of 
equitable utilisation of natural resources as principes insiprateurs, whilst in this thesis, these principles 
are treated as principes directeurs. Sperduti refers to principles of general application to international law, 
and, not surprisingly considering the early period, makes no reference to environmental law principles. Neither of them specifically associate or dissociate their 'principes' with or from the 'general principles 
recognized by civilized nations' in the sense of 1945 ICJ Statute, Art. 38(1)(c). 
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character' of international legal rules(61). The requirement for a rule to qualify as 
candidate rule of international law was particularily clearly spelt out in North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, where the ICJ stressed that «[i]t would in the first place be the 
necessary that the provision concerned should, at all events, potentially be of a 
fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of 
a general rule of law»(62). 
It is not the pretension of this thesis to assimilate the principle of sustainable 
development or any of the five 'principes directeurs' considered to 'general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations' in the sense of the 1945 ' ICJ Statute, Art. 
38(1)(c)(63), notwithstanding the fact that certain principles have been or could be 
qualified as such(64). The terms 'principes directeurs', 'principes inspirateurs', or 
principles are used throughout the thesis to denote some basic legal standards, or rules 
with a large degree of abstraction and generality, common to the various sectors of 
international environmental law(65), that have been inferred from treaty or customary 
international environmental law, from judicial or arbitral decisions, and from state 
(61) See in the same sense Beyerlin, supra n. 8, at 107; Birnie & Boyle, 123; Handl, supra n. 24, at 40 
et sequ.; Lang, 'How to Manage Sustainable Development ? ', in Ginther et al. (eds. ), Sustainable 
Development and Good Governance (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), Chap. 6, at 94 et sequ.; Sands, Principles 
Vol. I, 198 et sequ., and 'International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development', 65 British YbIL 
(1994), 303; Stokke, 'Sustainable Development: A Multi-Faceted Challenge', in Stokke (ed. ), 
Sustainable Development (Frank Cass, 1991), 8. 
(62) North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1969,3, Para. 72, emphasis added; the norm- 
creating character of a rule implies that the content and concrete implications of the latter are clear enough 
to allow the potential subject of the rule to foresee the consequence of their actions; see further van Dijk, 
'Normative Force and Effectiveness of International Norms', 30 German YbIL (1987), 9. 
(63) The identification, the functions and the status of the 'general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations' in the general international law context have remained the object of a controversy in the 
doctrine, which has little to do with the topic of the present thesis. Extensive reference on the relevant 
literature can be found in Brownlie, Principles, 15 et sequ.; Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, §§ 
228 et sequ.; Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. 1, § 12. See contributions by Bastid, Blondel, 
Favre, Verdross and Virally in Recueil d etudes de droit international en hon mage ä Paul Guggenheim 
(Faculte de Droit de l'Universite de Geneve & IUHEI, 1968). 
(64) See for instance equitable principles, infra Chap. 2/4/ii/a. Equitable utilisation, Sic Utere Tuo and 
Related No Substantial Transboundary Harm Principles, arguably derived from'general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations'; The Diversion of Water from the Meuse, PCIJ Ser. A/B, Fascicule No 
70, Judgment of June 28th, 1937, at 73 and 76. See also the principle of good faith, infra Chap. 3/4/ii. 
Prior Information, Notification and Consultation, qualified as «[o]ne of the basic principles governing the 
creation and performances of legal obligations... »; Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment of 20 
December 1974, ICJ Rep. 1974,253, at 267-268; and the abuse of right or principle of non utilisation a 
right in a way detrimental to other States, regarded as a 'general and well-recognized principle'; Corfu 
Channel case, Judgment ofApril 9th 1949: ICI Rep. 1949,4, at 22. Reference to some other principles 
relevant to international environmental law is made in Birnie & Boyle, at 23-24; Sands, Principles, Vol. 
1, at 123-124. 
(65) Sands, Principles, Vol. 1, at 185; also Ferrari Bravo, 'Considerations sur la methode de rechauhe 
des principes gCneraux du droit international de 1'environnement', 7 Hague YbIL (1994), 3, at 4. 
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practice. This remark probably also applies to the frequent references to 'principles' in 
international environmental law documents and instruments, although the exact 
signification of such references remains extremely unclear, and is only evasively 
considered in the doctrine(66). 
It should be stressed that sustainable development does not constitute a new 
discipline of international law, nor is it the subject matter of a new international law for 
sustainable development that would complement, or even replace, existing international 
environmental and developmental laws(67). Sustainable development is more a matter of 
(66) Whilst the term 'principle' is frequently used in environmental law, and most notably in relation to 
sustainable development (see supra n. 48 to 52), and to precaution (infra Chap. 3), it is never clearly 
assimilated to or differentiated from the 'general principles of law' in the sense of 1945 ICJ Statute Art. 
38(1)(c). Little indication as to the nature of the 'fundamental principles' enshrined in 1986 WCED-EG 
Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development and 1995 IUCN Draft International 
Covenant on Environment and Development is given in the commentary to both drafts. The latter merely 
provides that «the Fundamental Principles express the underlying legal norms in a declaratory form and 
constitute the basis for all the obligations contained in the Draft Covenant. The reflect international 
consensus... »; IUCN Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, prepared by the 
Commission on Environmental Law of the I(JCN in co-operation with the International Council of 
Environmental Law, Environmental Policy and Law Paper No 31 (IUCN, 1995), at 31. No explicit 
referenceis made to 'general principles of law recognized by civilized nations' in either draft and respective 
commentary thereto. 
Scholars have remained extremely evasive on this point so far, and have avoided to support or reject such 
an analogy, or otherwise qualify the 'principles' referred to in international environmental law. Kiss & 
Shelton for instance refer only briefly to the 'general principles of law recognized by civilized nations' of 
some relevance in the area of the environment, and abstain qualifying other fundamental principles of 
environmental law not assimilated to the first category, International Environmental Law, 107; see also 
Jurgielewicz, Global Environmental Change and International Law: Prospects for Progress in the 
Legal Order, (University Press of America, 1996), at 43-44. Birne & Boyle of the other hand, take the 
view that only those 'general principles of law recognized by civilized nations' that establish 'basic 
standards of behaviour for international society' have a significance and relevance in support of a decision 
taken on the basis or in application of international environmental law. They seem to dismiss however 
the possibility of'general principles of law' as a constitutive of a rule of law, Birnie & Boyle, at 23; also 
Birnie, `International Environmental Law : its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs', in Harrell & 
Kingsbury (eds. ), The International Politics of the Environment (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 2, at 61-62. 
No further clarification is provided in the various studies devoted to one or another specific principle; see 
for instance Freestone & Hey, Precautionary Principle in International Law (Kluwer Law International, 
1996); Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles of Modern International Environmental 
Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994); Rosenberg, Le principe de la souverainete des Etats 
sur leurs ressources naturelles (LGDJ, 1983). Sands is one of the few authors to have clearly and 
explicitly dissociated general principles as frequently referred to in international environmental law 
documents and instruments from the general principles of law in the sense of 1945 ICJ Statute Art. 
38(1)(c); see Principles Vol. 1, at 123, n. 102, and 'International Law in the Field of Sustainable 
Development', 65 British YbIL (1994), 303, at 336 n. 136. So did recently Dominicd in a paper devoted 
to `Les Principes: leur portee et leur signification'; supra n. 48. 
(67) As it could be understood from the substitution of 'international law for sustainable development' for 
'international environmental law' throughout 1992 Agenda 21, or from 1992 Rio Declaration on the 
Environment and Development, Principle 27, which provides for the development of international law in 
the field of sustainable development. Some authors however, fear that sustainable development reduces 
international environmental law to 'a mere appendage of international development law' subordinated to 
economic rationality, Pallemaerts, `International Environmental Law from Stockholm to Rio: Back to 
the Future? ', in Sands (ed. ) Greening International Law (Earthsean, 1993), Chap. 1, at 19; also 
Pallemaerts, 'La Conference de Rio: Grandeur ou decadence du droit international de l'environnement ? ', (continued) 
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reformulating or reaffirming existing or emerging environmental principles, than the 
statement of new ones. 
3) The definition of sustainable development is no clearer than its nature(68). 
International legal and political instruments often refer to sustainability and sustainable 
development in an inconsistent way; hence for instance, sustainable use is alternatively 
equated to rational use(69) or to conservation(70) of environmental resources, and despite 
the alleged inherent environmental dimension of the concept(71), the pleonastic 
expression of environmentally sound and sustainable development is commonly 
used(72). Very few are the instruments providing for a comprehensive and operational 
definition(73). Scholars on the other hand, tend to mould their own understanding of the 
terms according to their own economic, political or legal perspective. 
28 RBDI (1995), 175, at 221; Lipschutz, 'Wasn't the Future Wonderful? Resources, the Environment 
and the Emerging Myth of Global Sustainable Development', 2 Colorado JIELP (1991), 35. It is 
sometimes suggested, albeit never elaborated upon, that sustainable development constitutes an 
expression of the merger of environmental and developmental aws; see for instance Luff, 'An Overview of 
International Law of Sustainable Development and A Confrontation Between WTO Rules and 
Sustainable Development', 29 RBDI (1996), 90, at 143. 
(68) As an anonymous commentator wrote, sustainable development is «more easily defined by what it 
is not, than by what it actually is»; UN Chronicle, June 1992, at 46; see also Hoelting, 'After Rio: The 
Sustainable Development Concept Following the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development', 24 Georgia JICL (1994), 117,131 etsequ. 
(69) 1992 Biodiversity Convention, preambularParas. 5,13,20-23, and Arts. 8(g), 10(a), 11,12,13(b), 
and 19 (3); 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, preambular Para. 4 and 6, and Art. 3(1)(i); 1997 UN 
Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, preambular Para. 5; see also 
1982 UNEP decision on The Environment in 1982 
- 
Retrospect and Prospect, I(1)(a). 
(70) 1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development define 
conservation as «the management of human use of a natural resource or the environment in such a manner 
that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations whilst maintaining its potential to 
meet future generations needs»; see use of terms. 
(71) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 1987), 40. 
(72) 1991 ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, preambular Para. 2; 1992 
Biodiversity Convention, Art. 8(a); 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, Art. 2(2)(b); 1992 ECE 
Industrial Accidents Convention, preambular Para. 2; 1994 Protocol to the 1979 ECE Transboundary Air 
Pollution Convention, on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, preambular Para. 14. See also 1987 
UNEP Guideline on Environmental Impact Assessment, preambular Par. 1; 1989 Resolution 44/229, on 
International Cooperation in the Field of the Environment, Para. 11; 1990 Bangkok Ministerial 
Declaration on Sustainable Development, Paras. 7,10,24 and 30; 1991 Tlatelolco Platform on 
Environment and Development, Para. 4; German Council of Environmental Advisers, 'In Pursuit of 
Sustainable Environmentally Sound Development', 1994 Environmental Report (extracts), in 25 EPL 
(1995), 90. 
(73) See however the 1991 Resource Management Act, New Zealand, introduced into Parliament in 
December 1989, which defines 'sustainable management' as 'the management of the use, development, 
and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people to meet their 
needs (... ) without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, and includes 
the following considerations: (a) The maintenance and enhancement of the quality of the environment, including the life-supporting capacity of the environment and its intrinsic values; (b) The use, 
development or protection of natural and physical resources in a way which provides for the social, (continued) 
Introduction 14 Chapter 1 
Some influential economists for instance, define sustainable development as 
«a situation in which the development vector [that is, the vector of 
desirable social objectives that include access to resources, as well as 
increases in real income per capita, improvement in health and nutritional 
status, educational achievement, fairer distribution of income and increases in 
basic freedom] does not decrease over time. » (74) 
Sustainable development is about being fair to the future. It is about 
leaving the next generation a similar, or better, resources endowment than 
that which we inherited (... ) Being fair means (... ) taking only the 
sustainable yield from renewable resources and honouring the environment's 
limited capability for receiving waste. It means using exhaustible resources 
wisely so that, as they are depleted, the profits from their use are reinvested in 
technology and other forms of capital wealth. ) )(75) 
More generally, Conway understands sustainability as 
«the ability of a system to maintain productivity in spite of a major 
disturbance such as that caused by intensive stresses or a large perturbation 
(... ) Lack of sustainability may be indicated by declining 
productivity 
... 
» 
(76) 
In environmental politics, it is considered that 
«[s]ustainable development, if it is not to be devoid of analytical content, 
means more than seeking a compromise between the natural environment and 
the pursuit of economic growth. It means a definition of development which 
recognises that the limits to sustainability have structural as well as natural 
origins. » (77) 
«[I]t simply means a form of economy that does not undermine the 
capacity of the earth and all its component parts to provide both nurture and 
the basic resource needs for all living matter, including human beings. » (78) 
economic and cultural need and opportunities of the present and future inhabitants of a community, (c) 
Where the environment is modified by human action, the adverse effects of irreversible change are fully 
recognised and avoided or mitigated to the extend practicable; (d) The use, development, or protection of 
renewable natural and physical resources so that their ability to yield long term benefits is not 
endangered; (e) The use or development of non-renewable natural and physical resources in way that sees 
an orderly and practical transition to adequate substitutes including renewable resources; and (1) The 
exercise of kaitiakitanga which includes an ethic of stewardship»; referred after Hunt, Bobeff & Palmer, 
'Legal Issues Arising from the Principle of Sustainable Development: Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand', 9 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law (1991), 1, at 20. 
(74) Pearce et al., Sustainable Development: Economics and Environment in the Third World (E. Elgar, 
1990), at 2-3. 
(75) Pearce, 'An Economic Perspective on Sustainable Development', 2 Development, Journal of SID (1989), 17, at 17. 
(76)'Agroecosystem Analysis', ICCET Series E, No 1, (Imperial College London, 1983), at 12. 
(77) Redclift, Sustainable Development: Exploring the Contradictions (Routledge, 1987), 199. 
(78) O'Riordan, 'The new Environmentalism and Sustainable Development', 108 The Science of the 
Total Environment (1991), 5, at 7. 
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In sum, sustainable development 
«ensures continuing growth and progress for humankind, whilst arresting 
and changing those processes which cause irreversible damage to the 
environment (... ) overall, it exposes a concern which focuses on human need 
ratherthan human want. »(79) 
Lipschutz, inspired by the common characteristics identified in the various existing 
definitions in environmental politics, suggests the following definition of sustainable 
development: 
«a broad notion that human consumption of resources and environmental 
services must be sustainable and should not exceed the capacity of the 
biosphere/environment 
-possibly in conjunction with technology and social 
organisation- to supply those resources or absorb waste products. That is, 
`natural' stocks and flows of goods and services must not be degraded or 
damaged to the point that they collapse or disappear. At the same time the 
concept of sustainable development implies some degree of improvement in 
human standards of living 
-not necessarily unfettered economic growth in the 
classical sense, but some sort of growth, nonetheless. »(80) 
From a general legal perspective, sustainable development is perceived as 
«[a] development which is not only ecologically but also economically and 
socially sustainable. Sustainable development charts a way forward which not 
only meets the needs and aspirations of a present generation but also does so 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs to 
achieve sustainable development (... ) This complex concept is not a static state 
of affairs. It is an ever continuous and on-going process of change and 
adaptation. »(81) 
Frequent reference is made to the WCED's famed definition(82): 
«Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: 
- 
the concept of `needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's 
poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and 
- 
the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social 
organisation on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs. 
Scholars adopting a legal perspective are strongly influenced by the specific area of 
international law, namely development, human rights, or environment, in relation to 
which they consider sustainable development. Human rights lawyers for instance, tend 
(79) Smith, 'Global Environmental Issues', in Smith & Warr (eds. ) Global Environment Issues (Hodder 
& Stoughton, 1991), 206. 
(80) 
'Wasn't the Future Wonderful? ', 2 Colorado JIELP (1991), 35, at 38. 
(81) Salter, `The Environment, Sustainable Development and the Responsibilities of the Legal 
Profession', 16 International Legal Practitioner (1991), 75, at 76. 
(82) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 1987), at 43. 
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to focus more particularily on the aspect of equity within and between generations, and 
on the satisfaction of basic human needs, including the need for a clean and healthy 
environment(83). 
From the perspective of developmental law, sustainable development is more 
particularily appraised as a 'normative framework for a more just and human 
international economic order' that is reminiscent of the message conveyed by the new 
international economic order proposal(84). Some authors do not hesitate to qualify 
sustainable development as a'renewed claim for a new international economic order'(85). 
One should note in this context that, on the eve of the 1992 Conference on Environment 
and Development, the ILA reconstituted its Committee on a New International 
Economic Order, established in 1978, as the Committee on the Legal Aspects of 
Sustainable Development(86). 
By contrast with human rights and developmental law scholars' focus on human 
needs and aspirations, environmental lawyers put the accent on the conservation and 
preservation aspect of WCED's definition, and more generally on environmental limits 
and restrictions(87). As summarised by Handl, sustainable development means in this 
context (diving off nature's "income" rather than squandering its "capital"»(88). 
(83) Chowdhury, 'Intergenerational Equity: Substratum of the Right to Sustainable Development', in 
Chowdhury et al. (eds. ), The Right to Development in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), 
Chap. 3.1; Singh, 'Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law', in De Waart et al. (ed. ), International Law and Development (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), Chap. 1.1. 
(84) Hossain, 'Sustainable Development: A Normative Framework for Evolving a More just and Humane 
International Economic Order', in Chowdhury et al. (eds. ), ibid supra n. 83, Chap. 3.2, at 262. 
(85) Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, § 626; see also Anand, 'A New International Economic 
Order for Sustainable Development ? ', in Al-Nauimi & Meese (eds. ), International Legal Issues Arising 
Under the Decade of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 1209; Ginther, 'Sustainable 
Development and Good Governance: Development and Evolution of Constitutional Orders', in Ginther et 
al. (eds. ), Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), Chap. 10; Hossain, 
The Rio Conference and Post-Rio-New International Economic Order', in A1-Nauimi & Meese (eds. ) 
ibid., at 1199; Hossain, 'Sustainable Development: A Normative Framework for Evolving a More just 
and Humane International Economic Order', in Chowdhury et al. (eds. ), The Right to Development in 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), Chap. 3.2. 
(86) ILA Report of the sixty-fifth Conference, 21-26 April 1992 (Cairo, 1993), 407, at Para. 1.12. 
(87) Birnie & Boyle, at 4; Handl, 'Environmental Security and Global Change', in Lang et al. (eds. ), 
Environmental Protection and International Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), Chap. 2, 
at 79; Sands, 'International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development', 65 British YbIL (1994), 303, 
at 306. 
(88) Handl, ibid. supra n. 87. 
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WCED's definition is thus widely supported by legal scholars, and is occasionally 
echoed in international environmental documents(89). It is clear however, that, like most 
of other existing definitions, it expresses more a 'state of mind' or 'general orientation', 
than it sets forth clearly defined legal rules and operational goals or obligations(90). 
Nevertheless, considering that, in this thesis, sustainable development is understood as a 
principe inspirateur, and approached via some of its associated principes directeurs(91), 
no attempt will be made to elaborate a more comprehensive or detailed definition of 
sustainable development. WCED's definition(92) offers a satisfactory and well-accepted 
description of the overall background against which each of the principes directeurs have 
been construed. The main focus lies in the influence of sustainable development on 
international environmental law, appraised through the evolution of selected principes 
directeurs. 
ii. Approach and Methodology 
1) The thesis as a whole, as well as each chapter, follows an evolutionary 
perspective; the principes directeurs studied and the various environmental regimes used 
to illustrate them, are neither considered as static nor presented as latest updated; on the 
contrary, they are viewed as an evolving process. It is therefore important to bear in 
mind that a convention, a rule or a principle referred to early in a chapter, might have 
been substantially altered or indeed replaced by a subsequent convention, rule or 
principle referred to only later in the same chapter when it fits chronologically. The 
evolutionary approach, perhaps confusing to the reader, appeared nonetheless as the 
simplest and clearest way to highlight changes, if any, implied by the construction of 
most classic international environmental law principles against the background of 
sustainable development, without unnecessarily overburdening the already considerable 
footnotes. The fundamental modification of a given rule or regime are indicated as often 
as possible with a cross-reference. 
(89) See inter alia 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, Art. 2(5)(c); 1992 Biodiversity Convention, 
Art. 2, definition of sustainable use; 1992 OSPAR Marine Environment Convention, preambular Para. 3, 
and 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, introductory Para. 
(90) In the same sense, see Birnie & Boyle, at 6; Booldield, 'Environmental Stability with Development: 
What Proposals For a Research Agenda 7', in Stokke (ed. ), Sustainable Development (Frank Cass, 
1991), 42, at 46; Handl, supra n. 87, at 81; Malanczuk, 'Sustainable Development: Some Critical 
Thoughts in the Light of the Rio Conference', in Ginther et al. (eds. ), Sustainable Development and 
Good Governance (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), Chap. 2, at 31 et sequ.; Munn, 'Toward Sustainable 
Development', 26 Atmospheric Environment (1992), 2725. 
(91) See infra ii. Approach and Methodology. 
(92) Supra n. 82. 
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One should also specify that, at the time of writing the thesis, the Case concerning 
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project(93) was pending before the ICJ; fate decided that the 
decision of the Court would be delivered as the conclusions of our research were laid 
down. Whilst the various Chapters of the thesis integrate the most recent developments 
in the field of international environmental law, we chose to consider the ICJ's decision in 
the Gabcikovo Nagyrnaros case in the concluding Chapter only, to respect the overall 
approach of the thesis, and because we are convinced that the interesting aspects of the 
case lie in the expectations it raised, which are mentioned throughout the thesis, as much 
as, if not more than, in the final decision of the Court. 
2) There are two major techniques for approaching international environmental law; 
the first consists in focusing upon specific rules and their application to specific sectors, 
and is that usually followed in international environmental law manuals(94). A second 
technique involves the identification and development of general principles common to 
the diverse sectors of application of the law. In this thesis, preference is given to the 
second approach, considering (a) the inherent difficulty to construe sustainable 
development otherwise than in programmatic and inspirational terms, and (b) the non- 
sector specific nature of its subject matter, hence the difficulty to confine its study to 
particular sectors of the environment. 
Indeed, even though sustainable development is referred to in relation to various 
sectors of the environment, and most frequently in relation to the use (as opposed to 
the contamination or pollution) of environmental resources, it conveys primarily a 
holistic approach to environmental issues, whereby environmental issues are considered 
and addressed in their interrelations, and not in isolation from one another(95). In this 
context, it seems more appropriate to consider sustainable development as it relates to 
the environment in general, rather than to any particular sector(s). Consequently, the 
(93) Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 25 September 
1997, General List, No. 92,37 ILM (1998), 162; see infra Chap. 7, Evaluation of Sustainable 
Development as an Emerging Principle of International Environmental Law. 
(94) See Kiss, Droit International de 1'Environnement (Pddone, 1983); Kiss & Shelton, International 
Environmental Law (Transnational Publisher and Graham & Trotman, 1991); Kiss, & Shelton, Traite 
de Droit Europeen de 1 Environnement (Frison-Roche, 1995); Nanda, International Environmental 
Policy (Transnational Publishers, 1995). See however Birnie & Boyle, International Law & the 
Environment (Clarendon, 1992), combining both approaches, and Sands, Principles of International 
Environmental Law, Vol. I (Manchester University Press, 1995), Chap. 6. 
(95) See more particularly infra Chap. 2/2/iii. Sovereignty over Environmental Resources and 
Environmental Policies versus Globalisation of Environmental Standards and Policies; Chap. 3/2/ii/b. 
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment: Institutionalisation of Prevention, and more 
generally Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership, and Chap. 6, Principles Pertaining to Public Participation. 
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thesis is not divided into various environmental sectors, but into various environmental 
principles. 
The great majority of treaties and declarations referring to sustainable development, 
as well as part of the doctrine mentioned above, make reference to the 'principles' 
selected in the next Chapters(96). This, of course, does not demonstrate any particular 
link between the principles considered and sustainable development, as all of them 
predated sustainable development, and hence have an autonomous existence. However, 
it tends to confirm that these principles assume a particular role in the 'promotion' of 
sustainable development. On the other hand, the selected principles represent by no 
means an exhaustive or an exclusive list of the principles that can or could be associated 
with sustainable development; their choice, as much as their classification is partial(97). 
(96) See references supra n. 21 to 59; the principles are also frequently associated with sustainable 
development in the majority of the drafts or declarations purported to elaborate sustainable development, 
namely 1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development, 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment, 1995 IUCN Draft International Covenant on Environment and 
Development. See also Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, Report of the 
Expert Group Meeting on Identification of Principles of International Law for Sustainable Development, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 26-28 September 1995; posted at the UN Website @ 
[gopher: //gopher. un. org/00/esc/cnl7/1996/backgrnd/law. txtl. 
(97) Other researches on sustainable development have been structured around other principles; to 
mention only a few, Dommen contemplates the polluter-pays principle, the user-pays principle, the 
precautionary principle, and the subsidiary principle; Fair Principles for Sustainable Development 
(Edward Elgar, for UNCTAD, 1993). Freestone singles out the precautionary principle, the principle of 
differentiated obligations, the principle of protection of indigenous populations, the principle of effective 
environmental legislation, and the principle of environmental impact assessment; 'The Road from Rio: 
International Environmental Law after the Earth Summit' (the University of Hull Press, 1993). Sands 
identifies two categories of principles: the core principles apparently inherent in the principle of 
sustainable development, stating the limits to be placed on the use of environmental resburces, and other 
general principles drawn from other areas of environmental law, and intended to assist States in the 
promotion of sustainable development. The principles from the first category are the integration of 
environment and development, inter-state equity, intergenerational equity, and non-exhaustion on natural 
resources. The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and no environmental harm, the 
good neighbourliness and international co-operation principle, the common but differentiated 
responsibility principle, the precautionary principle and the polluter-pays principle belong to the second 
category, Sands, 'International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development', 65 British YbIL (1994), 
303. For Primrosch, sustainable development is synonymous with a'repertory of guiding legal principles 
serving as cardinal requirements, which contains inter alia the principle of solidarity, common but 
differentiated responsibility, intergenerational equity, prevention and precaution, and polluter-pays 
principle; 'The Spirit of Sustainable Development within Authoritative Decision-Making Processes', 47 
Austrian JPIL (1994), 81, at 83 et sequ.. Singh, inspired by 1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles for 
Environmental Protection and Development, focuses upon the right to an adequate environment, the 
principle of optimum sustainable yield, the principle of equitable utilisation of transboundary resources, 
and the principle of co-operation; 'Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law', in De 
Waart et al. (cd. ), International Law and Development (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), Chap. 1.1. The Report 
of A Consultation Convened by the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, 
supra n. 19, singles out the principle of precaution, intergenerational equity, common but differentiated 
responsibility, and public participation; see also Dupuy, 'Oü en est le droit international de 
1'environnement ä la fm du si6cle? ', 101 RGDIP (1997), 873, at 881; Ferrari Bravo, 'Considerations sur 
la mCthode de recherche des principes genCraux du droit international de 1'environnement', 7 Hague YbIL 
(continued) 
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Someone reasonably acquainted with the literature on sustainable development would be 
justified to expect to read about the polluter pays principle or internalisation of 
environmental costs at the source, the integrated approach principle(98), to cite only 
some of the principles most commonly associated with sustainable development, or 
could be surprised to note that the common but differentiated responsibility principle, 
or environmental impact assessment are not erected as autonomous principles. 
The selection of the five principles considered in the thesis was inspired by two 
major factors: (1) their applicability to all sectors of international environmental law, 
and not only to certain sectors only, and (2) their relevance in the light of the original 
focus of the research. Indeed, the thesis purported initially to concentrate on the link 
often drawn between women and sustainable development(99). For this purpose, it was 
originally divided into two parts: one dedicated to sustainable development in general, 
and the other devoted to the association of women to sustainable development, as 
expressed inter alia with 'women clauses' in international environmental law documents. 
As the research progressed however, it became evident (a) that the latter association 
was essentially motivated by the factual contribution of women to the development 
process and to the protection of the environment, as well as by their factual 
vulnerability to environmental degradation, and (b) that 'women clauses' relate more to 
the advancement of women, and less to environmental (or developmental) concerns as 
such(100). In sum, references to women in international environmental law could be 
understood as a 'cross-reference' to the issue of the advancement of women, a reminder 
that environment and development must be tackled with due consideration for and in a 
way consistent, inter alia, with the advancement of women. The clauses illustrate in fact 
the close interrelatedness of the social human rights and environmental facets of 
(1994), 3; Luff, 'An Overview of International Law of Sustainable Development and A Confrontation 
Between WTO Rules and Sustainable Development', 29 RBDI (1996), 90, at 99. 
(98) The principle of integration is probably the'greatest' absent from this research. The following point 
must be made with regard to this principle in particular: as it will be demonstrated in the concluding 
Chapter, the element of an integrated approach is indeed a predominant feature of sustainable 
development. In our view, the principle of an integrated approach principle would probably be the next 
and most useful topic of research, to envisage the future evolution and operationalisation of sustainable 
development in law, that is in all the areas of law, including environmental law, economic and trade law, 
human rights law, etc. This thesis, however, represents the preceding stage, that is the stage purporting 
to demonstrate that sustainable development is predominantly about integration. 
(99) See clauses referringto women in international environmental law instruments and documents listed 
at Chap. 6/4. Women Participation and Women Interests Clauses in Environmental Documents. 
(100) See Chap. 6/4/i. Origins of Women Participation and Women Interests Clauses. 
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sustainable development(101). This original 'gender' dimension of the thesis is also 
behind the decision to take women, and not NGOs, as an example of 'public 
participation' in international environmental law and policy. In practice, however, we 
would have been more justified to concentrate on the contribution of NGOs to 
environmental protection, as they clearly represent a seminal force in the international 
law making and law enforcing effort in this particular area(102). 
Such conclusion meant that 'women clauses', even in international environmental 
documents, fall within the province of the advancement of women, and hence well 
beyond the scope of a thesis dedicated to international environmental law. Besides, it 
appeared paradoxical to focus on women in a separate part of the thesis, whilst the 
major issue is about the integration of women in sustainable development. Accordingly, 
women are finally referred to only briefly, as a case study on the interrelation of the 
social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, and a case of 
application of the principles pertaining to public participation(103). This conclusion and 
the resulting re-orientation of the thesis are not meant to undermine the importance of 
women issues as such, or in relation to the environment; they simply obey the 
imperative to remain within the original legal framework of the thesis. 
iii. Legal Framework 
This thesis draws both upon 'classic' treaty and customary sources of international 
law and upon the numerous resolutions, declarations, recommendations, agendas, 
programmes and platforms of action adopted by the General Assembly, World 
Conferences and other multilateral fora in the area of the environment(104). Frequent 
(101) See infra Chap. 6/4/ii. Advancement of Women to Protect the Environment, or Protection of the 
Environment to Enhance the Advancement of Women?. 
(102) See infra Chap. 6/4/1 Introduction and Chap. 6/4/3. Towards a More Holistic Approach to 
International Environmental Law: the Environment-Human Rights Law Dimension. 
(103) See Chap. 6/4. supra n. 99, and Chap. 6/5. 
(104) As indicated by the of the lists of resolutions and recommendations and other documents annexed 
to the thesis, which length is comparable to the list of the treaties. The existence of sourcebook of soft 
international environmental law, and the introduction of a soft law section in international environmental 
law sourcebook is also indicative of the weight attributed to soft documents in this area of international 
law; see Burhenne, & Jahnke, International Environmental Soft Law, Collection of Relevant Documents 
(looseleaf), (Kluwer Law International, 1993-pres. ); Burhenne & Robinson (eds. ), International 
Protection of the Environment: Conservation in Sustainable Development (booklets) (Oceana, 1995- 
pres. ); Hohmann, (ed. ), Basic Documents of International Environmental Law (Graham & Trotman, 
1992) Vol. 1; Sands et al. (eds. ), Principles of International Environmental Law: Documents in 
International Environmental Law (Manchester University Press, 1994), Vol. HA. 
Introduction 22 Chapter 1 
references are also made to framework conventions and preambular clauses of treaties 
and declarations. 
Environmental law, alongside the law regulating economic relations and 
development(105), constitute an area in which the so-called 'soft regulation'(106) has most 
predominantly emerged, bringing those sectors of law at the 'thin edge of international 
law'(107). In the field of economic relations and development, the proliferation of 'soft 
instruments' testifies primarily to a strategy of developing countries to using their 
numerical majority at the United Nations General Assembly and at the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development to counter the hegemony of industrialised 
States, and amend classic international rules considered fundamentally biased in favour 
the latter(108). 
(105)More particularly on the development and use of 'soft law' in economic relations, see Gruchalla- 
Wesierski, 'A Framework for Understanding "Soft Law"', 30 McGill LJ (1984), 37; see also Benedek, 
'Progressive Development of the Principles and Norms of International Law Relating to the NIEO, The 
UNITAR Exercise', 36 ÖZÖRV (1986), 289; Bollecker-Stern, 'The Legal Character of Emerging Norms 
Relating to the NIEO: Some Comments', in Hossain (ed. ), Legal Aspects of the New International 
Economic Order (Frances Pinter/Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), Chap. 2; Chowdhury, Legal 
Status of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States', in Hossain (ed. ), ibid., Chap. 3; Flory, 
Droit international du developpement (Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), Chap. II; Mendelson, 
The Legal Character of General Assembly Resolutions: Some Considerations of Principle', in Hossain 
(ed. ), ibid., Chap. 4; Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law, 2nd edn. (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1992), Chap. 4, more particularly 37 et sequ.; Tomuschat, 'Die Charta der wirtschaftlichen Rechte und 
Pflichtender Staaten, Zur Gestaltungskraft von Deklarationen der UN-Generalversammlung', 36 ZaÖRV 
(1976), 444; Virally, `La deuxieme decennie des Nations Unies pour le d6veloppement, essais 
d'interpretation para; juridique', 16 AFDI (1970), 9; Virally, 'La Charte des droits et devoirs 
economiques des Etats : Notes de lecture', 20 AFDI (1974), 57; see also infra Chap. 2/2/ii Sovereignty 
over Economic Assets and Policy in a New International Economic Order. 
(106) That is regulation traditionally considered as formally non-binding due to its authors, hortatory 
content or/and its location into a legally binding treaty or convention. The use of the terms soft law and 
the distinction made between soft and hard law remains controversed in the doctrine; the considerations of 
the pros and cons for such classification of law is not directly relevant for this thesis and is thus not 
considered here; specifically on this issue see Bothe, 'Legal and Non-Legal Norms: a Meaningful 
Distinction in International Relations 7', 11 Netherlands YbIL (1980), 65; Klabbers, 'The Redundancy of 
Soft Law', 65 Nordic JIL (1996), 167, and referencescontained therein. See also Handl, 'National Use of 
Transboundary Air Resources : The International Entitlement Issue Reconsidered', 26 NRJ (1986), 405, 
at 407 et sequ.; Reisman, 'International Law-Making: A Process in Communication', 75 ASIL Proc. 
(1981), 101, at 102. 
(107) Lang, infra n. 109. 
(108) See infra Chap. 2, Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, and on the 
changing structure of international law, references Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership, 1. Introduction. 
Generally on the move away from classic law-making techniques to softer approaches, see Danilenko, 
Law Making in the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993). Danilenko is particularly critical 
of the increasing use of'soft' law-making techniques and observes the discussions about the legal value of 
'soft' rules «raise fundamental questions about the continued ability of international law to serve as an 
effective normative instrument contributing to the maintenance of the world order. There is a danger that 
international law will become just a loose collection of vague precepts used as a disguise for conflicting 
political claims couched in legal or quasi-legal language»; ibid., at xiv. 
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In the area of the environment by contrast, the important number of rules and 
declarations expressed in hortatory terms, or issued by institutions or organs formally 
deprived of the authority to take legally binding decisions or impose rules on the issue is 
more appropriately described as a 'voluntaristisches Defizit'('09) from the part of both 
developed and developing States. 
The phenomenon indeed reflects States' recognition of the necessity to take some 
measures on certain environmental issues, combined with a lack of genuine political will 
to set forth legally binding rules where a certain degree of uncertainty remains as to the 
actual necessity and potential implications of such rules(11O). It also reflects the 
difficulty to agree upon universal rules in the light of the fundamental inequality in the 
level of economic and scientific development of States, hence in the financial and 
technical means available(111). Besides, the rapid development of science and knowledge, 
as well as the constant emergence of new sources of environmental threats and pollution 
have highlighted the extreme rigidity and cumbersome nature of orthodox sources of 
international law, and the necessity to complement them with more flexible sources(112). 
As Fenwick pointed out: 
«The existence of a general forum where problems can be discussed and 
resolutions adopted makes it possible to meet critical situations before they 
reach the point of a dangerous crisis. ) (113) 
Among the 'alternative sources' that contribute more particularly to the development 
of international law in the area of the environment count the resolutions, 
(109) Lang, 'die Verrechtlichung des internationalen Umweltschutzes, vom "soft law" zum "hard law"', 
22 AVR (1984), 283, at 285. 
(110) See Dupuy, 'Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment', 12 Michigan JIL (1991), 
420, at 421 et sequ.; Lang, ibid supra n. 109; Sand, 'UNCED and the Development of International 
Environmental Law', 3 YbIEL (1992), 3, at 6 et sequ.; Tomuschat, infra n. 115, at 568. On States' 
reticence to take international binding measures despite of persistent scientific uncertainty with regard to 
the actuality of given environmental threat or harm, see infra Chap. 3, Prevention and Precautionary 
principles. 
(111) Beck, Die Differenzierung von Rechtsplichten in den Beziehungen zwischen Industrie- und 
Entwicklungsländern. Eine völkerrechtliche Untersuchung für die Bereiche des internationalen 
Wirtschafts-, Arbeits- und Umweltrechts (Peter Lang, 1994), Chap. IV; Lang, ibid. supra n. 109; see 
further infra Chap. 5/3, The Parameters for Global Co-operation. 
(112) Boyle, 'Treaties and Soft-Law', Paper presented at Forum Geneva, Multilateral Treaty Making: The 
Current Status of Challenges to and Reforms Needed in the International Legislative Process, organised 
by the American Society of International Law and the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes 
Internationales, Geneva, May 16,1998; Dupuy, ibid. supra n. 110; Tomuschat, infra n. 115, at 565. 
See also Dan Tarlock, 'Stewardship Sovereignty: The Next Step in Former Prime Minister Palmer's 
Logic', 42 Washington University Journal of Urban & Contemporary Law (1992), 21, at 22-23; 
Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy, Negotiating more Effective Global Agreements (Oxford University 
Press, 1994), Chap. 2. 
(113) Fenwick, ` International Law : the Old and the New', 60 AJIL (1966), 475, at 480. 
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recommendations and declarations issued by political bodies and the various agendas 
and platforms adopted by international fora, and the drafts and recommendations 
prepared by legal but private organs. In the 'harder' part of the law, particular 
consideration is paid to non legally binding provisions such as preambular clauses to 
treaties, and to framework conventions. 
As to the resolutions, decisions and other non-binding form of recommendations 
from political organs(' 14) and fora vested with no legislative mandate apart from a 
general recommendatory power(115), the view prevails in the doctrine(116) and among 
(114) As far as the UN General Assembly is concerned, a suggestion was expressly rejected at the 
Conference of San Francisco, to vest it with a limited legislative mandate and confer a certain legal 
authority to its recommendations. No mention 'of the General Assembly recommendations was finally 
included in the 1945 ICJ Statute, Art. 38(1), that lists the formal sources of international law, see 
Mendelson, supra n. 105, at 96 et sequ. The General Assembly is merely vested with recommendatory 
powers to the UN Members, on various matter with the UN Charter (1945 UN Charter, Arts. 10 to 14), 
inter alia «for the purpose of promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging 
the progressive development of international law and its codification»; Art. 13(1)(a). The implicit 
competence of the General Assembly to take binding decisions was recognised in a limited number of 
instances, such as in the context of the revocation of the League of Nations Mandate and the resolution, 
with the consent of the administering authority, the control of trusteeship agreement (so-called 'definitive 
legal effect' of UNGA resolution) see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion, ICJRep. 1971,16, at 31; Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. 
United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 2 December 1963: ICJ Rep. 1963,15, at 32; 
Certain Phosphates Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 
1992,240, at Para. 23. See extensive bibliography of the abundant literature on the question of the value 
of General Assembly resolutions in Oppenheim'sInternational Law, Vol. 1, § 16, n. 1. Kiss & Shelton 
identify essentially three organs vested with a limited authority to take binding resolutions on 
environment related matters: (1) the Security Council, by virtue and in the limited context of 1977 
ENMOD Convention, Art. 5; (2) OECD, whose decisions are in principle binding upon States parties 
unless stated otherwise. OECD however constitutes more of a consultative and research institution than a 
law-making authority, and issues essentially recommendations suggesting measures and providing 
guidelines (frequently referredto in this thesis) rather than takes binding decisions committing States to 
specific action. (3) The EC, vested with full law-making authority, and whose competence on 
environmental matters is now explicitly recognised; see infra Chap. 3, Prevention and Precautionary 
Principles, n. 43 and 44 (CR); Kiss & Shelton, International Environmental Law, 109 et sequ. 
(115) This includes most importantly international Conferences, which saw a revival of popularity in the 
recent years, with no less than five Conferences convened between 1992 and 1995 on diverse global 
issues of an 'economic, social, and humanitarian character' in the sense of 1945 UN Charter Art. 1(3), 
namely the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 
1992, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. 1 (3 Vol. ); the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14- 
25 June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23; International Conference on Population and Development, 
Cairo, 5-13 September 1994, UN Doc. A/CONF. 171/13; the World Summit for Social Development, 
Copenhagen, 6-12 March 1995, UN Doc. A/CONF. 166/9; and the Fourth World Conference on Women, 
Beijing, 4.15 September 1995, UN Doc. A/CONF. 177/20. For a brief discussion on the outcome of these 
five Conferences, see Tomuschat, The Concluding Documents of World Conferences', in Makarczyk 
(ed. ), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21" Century (Kluwer Law International, 
1996), 563. 
(116) See Brownlie, Principles, 14 et sequ. and 699 et sequ.; Charney, 'Universal International Law', 31 
AJIL (1993), 529; Dupuy (P. 
-M. ), 'Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment', 12 
Michigan JIL (1991), 420; Dupuy (R. J. ), 'Declaratory Law and Programmatory Law: From 
Revolutionary Custom to "Soft Lam", in Akkerman et al (eds), Declarations on Principles: A Quest for (continued) 
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industrialised States, that such instruments are not, strictly speaking, legally binding 
upon States(117). Industrialised States have more particularly reaffirmed the purely 
voluntary nature of international law and dismissed the legal value of General Assembly 
resolutions in the context of the debate on a new international economic order, for the 
obvious reason that they were not keen to surrender their law-making authority on 
issues to which they are firmly opposed, to organs and Conferences taking their 
decisions according to the majority rule, and where they are in numerical minority(118)_ 
More recently, a number of States have reasserted their understanding of the non- 
binding nature of concluding declarations and programmes of action of international 
Conferences, and expressly reserved their sovereign right regarding the implementation 
Universal Peace (Sijthoff, 1977), 247; Kolasa, 'Some Remarks on the Concept of Resolution and 
Decision of International Organizations', in Makarczyk (ed. ), Essays in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 493; Lang, ibid supra n. 109; Lauterpacht (ed. ), Oppenheim's International 
Law, 8th edn, Vol. 1 (Longman, Green & Co., 1955), at § 168(i) et sequ.; Oppenheim's International 
Law, Vol. 1 (9th ednJ; Para. 16; Virally, 'La valeur juridique des recommendations des organisations 
internationales', 2 AFDI (1956), 66, and Resolutions et Accord International', in Makarczyk (ed. ), 
Essays in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs (Martinus Nijhog 1984), 299; see also the position of the 
Institut de Droit International, infra n 132. See however contra, CastaAeda, 'La valeur juridique des 
resolutions des Nations Unies', 129 RdC (1970-I), 211, at 213; Sloan, `The Binding Force of a 
Recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations', 25 British YbIL (1948), 3, at 24, and 
'General Assembly Resolutions Revisited', 58 British YbIL (1987), 39. 
(117) This is notwithstanding the law-making effect of the resolution or recommendation on the internal 
order of the issuing organisation or institution (self-regulatory effect; actes auto-normateurs); see Kolasa, 
supra n. 116, at 493 et sequ.; Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, § 248; Virally, 'La valour juridique des recommendations des organisations internationales', in Virally, Le Droit International en 
Devenir (PUF, 1990), 169, at 172 et sequ. 
(118) See most notably the position of industrialised powers with respect to 1974 NIEO Declaration and 
NIEO Programme of Action, adopted by consensus, with reservations however from the part of the US, 
FRG, France, UK and Japan; the text of the reservations are reproduced in 13 ILM (1974), 744. See also 
the statement of US Ambassador Scali, extracts in 70 Department of State Bulletin (1975), No. 1822, 
569. No consensus could be reach on the subsequent 1975 Economic Charter, which was adopted by a 
vote (120 to 6, Belgium, Denmark, France, UK, US and Luxembourg, and 10 abstentions from other 
major market economies, Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway 
and Spain). The most controversial Article 2(2)(c) had to be adopted separately, with 104 votes in favour 
and 16 opposed votes (the six States also against to the whole Charter, plus those, but Israel which 
abstained, opposing it) and 6 abstentions. Already during the drafting stage, some controversy arose as 
regard to the mandatory character of the Charter, and industrialised States made it clear that such a 
document could not realistically be considered as anything more than a declaration of intention; see 
Castalieda, 'La Charte des droits et devoirs 6conomiques des Etats, Note sur son processus 
d'elaboration', 20 AFDI (1974), 31; Virally, 'La Charte des droits et devoirs economiques des Etats : 
Notes de lecture', 20 AFD1 (1974), 57; and further infra. Chap. 2/2/ii. Sovereignty over Economic 
Assets and Policy in a New International Economic Order. More particularly on US opposition to the 
Charter, see Statement by Senator Percy, in 72 Department of State Bulletin (1975), No. 
, 
1858,146. 
Similar reactions were triggered by the developing States' attempt to realise their claim for a new 
international economic order in the context of the exploitation of the deep-sea mineral resources, inter 
alia with the 1970 Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil 
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. On the status of this' declaration, see Li, The 
Transfer of Technologyfor Deep Sea-BedMining, the Law of the sea Convention and Beyond (Martins 
Nijhoff, 1994), at 34 et sequ.; see further infra Chap. 5/2/ iii. Common Heritage of Mankind under the 
1982 UNCLOS: Attempt to Set up a Marine Partnership. 
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the recommendations contained therein. The US declared, for instance, to understand 
and accept that the 1995 Beijing Declaration/Platform for Action for the Advancement 
of Women «are not legally binding, and that they consist of recommendations 
concerning how States can and should promote the objectives of the Conference, unless 
States indicate to the contrary(119). Guatemala explicitly reserved its «sovereign right to 
implementation contained in the Platform for Action... »(120). Similar statements were 
made for the 1995 Copenhagen Declaration/Programme for Social Development(121), and 
although no such declarations were issued with regard to 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development and 1992 Agenda 21 in toto, the political nature of the 
documents was reiterated by a number of States in relation to specific paragraphs or 
provisions(122). 
Sometimes, the non-binding nature of an instrument is specified in the very title or 
text of the instrument, as it is the case for the Non-Legally-Binding Authoritative 
Statement of Principles for Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and 
Sustainable Development of all Type of Forests(123), or for the various clauses in 1992 
Agenda 21, which provide that States are not obliged any further under the Agenda than 
they are under relevant legal instruments(124). 
It is worth noticing in this context that the term reservation is also used by States to 
qualify their decision to wave a resolution or recommendation with respect to 
themselves(125). Virally, one of the few authors to comment on this point, considers 
that the effects of a reservation to a decision taken by consensus is similar to the effects 
(119) Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, UN Doc. A/CONF. 177/20, at 173; the US and 
other States entered similar 'reservations' with regard to specific paragraphs of the Platform; see 
Reservations and interpretative statements on the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, ibid., at 
157 etsequ. 
(120) Ibid. supra n. 119, at 160. 
(121) Report of the World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, UN Doc. A/CONF. 16619, at 
111. 
(122) Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. 1 (Vol. II), at 17 et sequ.; the reservations and statements are more particularly 
considered in the subsequent Chapters when relevant. 
(123) On the failure to adopt a Forestry Convention, see infra Chap. 2/2/iii. Sovereignty over 
Environmental Resources and Environmental Policies versus Globalisation of Environmental Standards 
and Policies. 
(124) See for instance Para. 9.2. 
(125) Reservations were entered for instance with regard to 1974 NIEO Declaration and NIEO Programme 
of Action, and to the 1970 Strategy for the Second Development Decade; supra n. 118, and Virally, 'La 
deuxi8me dßcennie des Nations Unies pour le developpement, essais d'interpretation pars juridique', 16 
AFDI (1970), 9. 
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of a reservation to a multilateral treaty(126); one could also follow the view that such 
reservations enhance a contrario the legal significance of the resolution. 
Indeed, to deny any formal legal nature to 'political' recommendations, declarations 
and agendas is not tantamount to saying that such instruments are deprived of any legal 
significance'(127). The real issue, as underlined by Virally, «ne se reduit pas ä une simple 
alternative entre l'existence et l'absence d'une force obligatoire; c'est [un probleme] plus 
vaste et plus difficile de la signification juridique de l'invitation portee par la 
recommandation, des effets de droits qu'elle peut produire, ä defaut meme d'obligation 
directement et immediatement creee»(128). This notion of 'legal significance' as opposed 
to 'legally binding character' of a rule or principle is far from being clear-cut. The legal 
significance however, relates more to the broad influence of a rule or principle, whilst 
the binding character relates its normative content, in terms of the rights, obligations or 
limits imposed. 
The International Court of Justice has acknowledged, on several occasions, that the 
'persuasive force of General Assembly resolutions can be indeed very considerable', 
although it made it clear that such force operates at the political level, and 'does not 
make these resolutions binding in law'(129). Hence, whilst a large majority of resolutions 
from political bodies remain hortatory and 'declarative' in essence (prescriptive 
resolutions)(130), a restricted number of important resolutions or recommendations are 
accorded some degree of legal significance (law-making resolutions)(131). 
(126) 
'Resolutions et Accord International', in Makarczyk (ed. ), Essays in Honour of Judge Manfred 
Lachs (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 299, at 303; Tomuschat seems to adopt a similar stance with regard to 
disclaimers and reservations on Conference concluding documents; supra n. 115, at 568 et sequ. 
(127) Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. I, § 16 n. 1 in fine; Tomuschat, supra n. 115, at 563. 
(128) Virally, supra n. 117, at 171. 
(129) South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1966,6, at Paras. 50-53; see also Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1971,16, at 31; 
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1975,12, Paras. 54-59; Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ 
Rep. 1986,14, at 100. The Court reiterated its position in its recent decision over East Timor, but 
cautiously avoided to reconsider its position on the legal nature of resolutions; see East Timor (Portugal 
v. Australia), Judgment, ICJRep. 1995,90, Para. 29. See however ICJ recognition of a directly binding 
characterin a limited number of cases, supra n. 114. The importance of resolutions was also discussed 
in various international arbitrations; for instance Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co & California Asiatic Oil 
Co v. Government of Libyan Arab Republic (1975 and 1977), 53 ILR (1979), 389; see also subsequent 
decisions in the same sense, infra Chap. 2/2/i, Sovereign Control over, and Exploitation of Mineral 
Resources and other Natural Assets. The is no case-law on the 'legal significance' of Conference 
resolutions or decisions, but there is no real ground for departing from what is said about General 
Assembly resolutions; Tomuschat, infra n. 115. 
(130) Brownlie, Principles, 699. In 1968, Skubiszewski pointed out that among the over 2000 
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in its first twenty years of existence, only a few could be (continued) 
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There are no unified standards, no general rules to distinguish between these two 
main categories(132), and resolutions are evaluated on a case by case basis according to 
the following elements: 
1) The wording of the resolution or declaration, and the normative conception 
underlying it. Like any potential new rule of international law(133), the actual effectivity, 
hence the legal significance of that norm incorporated into a formally binding or non- 
binding instrument depends on the determinacy of the norm, viz. «on the precision of 
the provision, the kind of action prescribed, and any implied or explicit escape clauses)) 
('norm-creating character') (134). Some authors contend in fact that the lack of 
enforceability of resolutions and other political statements pertains more to the 
discretion left to the addressee to interpret subjectively the content of the obligation, it 
being understood that «the less precise the norm, the greater is the discretion of the 
addressee of the obligation»(135). 
Clearly however, the degree of precision is one but not the sole factor that evidences 
a certain legal significance of a declaration or resolution. As often, States consent to 
wider and more detailed plans of actions and programmes in political instruments than 
regarded as law-making; Skubiszewski, `A New Source of the Law of Nations: Resolutions of 
International Organisations', in Recueil d etudes de droit international en hommage a Paul Guggenheim 
(Faculte de Droit de 1'Universitd de Geneve & IUHEI, 1968), 508, at 508. 
(131) Brownlie, Principles, at 14. 
(132) This two-fold distinction is a pure creation of the doctrine, reflected to a certain extent in the 
judicial and arbitral decisions mentioned above, supra n. 129; it is therefore neither reflected in, nor 
regulated by international law as such. In such context, the conclusions of the Commission on the Value 
of the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, appointed by the Institut de Droit 
International in 1977, under the chair of Prof. Skubiszewski, are particularly useful to help identify the 
nature of such resolutions; 57 Ann. ID1(1977), Pt. II, 96, at 102-103. Skubiszewski's Report was first 
submitted at the Helsinki Session in 1985 (61 Ann. IDJ (1985), Pt. I, 29) and the final conclusions of the 
Institute on the report postponed to the Cairo Session, two years later; 62 Ann. IDI (1987), Pt. II, 204; 
the conclusions are reproduced in Institut de Droit International, 'L'elaboration des grandes conventions 
multilaterales et des instruments non conventionnels A fonction ou A vocation normative', Annuaire, 
Resolutions 1957-1991, (Pedone, 1992), 180; see also Dupuy (P. 
-M. ), Dupuy (R. J. ), and Virally, ibid. 
supra n. 116. 
(133) The 'none-creating character' of new rules and principles in international law is more particularly 
considered infra Chap. 3/2/ iii. Status of Precautionary Principle under International Law, Chap. 4/3/ iii. 
Operational Implications of a Planetary Trust. 
(134 ) Dupuy, `Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment', 12 Michigan JIL (1991), 420, 
at 254. 
(135) As Bodansky rightly points out, the determinacy of a norm influences compliance more than its 
legal or non-legal character, `Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law', 3 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (1995), 105, at 118. In the same sense, Gruchalla-Wesierski, 
'A Framework for Understanding "Soft Law", 30 McGill LJ (1984), 37, at 71. Some authors presume 
the non-legally binding character of rules worded in general and vague terms unless evidence of the 
contrary, Dupuy, ibid supra n. 134; Schachter, `The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International 
Agreements', 71 AJIL (1977), 296, at 297-298. 
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they would in legally binding documents for the very reason that they know themselves 
not legally bound(136); the successive Strategies for the United Nations Development 
Decade, the NIEO Programme of Action and 1992 Agenda 21 are but clear illustrations 
of this trend. Tomuschat, ironically commenting on the 'dazzling mass of statements 
that request, claim, admonish, exhort and recommend' contained in the latter document, 
considers that «[t]he reader feels compelled to conclude that almost uninhibited leeway 
was given to every delegation to insert into the text any amendment it considered useful 
notwithstanding the fact that may times the same idea was already expressed 
somewhere else, maybe even in different places»(137). 
2) The voting record, where the resolution is taken by a vote(138), and the eventual 
reservations in case of consensus resolution(139). The doctrine remains divided as to 
whether only unanimously supported resolutions can be attributed a certain law-making 
value(140), or whether resolutions adopted with an important majority, including those 
States most affected or concerned, should also be considered(141). 
3) The expectation that compliance with the norm embodied in the resolution or 
declaration will be effectively enforced by sanctions and other forms of pressures. 
Resolutions and declarations, on the contrary to treaty or customary rules, are not 
susceptible of judicial (or arbitral) enforcement. In the area of the environment however, 
«les occasions dans lesquelles les differends inter-etatiques sont portes devant une 
jurisdiction sont si rares que cette inferiorite ne porte pas beaucoup ä 
consequences»(142) 
The 'structural weakness' of international environmental law indeed, pertains more to 
the unwillingness of its subjects to enforce it and take legal action against failing States, 
(136) 
van Dijk, 'Normative Force and Effectiveness of International Norms', 30 German YbIL (1987), 9, 
at 20 et sequ. 
(137) Tomuschat, supra n. 115, at 567. 
(13 8) A positive vote is usually interpreted as an expression of agreement to the rule(s) embodied in the 
resolution, and a negative vote an opposition; the implication of an abstention and of a non participation 
to the vote remains more controversial; Virally, Resolutions et Accord International', in Makarczyk (ed. ), 
Essays in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 299. The importance of the voting 
record was particularly emphasised by Dupuy in the Topco case; supra n. 129. 
(139) A decision taken by consensus is considered as agreed to by all States unless States have explicitly 
reserved their positions; Virally, ibid supra n. 138. 
(140) 
van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law (Kluwer Law & Taxation, 1983), 186. 
(141) Brownlie, Principles, 14; Falk, 'On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly', 
60 AJIL (1966), 782. 
(142) Virally, supra n. 138, at 306; see further references infra Chap. 2, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, n. 98 et sequ. (CR). 
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than to the often 'soft' nature of that law itself(143). Apart from the classic Pacific Fur 
Seals arbitration(144), the Trail Smelter arbitration(145), Lac Lanoux arbitration(146), 
environmental issues have been rarely brought to the attention of international judicial 
organs. Environmental considerations were part of the arguments in Certain Phosphates 
Lands in Nauru(147) and in the Request for an Examination of the Situation in 
Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgement of. 20 December 1974 in the 
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case(148). As for fisheries jurisdiction cases, 
they were concerned with territorial jurisdiction (qualified with 'the needs of 
conservation') more than environmental issues per se(149). 
States tend to prefer out-of-court settlements to international adjudication to resolve 
environmental disputes for various reasons(150), ranging inter alia from the 'perceived 
lack of bite' of the ICJ or other ad hoc arbitration bodies, the desire to resolve the 
dispute promptly, to more strategic calculations(151). In some countries, domestic laws 
(143) Epiney, 'Das "Verbot erheblicher grenzüberschreitender Umweltbeeinträchtigungen" : Relikt oder 
konkretisierungsfähige Grundnorm ? ', 33 AVR (1995), 309, at 313; Mann, 'Environmental Learning in a 
Decentralized Political World', 44 JIA (1991), 301, at 322. 
(144) (1893), 1 Moore International Arbitrations, 755. 
(145) Final Award (1936), IIIRL4A, 1965. 
(146) (1957) X IRL4A, 281. 
(147) (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICI Rep. 1992,240. The case resolved 
with an out-of court settlement, raised interesting questions relating to fiduciary obligations embodied in 
the mandate and trusteeship systems. More particularily on the environmental aspect of the dispute, see 
Anghie, "'The Heart of my Home": Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the Nauru Case', 34 
HarvardlL7 (1993), 445. 
(148) ICJRep. 1995,288. 
(149) See inter alia Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Iceland), Merits, ICJ Rep. 1974,3, at 31. The 'needs of conservation' is also at the centre of Canada's 
defence strategy in the new fisheries jurisdiction case (Spain v. Canada) over the seizure of the Spanish 
trailer Estai off Canada's jurisdictional waters. The case however, provided the ICJ dismisses the 
preliminary objections presented by Canada, is more likely to be tackled under its jurisdictional aspect 
than its environmental dimension. 
(150) See more extensively on that issue Boisson de Chazournes, 'La mise en oeuvre du droit 
international dans le domaine de la protection de 1'environnement: enjeux et defis', 99 RGDIP (1995), 37, 
at 46 et sequ.; Dunoff, 'Institutional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ & Trade-Environment Disputes', 15 
Michigan JIL (1994), 1043, at 1088 et sequ. 
(151) It is not rare that an injured State renounces to take action against the source State ((because 
, 
on 
other occasions, that nation may be a source of pollution... »; Dunoff, supra n. 150,1093. It is for 
instance suspected that Germany chose not to take any action against Switzerland after the Sandoz blaze, 
for its responsibility for similar toxic spills in Switzerland earlier; Schwabach, Note: 'The Sandoz Spill: 
The failure of International Law to Protect the Rhine from Pollution', 16 Ecology LQ (1989), 443, at 
470. The issue of indemnity in the case of Sandoz has been resolved exclusively via out-of-court 
settlements between Sandoz Chemical Corporation and the affected States, and in few cases, between 
Sandoz and the affected individuals; Lefeber, Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Origin (continued) 
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were enacted that explicitly exclude the ICJ jurisdiction for any disputes that would 
arise from activities or areas regulated(152). As to arbitral procedures provided in some 
environmental treaties, they are often optional rather than compulsory(153). 
Compulsory adjudication of environmental agreements is therefore the exception rather 
than the rule(154). In this context, the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case recently decided by 
the International Court of Justice assumed a particular importance for the development 
and affirmation of a number of contested principles of environmental law considered in 
this thesis, inter alia the 'no substantial harm principle'(155), the precautionary 
principle(156), the principle mandatory prior consent(157) and the principle of 
responsibility and accountability to future generations(158). More generally, the parties 
submitted that the principle of sustainable development' was applicable to the 
dispute(159). 
of State Liability (Kluwer law International, 1996), 251-252. Likewise, the UK decision not to act 
against the against the Soviet Union and its successors could lie in its own massive contribution for acid 
rain in Scandinavia, and contamination of the Irish Sea; Sands, 'The Environment, Community and 
International Law', 30 Harvard ILJ (1989), 393, at 406. No State has taken the initiative to act against 
the Soviet Union on the behalf of its citizens, although a number of countries, including the UK, 
Germany, Sweden and Switzerland are reported to have paid indemnities to their own affected nationals; 
Sands, 'Transboundary Nuclear Pollution : International Legal Issues', in Sands (ed. ), Chernobyl : Law 
and Communication (Grotius, 1988), Introduction, at 26 et sequ.; also Dutoit, 'L'accident dc 
Tchernobyl et ses consequences en droit sovietique et en droit international public', in Dutoit et al., 
Pollution transfrontiere/Grenzüberschreitende Verschmutzung : Tschernobyl/Schweizerhalle (Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn, 1989), Chap. I; Lefeber, ibid., 246 etsequ. 
(152) See most notably Canada's reservation of jurisdiction with regards to her Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act, declaration of 7 April 1970,592, and more recently, Canada's reservation excluding ICJ's jurisdiction for disputes arising out of the application of 1994 Canada Coastal Protection Act, infra 
Chap. 2, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, at 78, n. 100 (CR). See also Poland's 
declaration of acceptance of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction, reserving explicitly cases involving 
disputes with regard to pollution unless the jurisdiction of the Court results from treaty obligations of the 
Republic of Poland; reported by Szafarz, Poland Accepts the Optional Clause of the ICJ Statute', 85 AJIL 
(1991), 374. 
(153) Sand, 'Transnational Environmental Disputes', in Bardonnet (cd. ), The Peaceful Settlement of 
International Disputes in Europe: Future Prospects, Hague Academy of International Law Workshop 
1990 (Martinus Nijhoff, 199 1), Chap. 7, at 123-124. 
(154) Kiss, 'Le reglement des differends Bans les conventions multilaterales relatives A la protection dc 
1'environnement', in Dupuy (ed. ), The Settlement of Disputes on the New Natural Resources, Hague 
Academy of International Law Workshop 1982 (Martinus Nijhof, 1983), 119. 
(155) Infra Chap. 2, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, n. 193,202 and 210 (CR). 
(156) Infra Chap. 3, Precautionary Principle, n. 84 (CR). 
(157) Ibid. supra n. 156 at n. 172 (CR). 
(158) Infra, Chap. 5, Intergenerational Equity, n. 85 and 104 (CR). 
(159) Reported by Judge Weeramantry, (sep. op. ), Case concerning the Gabclkovo IVagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 25 September 1997, General List, No. 92,37 ILM (1998), 204, at 205 n. 
1. The final judgement of the ICJ is more particularily considered in the concluding part of the thesis, (continued) 
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In sum, the expectations of compliance pertain less to the intrinsic judicial 
enforceability of the norm considered, and more to its degree of precision and the 
'willingness of the addressees to accept it as a guideline for their behaviour'(160). Other 
criteria, such as the competence and regional 'representativity' of forum, institution or 
body issuing the rule(161), or the substantive consistence of the norm with other norms 
of the system need also be taken into consideration(162). 
The legal signification of various political decisions or recommendations can be 
essentially threefold. Some resolutions constitute a source of interpretation of 
international treaty and customary law on the same issue (interpretative resolution). It 
is usually recognised for instance that General Assembly resolutions in one of the areas 
of the UN Charter represents an authoritative source of interpretation of the relevant 
Charter provisions(163). Other resolutions reflect and clarify existing customary 
international law, and help the crystallisation of customary norms (law-declaring 
resolution)(164). The most controversial resolutions however, and also the most common 
in the area of the environment (and economic relations) are those stating emerging 
principles upon activities not yet regulated in international law, and with regard to 
which state practice is scarce (prospective resolution)(165). 
It is widely admitted that prospective resolutions constitute at most a basis and 
catalyst for, indeed an'important stage' in the progressive development of international 
infra Chap. 7, Evaluation of Sustainable Development as an Emerging Principle of International 
Environmental Law. On the way the case is reported in the thesis, see infra n. 93. 
(160) van Dijk, supra n. 136, at 16. 
(161) Chamey, supra n. 116, at 546-547; Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, §§ 249 et sequ.; 
Virally, ibid. supra n. 138. 
(162) van Dijk, ibid. supra n. 136. 
(163) This is for instance the case of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 1960 
Decolonisation Charter; 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations. 
(164) See for instance the 1962 landmark Resolution on Sovereignty over Natural Resources; see further 
infra Chap. 2/3. The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: a Principle of 
Customary Law. 
(165) Terminology of the various resolutions after Dupuy, 'Declaratory Law and Programmatory Law: 
From Revolutionary Custom to "Soft Law"', in Akkerman et al (eds), Declarations on Principles: A 
Quest for Universal Peace (Sijthoff, 1977), 247. For the latter category, the expression of 'droit 
transitionel' was also suggested; Chaumont, 'Valour juridique des resolutions des Nations Unies', 129 
RdC (1970-1), 366, at 367. The 1970 Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, 
and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, the 1974 NIEO Declaration and 
NIEO Programme of Action, and 1975 Economic Charter clearly belong to the category of prospective 
resolutions. So does as we shall see, part of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
which for the other part, restates existing customary law. 
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law(166) and the 'speedy consolidation of customary rules'(167), but enter into customary 
law 'by the usual process'(168). Hence, some resolutions or recommendations can be 
interpreted 'with all due caution' as the expression of States' opiniojuris on the rule(s) 
its embodies(169); likewise, States' support 
-explicit or implicit- for a resolution or 
recommendation can provide some evidence of state practice(170). Conclusive evidence 
of a consistent state practice(171), most particularly from those States mostly affected 
or concerned by the matter(172), or an explicit endorsement of the rule in treaty law(173) 
(166) Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa), notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJRep. 1971,16, 
at 31; Danilenko, 'The Theory of International Customary Law', 31 German YbIL(1988), 9; Primrosch, 
`Das Vorsorgeprinzip im internationalenUmweltrecht', 51 ZÖR (1996), 227, at 228. 
(167) Brownlie, Principles, 14. The 'formative influence' of soft law in international environmental law 
was more particularily emphasised by the Institut de Droit International's Sub-Commission on Procedure 
for Adoption of Rules in the Field of the Environment at its 1997 rapport of the same name; see draft 
reports and comments of individual members of the Sub-Commission in 67 Ann. IDI (1997-1), 357 et 
sequ. and final report at 437 et sequ. The formative importance of soft law in the development of 
international environmental law was even enshrined in a draft resolution; ibid., at 474, Para. 8. 
(168) Birnie, 'International Environmental Law : its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs', in Hurrell 
& Kingsbury (eds. ), The International Politics of the Environment (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 2, at 99. 
See contra n. 116. Sloan considers that «in those areas and on those matters where sovereignty is not 
vested in a Member State, the General Assembly acting as an agent of the international community may 
assert the right to enter the legal vacuum and take binding decisions; 25 British YbIL (1948), 3, at 24. 
(169) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment, ICJRep. 1986,14, Paras 188 and 203; see also Danilenko, supra n. 166, at 
36. 
(170) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra n. 169; see also Brownlie, 
Principes, 14; Charney, Universal International Law', 31 AJIL (1993), 529, at 546-547; Virally, 
Resolutions et Accord International', in Makarczyk (ed. ), Essays in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs (Martinus Nijhofl 1984), 299, at 300. 
(171) As for the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, or at least Princ. 21; see 
Birnie, ibid. supra n. 168; Brownlie, Principles, 15; Charney, ibid supra n. 170; Handl, `Territorial 
Sovereignty and the Problem of Transfrontier Pollution', 69 AJIL (1975), 58; Pineschi, 'The Antarctic 
Treaty System and General Rules of International Environmental Law', in Francioni & Scovazzi (eds. ), 
International Law for Antarctica (Giuffr8,1987), 187; see infra Chap. 2/3, The Principle of Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources: a Principle of Customary Law. 
(172) Institut de Droit International, 'L'6laboration des grandees conventions multilaterales et des 
instruments non conventionnels ä fonction ou ä vocation normative', Annuaire des Resolutions 1957- 
1991, (Pedone, 1992), 185, Conclusion 8. 
(173) As for instance, in the case of the unanimously adopted 1962 Declaration of the Legal Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, translated into binding law 
with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. It is also contended that the resolution served in fact as 'midwife for 
the delivery of nascent rules of instant international customary law', and that it was therefore binding even 
before being codified; see Brownlie, Principles, 15; Cheng, 'United Nations Resolution on Outer Space: 
'Instant' International Customary Law ? ', 5 Indian JIL (1965), 23, at 39. The codification on the 
protection of the atmosphere was also preceded by numerous resolutions and recommendations on the issues; see infra Chap. 3/2/ii/c. Precaution and Sustainable Development; Chap. 5/2/iv. Common 
Concern, Common Interest of Mankind: Global Partnership or Global Bargain?. Another example is the 
influence of the decisions and recommendations issued at a series of political Conferences on the (continued) 
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remain necessary before the rule embodied in a resolution or declaration acquires a 
legally binding character. 
In the area of the environment law at least, decisions, recommendations, agendas and 
other instruments issued by multilateral fora, or. international institutions or 
organisations, contribute immensely to the development of international law on the 
issue, and indeed accelerate the traditional custom and treaty-based law-making 
process(174). Their impact is more immediate 
-albeit arguably more limited- in the sense 
that they do not need to go through domestic procedures of treaty approval, nor 
through the process of treaty ratification to enter into force(175). 
Consequently, although most recent declarations, resolutions and agendas referred to 
in the thesis might not have yet crystallised into binding international environmental 
law, they embody the 'common expression of the will and collective judgement of 
States'(176), and deserve full consideration as indicators of the future trends of that 
law(177). 
Drafts, guidelines and decisions of various legal or technical bodies or institutions 
specialised(178) or not(179) in international environmental law contribute equally to the 
development and codification of that branch of law, and are therefore frequently 
Protection of the North Sea held at the Ministerial level, over the legal process of re-negotiation of the 
North East Atlantic regime; see infra Chap. 3/2/ii/c. Precaution and Sustainable Development. 
(174) Sand, 'UNCED and the Development of International Environmental Law', 3 YbIEL (1992), 3; see 
also Birnie & Boyle, at 19 et sequ.; Epiney, supra n. 143, at 311; Kiss & Shelton, International 
Environmental Law, 110 et sequ. and 1994 Suppl. at 55 et sequ.; Lang, 'Luft und Ozon 
- 
Schutzobjekte 
des Völkerrechts', 46 ZaÖRV (1986), 261, at 2263 et sequ.; Palmer, `An International Regime for 
Environmental Protection', 42 Washington University Journal of Urban & Contemporary Law (1992), 
5, at 14. Charney even suggests that on certain matters with pronounced law-making potential, such as 
the environmental issues considered at the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development, repeated 
endorsements in multilateral fora tend to replace the custom law-making process; supra n. 170, at 549. 
See however more sceptical, Bodansky, supra n. 135, at 106. 
175 This point was more particularily developed by Boyle, in a paper on 'Treaties and Soft-Law', 
presented at Forum Geneva, Multilateral Treaty-Making: The Current Status of Challenges to and 
Reforms Needed in the International Legislative Process, organised by the American Society of 
International Law and the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva, May 16, 
1998. 
(176) See South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa), Voting 
Procedure, ICI Rep. 1955, Judge Lauterpacht (sep. op. ) 115; Fisheries case, Judgment of December 18th, 
1951: ICJRep. 1951,116, Judge Alvarez (sep. op. ), at 148. 
(177) Röling, International Law in an Expanded World (Djambatan, 1960), at 85; Susskind, 
Environmental Diplomacy, Negotiating more Effective Global Agreements (Oxford University Press, 
1994), Chap. 2. Also Bekhechi, 'Le droit international A 1'6preuve du developpement durable', 6 1lague 
YbIL (1993), 59. 
(178) Most notably IUCN, UNEP, WCED and WECD-EG. 
(179) See ILA, IDI, and ILC. 
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acknowledged throughout the research(180). Although formally deprived of law-making 
authority, and, in some cases, the result of a purely 'private' initiative(181), such drafts 
represent nevertheless a valuable source of information about existing international 
environmental law, and provide 'a realistic basis for legal obligations'(182), hence paving 
the way to future codification(183). 
(180) The most common drafts are listed in the table of non-binding environmental instruments appended 
to the thesis and are referred to in the text in an abbreviated manner, without their location being 
necessarily repeated. 
(181) Apart from UNEP, set up as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations in the aftermath of the 1972 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment to catalyse environmental action and raise awareness 
world-wide, and co-ordinator of environmental activities within the UN system, among States and 
governments, regional groupings and NGOs, and ILC, created in 1947 as a subsidiary organ of the UN 
General Assembly, to work for the progressive codification of international law, the organisations 
contributing to the development and codification of international law are the result of private initiatives. It 
is noteworthy that UNEP was originally attributed a catalytic and policy-oriented role and was not 
intended to deal much with law-making. In practice however, UNEP has largely contributed to the 
development of environmental law, most notably in the area of the regional seas and of the protection of 
wildlife and biodiversity; UNEP, Twenty Years Since Stockholm, Annual Report 1992, (UNEP, 1993), 
Chap. 1,3 and 4; see also Birnie & Boyle, at 47 et sequ.; Palmer, 'New Ways to Make International 
Environmental Law', 86 AJIL (1992), 259, at 260 et sequ.; Petsonk, 'The Role of the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) in the Development of International Environmental Law', 5 American 
UniversityJIL & Policy (1990), 351. 
(182) On the contribution of ILC, IDI and ILA in the codification of international law in general, see 
Brownlie, Principles, 30; Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. I, §§ 16 in fine, 30 and 31 (on ILC), 
and § 24 (on IDI and ILA). More particularly on their contribution in the codification of international 
environmental law, see Birnie & Boyle, at 27-28; Dupuy, 'Soft Law and the International Law of the 
Environment', 12 Michigan JIL (1991), 420, at 423 et sequ.; Lang, 'die Verrechtlichung des 
internationalen Umweltschutzes, vom "soft law" zum "hard law"', 22 A VR (1984), 283, at 290 et sequ.; Sands, Principles, Vol. I, Chap. 3 (64 et sequ. ). 
(183) Boyle, supra n. 175. To mention only the most frequently cited in the thesis, see for instance 1956 
ILA Principles of the Law Governing the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 1966 ILA Helsinki 
Rules on the Use of Waters of International Rivers, and successive ILC Draft Articles on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, widely reflected both in the 1992 ECE 
Watercourses Convention and 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses. See also 1978 UNEP Draft Principles on Shared Natural Resources, 1982 ILA Rules on 
Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin, and 1986 ILA Rules on the Law of International Groundwater Resources. 
The ILA 1982 Montreal Rules of International Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution and ILA 1984 
Draft Rules on Legal Aspects of Long-Distance Air Pollution have also widely influenced the codification 
and adaptation of international regulation on long-range transboundary air pollution. Likewise, 1985 
UNEP Montreal Guidelines on the Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution from Land- 
Based Source played a certain role in the elaboration inter alia of 1992 OSPAR Marine Environment Convention, and the UNEP 1987 Cairo Guidelines on Hazardous Wastes inspired the drafters of the 1989 
Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and to some extent of 1991 
Bamako Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes. The 1987 UNEP Guideline on 
Environmental Impact Assessment was an important platform for the negotiation of the 1991 ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, not to mention the important influence of the 1986 
WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development in the drafting of what was 
intended to be an Earth Charter, and finally lead to the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development. See also the considerable work of IUCN in the process leading to the 1992 Conference on 
Environment and Development, and more recently its milestone 1995 Draft International Covenant on 
Environment and Development, that might contribute to future development of general principles of (continued) 
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Another remarkable feature of the sources in the area of environmental law relates to 
what could be called the 'soft use of hard law'(184). A number of principles and rules 
relied upon in the thesis, including the principle of sustainable development(' 85), are 
contained in the soft or non-binding part of treaty law, viz. in preambular clauses. Like 
declarations and recommendations, preambular clauses are not, per se, a source of 
formally legally binding obligations. The Preamble to a treaty contains, apart from the 
list of the Contracting Parties, an 'expose des motifs' setting the general framework, 
spirit and goal of the treaty(186), and frequently embodies the ideas, concepts and 
principles which proved too controversial to be directly incorporated in the body text. 
It constitutes an element of interpretation of the document it prefaces('87), and also 
gives some indications about the future orientations of international environmental law. 
In an early case, the ICJ stated clearly, referring more specifically to the United Nations 
Charter, that 
«preambular parts constitute the moral and political basis for the specific 
legal provisions thereafter set out. Such considerations do not, however, in 
themselves amount to rules of law»(188). 
The so-called 'framework-protocol approach' constitutes another technique 
employed to set forth the general basis and framework for future actions on a 
particularly disputed issue without committing States to binding rules or specific 
measures and policies(189). Under this approach, a general institutional and legal 
framework of action on a given issue is first negotiated between States, with more 
specific and detailed provisions and commitments reserved for in annexes or subsequent 
international environmental law, more particularly on IUCN's contribution to the development of 
international environmental law, see infra Chap. 6/1, Introduction. One could also mention the 
numerous OECD and ECE guidelines and drafts; see list of Declarations, Resolutions and Other Relevant 
Documents. 
(184) Kiss, 'Concluding Observations on Transboundary Air Pollution and the Emerging Concepts of 
International Law', in Flinterman et al. (eds. ), Transboundary Air Pollution: International Legal 
Aspects of the Co-operation of States (Martinus Nijhoi 1986), Chap. 18, at 359. 
(185) See referencessupra n. 21 to 59. 
(186) Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, § 75. 
(187) 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(2); see also Case concerning the Rights of 
nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment of August 27th, 1952: ICJ Rep. 1952, 
176, at 196-197; South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa), 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962: ICJRep. 1962,319, at 330-331. 
(188) South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJRep. 1966,6, at § 50. 
(189) Terminology afterBodansky, 'The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change :A 
Commentary', 18 Yale JIL (1993), 451, at 493 et sequ. Also Beyerlin, Rio-Konferenz 1992: Begin einer 
globalen Umweltrechtsordnung? ', 54 ZaoRV (1994), 124, at 141 et sequ.; Kiss, 'Les traites-cadres: unc 
technique juridique caracteristique du droit international de 1'environnement', 39 AFDI (1993), 792. 
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protocols elaborated within the legal framework previously agreed, if necessary with the 
co-operation of scientists and other competent persons or organisations, it being 
understood that a consensus is more easily reached on principles and institutional 
framework, than on detailed commitments(190). Such a'step-by-step approach to regime 
building'(191) has proved particularly useful in the area of the environment, in the light of 
(a) the pervasive scientific uncertainty about certain environmental phenomena and 
processes, hence the difficulty to justify certain environmental measures proposed, and 
(b) the reticence of States to commit themselves to specific measures the very necessity 
and potential extent of which remain uncertain(192). The framework-protocol technique 
was used inter alia with respect to acid rain(193), the ozone layer(194), and climate 
change(195), and had previously been tested in UNEP regional seas program(196). Only 
the 1992 Climate Change Convention is explicitly qualified as framework in its title(197). 
(190) Caron, 'La protection de la couche d'ozone stratospherique et la structure de l'activite normative 
internationale en mati8re d'environnement', 36 AFDI (1990), 704, at 707; Kiss, 'Les traites-cadres: une 
technique juridique caracteristique du droit international de 1'environnement', 39 AFDI (1993), 792. 
(191) Lang, 'Diplomacy and International Environmental Law Making: Some Observations', 3 YbIEL 
(1992), 108, at 119 etsequ. 
(192) The attitude of the US at the Climate Conference held in Kyoto, 1-13 December 1997, convened to 
negotiate an international protocol to the 1992 Climate Change (Framework) Convention on the 
reduction of greenhouse gases (1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention) epitomises 
particularly well States' reticence in this respect; see 'For a Global Energy Policy to Limit Greenhouse 
Gases', International Herald Tribune, 17 November 1997,10; 'Les Etats Unis et l'Europe s'afIrontentA la 
ConferenceClimatique de Kyoto', Le Monde, 30 November-1 December 1997,2; 'Forecast for Climate 
Talks: Storms, National Interests Clash on Averting Global Warming', International Herald Tribune, 1 
December 1997,1 and 4; 'At Kyoto Talks, America Gropes for a Policy on Global Warming', 
International Herald Tribune, 3 December 1997,1 and 10; 'Kyoto Klimakonferenz; Kühler Empfang für 
Amerika', Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3 December 1997,1; 'Climate Talks Hit Stumbling Block', 
Financial Times, 3 December 1997,6; Hard task to Win US Friends for the Earth', Financial Times, 4 
December 1997,4. See also 'la Terre se rechauffe; 3. Les Etats divergent sur les solutions', Enquete, Le 
Monde, 28 November 1997,17. See equally negotiation on the ozone layer protection, infra Chap. 
3/2/ii. c. Precaution and Sustainable Development, and generally Chap. 2, Prevention and Precautionary 
Principles. 
(193) 1979 ECE Transboundary Air Pollution Convention; Protocol to the 1979 ECE Convention on 
the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their 
Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent; 1985 Protocol to the 1979 ECE Convention on the 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or 
their Transboundary Fluxes; 1991 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution Concerning the Control of the Emmissions of Volatile Organic Compounds of their 
Transboundary Fluxes 
(194) 1985 Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer, 1987 Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer; 
Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer as amended/adjusted in 1990; Montreal Protocol on the Ozone 
Layer as adjusted/amended in 1992; see Caron, supra n. 190. 
(195) 1992 Climate Change Convention; and protocol on the reduction of greenhouse gases, supra n. 
192. Among the other framework conventions counts the 1991 Alps Convention, 1992 ECE 
Watercourses Convention, 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents Convention, 1992 Baltic Sea Convention, 
1992 Biodiversity Convention, 1992 OSPAR Marine Environment Convention, each supplemented with 
(continued) 
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iv. Terminological Clarifications 
" 
States are often `categorised' into groups for practical considerations, to offer an 
'international perspective' without neglecting however the divergent positions of States. 
Reference is made to the position of individual States in specific contexts insofar as it 
has a particular importance for the purpose of the thesis. States are most frequently 
categorised according to the classic North-South divide, which usually reflects well the 
existing fronts on environmental issues, at least under the perspective of sustainable 
development. As a result of purely personal choice, marginal consideration is paid to 
former Eastern European States. In this respect, the North is used interchangeably with 
developed, industrialised, and northern countries, to qualify those countries having 
achieved an advanced stage of development through industrialisation, which corresponds 
by-and-large to OECD States. The expressions South, developing countries, or the 
Third World, are used to refer to Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia. Those 
countries comprise the G77(198). The author is yet well aware that such categorisation is 
over-reductive, arbitrary and fails to reflect the different stage of developments achieved 
by individual countries. 
"A chronological list of binding, as well as non-binding, documents most frequently 
mentioned in the thesis is provided in separate tables at the beginning of the thesis, with 
at least one source of reference. To alleviate the footnotes, the listed documents will be 
summarily referred to with the year of adoption and full or abbreviated titles as 
indicated in the tables. All resolutions referred to are General Assembly resolutions, 
unless stated otherwise. Case-law is fully quoted to facilitate precise reference to pages 
or paragraphs. 
protocols or annexes. The 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses is also qualified as a framework convention in its preambular. Some authors have expressed 
reservations however as to the genuine framework nature of the convention, and consider on the contratry 
that a great majority of the convention provisions are specific enough to be a source of direct rights and 
obligations; see particularily Tanzi, 'La Convenzione di New-York sui corsi d'acqua internazionali', 80 
Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (1997), 956, at 974. To that author, the qualification as framework 
convention in the preambular suggests that the convention could serve as a model to other more specific 
convention. 
(196) See references in Bodansky, ibid. supra n. 189; Kiss & Shelton, International Environmental 
Law, at 102-103, and 1994 Suppl., 53 et sequ.; Kiss, supra n. 190. More generally, environmental 
treaties often embody programmatic commitments rather than strict mandatory provisions susceptible of 
direct enforcement; Kiss, supra n. 184, at 359. 
(197) Lang attributes such explicit reference to the political necessity to signal clearly that concrete 
measures are reserved for subsequent protocols; supra n. 182. 
(198) See explanation of the term and origins of the G77 infra Chap. 2, Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources, n. 29 (CR). 
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" 
Cross-references to other Parts of the thesis are structured as follow: the Chapter is 
first mentioned, followed where appropriate with the number of the section and 
subsection; the title mentioned refers to the specific section or subsection considered, 
unless of course the whole Chapter is concerned. Hence for instance, reference to a 
specific section reads as follow: Chap. 3/2/ii. c. Precaution and Sustainable Development; 
Reference to the whole Chapter would be: Chap. 2, Prevention and Precautionary 
Principles. Where the Chapter is not expressly mentioned, it means that the cross- 
reference refers to the same Chapter: see infra 2/ii. c. Precaution and Sustainable 
Development. 
" The masculine is usually employed in this thesis, albeit in a non-gender-specific 
way to denote both men and women without any offence being intended to women. 
3. Evolutionary Perspective of Sustainable Development 
i. Sustainable Development and Equilibrium State 
The complexity of sustainable development in terms of its nature and 
conceptualisation is but a reflection of the complexity of its origins and evolution. All 
too often, the 1987 WCED Report is credited with the creation of sustainable 
development. Such an attribution however, is partial and inaccurate. Whilst a milestone 
in the popularisation of the terms, and an important factor in the consideration of the 
issue in the United Nations, 1987 WCED Report constitutes one stage, not the source, 
of sustainable development. 
Sustainable development draws its origins in the late 1960 early 1970s, from the 
politico-economic discourse on the limits to growth, in a general context of economic, 
social and emerging environmental crisis. A landmark contribution to this debate and to 
the emergence of sustainable development was made by the project on the predicament 
of Mankind, commissioned by the 'Club of Rome'(199) in 1968, to evaluate the future 
trends of human society and the global economic, social, political and ecological system. 
In this perspective, an extremely complex computerised world model was set up, that 
(199) The Club of Rome is an informal college of personalities representing different disciplines and from 
different countries. First convened in 1968, on a purely private initiative to foster the understanding of the 
various interdependent components 
-economic, social, political and natural- of the global system and 
promote new policy initiatives, the Club was originally composed of 30 scientists, educators, humanists, 
industrialists, and national and international civil servants coming from 10 different countries. By 1972, 
the membership of the club had increased to 70 persons from 25 different nationalities. The Club 
commissioned D. H. Meadows, D. L. Meadows and J. Randers to compile a computerised study on the 
various alternative evolution of the global system, that became to be known as the Club of Rome Report, 
subsequently published under the forewarning title The Limits to Growth, A Report of the Club of 
Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind (Earth Island, 1972) (hereafter, The Limits to Growth). 
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integrated the variables 
- 
viz. variations in the level or physical quantities- associated 
with the following five major areas of concern: 
1) accelerating industrialisation and economic growth; 
2) rapid population growth; 
3) food shortage and widespread malnutrition; 
4) depletion of non renewable resources; 
5) environmental deterioration. 
The aim of the project was to predict possible future growth trends, and identify the 
most viable alternative, simply by programming the computer to produce pictures of 
the various future states of affairs given changes in the variables. The conclusions of the 
report were clear: if the present growth trends in the world population, industrialisation, 
pollution, food production and resources continue unchanged, the limits to growth will 
be reached sometime within the next hundred years. The most probable result will be a 
sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity (growth- 
and-collapse behaviour). The Report identified however a possible way to alter the 
growth trends and establish a condition of ecological and economic stability that is 
'sustainable far into the future': the state of equilibrium, in other words, a zero-growth of 
the population and the economy. 
The experience was reiterated twenty years later, and the same conclusions were 
reached, with one additional remark: despite man's technological capacity and stronger 
environmental awareness, sustainable environmental limits have now been reached(200). 
The Club of Rome's world model has remained, and was then largely perceived, as a 
purely rhetorical model, besides imperfect, oversimplified and unfinished. It was based 
on strictly programmed information and did not for instance account for the unpredicted 
or 'unpredictable' elements such as epidemics, wars, or technological progress. It was 
also largely unrealistic for the drastic policies and unacceptable state interventions into 
both familial and economical circles it implied, not to mention the renunciation of 
acquired privileges and luxury. The Report was finally largely dismissed as a prediction 
of doom. 
The conclusions of the Club of Rome's Report were, for a great part, echoed in the 
Blueprint for Survival published by The Ecologist the same year: 
«The principal defect of the industrial way of life with its ethos of 
expansion is that it is not sustainable. We can be certain that sooner or later 
(200) Meadows et al., Beyond the Limits, Global Collapse or a Sustainable Future, (Earthscan, 1992). 
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it will end, whether against our will, in a succession of famines, epidemics, 
social crises and war, or because we wanted to. » (201) 
In the same way as the Club of Rome, The Ecologist concluded that the combination 
of increase in human beings and in per capita consumption had an unsustainable impact 
on the environment in terms of both the resources taken from it, and the pollution 
imposed on it. Homo Sapiens Industrialis is assimilated to a bull in a china shop, with 
the only difference that the bull might try to adapt its behaviour to its environment 
should it have the capacity to realise the fragility of the merchandise, whilst man tends 
rather to expect his environment to adapt to him(202). 
The Ecologist's Blueprint defined a sustainable society as a stable society(203), close 
to the Club of Rome's equilibrium state, and implied controlled and well-orchestrated 
changes on several fronts: 
1) minimisation of the disruption of ecological processes generated by the introduction 
of foreign substances such as pesticides, fertilisers, domestic sewage or industrial 
wastes, or by the correction of the existing ones; 
2) maximisation of the conservation of stocks (free use of the flow) of materials and 
energy; 
3) stabilisation of the population; 
4) new decentralised social system, such as to reinforce the community feeling and 
global awareness of the consumers. The Ecologist indeed assumes that the 
community feeling, essential in conservative actions involving restrictions, is eroded 
in an heterogeneous congeries of strangers sharing few common interests, and no real 
common future; 
5) an integrated perspective of economic growth, new technologies, pollution, use of 
natural resources and population in a common and global 'programme for survival'. 
Despite the fundamentally pessimistic nature of their message and the rhetorical 
character of the alternative suggested, both reports were nonetheless the first articulated 
expressions of sustainable development. Besides, they both raise a number of extremely 
important issues thenceforth constantly associated with sustainable development(204), 
namely: 
(201) 
'A Blueprint For Survival', 2 The Ecologist (1972), Para. 110. See also updated and 
complemented diagnosis of the environmental crisis published 20 years later, The Ecologist, Whose 
Common Future? Reclaiming the Commons (Earthscan, 1993). 
(202) Supra n. 201, Para. 129. 
(203) Supra n. 201, Paras. 210 et sequ. 
(204) porter & Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics (Westview, 1991), Chap. 1. 
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1) the needs for quantitative restraints on growth owed to the 'finiteness' and 
assimilative ceilings of the ecosystem; 
2) the necessity to follow an integrated and pluridisciplinary approach to environmental 
matters; 
3) the inherent limits of technological solutions and remedies. 
ii. Environment versus Development 
In a context of economic development crisis, and in the light of the radical change in 
the United Nations political constellation(205), it comes as no surprise that the 'no- 
growth' conception of sustainable development found no fertile ground at the first ever 
international Conference on global environmental issues, held at Stockholm in 1972. The 
no growth philosophy was wholly unacceptable, and indeed constituted an affront to the 
dignity of the majority of mankind that had not yet managed to fulfil most of its most 
basic needs(206). The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment was, on 
the contrary, firmly directed towards future development of techniques 
-((the capability 
of man to improve the environment increases with each passing day) )(207)-, and 
revitalisation of the Third World economy. 
The development versus environment conflict haunted the whole Conference(208), and 
despite repeated attempts inter alia from the part of the Conference Secretary to follow 
a more conciliatory and integrated perspective of both requirements, developing States 
would not abandon their rigid antagonistic conception of environment and development, 
and displayed an extreme reticence to international environmental standards or 
obligations in general. They considered environmental problems to be essentially the 
concern and the responsibility of industrialised countries, and perceived environmental 
(205) As from 1965, industrialised States lost their numerical majority as a result of the massive 
adhesion of newly independent 'developing' States. 
(206) Sicault & Kiss, 'La Conference des Nations Unies sur I'environnement (Stockholm, 5-16 juin 
1972)', 18 AFDI (1972), 603, at 612; also Morgan, 'Stockholm : the Clean (but Impossible) Dream', 8 
Foreign Policy (1972), 149, at 152. 
(207) Preambular Para. 5; also Princ. 8,9 and 18. 
(208) The Conference was largely dominated by the North-South, as part of the East European 
communist bloc including Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, boycotted the Conference over the failure to convene the German Democratic Republic as a 
participant; Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, 57. Communist States have also long 
considered environmental problems as a result of capitalist greed and private ownership; Porter & Welsh Brown, ibid supra n. 204. The position of communist States was even strengthened by the events in North Vietnam, largely considered as yet another manifestation of US imperialism, and in fact, many at 
the Conference feared that environmental issues on Agenda would be overshadowed by political 
antagonism; brief description of the political context in Morgan, ibid supra n. 206. 
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protection measures as 'duplicitous efforts to retard economic growth in the third 
world'(209). Developing States were far more concerned with the promotion of a new 
international economic (and marine) order than with the protection of the 
environment(210). 
The final Declaration and the Action Plan widely reflected the preoccupation of 
developing States(211). The Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment stated 
explicitly that «the developing countries should direct their effort to development»(212), 
and emphasised that «environmental policies of States should enhance and not adversely 
affect the present or future development potential of developing countries»(213) with 
due account taken of «the circumstances and particular requirements of developing 
countries»(214). The principles of common but differentiated responsibility(215), 
compensation(216) and additionality(217) were also embodied in the Action Plan(218). 
Hence, whilst sustainable development in the sense understood in this thesis 
underpinned in many ways the 1972 Conference on Human Environment(219), it was not 
(209) Haas, 'Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus', 19 
Millennium (1990), 347; also Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, 56 et sequ.; Leonard & 
Morell, 'Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing Countries: A Political Perspective', 17 
Stanford JIL (1981), 281. The negotiation of each principle is reviewed in detail in Sohn, `The 
Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment', 14 Harvard ILI (1973), 433. Sicault and Kiss attribute 
such fear to the disappointing result on development aid at UNCTAD, held only days before the 
Stockholm Conference; supra n. 206. 
(210)Environmental protection is besides barely mentioned in the 1974 NIEO Declaration and NIEO 
Programme of Action and in the 1975 Economic Charter; see infra Chap. 2/2/ ii. Sovereignty over 
Economic Assets and Policy in a New International Economic Order, and Chap. 5/2/ iii. Common 
Heritage of Mankind under the 1982 UNCLOS: Attempt to Set up a Marine Partnership. 
(211) Porter & Welsh Brown, ibid supra n. 204. 
(212) Preambular Para. 4. 
(213) print. 11. 
(214) print. 12. 
(215) The Principle of common but differentiated responsibility is also mentioned; Stockholm 
Declaration on Human Environment, Princ. 13 and Action Plan, Recommend. 102-109. 
(216) Action Plan, Recommend. 103. 
(217) Action Plan, Recommend. 109 in fine. 
(218) See Founex Report, infra n. 232, at 13, and further infra Chap. 5/3/i. Financial Assistance: 
Additionally and Compensation. 
(219) A majority of principles studied in the thesis were already embodied in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration; in fact, a combined reading of Princ. 2 and 3, respectively referring to future generations and the necessity to preserve the capacity of the earth to produce vital natural resources, would give a definition of the preservation of the human environment that is not so far from the classic definition of 
sustainable development mentioned above, supra n. 82. 
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explicitly enshrined in the final documents, probably in the light of the pessimistic 
connotation attached to it then, and most importantly in the light of the reluctance of the 
new numerical majority at the United Nations to link environment and development, and 
indeed support international environmental measures. Likewise, no proper 
environmental charter was negotiated, that would impose specific obligations on 
governments, in order to fulfil the aspirations of the world's people for a better 
environment. 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment remained but a 
non-binding declaration, couched in terms of general principles more than in terms of 
concrete obligations(220). 
Nevertheless, Stockholm announced a departure from traditional approaches to 
environmental issues towards a more 'sustainable' perspective on several aspects: 
Firstly a more global and genuinely international perception of environmental issues 
is substituted for the then prevailing conception of protection of the environment as a 
matter of good neighbourhood to be solved on a bilateral basis, or at the national level 
exclusively(221). As one author wrote in the early 1970s, it had become clear that: 
«the entire ecology of the planet is not arranged in national compartments; 
and whoever interferes seriously with it anywhere is doing something that is 
doing something that is almost invariably of serious concerned to the 
international community at large. ) )(222) 
Environmental rules thus shifted from rules of coexistence, to genuine rules of co- 
operation(223). Far from constituting an surrender of national sovereignty however, such 
a perception stressed on the contrary, the necessity for the States to exercise such a 
power collectively, with a greater sense of responsibility for common goods(224). 
«To achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance of 
responsibility by citizens and communities and institutions at every level, all 
sharing equitably in common effort (... ) A growing class of environmental 
problems, because they are regional or global in extend or because they affect 
(220) Sohn, supra n. 209, at 513. 
(221) Paradoxically however, the responsibility for the implementation of the various recommendations of 
the Action Plan was divided between the relevant UN bodies and agencies (FAO, UNESCO, WHO, 
WMO... ) and resulted in a restoration of the sector-based approach at the implementation level; Munn, 
'Toward Sustainable Development', 26 Atmospheric Environment (1992), 2725. 
(222) Kennan, 'To Prevent a World Wasteland', 48 Foreign Affairs (1970), 401. 
(223) Beyerlin, 'Rio-Konferenz 1992: Begin einer globalen Umweltrechtsordnung ? ', 54 ZäoRV (1994), 
124, at 127; see further infra Chap. 2/2. Objects of Permanent Sovereignty: From Mineral Resources to Environmental Policy, and Chap. 511. Introduction. 
(224) Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, at 22; Sands, `The Environment, Community and International Law', 30 Harvard ILI (1989), 393; see further infra Chap. 2/2/iii. versus Globalisation of Environmental Standards and Policies, and Chap. 3/2/ii/b. 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment: Institutionalisation of Prevention. 
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the common international realm, will require extensive co-operation among 
nations 
... 
» 
(225) 
Cautiously worded, the above statement departed nonetheless from the classic 
understanding reasserted on the eve of the Conference that: 
vas a general rule, [standards to preserve the environment] will have to be 
defined at the national level and, in all cases, will have to reflect conditions 
and systems of values prevailing in each country. » (226) 
Secondly, environmental issues were no longer taken in isolation (compartmentalised, 
sectoral approach), but in their interrelation with other issues, such as poverty(227), 
population growth(228), urbanisation(229), economic development(230) and human 
rights(231), reflecting the factual interrelatedness of these processes (holistic, inter- 
disciplinary approach)(232). 
Thirdly, intergenerational equity, already acknowledged in previous conventions(233), 
was clearly affirmed, recreating the link between past, present and future generations, in 
(225) 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, preamble Para. 7 
(226) UNGA Res. A/2849()CXVI), 20 December 1971 on Environment and Development; the resolution 
was adopted with 85 votes in favour, 34 abstentions, and 2 oppositions (US and UK). 
(227) 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, introductory Para. 4, and Princ. 8 to 14. 
(228) Ibid., introductory Para. 5, and Princ. 19. 
(229) Ibid., Princ. 15. 
(230) Ibid., introductory Para. 2. 
(231) Ibid., introductory Para. 1, and Princ. 1. 
(232) Kiss & Shelton, International Environmental Law, at 155 et sequ.; Kiss, Will the Necessity to 
Protect the Global Environment Transform the Law of International Relations ?, Occasional Paper, (Hull University Press, 1992), at 6 et sequ.; Beyerlin, supra n. 223, at 127; Dupuy, 'Oü en est le droit 
international de 1'environnement A la fm du si8cle? ', 101 RGDIP (1997), 873. For a more factual 
discussion of the interrelation of environmental processes, see for instance Tolba, Saving Our Planet, 
Challenges and Hopes (Chapman & Hall, 1992). See further infra Chap. 2/2/iii. versus Globalisation of 
Environmental Standards and Policies, and Chap. 3/2/ii/b. 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment: Institutionalisation of Prevention. The interrelatedness of environmental, economic and 
social issues, and indeed the necessity to adopt an integrated approach to environment and development 
was even more clearly expressed by a panel of experts convened at Founex, Switzerland, in June 1971, to 
explore development and environmental challenges. The resulting Founex Report is the first 
comprehensive document on the issue of environment and development; Environment and Development, 
The Founex Report on Environment and Development, Submitted by a Panel of Experts Convened by 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 4-12 June 1971, 
Founex, Switzerland, in International Conciliation No. 586 (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1972), 7. 
(233) 1945 Charter of the United Nations, preambular Para. 1; 1946 International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling, preambular Para. 1; 1968 African Convention on Nature, preambular Para. 6; 
also 1970 Strategy for the Second Development Decade, Para. 4. See infra Chap. 4/3/ii. Legal Basis fora 
Planetary Trust: Intergenerational Equity as a Fundamental Principle Deeply Rooted in International 
Law. 
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sharp contrast with the traditional conception of international obligation as obligations 
between contemporaneous members. 
«To defend and improve the human environment for present and future 
generations has become an imperative goal for mankind 
... 
» 
(234) 
Fourthly, the 1972 Stockholm Conference secured its place in the contemporaneous 
history with the adoption of the first global action plan for the environment although 
little was undertaken to implement it and secure its follow-up(235). The Conference 
constituted a springboard and set the institutional basis for future developments in 
international environmental law(236) 
iii. Sustainable Development 
A major contribution towards the transposition of sustainable development in 
international environmental discourse was taken with IUCN/WWFIUNEP's World 
Conservation Strategy(237). Construed as an intellectual framework and practical 
guidance for the conservation actions necessary to achieve a sustainable development, 
the World Conservation Strategy was confined to the exploitation of living or self- 
renewable resources, to the exclusion of non renewable natural resources. Of particular 
interest is the redefinition of two core actions, viz. development and conservation, that 
have both undoubtedly inspired the WCED's classic definition of sustainable 
development. 
(234) 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, preamble Para. 6; also Para 7 and Princ. 
1 and 2. UNEP was created to preserve and improve the environment for 'present and future generations'; 
see founding UNGA Res. A/2997(XXVII), 15 December 1972, on Institutional and Financial 
Arrangements for International Environmental Cooperation, preambular Para. 1. 
(235) Some authors consider in fact, that the decade that immediately followed the Conference was 
characterised by the virtual disappearance of the environmental matters from national political agenda 
despite the fact that the implementation of the Stockholm Action Plan rested primarily upon national 
action; Munn, `Toward Sustainable Development, An Environmental Perspective', 2 Development, 
Journal of SID (1989), 70. 
(236) On the impact of the Conference on the general development of international environmental law, see 
Birnie & Boyle, at 39 et sequ.; Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, at 59 et sequ.; Sands, 
Principles, (Vol. I), at 34 et sequ.; Kiss, 'Dix ans apres Stockholm. Une ddcennie de droit international 
de 1'environnement', 28 AFD1 (1982), 784; Kiss & Shelton, International Environmental Law, 41 et 
sequ.; Sohn, ibid supra n. 209. See also ASIL, 'Ten Years after Stockholm 
- 
International 
Environmental Law', 79 ASIL Proc. (1983), 411; Maffei, La protezione internazionale delle specie 
animali minacciate (CEDAM, 1992), 295 et sequ.; Sicault, & Kiss, 'La ConfErence des Nations Unies 
sur 1'environnement (Stockholm, 5-16 juin 1972)', 18 AFD1 (1972), 603, and anonymous Note: 'New 
Perspectives on International Environmental Law', 82 Yale LI (1973), 1658, attributed to Schneider by 
Picone in 'Obblighi reciproci ed obblighi erga omnes degli Stati net Campo della protezione internazionale dell'ambiante marino dall' inquinamento', in Starace (ed. ), Diritto internazionale e 
protezione dell'ambiente marino (GiutE'8,1983), 15, at 28 n. 27. 
(237) IUCN/UNEP/WWF, World Conservation Strategy (IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1980). 
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Development was defined as ((the modification of the biosphere and the application of 
human, financial, living and non-living resources to satisfy human needs and improve the 
quality of human life. To be sustainable, «development must take account of social and 
ecological factors, as well as economic ones; of the living and non-living resource base; 
and of the long term as well as the short term advantages and disadvantages of alternative 
actions)) (238). Conservation would command such a management of human use of the 
biosphere that «may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while 
maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations. 
Conservation was construed as 'a positive action that embraced «preservation, 
maintenance, sustainable utilisation, - restoration, and enhancement of the natural 
environment) >(239). 
- 
The 'separate' consideration of development and conservation was subsequently 
abandoned in the 1990 update of the World Conservation Strategy, for a more holistic 
vision of 'sustainable societies' both people-centred, and conservation-based(240). The 
World Conservation Strategy constituted an important source of reference for WCED's 
work on sustainable development. 
A major factor in the introduction of sustainable development in the UN fora 
however, was the progressive change in the attitude of developing countries towards 
international environmental action,, 
. 
hence the creation of a broadly favourable 
atmosphere to a more integrated perspective of environment and development clearly 
implied by sustainable development. Such change in attitude can be attributed to three 
major factors(241). 
1) the link increasingly drawn between environmental degradation and poverty 
illustrated that environment was not merely a problem of rich industrialised nations 
but indeed also a matter of concern to poorest nations(242); 
(238) Ibid. supra n. 237, Chap. 1, Para. 3. 
(239) Ibid supra n. 237, Chap. 1, Para 4. 
(240) IUCN/UNEP/WWF, Caring for the Earth (IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1991), Chap. 1. Sustainable 
societies have been purposely put in the plural, for there is not one unique definition of sustainable 
society, but only a series of broadly described principles and actions forming the basic structure of such a 
society, meant to be interpreted and adapted by each community according to its specific circumstances; 
ibid., at 8. 
(241) Kiss & Shelton, International Environmental Law, at 50 et sequ. and Leonard & Morell, supra n. 
209. 
(242) The link was already acknowledged at Stockholm, and by the Panel of experts convened at the initiative of the Secretary General of the 1972 Stockholm Conference a year before, although at the time 
the issue was perceived as one of priority 
-eradication of poverty via development first- rather than one 
calling for interrelated and simultaneous action. This question made by Indian Prime Minister speaking for the G77 is particularly illustrative in this respect: «How can we speak to those who live in the (continued) 
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2) the recognition of a close interrelatedness between environment on the one hand, and 
health, food, social progress on the other; 
3) the realisation of the important risk entailed by exportation of hazardous production 
by foreign northern companies to countries where environmental regulation was non 
existent or flexibly applied, and the responsibility finally rests upon developing 
States to cope with the environmental damage caused by unsafe use of such 
technology(243). 
The first illustration of the change in attitude of developing States towards 
environmental matters was reflected in the adoption of the World Charter for Nature in 
1982(244). The failure to adopt a binding text enumerating clear environmental rights and 
obligations has been a long-standing subject of scholarly debate, inflamed by the scarcity 
of concrete actions undertaken in furtherance of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on 
Human Environment. In September 1975 already, in a speech delivered to 12th general 
assembly of the IUCN held in Kinshasa, ex-Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko re-launched the 
idea of the formulation of global environmental principles in a World Charter for Nature. 
A set of general principles of conduct of both States and individuals limited to the 
conservation of living natural resources was elaborated by the IUCN panel of experts, 
villages and in the slums about keeping the oceans, the rivers, and the air clean, when their own lives am 
contaminated? Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters? »; quoted after Leonard & Morell, supra 
n. 209, at 282. For a particularly vibrant account of the link between developmental policies, poverty and 
environmental degradation on the African continent, see Timberlake, Africa in Crisis, The Causes, the 
Cures of Environmental Bankruptcy, (new edn, East African Educational Publishers, 1985). Timberlake 
then already mentioned sustainable development which he defines rather poetically as a development 
«which takes from the land only as fast and as much as the land can provide, which puts back into the 
land as much as it takes from it»; ibid. at 5. 
(243) The risk was more particularly illustrated with the Bhopal disaster in 1984. The sudden release of 
methyl isocyanate at the US Affiliate Union Carbide pesticide plant, left over 2,800 dead and 20,000 
injured. The thousands of individual applications for indemnification are being processed by Indian 
Courts, afterUS Courts dismissed all individual actions on the ground of forum non conveniens. By the 
mid 1995, more than ten years afterthe disaster had occurred, only 12 000 files had been considered, with 
over 6000 more to consider; and derisory compensation (an average of US $ 6000 per life) was granted on 
the basis of strict (but never published) criteria, in only 6 600 cases; see M. L. Bouguerra, 'Persistente 
impunite du pollueur', Le Monde Diplomatique, June 1995, at 11. In 1985, the Bhopal Gas Leak 
Disaster Act was passed, arrogating the exclusive power to act for the damages caused by the disaster to 
the Indian Government; Anderson, 'Individual Rights to Environmental Protection in India', in Boyle & 
Anderson, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon, 1996), Chap. 10, at 216. 
A US $ 470 million out-of-court settlement between the Union Carbide Corporation and the Indian 
Government was confirmed by the Indian Supreme Court on 19 February 1989, thereby exonerating the 
US registered Company of any criminal responsibility for the 6600 to 19 000 dead (depending on the 
sources) and many more injured after some toxic gas leaked from its subsidiary pesticide manufacturing 
plant in India. Public outcry however forced the Supreme Court to review its decision and consider the 
criminal responsibility of the US company; Lefeber, Transboundary Environmental Interference and the 
Origin of State Liability (Kluwer law International, 1996), 252 et sequ. 
(244) Some authors see in the WCN the first expression of sustainable development; Koester, 'From Stockholm to Brundtland', 20 EPL (1990), 14, at 15. 
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modelled upon the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The principles were 
submitted to the UN General Assembly by the delegation of Zaire, with the support of 
the Organisation of African States. The World Charter for Nature was nearly 
unanimously endorsed by UN General Assembly in October 1982, solely opposed by 
the US(245). 
The Charter, a genuine 'moral code of action'(246), acknowledges the interrelatedness 
of every form of life, economic, social and political stability and environmental 
preservation(247), and extensively addresses, albeit without expressly referring to it, the 
idea of sustainable consumption. 
«Lasting benefits from nature depends on the maintenance of essential 
ecological processes and life support systems, and on the diversity of life 
forms, which are jeopardised through excessive exploitation and habitat 
destruction by man. »(248) 
The yardstick of sustainable utilisation of living natural resources or ecosystems lies 
in the optimum sustainable yield, which introduces a margin of error, due for instance to 
inadequate or inaccurate data, and a safety margin to cover unpredictable events(249). 
Whilst adopted in the form of a non-binding United Nations General Assembly 
resolution, the World Charter for Nature represented nonetheless the first consensus 
endorsement of sustainable development by States(250), and paved the way for further 
development of international environmental law(251); some of its provisions were 
(245) And with 18 abstentions, most of them Amazonian States. On the history of the World Charter for 
Nature, see Burhenne & Irwin, The World Charter for Nature, Beiträge Zur Umweltgestaltung Vol. A 
90,2nd revised edn (Erich Schmidt, 1986), B; Wood, 'The United Nations World Charter for Nature: 
The Developing Nations' Initiative to Establish Protection for the Environment', 12 Ecology LQ (1985), 
977. See also Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, at 90 et sequ. 
(246) preambular Para. 3(a); the 1989 Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous 
Wastes qualifies the Charter as the expression of rules of ethics in respect of environment and 
conservation of natural resources; preambular Para. 14. For a 'definitive study' on the regime hasardous 
wastes management, see Kummer, International Management of Hazardous Wastes: The Basel 
Convention and Related Legal Rules (Clarendon, 1995). 
(247) Preambular Paras. 2(b) and 4(b). 
(248) Preambular Para. 4(a). 
(249) para. 1(4). See also Pam. 10, dealing extensively with the direct use, re-use and recycling of natural 
resources. 
(250) One should mention that the expression of sustainable development had already previously been 
used in international instruments; see for instance 1980 Strategy for the Third Development Decade, Para. 
44. 
(251) Birnie, 'International Environmental Law : its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs', in Hurrell & Kingsbury (eds. ), The International Politics of the Environment (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 2, at 81. 
Introduction 50 Chapter 1 
subsequently reflected in treaty law(252). For Caldwell, the World Charter for Nature is 
no less than «the Decalog of the International Environmental Movement, and the World 
Conservation Strategy (... ) its expression in practice»(253). 
The document to which sustainable development is usually associated with is the 
Report prepared by the World Commission on Environment and Development, 
commissioned by the General Assembly in the mid 1980s to examine the relationship 
between environment and development, and to formulate realistic proposals to address 
those issues in the future(254). The reputation of the Report is mostly due to the fact 
that it was the first document to offer an accessible, non technical presentation of the 
debate on sustainable development. 
The WCED Report was based on the premise that the successes and achievements in 
national and international societies are widely undermined by failures in the 
development and management of the human environment. In terms of absolute numbers, 
there are more hungry, illiterate people and people deprived of home, water and 
fuelwood than ever before, and the gap between rich and poor is widening. 
Environmental trends threatening the integrity of the planet are qualitatively and 
quantitatively increasing, and with them, the future of the world societies(255). WCED 
Report did not purport however to be «a prediction of ever increasing environmental 
decay,. poverty and hardship in an ever more polluted world among ever decreasing 
resources; rather, it was intended to be an affirmation of the «possibility for a new area 
of economic growth, one that must be based on policies that sustain and expand the 
environmental resource base»(256). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the report itself has examined the common challenges in 
separate chapters(257), WCED considered there is no separate environmental, 
developmental; energy or demographic crises but indeed interlocking crises; «[e]cology 
(252) The Charter was most notoriously echoed in the 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of 
Nature; reference is also made to it in the 1989 Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Wastes, supra n. 246. 
(253) Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, at, 93. 
(254) UNEP GC Dec. 11/3, on the Process of preparation of the environmental perspective to the year 
2000 and beyond, GAOR 38th Session, Suppl. No. 25 (A/38/25), Annex; endorsed by UNGA, 
A/Res. /38/161,19 December 1983 on the Process of preparation of the environmental perspective to the 
year 2000 and beyond. The Commission became known as the World Commission on Environment and 
Development. 
(255) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 1987), 29 et sequ. 
(256) Ibid. supra n. 255, p. 1. 
(257) Ibid. supra n. 255, Chap. 4-9. 
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and economy are becoming even more interwoven 
- 
locally, regionally, nationally and 
globally 
- 
into a seamless net of causes and effects»(258), that call for an integrated 
perspective to environment and development. To address this complex system of causes 
and effects, the WCED suggested its own path, largely inspired from the World 
Conservation Strategy. 
WCED was not only aware of the risks inherent in economic growth, «economic 
growth always brings risks of environmental damage, as it put increased pressure on 
environmental resources»(259). It was also conscious that economic development is 
necessary to eradicate another important source of environmental stress, that is 
poverty: The zero-growth alternative was thus ruled out. As one author suggested, «the 
maxim for sustainable development is not `limits to growth'; it is `the growth of 
limits»(260) 
WCED introduced sustainable development as 
«a framework for the integration of environment policies and development 
strategies in order to assure that growing economies remain firmly attached to 
their ecological roots and that these roots are protected and nurtured so that 
may support growth over the long term». (261) 
Like the World Conservation Strategy, WCED report recognised that there is no 
single blueprint of sustainability, but rather several paths proper to each nation and 
leading to the same objective. On the other hand, these paths are guided by common 
general principles, reflected in 1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental 
Protection and Development. 
The Brundtland report was wholly endorsed by the UN General Assembly the same 
year of its publication(262). At the same session, the Assembly approved UNEP's 
Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond(263), that restates more or less 
WCED's conclusions and recommendations, as a framework to guide national action and 
(258) Ibid supra n. 255,5. 
(259) Ibid. supra n. 255,40. 
(260) MacNeil, `Sustainable Development, Meeting the Growth imperative for the 21st Century', in 
Angell et al (eds. ), Sustaining Earth: Response to the Environmental Threat (Macmillan, 1990), Chap. 
17, at p. 196. 
(261)Ibid. supra n. 255,40. 
(262) UNGA, A/Res. /42/187,11 December 1987. 
(263) Endorsed by and annexed to UNGA, A/Res. 42/186,11 December 1987. See also 1988 Regional Strategy for Environmental Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources in ECE Member Countries Covering the Period up the Year 2000 and Beyond. 
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international policies(264). In December 1989, the General Assembly called for the 
Conference on the Environment and Development, 
«to elaborate strategies and measures to halt and reverse the effects of 
environmental degradation in the context of strengthened national and 
international efforts to promote sustainable and environmentally sound 
development in all countries. ))(265) 
Whilst the Conference has not created the expression of sustainable development, it 
has clearly attributed a certain legal existence, if not to the ideas underpinning 
sustainable development, already discussed at the 1972 Stockholm Conference on 
Human Environment, at least to the expression of sustainable development itself. It is 
the purpose of the thesis, to consider how far this legal mutation of sustainable 
development has been reflected in international environmental law. 
1'x 
(264) For an evaluation of the actual impact of the WCED Report and its endorsement at the national and 
international level, see Starke, Des raisons d'esperer, preparer notre avenir commun (Frison Roche, 
1992). 
(265) 1989 Resolution 44/228, on United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Para. 
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1. Introduction 
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources(1) is widely regarded 
as a supreme attribute of permanent, full and sovereign statehood under international 
(1) See generally on permanent sovereignty over natural resources: Birne & Boyle, 112 et sequ.; 
Bouveresse, Droit et politiques du developpement et de la cooperation (Presses Universitaires de France, 
1990), Second Part, Chap. 2; Brownlie, 'Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law', 162 
RdC (1979-1), chapter II (hereafter Brownlie, 'Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law'); 
Elian, The Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979) (hereafter Elian, 
The Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources); Fischer, `La souverainete sur les ressources 
naturelles' 8 AFDI (1962), 516; Gess, `Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources', 13 ICLQ (1964), 398; Hyde, 'Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources', 50 AJIL (1956), 854; 
Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, §§ 308 et sequ.; Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Humanities Press, 1978) (hereafter, Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resources); Rosenberg, Le principe 
de la souverainete des Etats sur leurs ressources naturelles (LGDJ, 1983) (hereafter Rosenberg, Le 
principe de la souverainet6 des Etats sur leurs ressources naturelles); Schwebel, 'The Story of the UN's 
Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources', 49 American Bar Association Journal (1963), 463; Subrata Roy Chowdhury, 'Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources', in Hossain and 
Chowdhury (eds. ), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (Frances Printer, 1984), Chap. 1; 
Sands, Principles (Vol. 1), 186 et sequ. 
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law(2). First raised in the late 1950s, in connection to the decolonisation process, 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources was originally held as a `basic constituent' 
of the right to self-determination(3); it was essentially invoked by `new' States to 
(2) UNGA, A/Res. /626 (VII), 21 December 1952, on the Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth 
Resources, for instance, proclaims that «the right of people to use and exploit their natural wealth and 
resources is inherent in their sovereignty»; also UNGA 1962 landmark Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources (preambular Para. 4); the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and Social Economic an Cultural Rights, common Art. 47/25, which follows: 
«Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to 
enjoy and utilise fully and freely their natural wealth and resources» (emphasis added). See also Report of 
the Secretary General on the Exercise on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources and the Use of 
Foreign Capital and Technology for their Exploitation, A/8058,14 September 1970. 
In the doctrine: Brownlie, 'Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law'; Cassese, Self- 
Determination of People: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 55-57; Quoc Dinh: 
Droit International Public, § 308; Oppenheim'sInternational Law, Vol. 1, Chap. 3 (§§ 106 et sequ. ); 
see also Elian, The Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 10; Rajan, Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources, Chap. 1; Schrijver, `Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources versus the 
Common Heritage of Mankind', in de Waart et al. (eds. ), International Law and Development (Martinus 
Nijhog 1988), 87. Some authors nonetheless would stick to the argument that permanent sovereignty, 
like the right to self-determination, has never ceased to be a purely political claim disguised in legal 
rights; O'Keefe, `The United Nations and Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources', 8 JWTL 
(1974), 239; see infra 3. The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: a Principle of 
Customary Law. The existence of a sovereign legal right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
in international law, and to some extent to correlated right to nationalise or expropriate, was already 
generally agreed both by developing States and by former colonial Powers, when it was first suggested to 
embody such right in a resolution. The major point of dissent lies essentially (a) on the pertinence to 
affirm in an international document a right already consecrated nationally, and (b) the conditions of 
exercise of the rights; see infra 2/i. Sovereign Control over, and Exploitation of Mineral Resources and 
other Natural Assets. 
(3) Brownlie, 'Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law', and Principles, 539 and 597; 
Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resource, Chap. 1; Rosenberg, Le Principe de souverainete des Etats 
sur leurs ressources naturelles, 131. The conjunction was consistently recalled in early statements of the 
principle, inter alia by UNGA resolutions: for instance 1960 Decolonization Charter, preambular Para. 8; 
A/Res. /523 (VI), 12 January 1952, on Integrated Economic Development and Commercial Agreements; 
A/Res. /626 (VII), 21 December 1952, on the Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth Resources; 
A/Res. /837 (I)X), 14 December 1954, Recommendations Concerning International Respect for the Right 
of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination; 1960 Decolonisation Charter, Resolution (preambular 
Para. 8, and operational Para. 2); 1962 landmark Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources (preambularPara. 2); A/Res. /2158 (XXI), 25 November 1966, on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources; A/Res. /2386 (XXIII), 19 November 1968, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources; A/Res. /2692 (XXV), 11 December 1970, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
of Developing Countries; A/Res. /3016 (XXVII), 18 December 1972, on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources of Developing Countries; A/Res. /3037 (XXVII), 19 December 1972, on a Charter on 
Economic Rights and Duties of States; A/Res. /3171 (XXVIII), 17 December 1973, on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources; 1974 NIEO Declaration (Paras. 2, and 4(h) and (i)). See also the 
terms of reference of the Commission on Natural Resources, appointed in 1958 by the UNGA, via 
ECOSOC, on the proposal of the Commission on Human Rights. A/Res. /1314 (XIII), 12 December 
1958, Recommendations Concerning International Respect for the Right of Peoples and Nations to Self- 
Determination, mandated the Commission to conduct «a full survey of the status of this basic element of 
the right to self-determination». 
During the drafting of or vote on the above resolutions, developing States delegations would often x1 er 
to economic self-determination, or economic sovereignty, thereby affirming the correlation between 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and complete and permanent self-determination. Thus for 
instance, at the 13th Session of the General Assembly (1958), the Yugoslav representative stressed that 
(continued) 
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counter continuing forms of'hegemonical' influence of former colonial powers and other 
powerful States, and restore total and effective control over their natural resources still 
under foreign domination(4). 
It has since been consistently reaffirmed throughout and well beyond the 
decolonisation context(s); it was most notably referred to in support of claims for a new 
international economic order. The principle was `revived' more recently, in an attempt 
to withstand the process of `internationalisation' of certain natural resources, for the 
sake of environmental conservation or the protection for the common interest of 
mankind. 
The structure of this section is essentially three-fold: first, it considers the various 
phases in the evolution of the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
and distinguishes those dimensions which are generally accepted as the components of a 
the right of self-determination would remain «... a dead letter where people were unable to freely dispose 
of their natural wealth and resources... », thereby reaffirming the view previously expressed by a Polish 
delegate that "... Sovereignty was obviously one of the principal safeguards of the exercise and continued 
existence of the right of self-determination"; a Chilean representative resorted to a more accusatory tone, 
and suggested that «... any one who doubted the right of ownership on natural resources, ipso facto cast 
doubt on the right of self-determination itselfo. A similar line of argument was developed at length by 
Romania, at the 20th Session, which, using its own experience as example, argued that «... no country 
could consolidate its national independence, and ensure its economic progress, until it exercised full 
sovereignty over its own natural resources... », and it went on to suggest that «It was the prospect of 
losing their profits that made some Powers so utterly opposed to the right of self-determination and to 
national sovereignty over natural resources. All the above extracts are contained in Rajan, Sovereignty 
over Natural Resource, at 56-58; see further position of Bulgaria (ibid., at 44), Ukraine (45), Chad and 
UAE (46), Ghana and Bolivia (47), Zambia (48), and Nicaragua (60). 
The correlation between permanent sovereignty over natural resources and self-determination was 
acknowledged in the United Nations Council for Namibia's Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia, 
27 September 1974; it is interesting to note that in that case, the matter was not about sovereignty over 
natural resources as a necessary condition to full and permanent self-determination, but rather one of full 
and permanent sovereignty as a necessary condition to exercise permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources; the Council undertook to preserve Namibia's natural resources on behalf of the latter, itself not 
in a position to exercise that sovereign prerogative. The first operational paragraph of the Declaration 
hence reads: 
«No person or entity, whether a body corporate or unincorporated, may search 
for, prospect for, explore for, take, extract, mine, process, refine, use, sell, 
export, or distribute any natural resource, whether animal or mineral, situated 
or found to be situated within the territorial limits of Namibia without the 
consent and permission of the United Nations Council for Namibia (... )» 
The Decree is reproduced in 13 ILM (1974) 1513. 
(4) Schachter, Sharing the World's Resources (Columbia University Press, 1977), 124 et sequ. 
(5) As `political' decolonisation proceeded, fulfilling aspirations to `political' self-determination, States 
tended to concentrate on `economic self-determination', and came progressively to assert the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources independently of any claim to political self-determination. 
The original correlation of the principle to self-determination was omitted in 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
on the Human Environment, Princ. 21, as well as in most subsequent referenceto permanent sovereignty. 
This flows essentially from the fact that such link was factual, accidental (temporal coincidence), than 
legal. 
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legal principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources under customary 
international law, from those which have remained essentially political incantations. It 
will then consider the actual implications of the principle, approaching the principle 
from the perspective of its limits, rather than its positive components; as it appears 
indeed, that the key and most disputed dimensions of permanent sovereignty in the 
particular context of international environmental law, pertain to its limitations, as much 
as to its positive implications. 
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources is probably the `oldest' and least 
contested principle among those considered in this thesis. Once considered an exclusive 
and absolute prerogative, it has increasingly become the object of interference or 
restrictions, as a result of the changing perspective of environmental regulations, as well 
as the intensification of inter-state relations, and related interdependence. 
2. Objects of Permanent Sovereignty: From Mineral Resources to 
Environmental Policy 
i. Sovereign Control over, and Exploitation of Mineral Resources and other Natural 
Assets(6) 
The issue of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was first brought to the 
fore by a group of developing States particularly rich in mineral resources(7), claiming to 
act in the vanguard of all the rest of developing countries, and fighting against economic 
remnants of the colonialist era towards complete emancipation(8). Their major theme 
was the right to expropriate and nationalise asymmetric concessional arrangements, held 
(6) More specifically on permanent sovereignty over oil resources and the right to nationalise: Mughraby, 
Permanent Sovereignty over Oil Resources (The Middle East Research & Publishing Center, 1966) 
(hereafter Mughraby, Permanent Sovereignty over Oil Resource), Chap. II and Part 4; O'Keefe, 'The 
United Nations and Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources', 8 JTVTL (1974), 239. Also on oil 
resources: Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Report prepared by the Secretary General, 
E/CN. 7/119,4 May 1981. 
(7) Mostly in petroleum resources (Algeria, Colombia, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Quatar, 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Venezuela) but also non fuel mineral resources, such as iron ore (Gabon, Mauritania, 
Venezuela), iron and steel (Liberia), copper (Zambia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia), bauxite (Jamaica), 
aluminium (Ghana), gold (Ghana) and diamonds (Sierra Leone, Ghana); see further Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Report prepared by the Secretary General, E/CN. 7/1983/5,7 April 
1983. The multiplication of commodity groupings or agreements in the 1970s also reflects the tendency 
of developing States to be more assertive with respect to their sovereignty over their natural resources, 
against what was increasingly perceived as the 'looting' of their natural resources by foreign companies, 
and gain control over the extraction and marketing of their resources; see Smith & Wells, 'Mineral 
Agreements in Developing Countries: Structures & Substance', 69 AJIL (1975), 560. 
(8) Dolzer, 'Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Economic Decolonization', 7 HRLJ (1986), 217. 
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as the major factor perpetuating economic subservience, hampering economic 
development, and preventing full satisfaction of the needs of indigenous populations. 
Hence for instance, as early as 1938, Mexico took a number of measures of 
nationalisation of the means of production, which include the establishment of a state oil 
monopoly, on the basis of the 1917 Mexican Constitutional Art. 27, expressly 
providing for the nationalisation of property as a means to'fulfil social needs(9). In Iran, 
the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951, was justified as a 
measure necessary, inter alia, to meet the needs of impoverished Iranian peoples(10). 
Such indiscriminate measures of nationalisation were widely challenged and are the 
object of abundant case-law, known en en bloc as the nationalisation cases(11)" 
Dating back to colonial time, the terms of these concessional arrangements were 
(9)See Rosenberg, Le Principle de la Souverainete des Etats sur leurs ressources naturelles, 80 et sequ. 
Also Bullington, 'Problems of International Law in the Mexican Constitution of 1917', 21 AJIL (1927), 
685. 
(10) See Iran's preliminary observations the case ofAnglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (Jurisdiction), Judgment 
of July 22nd, 1952: ICJ Rep. 1952,93, at 306. Egypt (1956), and Indonesia (1957) were soon to 
embrace the pace, and the phenomenon appeared to generalise in the 1960s and 1970s, with large-scale 
nationalisation of mineral extraction facilities in Iraq, Ceylon and Cuba (1961), Peru (1968), Bolivia and 
Zambia (1969), Chile (1970), Libya and Algeria (1971), Saudi Arabia and Mauritania (1972), and 
Kuwait (1973); some oil assets were also expropriated during the Iranian Islamic Revolution (1979). See 
generally Burton & Inoue, 'Expropriations of Foreign-Owned Firms in Developing Countries: A Cross 
National Analysis', 18 JWTL (1984) 396. 
(11) On the nationalisation in Libya. see for instance BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v. Astro Protector 
Compania Naviera SA, Sincat, & National Oil Corp. LAR (1973), 77 ILR, 543; BP Exploration Co 
(Libya) Ltd v. Government of Libyan Arab Republic (1973 and 1974) (BP case), 53 ILR, 297; Texaco 
Overseas Petroleum Co & California Asiatic Oil Co v. Montedison, Libyan National Oil Corp. & 
Viltanelle Etablissement (1976), 77 ILR, 584; Libyan American Oil Co v. Government of Libyan Arab 
Republic (1977) ((Liamco case), 62 ILR, 140; Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co & California Asiatic Oil 
Co v. Government of Libyan Arab Republic (1975 and 1977) (Topco case), 17 ILM (1978), 1; on which 
see Lalive, 'Contrats entre etats ou entreprises etatiques et personnes privCes. DCveloppements rCccnts', 
181 RdC (1983-III), 9, at 83 et sequ.; and more generally Lipstein, 'International Arbitration Between 
Individuals and Governments and the Conflict of Laws', in Cheng & Brown, Contemporary Problems of 
International Law: Essays in Honour of Georg Schwarzenberg on his eightieth Birthday (Stevens & 
Sons, 1988), 177; see also Rigaux's strong critique, 'Des Dieux et des Heros: Reflexions sur une 
sentence arbitrale', 67 Revue Critique de Droit International Priv6 (1978), 16. Cases related to 
nationalisation in Cuba: Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino et al., (1964) 376 US 398; on which see 
Julliard, 'L'affaireBanco Nacional de Cuba c/ Sabbatino', 11 AFDI (1965), 205; in former Congo: AGIP 
Co v. Popular Republic of the Congo (1979), 21 ILM (1982), 726; Benvenuti & Bonfant v. Popular 
Republic of the Congo (1980), ibid., 740; in Iran: Oil Field of Texas Inc. v. The Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, National Iranian Oil Co (1986), Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Chamber 1, 
reproduced in 21 JWTL (1987), 107; in Kuwait: Government of the State of Kuwait v. American 
Independent Oil Co (Aminoil) (1982), 21 ILlL1 (1982), 976; on which see Redfern, 'The Arbitration 
Between the Government of Kuwait and Aminoil', 55 British YbIL (1984), 65; also Lalive, supra, at 
147 et sequ. and Lipstein, ibid supra. See also cases related to nationalisation of copper industry in 
Chile: Sociedad Minera el Teniente £4 v. Norddeutsche Affinerie AG (1973), 73 ILR (1987), 230; 
Anaconda Co V. Overseas Private Investment Corp. (1975), 59 ILR, 406. Extensive referenccsto doctrine 
and case-law on nationalisation in general, and of mineral resources in particular in Oppenheim's 
International Law, Vol. 1, § 407. 
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biased in favour of the concessionaires, essentially transnational corporations from 
former colonial powers or other powerful States. In the 19th Century, they were 
justified under the principle of commercial freedom, as an absolute right grounded in the 
common necessity of mankind. Girault summarised perfectly well the opinion of the 
doctrine at the time as he wrote: «C'est, en effet, un droit naturel et superieur pour tous 
les hommes que celui de se procurer par le travail et par l'echange des produits de toute 
nature qui se rencontrent ä la surface du globe. Certaines peuplades par exemple ne 
peuvent empecher d'utiliser les ressources de leurs sols et sous-sols»(12). In other 
words, the necessity of the survival of mankind as well as the incompetence of 
indigenous populations to exploit efficiently their natural resources would legitimise the 
colonial powers to exploit the natural resources of their colonies, for no nation is vested 
with an exclusive prerogative over the natural resources it hosts. A major proponent of 
the doctrine of the freedom of commerce, Scelle concluded that «[u]n tel droit [des 
populations indigenes ä se gouvemer comme elles 1'entendent et ä resister ä toute 
intervention exterieure] n'existe, nous le savons, au profit d'aucun groupement humain, 
nulle collectivite n'ayant le droit de s'isoler du commerce international»(13). 
The principle of commercial freedom for the survival of mankind was challenged 
under the principle of sovereignty over natural resources and preservation of natural 
resources for the survival of indigenous populations(14). The case for sovereignty over 
natural resources was therefore primarily one of sovereignty over mineral resources, and 
the final claim one of discretionary nationalisation of (foreign) private interests and 
investments. In this respect, it reversed the classic doctrine of acquired rights(15) and the 
(12)A. Girault, Principes de colonisation et de legislation coloniale. Les colonies francaises avant et 
depuis 1815,6th edn. (L. Larose, Paris, 1943), 23-24, quoted after Rosenberg, Le principe de la 
souverainete des Etats sur leurs resources naturelles, at 44. 
. 
(13)precis du Droit des Gens, Tome I, Introduction, Le Milieu Intersocial (Sirey, 1932), at 142. 
(14) In a context other than decolonisation, such argument was inter alia invoked by Norway to 
substantiate its claim of an exclusive right over fisheries off its coasts; Fisheries case, Judgment of 
December 18th, 1951: ICJRep. 1951,116, at Paras. 55 et sequ.; see also Prof. Bourquin, Fisheries case, 
ICJ Pleadings 1951, Vol. IV, at 178-179. The argument found some sympathy with the Court (see Part 
V, for the criteria), but was strongly criticised by Judge Alvarez (sep. op. ) and Lord McNair (diss. op. ), 
ICJ Rep. 1951,153, and 158 et sequ. It is extremely interesting to note that 1992 Agenda 21 explicitly 
acknowledges that the `right to subsistence' of local communities and indigenous people has to be duly 
considered and respected in the negotiation and implementation of international agreements on the 
development or conservation of marine living resources; Para. 17.83. 
(15)rhe doctrine of acquired rights makes it unlawful for a State to interfere with foreign-owned property, 
inter alia resorting to nationalisation or expropriation, inter alia without prompt and effective 
compensation, and engages state responsibility in application of the general rules of state responsibility 
for unlawful acts; Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity) (Jurisdiction), PCIJ 
Ser. A-No 9, September 7th, 1927, at 27-28. See furtherKaeckenbeeck, `La Protection Internationale des 
Droits Acquis', 59 RdC (1937-I), 321; Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. 1, § 407; Jimenez dc 
Arechaga, `Application of the Rules of State Responsibility to the Nationalization of Foreign-Owned (continued) 
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inviolability of the basic and fundamental property right invoked by capital-exporting 
States to preserve their exploitation activities in `non civilised nations' from the wave of 
nationalisation(16). 
The applicability of the doctrine of acquired rights to situations of decolonisation 
was denied by the International Law Commission, as antithetical to the very affirmation 
of inalienable and permanent right of peoples to dispose of their natural resources(17). 
More generally, the preservation of acquired rights in the case of succession of States 
has never been endorsed as a general principle of international law. On the contrary, 
1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties provides: 
«Nothing in the present Convention shall affect the principles of 
international law affirming the permanent sovereignty of every people and 
every State over its natural wealth and resources. »(18) 
The Right of Sovereign Countries to Nationalize and Freely Exploit their Natural 
Resources was put as an item on UN Agenda in 1953(19), after Uruguay had tabled a 
draft resolution, recommending States to respect «the right of each country to 
nationalize and freely exploit their natural wealth, as an essential factor of economic 
independence) )(20). While States were finally unanimous in embracing the principle of 
Property', in Hossain (ed. ), Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order (Frances 
Pinter/Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), Chap. 17. 
(16) Rosenberg, Le principe de la souverainet6 des Etats sur leurs resources naturelles, at 50 et sequ. 
(17) UNGA, Report of the International Law Commission on its 21st Session, A/7610,21 September 
1969. At the 21st session of the ILC, Bedjaoui, at the time special rapporteur on the succession of States 
and Governments, emphatically declared that «the fundamental incompatibility between decolonization 
and acquired rights derives from the fact that the successor State is confronted with a choice over which it 
cannot possibly hesitate, between the possible equality which requires it to respect private rights and the 
real necessity which forces it to consider the public interest. )); 1969 YbILC Vol. II, 69, at Para. 108 (emphasis as in original). 
(18) Art. 13; see further Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, § 358. The authors underlined that, with 
the emergence of new States, the doctrine of acquired rights has lost its customary character dating back 
from the time of a `European' international community, and no longer benefits from a sufficient opinio 
juris to be universally opposable. 
(19) Since the late 1970s, the issue has been treated under the general heading The Use of Development of 
Natural (Non Agricultural) Resources. 
(20) The Uruguayan draft is partly reproduced in Mughraby, Permanent Sovereignty over Oil Resources. 
The way had already been partly paved by a resolution pushed through the UN General Assembly by 
Poland, and unanimously passed, albeit with some modifications. The resolution recognised that under- 
developed countries have «the right to determine freely the use of their natural resources and that they 
must utilise such resources in order to be in a better position to further the realisation of their plans of 
economic development in accordance with their national interests, and to further the expansion of the 
world economy; UNGA, A/Res. /523 (VI), 12 January 1952, on Integrated Economic Development and 
Commercial Agreements, preambularPara. 1. Yet, contrary to the Uruguayan draft, the Polish initiative 
was essentially designed to invite developing States to enter into long term economic agreements with 
less developed States. The reference to the world economy was inserted after a US initiative. For a 
thorough review of the debates on permanent sovereignty over natural resources at the UN up to the mid 
(continued) 
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permanent sovereignty over national resources, and its correlative right to 
nationalise(21), a serious controversy arose over the exercise of those prerogatives, and 
the limits thereto. 
Industrial countries, at the time indirectly affected by the dispute over the 
nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, were anxious to preserve their vested 
interests and to assure a stable climate favourable to future commercial transactions 
without being haunted with the fear of unpredictable and arbitrary measures of 
expropriation or nationalisation. No opportunity was missed to resort to some sort of 
`chantage aux investissements'(22), and stress the importance of the security of 
economic transactions for the sake of developing countries themselves in their battle for 
economic development, as a necessary premise to foreign investments and associated 
inflow of foreign currency. Industrialised States thus insisted on the qualification of 
sovereign prerogatives, with express reference to a duty to respect, in good faith, the 
commitments assumed (a) under contractual relations, (towards private companies) and 
(b) under international law in general (towards other States)(23). A US delegate declared 
at the 7th Session of UN General Assembly: 
«... No one questions the power of countries to control and to use their 
natural wealth and resources as they see fit, provided that they respect their 
obligations under contract and under international law. » (24) 
Any reference to contractual commitments was objected to by developing States, on 
the ground that the terms of concessionary arrangements did not result from fair 
negotiations, but had been unilaterally decided and imposed by concessionaires, taking 
advantage of both their dominant position as the sole owner of financial resources and 
technologies, and of the vulnerability of the host States, in need of foreign 
investment(25). Likewise, any reference to international law, more particularly to the 
`general principles of international law as recognised by civilised nations', was fiercely 
1970s: Elian, The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Chap. 4; Rajan, 
Sovereignty over Natural Resource, Chap. 2 and 6. 
(21) On this aspect of the question, see frutherMughraby, Permanent Sovereignty over Oil Resources, 17; 
Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resource, 15. 
(22) Rosenberg, Le Principe de souverainete des Etats sur leurs ressources naturelles, 107. 
(23) Generally on the position of industrialised countries towards the assertion of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources and the right to nationalise: Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resource, Chap. 4. 
(24) Quoted alterRajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resource, at 87. 
(25) In response to US insistence on the fact that those agreements had been freely entered into and had 
therefore to be honoured, a Nigerian delegate ironically pointed out that those were like 'free' agreement 
between a lion and a rabbit; reported in Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resource, 72; also Rosenberg, 
Le Principe de souverainete des Etats sur leurs ressources naturelles, 181 et sequ. 
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resisted by most developing States, on the ground that this law, in its present state, was 
a pure European product not representative of the interests of the `new' States(26); they 
also argued that any reference to international obligations required from States to 
surrender some of their essential sovereign prerogatives(27). 
Hence, the debate took place essentially on a North-South basis or more exactly 
between an `elite' of developing States(28), and occidental capitalist States, although 
States from the communist bloc tried to inject an ideological dimension to the principle 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and associated right to nationalise, and 
pressurised developing countries into nationalisation as a means of promoting self- 
reliance and appropriation of all means of production, and suppressing all forms of 
`capitalist' interference. Developing States however, ostensibly distanced themselves 
from the positions of the communist bloc, and denied acting on ideological grounds(29). 
(26) Algeria and Greece both insisted on the need to adopt international law «which has always been 
prepared against us, in spite of us)); as quoted in Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resource, at 81-82. 
Reference to international law was equally criticised by the Soviet Union, as an attempt to impose 
capitalist and bourgeois principles upon the whole international community, see Tunkin, Le droit 
international public: problPmes theoriques (Pedone, 1965), 125. 
(27) Generally on the position of developing countries with respect to an `international' recognition of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and related nationalisation prerogatives: Rajan, Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources, 72; Cuba resisted any referenceto any international law, «because the sovereign 
rights to dispose of [one's] wealth and natural resources cannot be subject to any limitation; otherwise, it 
would cease to be a sovereign right; as quoted in Rajan, ibid., at 72-73. Mexico had taken an even 
more radical stance, and denied its support to all proposals embodying the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources and related right to nationalise, on the ground that «... any such 
proposal would seem to cast doubt on the validity of a right, the exercise of which [is] one of the clearest 
manifestations of national sovereignty; Saudi Arabia considered such international recognition would be 
equivalent to «... the United Nations asking governments to recognize their right to act as governments»; 
as quoted in Rajan, ibid., at 82-83; Chile stressed the paradox of referring to international law where 
attempts are made to `re-nationalise' and strengthen state sovereignty over their natural resources; Rajan, 
ibid., at 73. 
(28) Some of the non oil-rich countries in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific on the other hand, became bound 
to their former colonial Powers through the Lome process. The EEC-ACP special relationship arose from 
the recognition of collective responsibility of EEC founding members (Germany, France, Italy and 
Benelux). Initiated with the successive Yaoundd (1965) and Arusha (1970) Conventions, the process of 
close co-operation has been perpetuated through the successive Lome Conventions, to further the 
development of the ACP; 1975 ACP-EEC Lome I; 1980 ACP-EEC Lome II, 1985 ACP-EEC Lomd IV; 
1989 ACP-EEC Lomd IV). The major emphasis of these conventions is essentially on co-operation, 
whilst no attempt is made to integrate the ACP in the common market. For some, the Lome process 
purports to preserve reliable sources of raw material for European States; Elian, The Principle of 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Chap. 2, at 51 et sequ. No reference is made to 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources in 1975 ACP-EEC Lomd I; 1989 ACP-EEC Lomd IV 
expressly reserves «the right of each State to determine its own political, social, cultural and economic 
policy options, and the right of ACP States «to determine the development principles, strategies and 
models for their economies and societies in all sovereignty; (Arts. 2 and 3). 
(29) Throughout the debate on sovereignty over natural resources, developing States adopted a strategy of 
non-alignment, and refused to take side in the East-West ideological conflicts paralysing the United 
Nations; even Mexico, which had just passed a constitution inspired by socialist ideals, providing, inter 
alia, for the nationalisation of all means of production without guarantee of indemnification, refused to (continued) 
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Uruguay for instance, pointed out that «... [t]he sovereign right of states to exploit what 
belongs to them should certainly not be confused with a manifestation of an aggressive 
and destructive ideology... »(30). 
While any explicit reference to nationalisation was finally barred from the final text of 
Resolution 626 (\m)(31) in a vain attempt to achieve a consensus on the text(32), a 
compromise in four points was finally reached between the two major negotiating 
groups of States(33): 
favour one or another economic and political system; Verwey, Economic Development, Peace and 
International Law, (VanGorcum, 1972), 244. 
The G77 had emerged out of the first UNCTAD, held in 1964, as a strategic association used by 
developing States to present a unified front against industrialised and socialist States on economic issues. 
Most States forming the G77 (now counting over 150 States) were also members of the Non-aligned 
Movement (now 113 States; Brazil, Chile and Venezuela among others, are members of the G77 but not 
of the NAM); consequently, the G77 has very often followed the line of the NAM on more political 
issues, and inter alia embraced a policy of non alignment. 
The NAM was set up in the mid 1950s, and gathered newly independent States refusing to align with 
either of the superpowers «to their safeguard their national independence and the legitimate rights of their 
people; Lusaka Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Cooperation, and Democratization of 
International Relations, issued by the Third Conference of Heads of State of Governments of the Non- 
Aligned Countries, 1970,10 ILM (1971), 215; on NAM, see for instance Arnold, The Third World 
Handbook, 2nd edn (Cassell, 1994), Chap. 3; on the G77: Sauvant, The Group of 77: Evolution, Structure, Organization (Ocean, 1981); Soroos, supra n. 7, at 199 etsequ. 
(30) As quoted in Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 67; see also statement issued by Nigeria, Algeria, Brazil, and Chile, reported ibid., 67-68. 
(31) UNGA, A/Res. /626 (VII), 21 December 1952, on the Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth 
Resources, consecrates the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in accordance with 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and stresses the need for maintaining the flow 
of capital in conditions of security, mutual confidence and economic co-operation. The related prerogative 
of nationalisation underpins the declaration, as clearly illustrated by the US opposing vote, on the ground 
of absence of reference to the duty to protect private interests under international law in case of measures of 
nationalisation; Hyde, `Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources', 50 AJIL (1956), 
854, at 859-860. On the debates leading to UNGA, A/Res. /626 (VII), 21 December 1952, on the Right 
to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth Resources, see generally Hyde, ibid.; Mughraby, Permanent 
Sovereignty over Oil Resources, Chap. II (16 et sequ. ); Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 14 et 
sequ. Nevertheless, Resolution 626 (VII), 21 December 1952, came to be referred to as the nationalisation 
Resolution as a reflection of the focus of the debates leading to its adoption; Rosenberg, Le Principe de 
souverainete des Etats sur leurs ressources naturelles, 107; Schrijver, `Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources versus the Common Heritage of Mankind', in de Waart et al. (eds. ), International 
Law and Development (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 87, at 88. 
(32) The resolution was passed by 36 votes to 4 (New Zealand, South Africa, UK and US) with 20 
abstentions (both from developing, socialist and free market States). 
(33) Although UNGA, A/Res. /523 (VI), 12 January 1952, on Integrated Economic Development and 
Commercial Agreements, originated in a Polish draft the majority of the States from the socialist bloc 
abstained from voting in subsequent resolutions, including the 1962 landmark Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, where 9 socialist States abstained, alongside Cuba, Burma and 
Ghana. 
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(1) every State is vested with a right of permanent sovereignty over its natural 
resources, understood as the ground and underground mineral resources within 
its territorial jurisdiction, including maritime zones under such jurisdiction; 
(2) every State is vested with the correlated prerogative to nationalise `in order to 
safeguards its national resources'(34); 
(3) both prerogatives are to be exercised in the interest of peoples and their 
development, according to the general principles of international law (inter alia 
compensation)(35); 
(4) due consideration shall be paid to the necessity to maintain capital flows in 
conditions of security, mutual confidence, and economic co-operation. 
This hard-won consensus was subsequently crystallised in the 1962 landmark 
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources(36) and endorsed again in 
subsequent resolutions(37); any subsequent attempt to modify it ended in failure. 
ii. Sovereignty over Economic Assets and Policy in a New International Economic 
Order 
The first major attempt to broaden the conception of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources was triggered by less developed countries `new' dilemma, generated in 
fact by their newly won sovereignty over their natural resources. On the one hand, 
mineral resources-rich developing countries were aware of the illusory nature of a 
(34) AIRes. /3171 (XXVIII), 17 December 1973, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. The 
right to nationalise as a customary right was subsequently recognized in the nationalisation cases, quoted 
supra. See more particularly Topco case, supra n. 9,17 ILM (1978), at 30. 
(35) See infra, 4/ii. /b. Limits Flowing from International Law. Exception is made however with respect 
to acquired rights before the realisation of complete sovereignty of countries formerly under colonial rules, 
for which no indemnification is required in case of measures of nationalisation; 1962 landmark Resolution 
on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Preamble. 
(36) Passed with 87 votes against 2 (France and South Africa) and 12 abstentions (the soviet bloc, Cuba, 
Ghana and Jamaica); the abstention en bloc of socialist States was triggered by the 'capitalist bias' of the 
Resolution, most notably the nationalisation and compensation clause. For a comprehensive review of 
the debates leading to the adoption of the resolution: Gess, 'Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources'; Schwebel, `The Story of the UN's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources', 49 American Bar Association Journal (1963), 463. See also Banerjee, 'The Concept of 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: An Analysis', 8 Indian JIL (1968), 515; Rosenberg, Le 
Principe de souverainetc des Etats sur leurs ressources naturelles, 149 et sequ. 
(37) A/Res. /2158 (XXI), 25 November 1966, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, passed 
with 104 votes with no opposition, and 6 abstentions; A/Res. /2386 (XXIII), 19 November 1968, on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources; A/Res. /2692 (XXV), 11 December 1970, on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources of Developing Countries; A/Res. /3016 (XXVII), 18 December 1972, 
on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of Developing Countries; A/Res. /3037 (XXVII), 19 
December 1972, on a Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States; A/Res. /3171 (XXVIII), 17 
December 1973, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources; See also 1972 Stockholm Action 
Plan for Human Environment, Recommend. 51(a). 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources 64 Chapter 2 
strategy of Alleingang in an inter-dependent world, and more particularly of their 
dependence on foreign investment and (technological and financial) assistance to 
optimise the exploitation of their own natural resources(38). On the other hand, those 
countries were not ready to surrender even part of their sovereign prerogatives to 
foreign corporations for the sake of economic development. Banking on the dependence 
of developed States on raw materials, they sought to use the `weapon of natural wealth' 
to force those States into concessions(39). 
The claim of `economic self determination' became increasingly associated with the 
plea of sovereign equality(40) to reconcile both imperatives of sovereignty and co- 
operation, and to substantiate claims for equal opportunities and fair trade relations in a 
new international economic order(41): 
«Au nom d'une egalite souveraine qu'ils veulent plus reelle, les 
nouveaux Etats vont revendiquer un developpement auquel ils estiment avoir 
droit. Le principe de l'egalite des Etats va alors trouver une nouvelle 
vocation(42) (... ) C'est au nom de cette souverainete [que les Etats vont] 
reclamer la cessation d'une inegalite de dCveloppement alienante. La 
souverainete nest plus un instrument de defense passive; eile devient une 
operation-verite au nom de laquelle on reclame 1 'egalite ä laquelle tout Etat 
a droit cest-ä-dire 1 egalite de developpement, l'egalite de niveau de 
vie. » (43) 
Developing States strove to extend the material object of their permanent sovereignty 
claim beyond mineral resources, to encompass the whole national economic machinery, 
on the ground that, for the purpose of an emancipating development, countries must 
«undertake themselves the exploitation and marketing of their natural resources 
... 
» 
(44). 
(38) Even China, partisan of self-reliance and self-exploitation, recognised the need for 'sincere and 
effective external assistance or economic and technical exchanges; Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources, 82 et sequ. 
(39) Flory, 'Inegalite economique et evolution du droit international', in SociCte Francaise pour Ic Droit 
International, Pays en vole de developpement et transformation du droit international Colloque d'Aix- 
en-Provence (Pedone, 1974), 11. 
(40) Virally prefers the terms of 'inegalite compensatrice', as implying a certain duty of solidarity from 
the part of developed States to the benefit of developing, countries, to progressively achieve factual 
equality, 'La Charte des droits et devoirs economiques des Etats: Notes de lecture', 20 AFDI (1974), 57, 
at 72; and Virally, 'Panorama du Droit International Contemporain, Cours G6nCral dc Droit 
International', 183 RdC (1983-III), 9, at 324 et sequ. 
(41) For a sample of references on early literature on a new international economic order, see Saxena, 
`Selected Bibliography on the New International Economic Order, 1960-1978', 20 Indian JIL (1980), 
125. 
(42) Thus far, small States had relied on sovereign equality essentially to protect themselves against intervention from great powers (duty of abstention/non interference). 
(43) Flory, supra n. 39, at 33-34 (emphasis added). 
(44) A/Res. /2158 (XXI), 25 November 1966, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Para. 6; (continued) 
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Developing countries made it clear however, that they were not opposed to all forms of 
co-operation or the flowing in of foreign capital; Iran for instance, expressed its 
willingness to attract foreign capital, but on a fair contractual basis, and provided that 
the foreign capital `would not try to obtain privileges contrary to the interests of 
Iran'(45). Regardless of the opposition of developed States, developing States went even 
further and deduced extremely bold implications from permanent sovereignty and 
sovereign equality, ranging from the right to receive financial and technological assistance 
to exploit domestic mineral resources, and a right to a share in the exploitation of 
common resources, to the right to fair access to, and equal opportunities in the world 
economic order. 
Developing States thus turned themselves into the advocates of a `progressive' vision 
of international law, as a dynamic codification of norms of co-operation(46), and pressed 
for a greater regulation of co-operation and economic relations to build-up and promote 
a new social and economic order. The main outcome was the adoption of the 1975 
Economic Charter(47), which provides at its first article that «[e]very State has the 
sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system... »(48). The next article 
see also 1974 NIEO Declaration, operational Para. 4(e) and (h); Solemn Declaration of the Sovereigns & 
Heads of State of the OPEC, issued at the first top-level Conference of OPEC (Algiers, 5-6 March 1975), 
reproduced in 14 ILM (1975), 566; Action Programme and Declarations issued by the first Conference of 
Developing Countries on Raw Material (Dakar, 3-8 February 1975), reproduced in 14 ILM (1975), 520 
(for instance Action Programme Paras. 1&3, and Resolution 1. 
(45) As reported in Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 54 (emphasis added). It was not until 
1985 ACP-EEC Lome III that developing States finally committed themselves to create and maintain 
stable investment conditions; see Arts. 24'-247. 
(46) Developing States had already expressed their disapproval of the classic conception of international 
rules as static rules of coexistence, which they consider wholly inappropriate to serve their own needs and 
interests, and called for a more progressive approach to international law during the discussions on the 
reference to international law in the compromise statement of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, supra; see also De Waart, 'Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources as a Cornerstone for 
International Economic Rights and Duties', 14 Netherlands ILJ (1977), 304. 
(47) Castafieda, `La Charte des droits et devoirs 6conomiques des Etats', 20 AM (1974), 31,35 et 
sequ.; Virally, `La Charte des droits et devoirs economiques des Etats: Notes de lecture', 20 AFDI 
(1974), 57,62 et sequ. See Verloren van Themaat, The Changing Structure of International Economic 
Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 198 1), Chap. IV. 
(48) Very similar wording is used in the Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development 
and Cooperation, adopted at UNIDO Second General Conference, Lima, 1975. Lima Declaration, Para. 
32 reads: 
[E]very State has the inalienable right to exercise freely its sovereignty and 
permanent control over its natural resources, both terrestrial and marine, 
and over all economic activity for the exploitation of these resources in the 
manner appropriate to its circumstances, including nationalization in 
accordance with its laws as an expression of this right, and that no State 
shall be subjected to any forms of economic, political or other coercion 
which impedes the full and free exercise of that inalienable right; 
(continued) 
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reiterates the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and economic 
activities as entailing the right to regulate and supervise foreign investments as well as 
the activities of transnational corporations, and the right to nationalise and expropriate 
foreign property(49). 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-1982), served as 
a battleground for developing States to promote and develop their ideal of a new 
international economic order(50) and realise a new international marine order(51). The 
result was the declaration of the exploitation of the deep sea-bed and ocean floor and 
subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (the Area), the common 
heritage of mankind(52), to be exploited for the common interest and benefit of 
mankind(53); «sharing in the common heritage of mankind was to replace the humiliating 
Lima Declaration and Plan of Action are reproduced in 14 ILM (1975), 826; it was adopted by a vote cf 
82 to 1 (US) with 7 abstentions (Belgium, Canada, FRG, Israel, Italy, Japan, and UK). 
(49) It is illustrative to note that no mention of sovereignty over natural resources is made in the 
resolutions launching the first development decade (1961); instead, UNGA, A/Res/1710(XVI) 19 
December 1961, confines itself to urging States «to pursue policies designed to ensure to the developing 
countries an equitable share of earnings from the extraction and marketing of their natural resources by 
foreign capital» (Para. 2(b)); the strategy was still much Western dominated, as the future G77 was not 
yet powerful enough to lobby against or push in UNGA resolutions. No mention was made either to the 
finiteness of natural resources, the main preoccupation being economic growth and social development. 
Both the 1970 Strategy for the Second Development Decade and 1980 Strategy for the Third 
Development Decade contain a provision on permanent sovereignty over natural resources (respectively 
Arts. 74 and 126(b)); no express nelerence is made however to a correlated right of nationalisation, and no 
reference either is made to the duty to exercise the permanent sovereignty according to objectives and 
principles of international law. Presumably because of the lack of express reference to international law, 
the USA entered a reservation on the causes that might justify the suspension thereof; see Virally, `La 
DeuxiBme D6cennie des Nations Unies pour le Developpement', 16 AFDI (1970), 9. Consequently, as a 
result of a compromise over the acceptability of the whole decade, the 1990 Strategy for the Fourth 
Development Decade abstained from any reference to permanent sovereignty over natural resources and 
related right to nationalise, and to new international economic order; see Flory, 'La Quatrieme DEcennie 
pour le Developpement; la Fin du nouvel ordre 6conomique international? ' 36 AFDI (1990), 606. 
(50) For a review of the position of Latin American and African States at the Third Conference on the 
Law of the Sea: Adede, 'The Group of 77 and the Establishment of the International Sea-Bed Authority', 
7 ODIL (1979), 31; Friedman, & Williams, 'The Group of 77 at the United Nations : an Emergent 
Force in the Law of the Sea', 16 San Diego LR (1979), 555; Galindo Pohl, 'Latin America's Influence 
and Role in the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea', 7 ODIL (1979), 65; Simoes Ferreira, 'The 
Role of African States in the Development of the Law of the Sea of the Third UN Conference', 7 ODIL (1979), 89. 
(51) 1982 UNCLOS Preambular refers to a'just and equitable economic order'; Para. 5; [t]he actions of 
the developing countries have been influenced by thought that the model created in an ISA should be the 
first such model in a NIEO»; Grolin, 'The Deep Seabed: A North-South Perspective', in Laursen (ed. ), 
Towards a New International Marine Order, Nijhoff, 1982), Chap. 9, at 125. 
(52) See 1982 UNCLOS Art. 136. 
(53) 1982 UNCLOS Art. 140; the clearest expression of a new international marine order is contained at 
Art. 150. 
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concept of foreign aid»(54). In its original version, the regime applied to the Area entailed 
a planned and partly centralised exploitation for the common benefit of mankind, and a 
regulated co-operation(55). 
On the other hand, developed States regarded the extension of permanent sovereignty 
to all economic activities with extreme suspicion, as a sign of controlled/interventionist 
economic policy (and a source of danger for their own vested interests), and hence 
consistently opposed it. Instead, developed States insisted on the responsibility of 
developing States to create a favourable environment to induce co-operation and attract 
foreign investments. They failed however, in their suggestion to amend the 1975 
Economic Charter, Article 2 and confine the concept of sovereignty over natural 
resources to natural wealth and resources(56). Nevertheless, their persistent objection to 
the extension of sovereignty to any sort of economic activities has definitely hampered 
the achievement of a real opiniojuris communis thereupon(57). 
In a similar way, developed States admitted in principle that certain areas constitute 
part of common heritage of mankind to be exploited in the interests of mankind, but 
fiercely contested any claim to a fair share of the benefit obtained from the exploitation 
of these common areas, or to a free access to the technologies developed for such to 
(54) Mann-Borgese, `The New International Economic Order and the Law of the Sea', 14 San Diego LR 
(1977), 584, at 590. More generally of the'trade versus aid' revendication, see Middleton et al., Tears of 
the Crocodile, From Rio to Reality in the Developing World (East African Educational Publisher, 1993), 
Chap. 5. 
(55) For more detailed considerations on the meaning and general implications of the concept of common 
heritage of mankind, see infra, Chap. 5/2, Partnership in National and International Law. On the 
expression of the new international economic order in the context of the law of the sea negotiations, see 
for instance: Boczek, `Ideology and the Law of the Sea: The Challenge of the New International 
Economic Order', 7 Boston College ICLR (1984), 1; Mann-Borgese, `The New International Economic 
Order and the Law of the Sea', 14 San Diego LR (1977), 584; Goldwin, `Le droit de la mer: sens 
common contre «patrimoine commun»', 89 RGDIP (1985), 719; Hossain (ed. ), Legal Aspects of the 
New International Economic Order (Frances Pinter/Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), Part Ill; 
Imnadze, `Common Heritage of Mankind: A Concept of Co-operation in Our Interdependent World? ', 
Kuribayshi & Miles (eds. ), The Law of the Sea in the 1990s: A Framework for Further International 
Cooperation (The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1992), 312; Juda, 'UNCLOS III and 
the New International Economic Order', 7 ODIL (1979), 221; Mahmoudi, The law of Deep-Sea Bed 
Mining (Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), Chap. 4; Mann-Borgese, `The New International 
Economic Order and the Law of the Sea', 14 San Diego LR (1977), 584. 
(56) Proposed Amendment to Article 2, reproduced in 14 ILM (1975), 262. See also De Waart, 
`Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources as a Cornerstone for International Economic Rights and 
Duties', 14 Netherlands ILJ (1977), 304, at 311. 
(57) A parallel examination of the 1962 landmark Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over natural 
Resources and subsequent modification brought, inter alia by the 1975 Economic Charter was 
undertaken in Topco case, supra n. 9, lead the Arbitral Tribunal to conclude (although more in the 
context of nationalisation) that clear lack of consensus on the alteration of the compromise reached in the 
former resolution implied that the 1975 Economic Charter Art. 2 had to be analysed as a political rather 
than as a legal declaration contra legem for developed States; 58 ILR, 389, at Para. 88. 
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exploitation. The `re-evaluation (in the sense of de-regulation) of some aspects of the 
regime for the Area and its resources', introduced by the 1994 UNCLOS Agreement 
Relating to the Implementation of Part XI(58), was presented as necessary due to 
«political and economic changes, including in particular a growing reliance on market 
principles... »(59). 
iii. Sovereignty over Environmental Resources and Environmental Policies versus 
Globalisation of Environmental Standards and Policies 
Recent years have witnessed substantial changes in States' attitude towards 
sovereignty over natural resources. In the same way as developing countries had 
previously used the concept of common heritage of mankind to justify the intrusion of 
national and international law in the exploitation of certain (mineral) resources located 
both within and outside state jurisdiction, developed States(60) availed themselves of the 
common interest /concern of mankind(61) to justify the intrusion in the management and 
protection of certain natural resources under and outside other state jurisdictions(62). It 
is thereby suggested that «[s]ome parts of the World's heritage are so unique and 
important to the world as a whole, that their conservation and protection is not only a 
problem for individual nations, but for the international community as well»(63). 
(58) The Resolution endorsing the Agreement was unanimously passed with 121 votes in favour, seven 
countries abstained, mostly Latin American States (Colombia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela), 
and also Thailand, and the Russian Federation. On the changes brought by the 1994 Agreement, see 
infra, Chap. 5/2/iii. Common Heritage of Mankind under the 1982 UNCLOS: Attempt to Set up a 
Marine Partnership. 
(59) UNGA, A/Res. /48/263,17 August 1994, Para. 6. 
(60) For the purpose of comparison only, the present section adopts the same classification of `States 
groups' as the previous section, although it is clear to the author that these groups are far from being 
homogenous with respect to the `commonalisation' of environmental regulation, as illustrated by the 
strong divergence between US and EC on the issue of extra territoriality of national environmental laws. 
Intra-grouping difference shall be mentioned when particularily significant. 
(61) On the implications and difference between the expressions of common heritage, concern and 
common interest of mankind, infra Chap. 5/2/iv. Common Concern, Common Interest of Mankind: 
Global Partnership or Global Bargain?. 
(62) This chapter focuses upon International rules applying to resources under domestic jurisdiction 
exclusively, the regulation of international commons (beyond state jurisdiction) raises as such no 
particular issue under the principle of sovereignty over natural resources, and will be dealt with 
essentially infra in Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership. See also Birnie & Boyle, at 112; Boyle, 
`International Law and the Protection of the Global Atmosphere', in Churchill & Freestone (eds. ), 
International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham & Trotman / Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), Chap. 1; 
Hahn & Richards, 'The Internationalization of Environmental Regulation', 30 Ilarvard ILJ (1989), 421. 
(63) Bilderbeck (cd. ), Biodiversity and International Law (IOS, 1992), at 86. The 1971 Ramsar 
Convention and 1972 World Heritage Convention stand among the earliest documents to express the 
neccessity of an international protection of domestic natural resources, part of which are «of outstanding 
interest and therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole» (continued) 
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In that context, one should perhaps specify that a genuine `droit d'ingerence 
ecologique' or eco(logic) intervention, as a modified form of humanitarian intervention, 
has not yet gone beyond the stage of pure hypothesis de lege ferenda, and endorsed by 
a limited number of authors(64). Some scholars, in the light of the financial and/or 
technological incapacity of certain States to address domestic environmental problems, 
propose a genuine right of external intervention, decided by the international 
community, and imposed, where necessary by force, upon given States. Such 
intervention would be strictly limited to extreme cases «lorsque le danger est 
suffisamment grave par rapport aux moyens dont [l'Etat en crise] dispose pour gerer le 
risque en evitant sa realisation, ou en assurant lui-meme la remise en etat lorsque la 
catastrophe s'est produite»(65); it would therefore constitute a «solution to the 
management of economically and ecologically sensitive areas whose mismanagement is 
likely to threaten international peace and security) )(66). 
On the contrary to the controversed ingerence humanitaire, involving often 
subjective and partial assessments of often disguised human rights violations, the 
ingerence ecologique would follow objective and more easily verifiable criteria; indeed, 
(preambularPara. 6; see also 1971 Ramsar, preambularParas 2&3, and Art. 2(1) & 2(6)). In the case of 
the 1972 World Heritage Convention, however, it had a very limited impact most particularl with respect 
to environmental resources, due to the fact that (1) it only applies to listed cultural and natural sites 
located on the territories of High Contracting Parties; (2) procedures of nominations and listing are 
extremely burdensome; and (3) such procedures have to be engaged by hosting State itself, which means 
precisely that the State retains the power to decide to alienate its own sovereignty over a particular 
resources. A particularily enlightening perspective of the inherent weaknesses of the convention, albeit not 
an authoritative international interpretation thereof, was provided the oft quoted decision of the Australian 
High Court in Tasmanian Dam case (1983). 
In a dispute opposing the Commonwealth and Tasmania over the construction of a dam in a natural park 
considered to be part of the world heritage Australian High Court held that, although the 1972 World 
Heritage Convention imposes on States Parties 'certain obligations', inter alia to help in the 
identification, protection, conservation and preservation of the listed heritage (Art. 6(2)), it specifics no 
obligation on the host State to take any concrete action to protect the natural heritage from possible or 
actual damage; Commonwealth v. Tasmania, [1984-85] 154 Commonwealth Law Reports, 1, at 88 et 
sequ. Generally on the contribution of the 1972 World Heritage Convention to environmental protection, 
see Birnie & Boyle, 59-60,458 and 468 et sequ.; Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, 90 et 
sequ; Lyster, International Wildlife Law (Grotius, 1985), Chap. 11. For a comment on the 1971 Ramsar 
Convention, see Bowman, 'The Ramsar Convention comes of Age', 42 Netherlands ILR (1995), 1; 
Lyster, op. cit., Chap. 10. 
(64) The concept of ingerence dcologique, like that of ingerence humanitaire, largely owes its 
development to French authors; see for instance Bachelet, L'ingerence ecologique (Frison Roche, 1995); 
Cans, 'L'ingerence ecologique', Le Monde, 28 November 1991, at 8. 
(65) Bachelet, supra n. 64, at 41. 
(66) Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 1998), Ph. D manuscript, at 181. See also Nettesheim, 'Die ökologische 
. 
Intervention, 
Gewalt und Druck zum Schutz der Umwelt? ', 34 A VR (1996), 168; Boisson de Chazournes, 'Variations juridiques sur le theme de l'ing&rence dcologique', in Sabelli (cd. ), Ecologie contre nature (Presses 
Universitaires de France/Nouveau cahiers de 1'IUED, 1995), 53. 
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«[d]eceler un risque ecologique majeur (... ) procede de moyens techniques (satellites 
d'observation) dont on ne trouve pas d'equivalant en matiere de droits de 1'Homme»(67). 
The major difficulty with such theory is that it is essentially reactionary, and implies 
a clear identification of the author(s) and source(s) of the damage, none of which is 
necessarily straightforward in the case of environmental harm(68). In fact, such an 
approach might be appropriate as a temporary measure for emergencies and extreme 
cases like Chernobyl, Seveso, or the setting fire to the Kuwaiti oil wells, to mitigate an 
immediate threat/harm; it would then require a rapidity of reaction that can probably not 
be expected from the international community, as well as a degree of information on the 
causes, sources and importance of the risk/damage which the State at the origin of the 
risk/damage might not have, or might not want to communicate. The ingerence 
ecologique would certainly be inappropriate for other long term environmental disasters, 
such as deforestation, ozone layer depletion, or loss of biodiversity, unless green 
helmets are permanently stationed round the globe(69). 
Nevertheless, the idea of an international environmental task force(70), that would 
intervene in case of environmental emergencies, if necessary within national borders, 
clearly has been increasingly discussed as part of the on-going debate on global 
environmental security(71), brought as an issue to the United Nations in 1988, as a result 
(67) Bachelet, supra n. 64, at 30; for a comparison of 'ingdrence humanitaire' and 'ingerence Ccologique', 
see more particularily Tamiotti, 'L'ingerence ecologique: un concept', in Sabelli (ed. ), Ecologie contre 
nature (Presses Universitaires de France/Nouveau cahiers de 1'IUED, 1995), 159. 
(68) See infra Chap. 3/3/iii, Causality Link Between the Object and the Harm/Risk. 
(69) See Sand, 'UNCED and the Development of International Environmental Law', 3 YbIEL (1992), 3, 
at 9. 
(70) On the various proposals for reform of the UN system to preserve security, see Schrijver, 
'International Organization for Environmental Security', 20 Bulletin of Peace Proposals (1989), 115. On 
the proposal of UN Green Helmets', see Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock, 'Carrot and Stick: 
Spurring Conservation with a Prize and a Police Force', Time (Magazine), 9 October 1989,45, referred 
to in Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 1998), Ph. D manuscript, at 181, n. 199. 
(71) On which see for instance: Dyer, 'Environmental Security as a Universal Value', in Volger & Imbcr 
(eds. ), The Environment & International Relations (Routledge, 1996), Chap. 2; Handl, 'Environmental 
Security & Global Change: the Challenge to International Law', in Lang et al. (eds. ) Environmental 
Protection and International Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), Chap. 2; Hassan, 
'Moving Towards a Just International Environmental Law', in Bilderbeck, Biodiversity in International 
Law (IOS, 1992), 79, at 97; Holst, 'Security and the Environment: A Preliminary Exploration', 20 
Bulletin of Peace Proposals (1989), 123; Magraw & Vinogradov, 'Environmental Law', in Damrosch et 
al. (eds. ), Beyond Confrontation: International Law in the Post-Cold War Era (Westvicw, 1995), 
Chap. 7; Myers, 'Environment and Security', 74 Foreign Policy (1989), 23; Porter, 'Post-Cold War and 
Global Environmental Security', 14 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (1990), 332; Sand, 'International 
Law on the Agenda of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Towards 
Global Environmental Security? ', 60 Nordic JIL (1991), 5, at 9 et sequ.; Sands, 'Enforcing 
Environmental Security', in Sands (ed. ), Greening of International Law (Earthscan, 1993), Chap. 4, 
adapted version of Sands, Principles (Vol. I), Chap. 5; Schrijver, supra n. 70; Timoshenko, 'Ecological (continued) 
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of the mounting recognition, both among the capitalist and former socialist States, of the 
inter-relatedness of the world security and the global environment(72). Various 
proposals have been made, for a body entrusted with the enforcement of international 
environmental security. The proposition includes the establishment of an Environmental 
Security Council out of the defunct trusteeship council and to the creation of an 
international force that would intervene and assist the State in cases of serious 
environmental degradation (sort of green helmets, similar to the famous Red Adairs, 
according to the Soviet suggestion). 
Other suggestions include the broadening of the understanding of 'security' as to 
encompass ecological security, so as to `squeeze' the latter in the mandate of UN 
Security Council, or alternatively, the extension of the mandate of ECOSOC, originally 
intended to be a counterpart of the Security Council for economic and social issues, to 
Security: Global Change Paradigm', 1 Colorado JIELP (1990), 127; Timoshenko, 'Ecological Security: 
Response to Global Challenge', in Brown Weiss (ed. ), Environmental Changes and International Law (United Nations University Press, 1994), 413; Timoshenko, 'Control Machinery in the Ecological 
Security System', in Butler, (ed. ), Control over Compliance with International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1991), 51; Tinker, '«Environmental Security>) in the United Nations: Not a Matter for the Security 
Council', 59 Tennessee LR (1992), 787; Tuchman Mathews, `Redefining Security', 68 Foreign Affairs 
(1988/89-1989/90), 162; Vavrousek, 'Institutions for International Securiy, in Kirkby et al. (eds. ), The 
Earthscan Reader in Sustainable Development (Earthscan, 1995), 267; Vinogradov, 'International 
Environmental Security: The Concept and its Implementation', in Carty & Danilenko (eds. ), Perestroika 
and International Law (Edinburgh University Press, 1990), Chap. 16; Westing, 'Environmental 
Component of Comprehensive Security', 20 Bulletin of Peace Proposals (1989), 129. 
(72) The link between environment and global security was already emphasised in 1987 WCED Report; 
Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 1987), at 19; yet the decisive step was taken in July 
1988, with an Aide-Memoire on 'Concept of International Ecological Security', submitted on behalf of 
the socialist countries of Eastern Europe to ECOSOC; E/1988/105, reprinted in 18 EPL (1988), 189. 
The terms of ekologicheskaya bezopasnost (ecological security) is attributed to Gorbachev, in his 1986 
report to the 27th Communist Party Congress; Sand, 'International Law on the Agenda of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Towards Global Environmental Security? ', 60 
Nordic JIL (1991), 5, at 16, n. 52. In 1988, the USSR Foreign Minister addressed the Forty-Third 
Session of the UN General Assembly, dismissing the 'traditional approach to national and universal 
security, based primarily on military defence' as `conclusively outdated and in need of revision'; UN 
Doc. A/43/PV. 6, at 76, quoted afterSchrijver, supra, n 70, at 115, n. 3. See also Shevardnadse, 'Ecology 
and Diplomacy', in 20 EPL (1990), 20; Vinogradov, 'International Environmental Security: The 
Concept and its Implementation', in Carty & Danilenko (eds. ), Perestroika and International Law (Edinburgh University Press, 1990), at 197 et sequ. In the same spirit, US Vice President Al Gore stated 
that «'national security' must be seen as more than military security; quoted after Magraw & 
Vinogradov, 'Environmental Law', in Damrosch et al. (eds. ), Beyond Confrontation: International Law 
in the Post-Cold War Era (Westview, 1995), Chap. 7, at 204. 
Vinogradov stresses the importance of the position of the Soviet leadership on the issue of environmental 
security, as disclosing a fundamental change of attitude towards environmental problems; the author also 
quite rightly underlines that environmental security arises out of over-utilisation or pollution of natural 
resources, but can also arise out of 'unjust economic policy towards less developed countries' as 
disguised environmental measures; 'International Environmental Security: The Concept and its 
Implementation', in Carty & Danilenko (eds. ), Perestroika and International Law (Edinburgh 
University Press, 1990), at 200. 
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include environmental issues and vest ECOSOC with the competence to negotiate 
promptly urgent measures to tackle imminent or actual environmental threats. 
Developing States on the other hand, although the originators of an `extensive' 
conception of sovereignty and major proponents of the principle of exploitation of 
global resources for the common benefit on mankind(73), have returned to a more classic 
conception of sovereignty, that guarantees each State an exclusive prerogative over its 
domestic natural resources. Throughout the negotiations leading to the 1992 Rio 
Conference on Environment and Development, based inter alia on the idea of 
partnership for a protection of the global environment(74), developing States 
consistently reaffirmed that «international cooperation [to remove the threat to the 
environment] should be based on full respect for the sovereignty of States»(75), and 
insisted on the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources being 
expressly enshrined in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development(76). 
The major factor underlying this apparent change in attitude is essentially two-fold: 
First, natural resources are no longer perceived as an object of exploitation 
exclusively, but are increasingly treated as an object of protection. In other words, the 
issue is no longer solely about sharing the benefits and interests derived from the 
exploitation of natural resource; it also includes the sharing the conservation and 
management costs and responsibilities. And as one author stresses it in the context of 
the preservation of biodiversity: 
«Numerous examples could be shown where 'national sovereignty' has 
been impinged in the name of exploiting natural resources; but when efforts 
(73) Supra 2/ii. Sovereignty over Economic Assets and Policy in a New International Economic Order. 
(74) See supra Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership. 
(75) 1989 Belgrade Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned countries, Para. 31; 
see also 1991 Beijing Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by the 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific ESCAP whereby the Ministers from 41 
developing States declared that «[i]nternational cooperation in the field of environmental protection 
should be based on the principle of equality among sovereign states. The developing countries have the 
sovereign right to use their own natural resources in keeping with their developmental and environmental 
objectives and priorities; in the same sense, see 1980 Belem Declaration on the Amazonian Cooperation 
Treaty. The argument of sovereignty lay at the centre of developing States opposition to major 
environmental policy changes at 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment; see Caldwell, 
'The Geopolitics of Environmental Policy : Transnational Modification of National Sovereignty', 59 
RevistaJuridica de la Univerisdadde Puerto Rico (1990), 693, at 696-697. 
(76) Developed States by contrast, considered that the preambular general reference to 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment implied the recognition of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, and hence made any further referenceto this principle redundant; Porras, 'The Rio Declaration: 
A New Basis for International Cooperation', in Sands (ed. ), Greening International Law (Earthscan, 
1993), Chap. 2, at 30 et sequ.; also Berthelot, `Are International Institution in Favour of the 
Environment? ', in Campiglio et al. (eds. ), The Environment after Rio (Graham & Trotman/Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1994), Chap. 19, at 271 et sequ. 
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are made to conserve those resources `national sovereignty' is called upon to 
prevent those actions. » (77) 
Secondly, the mounting tendency, for the past years, to consider environmental 
resources as part of a global interdependent ecosystem(78) and to tackle environmental 
problems as interrelated and transcending national boundaries and interests(79) has 
broadened the circle of States (essentially developed) having an interest in the protection 
and preservation of natural resources hosted by other (mostly developing) States(80). In 
many respects, such globalisation of environmental interest has undermined 
-albeit not 
made wholly redundant- the relevance of political boundaries and, by the same token, 
that of exclusive sovereignty over natural resources now regulated and curtailed by 
external environmental standards for the sake of the common concern of mankind(81). 
It is not without justification that some States have expressed strong reservations 
towards the authenticity of industrialised States' concern for the global environment, 
(77) McNeely, quoted afterBilderbeek (ed. ), Biodiversity and International Law (IOS, 1992), at 79. 
(78) Sands, 'The Environment, Community and International Law', 30 Harvard ILJ (1989), 393; by 
contrast with the classic 'compartmentalised' approach to environmental issues; see Kiss & Shelton, 
International Environmental Law, 155 et sequ.; see also Dupuy, 'Oü en est le droit international de 
1'environnement ä la fm du si6cle? ', 101 RGDIP (1997), 873, and supra Chap. 1/3/ii. Environment 
versus Development. 
(79) As UNDP Administrator J. G. Speth puts it, «problems do not need passports to travel around the 
globe; Address to the US Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 22 March 1995. See also Kiss, 
Will the Necessity to Protect the Global Environment Transform the Law of International Relations ?, 
Occasional Paper (Hull University Press, 1992), 6 et sequ.; Fraenkel, 'The Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution : Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation', 30 Harvard IIJ 
(1989), 447, at 449 et sequ. 
(80) Boyle, 'The Convention on Biological Diversity', in Campiglio et at (eds. ), The Environment After 
Rio: International Law and Economics (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), Chap. 8, at 117 et 
sequ.; see infra, erga omnes environmental obligation and possibility of 'actio popularis' entailed by 
concept such as common concern/heritage/interest of mankind. See also supra, 'ing&rence ecologique', 
supra n. 64. 
(81) See 1989 Paris Economic Declaration of the G7 (Paras. 42-43) and 1989 Langkawi Declaration of the 
Commonwealth Heads of Governments (Para. 4), particularly illustrative of the mounting 'intrusiveness' 
of international environmental rules. See further Bothe & Hohmann, 'Internationalization of Natural 
Resources Management', 3 YbIEL (1992), 171; Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, at 22 et 
sequ.; Handl, 'Environmental Security and Global Change: the Challenge of International Law', in Lang 
et at (eds. ), Environmental Protection and International Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 
1991), Chap. 2; Kahn & Richards, 'The Internationalization of Environmental Regulation', 30 Harvard 
IIJ (1989), 421; Kiss, 'International Protection of the Environment', in Macdonald & Johnston (eds. ), 
The Structure and Process of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 1069, at 1083 et sequ.; Kiss, 
'The Implications of Global Change for the International Legal System', in Brown Weiss (ed. ), 
Environmental Change and International Law: New Challenges and Dimensions (United Nations 
University Press, 1992), Chap. 10; Sands, supra n. 78, at 420 et sequ. 
For a brief review of the impact of international environmental documents on state sovereignty, see Haas 
& Sundgren, «cooperation is easier in small groups, where mutual verification is easier and less 
expensive; 'Evolving International Environmental Law', in Choucri (ed. ), Global Accord (MIT, 1993), 
401. 
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and more generally towards the `eco-centricity' of environmental concern. As Brunnee 
rightly pointed out, most of individual environmental interests obey egotistical 
(economic) considerations; common interest, as `the result of coinciding individual 
interests', display more `egocentric' than `altruistic' features (82). Furthermore, States 
rich in biodiversity were obviously not keen on being reduced to the role of international 
reserves of biological resources, deprived of their use with no compensation. Most 
developing States perceived the intrusion of the environmental discourse into their 
sovereignty as yet another form of neo-colonialism, a new tactic to hamper their 
economic development(83): 
«This new globalizing rhetoric, in which natural resources become 
common good of humankind, turn the State where the resource is located (... ) 
into guardian of the resource 
-a guardian on behalf of all the people of the 
planet. It seeks to transform the accepted relationship between the State and 
its natural resources in accordance with its national policies and priorities, 
into one of trusteeship, where the State would be required to consider the 
interest of, and probably consult with, the international community before 
taking any action affecting the resources. Developing countries were not ready 
to accept the erosion of traditional sovereignty implied by such a shift 
... 
»(84) 
The following statement of the Prime Minister of Malaysia at the Summit Segment 
of the 1992 UNCED Conference illustrates well the position of developing States: 
«The poor countries have been told to preserve their forests and other 
genetic resources on the off-chance that at some future date something is 
discovered that might prove useful to humanity. This is the same as telling 
these poor countries that they must continue to be poor because their forests 
and other resources are more precious than themselves (... ). 
When the rich chopped down their own forests, built their poison-belching 
factories and scoured the world for cheap resources, the poor said nothing. 
Indeed they paid for the development of the rich. Now the rich claim to 
regulate the development of the poor countries (... ) As colonies we were 
exploited. Now as independent nations we are to be equally exploited. »(85) 
(82) Brunnie, '"Common Interest'- Echoes from an Empty Shell? ', 49 ZaÖRV (1989), 791. Sir Charles 
Russell, speaking forthe UK in Pacific Fur Seals Arbitration (1893), had this elegant and tactful remark 
about US' claim to act (and protect fur seal in the high seas) 'as the friends of humanity', under `no 
selfish motives' and only 'in the interests of mankind': «Well, I am very far from doubting the sincerity 
of my learned friends; but I must be permitted to point out that, while accepting these professions as 
sincere, their demands seem to me to be exactly the demand which would be made by a selfish power 
making an effort to secure the seals for themselves... »; 1 Moore International Arbitrations, 755, at 875. 
(83) Nayar & Mohan Ong, 'Developing Countries, 'Development' and the Conservation of Biological 
Diversity', in Bowman & Redgwell (eds. ), International Law and the Conservation of Biological 
Diversity (Kluwer Law International, 1996), Chap. 12; Sands, Principles (Vol. I), 190. 
(84) Porras, 'The Rio Declaration', in Sands (ed. ), Greening International Law (Earthscan, 1993), 
Chap. 2, at 31; see also Birnie & Boyle, 114. 
(85) 1992 UNCED Report, Vol III, at 232 
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Three major forms of 'environmental intrusions' into domestic spheres can be 
distinguished out in practice: 1) the imposition of restrictive commercial measures to 
influence national environmental policies; 2) the enforcement of domestic environmental 
standards beyond national jurisdiction or within the jurisdiction of another State; and 3) 
the enactment of international environmental protective measures with regards to 
resources located or activities performed within the territorial jurisdiction of a State. 
1) Restrictive commercial measures, such as the imposition of trade barriers on 
imports for any products harvested or manufactured according to processes or 
techniques that do not meet the domestic environmental standards of the importing 
States, are perhaps the most common and most efficient tool available to certain 
economically powerful States to influence the domestic environmental policy of other 
States. One can mention, for instance, the US imposition of trade restrictions upon tuna 
fished according to methods which incur a percentage of incidental death of dolphins in 
excess of US national standards(86), US embargo on specific shrimp imports from 
countries that do not require their trawlers to use turtle excluder devices(87), Canada's 
(86) See First Gatt Panel Report in the matter of US Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1991), 30 ILM 
(1991), 1594 (Tuna/Dolphin I); Second Gatt Panel Report in the matter of US Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna (1994), 33 ILM (1994), 839 (Tuna/Dolphin II); on which see inter alia Kingsbury, 'The Tuna- 
Dolphin Controversy, the WTO and the Liberal Project to Reconceptualize International Law', 5 YbIEL 
(1994), 1. See also Canada-US Free Trade Agreement Panel Report in the matter of Lobsters from 
Canada (1990), concerning the imposition of a minimum size for the lobsters exported to US, to 
preserve the depletion of the stocks of lobsters; referredafter Sands, Principles (Vol 1), 707. 
(87) The uses of such device is made mandatory under the US 1989 Sea Turtles Conservation 
Amendments to the 1973 Endangered Species Act, codified at 16 USC §§1531-1544 (1988); such 
requirement is justified with the necessity to preserve the dwindling sea turtle population; a WTO panel 
was set up early 1997, upon request from India, Thailand, Malaysia and Pakistan, to consider the 
justifiability of the measure under the Gatt requirement; see McDorman, 'The Gatt Consistency of US 
Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles', 14 George 
Washington JIL & Economics (1990-91), 477, at 495; see also Kaczka, 'A Primer on the Shrimp-Sea 
Turtle Controversy', 6 RECIEL (1997), 171. The 1973 Endangered Species Act was also challenged in 
front of US Courts, for applying outside the US territorial jurisdiction, to federal agencies' projects and 
actions occurring in foreign countries; see Robbins, 'Environment 
-Endangered Species- Extraterritorial 
Application of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 91 F. 2d. 117 (8th 
Cir. 1990), cert. granted, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991)', 21 Georgia JICL 
(1991), 575; and review of the latest development: Just, 'Comment: Intergenerational Standing under the 
Endangered Species Act: Giving Back the Right to Biodiversity afterLujan v. Defenders of Wildlife', 71 
Tulane LR (1996), 597. 
Different is the case of the US 1979 Packwood Magnuson Amendment to the 1976 Magnuson Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (16 US §§ 1801-1882 (1988)), which confers a discretionary power to 
the Secretary of Commerce to impose trade sanctions upon on all fish products imported from countries 
which fail to abide by the international whaling quotas set by the International Whaling Commission 
under the 1946 Whaling Convention; Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 478 US 
221 (1986); on which see Haskell, 'Abandoning Whale Conservation Initiative in Japan Whaling 
Association v. American Cetacean Society', 11 Harvard ELR (1987), 551; Morley's note at 11 Suffolk 
Transnat. LJ (1987), 287. 
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import ban on certain sort of unprocessed fish(88) and the Dutch ban on import of birds 
yet lawfully hunted in the exporting country, on the ground that such birds were held as 
endangered in the Netherlands(89). The sole limits to any such restrictive measures are 
set out in the various free trade agreements, that tolerate health and environment 
exceptions to free trade principles only 'when necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health', or when primarily aimed at 'the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources', insofar as the restrictive measure does not constitute a disguised 
discriminatory trade barrier(90). 
These environmental exceptions have been the object of restrictive interpretation by 
the dispute settlement bodies set up under the respective free trade agreements, largely 
supported in that sense by the doctrine(91). Various ad hoc Gatt/WTO panels, for 
instance, have consistently applied a strict understanding of the necessary test (1947 
Gatt, Art. XX(b))(92) and relating to 
- 
primarily aimed at test (1947 Gatt, 
(88) Gatt Panel Report in the matter of Canada Measures Affecting Import of Unprocessed Herring and 
Salmon (1988), BISD/35S/98, noted at 27 ILM (1988), 1599; on which see McDorman, 'International 
Trade Law Meets International Fisheries Law: the Canada-US Salmon and Herring Dispute', 7 Journal 
of InternationalArbitration (1990), 107. 
(89) EEC Case C-169/89, Criminal Proceedings against Gourmetterie Van Den Burgh (Red Grouses 
case), [1990] ECR 1-143. 
(90) See for instance 1947 Gatt Art. XX(b) and (g), preserved in 1994 Gatt, with an introductory clause 
(referredto as the chapeau of Art. XX) which states that the measures taken under the general exceptions 
shall not be applied «in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade... ». See also 1986 EC Treaty, Art. 36; 1992 NAFTA (superseding 1987 Canada-US 
Free Trade Agreement), Arts. 712(2), 904(2) and 905(1), preserve the right of the contracting parties to 
establish its 'appropriate levels of protection' and take any standards-related measures to preserve human, 
animal or plant life or health. For a brief comparison of these environmental exceptions, see Montini, 
'The Nature of the Necessity and Proportionality Principles in the Trade and Environment Context', 6 
RECIEL (1997), 121. 
(91) See inter alia Birnie & Boyle, at 131-132; Brown Weiss, 'Environment and Trade as Partners in 
Sustainable Development: a Commentary', Agora 
- 
Trade and Environment, 86 AJIL (1992), 728; 
Charnovitz, 'Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in Gatt Article XX', 25 JGV1' (1991), 37; 
Chamovitz, 'Environmentalism Confronts Gatt Rules', 27 JWT (1993), 37; Kingsbury, 'Environment 
and Trade: The GATT/WTO Regime in the International Legal System', in Boyle (ed. ), Environmental 
Regulation and Economic Growth (Clarendon, 1994), Chap. 9, at 206 et sequ.; McDorman, 'The Gatt 
Consistency of US Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and 
Turtles', 14 George Washington JIL & Economics (1990-91), 477, at 507 et sequ.; Sands, Principles 
(Vol. I), Chap. 18; Schiffman, 'The Protection of Whales in International Law: Perspective for the Next 
Century', 22 Brooklyn JIL (1996), 303, at 334-43; Schoenbaum, 'Free International Trade Protection of 
the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict? ', Agora 
- 
Trade and Environment, 86 AJIL (1992), 700. 
(92) The necessity test under Art. XX(b), first considered in the Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of 
and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 7 November 1990, BISD 37S/200, is inspired from the interpretation 
of the necessity test under Art. XX(d) exception. In the Section 337 case, 7 November 1989, BISD 
36S/345, a Gatt Panel found that «a contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with other 
Gatt provisions as 'necessary in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which could reasonably 
be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other Gatt provisions is available to it»; at 
Para. 5.26. 
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Art. XX(g))(93). It is considered that, to effectively preserve a given environmental 
resource, a restrictive trade measure has to be taken `in conjunction with a similar 
restriction on domestic production and consumption'(94). 
The necessity test might find a slightly less stringent application in the EC context, 
as testified by the decision of the European Court of Justice partly upholding a Danish 
piece of legislation restricting the marketing of non-reusable drink containers as 
«necessary to attain the objectives of the disputed regulations»(95). Some authors 
contend more generally that the interpretation of the environmental exceptions applied 
under the 1947 Gatt is more stringent than under EC regime, and that the European 
Court of Justice, which has declared itself bound by the Gatt(96) might review its 
(93) In the dispute concerning the restriction on imports of unprocessed herring and salmon by Canada, 
supra n. 88, Canada tried to justify the measure as necessary and essential to conserve specific natural 
resources (Gatt Art. XX(g)). The Gatt panel found however that the measures did not meet the necessary 
requirements under Gatt environmental exception: 1) they were not 'primarily aimed at conservation', 
and 2) were not taken in conjunction with parallel restrictions on domestic consumption and production. 
Subsequent to that decision, Canada passed a new regulation whereby any salmon or herring caught in its 
exclusive fishing zone had to be landed in Canada before exportation. The US challenged the measure, 
this time under the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement; the bi-national panel found, inter alia, that the 
landing requirements could not be justified as environmental conservation measures; Canada-US Free 
Trade Agreement Panel Report in the matter of Canada-Landing Requirements for Pacific Coast Salmon 
and Herring (1989), 30 ILM (1991), 181; on which see Sands, Principles (Vol 1), 692 and 707. A 
similarly restrictive understanding of both 'necessity' and 'relating to test' was applied in the 
Tuna/Dolphin I and II, supra n. 86, and in the first WTO panel confronted with an environmental 
dispute. The dispute was brought by Venezuela and Brazil, and concerned the enforcement of different 
standards for imported 'reformulated' gasoline and for domestically refined version. The WTO Panel 
recognised the right of the US to set the environmental standards for its own production, but considered 
that the application of different standards to foreign production was contrary to the free trade rules, namely 
the national treatment principle; WTO Panel Report in the matter of US-Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, 29 January 1996. The WTO Panel decision was upheld in its 
outcome (albeit not without some criticisms as to its reasoning) by the WTO Appellate Body, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, 20 May 1996,351LM (1996), 603; see further Appleton, 'Gatt Article XX's Chapeau: 
A Disguised 'Necessary' Test?: The WTO Appellate Body's Ruling in United States 
- 
Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline', 6 RECIEL (1997), 131; Robert, `L'affaire des normes 
americaines relatives ä 1'essence', 101 RGDIP (1997), 108. 
(94) See Gatt Panel Report in the matter of US-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from 
Canada (1982), BISD/29S/91; on which see McDorman, 'The Gatt Consistency of US Fish Import 
Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles', 14 George Washington 
JIL & Economics (1990-91), 477, at 511 et sequ.; Sands, Principles (Vol 1), 691. The Dispute was 
triggered by the seizure of 19 fishing boats by Canada within its 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zone. 
The US, having consistently denied the application of the 200-mile limits with respect to highly 
migratory species, retaliated with an embargo on Canadian tuna, which it tried to justify as a necessary 
measure to conserve and preserve an exhaustible natural resources in the sense of Gatt Art. XX(g). Such 
argument was dismissed by the Gatt panel, on the ground that the measures was not made 'in 
conjunction with similar restriction on domestic production and consumption', and was therefore 
discriminatory. 
(95) EEC Case C-302/86, Commission v. Denmark (Danish Bottles case), [1989] 1 CMLR, 619 at 631. 
(96) See EEC Joined Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, [1972] ECR 1-1226. 
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position and bring it in line with the Gatt rulings(97). Albeit short of constituting a case 
of extraterritoriality of domestic environmental laws stricto sensu in the sense that the 
domestic regulations apply to the foreign products only insofar as those products try to 
enter the jurisdiction of the importing State, trade restrictive measures represent 
nonetheless a subtle, efficient way, and within certain limits, an admissible way to 
influence the sovereign competence of exporting State upon its natural resources and to 
impose foreign standards(98). 
2) On the other hand, it appears that, at least under the Gatt system(99), the 
environmental exception does not encompass domestic measures taken beyond the 
jurisdiction of any States(100), or within the jurisdiction of another State(101). 
(97) Sands, `Danish Bottles and Mexican Tuna', 1 RECIEL (1992), 28, at 33 
(98) A number of international environmental law instruments explicitly rely on the use of national 
sanctions, inter alia foreign trade sanctions, for the implementation of the treaty objectives in other 
States; see most notably 1973 CITES, Art. 8; 1987 Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer, Art. 4(1); 
1989 Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Art. 9(5). On the use of 
trade sanctions to achieve environmental purposes, see further Jenkins, 'Trade Sanctions: Effective 
Enforcement Tools', in Cameron et al. (eds. ), Improving Compliance with International Environmental 
Law (Earthscan, 1996), Chap. 10; Sand, 'International Economic Instruments for Sustainable 
Development: Sticks, Carrots and Games', 26/2 Indian JIL (1996), 1. 
(99) See Tuna/Dolphin I and II, supra n. 86; see also Birnie & Boyle, at 131-132. 
(100) A classic example being the dispute that arouse between the US and the UK over the right of the 
formerto take effective measures to preserve fur seals in Bering Sea beyond territorial water «based upon 
established principles of the common and the civil law, upon the practice of nations, upon the laws of 
natural history, and upon the common interest of mankind; Pacific Fur Seals Arbitration (1893), 1 
Moore International Arbitrations, 755, at 811; on which see Birnie & Boyle, 493 et sequ.; Sands, 
Principles (Vol 1), 415 et sequ. See also the latest fisheries case opposing Spain and Canada, pending 
before the ICJ. The case arose out of the boarding of a Spanish fishing boat by Canadian fisheries 
protection authorities on the high sea adjacent Canada's 200 nautical miles exclusive fisheries zone (in 
NAFO Regulatory Area) on March 1995, on the allegation that the vessel was fishing in breach of NAFO 
conservation and management measures, and in application to the Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection 
Act. The Act, which expressly permits Canadian authorities inter alia to disallow (if necessary by force) 
foreign vessels in NAFO Regulatory Area fishing in contravention of any of the conservation and 
management measures prescribed by NAFO, was enacted in reaction to the European Commission's 
decision to set its own fishing quotas within the overall allowable catch ceiling fixed by a majority vote 
in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, in disregard of those (lower) quotas attributed to it by 
NAFO; see Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as amended 12 May 1994, reprinted in 33 ILM 
(1994), 1383, more partic. Sect. 5.2. In its application to the ICJ, filed on 28 March 1995, Spain alleged 
the boarding of the Estai infringes (a) the freedom of the high seas, and (b) the sovereign rights of Spain, 
and requested the ICJ to declare, inter alia: 
«(A) that the Court find that the legislation of Canada, in so far as it claims 
to exercise a jurisdiction over ships flying a foreign flag on the high seas, 
outside the exclusive economic zone of Canada, is not opposable to the 
Kingdom of Spain; 
(B) (omitted) 
(C) that consequently, the Court declares also that the boarding on the high 
seas (... ) of the ship Estai (... ), and the measures of coercion and the exercise 
of jurisdiction over that ship and over its captain, constitutes a concrete 
violation of the (... ) principles and norms of international law; » 
(continued) 
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The issue is already less clear-cut under EC Treaty, Art. 36. In the Tuna/Dolphin II, the 
EC Commission dismissed the US interpretation of the Red Grouses case(102) as a 
recognition that «Article 36, like the corresponding provision in the General Agreement, 
contained no jurisdictional limitation in the text, permitted measures to protect bird life 
not only in the country's territory, but also outside of it) >(103). The Commission 
contended that the US had misunderstood the case, and argued that «... the Court had 
simply ruled that Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome could not be invoked by a member 
State when a Community Directive provided for full harmonisation of national 
legislation in the relevant policy area. The Court said nothing else concerning the 
interpretation of Article 36)>(104). Krämer is one of the few authors to have expressed a 
clear-cut opinion in favour the absence of geographical limitation to the EC Treaty 
requirement of the protection of the environment (Art. 36)(105). 
The extraterritorial application of environmental regulations was raised at the 1992 
Rio Conference on Environment and Development by Latin American and EC States, 
alarmed by the mounting tendency of the US to resort to trade regulations to influence 
environmental practices of certain countries and protect its own market. Any attempt to 
decide the issue fell through; the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
ICJ Communique No 25/9,29 March 1995, at 2 (emphasis added). Canada has adopted a similar line of 
arguments as the US in the Tuna/Dolphin I and II, and invoked environmental necessity to protect 
dwindling stocks of Greenland halibut from over fishing, and the necessity to respect NAFO total catch 
and allocated quotas. Hence the matter is one of unilateral enforcement of NAFO measures in NAFO 
Regulatory Area more than a case of extraterritorial application of domestic law, Freestone, 'Canadian and 
the EU Reach Agreement to Settle the Estai Dispute', 10 IJ Marine & Coastal L (1995), 397, at 400; 
Lugten, 'Fisheries War for the Halibut', 25 EPL (1995), 223; Joyner & von Gustedt, 'The Turbot War 
of 1995: Lessons for the Law of the Sea', 11 IJMarine & Coastal L (1996), 425. For an analysis of the 
dispute under the angle of environmental law rules and principles, more particularly the law of the Sea 
framework: Davies & Redgwell, 'The International Legal Regulation of Straddling Fish Stocks', 67 
British YbIL (1997), 199. For an examination of the dispute under the general rules and principles of 
international law: Davies, 'The EC/Canadian Fisheries Dispute in the North West Atlantic', 4 ICLQ 
(1995), 927, at 933 et sequ. The Court has first to decide on its jurisdiction, as Canada had entered a 
reservation on its previous recognition of the ICJ mandatory jurisdiction only days before the entry into 
force of the disputed 1994 Amendment to the 1985 Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, excluding the ICJ's 
jurisdiction for most of the disputes arising out of the application of the Act; see Davies & Redgwell, 
ibid., at 212 etsequ. 
(101) US Dolphin friendly measures for instance applied to tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific 
Ocean which, as defined under the US Marine Mammal Protection Act, Mexican coasts and exclusive 
economic zone; see (Tuna/Dolphin I), 30ILM (1991), 1594, at 1602. 
(102) Supra n. 89. 
(103) Tuna/Dolphin II, supra n. 86, at Para. 3.25. 
(104) Ibid at Para. 3.48. 
(105) 
'Environmental Protection and Article 30 EEC Treaty', 30 Common Market Law Review (1993), 
111, at 118-119. 
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Development adopts a formule de compromis(106), and merely recommend importing 
States to abstain from unilateral actions to address environmental challenges outside 
their jurisdiction(107). 
In its interpretative statement of principle 12, the US declared that «in certain 
situations, trade measures may provide an effective and appropriate means of 
addressing environmental concerns, including (... ) environmental concerns outside 
national jurisdiction, subject to certain discipline»(108). The European Community in the 
Tuna/Dolphin II, inspired by the equivocal dictum of the PCIJ in the SS Lotus case(109), 
followed a more classic conception of extraterritorial measures and invoked, among the 
relevant rules of customary international law to define the limits to state jurisdiction, 
«the basic principle that a law should not be interpreted as having extra-territorial 
jurisdictional effect, in accordance with the duty of non-intervention, unless there were 
explicit indications to the contrary»(110). 
(106) Lang, Us mesures commerciales au service de la protection de 1'environnement', 99 RGDIP 
(1995), 545, at 560. 
(107) plc. 12; see also 1992 Agenda 21, Paras. 2.21(a) and 2.22(c) and (d). 
(108) Quoted after Kovar, `A Short Guide to the Rio Declaration', at 133 (emphasis added). The US 
confirmed its positions in the Tuna/Dolphin II, and, referring to 1992 Rio Declaration, Princ. 12, 
underlined that, while no international law provision expressly provides for the extraterritorial application 
of domestic environmental norms, no provision precludes it either; Para. 3.18; on which see Sands, 
Principles (Vol. 1), 190. 
(109) In the Lotus case, the Court first set the basic rule according to which «... the (... ) foremost 
restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that 
-failing the existence of a permissive rule to 
the contrary 
- 
it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State; in the next 
paragraph it went on saying that «[f]arfrom laying down a general prohibition to the effect that State may 
not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts 
outside their territory, [this basic rule] leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is 
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules... »; The Case of the S. S. "Lotus", PCIJ Ser. A-No 10, 
September 7th, 1927, at 19-20. And whilst substantial clarification has been brought by the doctrine as 
to the various possible grounds justifying state extraterritorial jurisdiction, the conditions of exercise and 
limits thereto have remained extremely nebulous; see inter alia Brownlie, Principles, 307 et sequ.; 
Dixon & McCorquodale, Cases & Materials, Chap. 8; Oppenheim's International Law Vol. 1, § 138. 
Also: Akehurst, `Jurisdiction in International Law', 45 British YbIL (1972-73), 145, at 190 et sequ.; 
Higgins, `The Legal Bases of Jurisdiction', in Olmstead (ed. ), Extra-Territorial Application of Laws 
and Responses Thereto (ILA-ESC, 1984), Chap. 3; Mann, `The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International 
Law', 111 RdC (1964-I), 1, at 126 et sequ. ; Mann, `The Doctrine of Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty 
Years', 186 RdC (1984-III), 9, at 20 et sequ. 
(110) Tuna/Dolphin II, at Paras. 3.38. The European Union adopted a similarly rigid stance in the recent 
conflict over the D'Amato and Helms-Burton Acts, whereby the US reserved its rights to penalise non 
US enterprises maintaining commercial links with `outcast' countries; see US Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), 35 ILM (1996) 357; US Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996 (D'Amato Act), 35 ILM (1996) 1273. The Council of the European Union 
declared that «... by their extra-territorial application such laws, regulations and other legislative 
instruments [which purport to regulate activities of natural and legal persons under the jurisdiction of the 
Member State] violate international law... »; EC Regulation No 2271/96,22 November 1996, reproduced 
in 36 ILM (1997), 127. Canada and Mexico adopted a similar stance and passed legislation to counter 
both Acts; see Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 36 ILM (1997), 111; Mexican Act to (continued) 
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Maybe more than any other areas of the law, the 'application of environmental law 
raises question of extraterritoriality, due to the nature of its object. Some natural 
resources (migratory species for instance) can simply not be attached to one single 
jurisdiction, or to any jurisdiction at all (high seas resources)(111). Such resources are 
bound to generate jurisdictional conflicts, unless and until there are international norms 
to co-ordinate their use and assure their protection. Likewise, environmental pollution 
knows no political borders, and the discrepancy between the geographical scope of the 
legal rule and the geographical scope of the issue to be tackled entails serious risks of a 
legal loophole(112). It is therefore a matter of urgency (a) to set clear limits to the 
application and enforcement of domestic environmental laws, and (b) to provide for a 
regional or international co-operation regime where no domestic law applies(113). 
3) International environmental rules that impose certain restrictions upon States with 
regard to their own domestic environment or to common areas, whilst carrying more 
'legitimacy' than unilateral measures imposed by one State are nonetheless perceived as 
an interference into state sovereignty over domestic natural resources. In this respect, 
the adoption of international standards pertaining to natural resources clearly and 
definitely located within national jurisdiction proved particularly controversial in that 
respect, and revived old claims of sovereignty over natural resources. 
Sovereignty was the object of particular controversy throughout the negotiations 
leading to the 1992 Biodiversity Convention(114). On the one hand, developing States 
Protect Trade and Investment from Foreign Norms that Contravene International Law, 36 ILM (1997), 
133. For a general comment on D'Amato and Helms-Burton Acts, see for instance Lowe, 'Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction: the Helms-Burton and D'Amato Acts', 46 ICLQ (1997), 378; Lowenfeld, 'Congress and Cuba: The Helm-Burton Act', Agora 
-The Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, 
90 AJIL (19996), 419; and Clagett, B. M., 'A Reply to Professor Lowenfeld', ibid., 641. 
(111) US argument in the Tuna/Dolphin II, supra n. 86, at Paras. 3.18. 
(112) Wolfrum, `Die grenzüberschreitende Luftverschmutzung im Schnittpunkt von nationalem Recht 
und Völkerrecht', 99 DVBI. (1984), 492, at 494; also Handl, `Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of 
TransfrontierPollution, 69AJIL (1975), 58. 
(113) The protection of straddling fish and migratory species constitutes a clear illustration of the 
necessity to enact certain international rules to complement and coordinate domestic measures; it is also 
an example of the reluctance of States in general (in this case, non coastal States involved in fishing in 
the high seas), towards the extension of domestic rules of given States (coastal States) to common areas. 
Short of recognising the controversial preferential right of coastal States on the protection of straddling 
fish in high seas, the 1995 Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement endorses rather a regime of joint co- 
operative effort of coastal and fishing States; see inter alia Art. 5. On the negotiation leading to the 
agreement and more particularly on the preferential right of coastal States, see Lucchini, 'Stocks Chevauchants 
- 
Grands Migrateurs', in A1-Nauimi & Meese (eds. ), International Legal Issues Arising 
Under the Decade of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 513; also Davies, & Redgwell, `The 
International Legal Regulation of Straddling Fish Stocks', 67 British YbIL (1997), 199. 
(114) For a detailed review of the negotiation of the Convention, see Burhenne-Guilmin et al., A Guide 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity Environmental Policy & Law Paper No. 30 (IUCN 
Environmental Law Center, 1994); Bilderbeek (ed. ), Biodiversity and International Law (IOS, 1992); (continued) 
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lobbied for an explicit recognition of their sovereignty over the biological resources 
under their jurisdiction(115) and access thereto based on `mutual agreement between 
countries'(116); on the other, developed States were eager to balance national sovereignty 
with responsibility towards other nations(117). The suggestion to add the conservation 
of biodiversity to the list of elements considered to be the common heritage of mankind 
was rejected outright as inapplicable(118). The conservation of biodiversity, like climate 
change(119), was finally declared a common concern of humankind, as to imply a general 
and common obligation of all States ` towards an issue that is of paramount importance 
to the international community'(120). 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that the 1992 Biodiversity Convention `leans much 
more to the side of national sovereignty'(121), implying little more than effective co- 
McConnell, The Biodiversity Convention, a Negotiating History (Kluwer Law International, 1996). 
Generally Convention: Boyle, `The Convention on Biological Diversity', supra n. 80; Bowman & 
Redgwell (eds. ), International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity (Kluwer Law 
International, 1996); Bragdon, `National Sovereignty and Global Environmental Responsibility: Can the 
Tension be Reconciled for the Conservation of Biological Diversity? ', 33 Harvard ILJ (1992), 381; 
Burhenne-Guilmin & Casey-Lefkowitz, `The Convention on Biological Diversity: A Hard Won Global 
Achievement', 3 YbIEL (1992), 43; Chandler, `The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest 
to the International Lawyer', 4 Colorado JIELP (1993), 141. 
(115) Chandler, `The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the International Lawyer', 
at 145. 
(116) Quoted after Porter & Brown, Global Environmental Politics (Westview, 1991), 131; see also 
Sell, `North-South Environmental Bargaining: Ozone, Climate Change and Biodiversity', 2 Global 
Governance (1996), 97, at 110 et sequ. 
(117) McConnell, supra n. 114, at 89; see also Bell, `The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity: 
the Continuing Significance of US Objections at the Earth Summit', 26 George Washington JIL & 
Economics (1993), 479. 
(118) Developing States opposed such qualification, which the considered unsuited to natural resources 
located in great majority on national territory. More generally, no State was willing to revive the old 
political controversy about the regime of exploitation of the common heritage of mankind; Burhenne- 
Guilmin & Casey-Lefkowitz, supra n. 114, at 47 et sequ., and 53 et sequ. See infra Chap. 5/2/iv. 
Common Concern, Common Interest of Manlind: Global Partnership or Global Bargain?. 
(119) 1992 Climate Change Convention, preambular Para. 1; Para. 9 reaffirms the principle of 
sovereignty of States in the international co-operation to address climate change. 
(120) Burhenne-Guilmin & Casey-Lefkowitz, supra n. 114, at 48; see more generally Boyle, `The 
Convention on Biological Diversity', supra n. ' 80; Kiss, `The International Protection of the 
Environment', in Macdonald & Johnston (eds. ), The Structure and Process of International Law: 
Essays in Legal Philosophy Doctrine and Theory (Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), 1069, at 1084. See infra 
Chap. 5/2/iv. Common Concern, Common Interest of Mankind: Global Partnership or Global Bargain?. 
(121) Klemm & Shine, Biological Diversity Conservation and the Law, 54; Chandler, `The 
Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the International Lawyer', at 147 et sequ.; 
permanent sovereignty over genetic resources is reaffirmed in the Preamble (Para. 4), and at Arts. 3 and 
15. Subsequent State practice has confirmed such inclination, as several States have availed themselves of 
the possibility, under the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, to enact unilateral measures to control access 
and exploitation to wild resources located on their territory, and even claim participation to the benefit 
derived therefrom; see for instance Costa Rica Wildlife Protection Act October 1992; and 1994 (continued) 
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operation, and entailing no fundamental reconsideration of the legal status of biological 
resources(122): 
1) State sovereignty over natural resources located on its territory suffers no more 
compelling or far-reaching restrictions than already imposed under general 
international law(123), and inter alia under the no substantial harm principle(124). 
Besides, each State retains sole competence to control and regulate access to its 
biological resources(125). 
2) The obligations imposed by the Convention, as a rule, do not engage the State 
beyond the limits of its national jurisdiction(126), hence precluding any attempts 
to infer any extra-territorial jurisdiction from the qualification of common concern 
of mankind. However, whilst the declaration of common concern of mankind does 
not justify any intrusion into the permanent sovereignty of States on 
environmental grounds, it also precludes any exclusive conception of such 
sovereignty by the host State as `a basis for exclusion for others'; rather, it entails 
a `commitment to co-operate for the good of the international community at 
large'(127). 
Amendment to the Western Australia Constitution; reported in Johnston, `Sustainability, Biodiversity 
and International law', in Bowman & Redgwell (eds. ), International Law and the Conservation of 
Biological Diversity, (Kluwer Law International, 1996), Chap. 3, at 68. 
(122) Boyle, `The Convention on Biological Diversity', in Campiglio et al (eds. ), The Environment 
After Rio: International Law and Economics (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), Chap. 8, at 
117. 
(123) See infra 4/ 
ii. Towards a Limited Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Some authors however, seem to attach 
a particular significance to the fact that the Preamble first qualifies the conservation of biodiversity as of 
common interest of mankind, and then affirms the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources; Burhenne-Guilmin & Casey-Lefkowitz, supra n. 114. 
(124) As understood under 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment Princ. 21, 
reproduced verbatim at Art. 3 of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention. General duties of conservation and 
sustainable use are set forth at Arts. 6-9. 
(125) Art. 15; the issue of access to genetic resources have always been the object of controversy. On the 
one hand, the principle of free access to wild natural resources had long been regarded as the rule, and was 
inter alia embodied in the non-binding FAO Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources 1983, assimilating 
plant genetic resources to a heritage of mankind; Boyle, `The Convention on Biological Diversity' supra 
n. 122. On the other hand, such freedom has been largely curtailed by domestic legislation passed by 
major host States, that restrict the access to natural resources; Burhenne-Guilmin & Casey-Lelkowitz, 
supra n. 114, at 52 et sequ. 
(126) Art. 4; except where expressly provided otherwise. The jurisdiction limitation clause was 
introduced in the last minute only, at the instance of host States of biodiversity, Bell, supra n. 117. 
(127) Handl, supra n. 81, at 87; Boyle, `The Convention on Biological Diversity' supra n. 122, at 117- 
118. 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources 84 Chapter 2 
Developed and developing States followed a similar line of argument during the 
negotiation of a global regime for tropical forests(128), and more recently, during the 
renegotiation of the International Timber Agreement 1983(129). Like biodiversity, early 
proposals had been made to consider tropical forests as the common heritage of 
mankind, or put them under some sort of `global stewardship'(130). The negotiation of 
an internationally binding agreement on Forestry management was finally postponed in 
the process leading to the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development(131), 
(128) See generally Brunnde, `A Conceptual Framework for an International Forests Conventions: 
Customary Law and Emerging Principles', in Canadian Council on International Law (ed. ), Global 
Forests and International Environmental Law (Kluwer Law International, 1996), Chap. 2; Myers, 'The 
Anatomy of Environmental Action: the Case of Tropical Deforestation', in Hurrell & Kingsbury, The 
International Politics of the Environment (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 16; Sands, Principles (Vol. I), 406 
et sequ.; Saunders, `Valuation and International Regulations of Forest Ecosystems: Prospects for a 
Global Forest Agreement', 66 Washington LR (1991), 871; Schally, `Forests: Towards an International 
Legal Regime? ' 4 YbIEL (1993), 30; Dan Tarlock, 'Exclusive Sovereignty versus Sustainable 
Development of a Shared Resource: the Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest Management', 32 Texas 
ILJ (1997), 37; Yamin & Flint, '1992: the Year in Review 
- 
Forests', 3 YbIEL (1992), 326. See also 
Yamin & Cameron, Convention for the Conservation and Wise Use of Forests Draft Text, (Center for 
International Environmental Law, 1991). 
(129) Humphreys, 'Hegemonie Ideology and the International Tropical Timber Organisation', in Vogler 
& Imber (eds. ), The Environment and International Relations (Routledge, 1996), Chap. 12. 
(130) See for instance FAO draft proposal for a Forestry Convention; on which see Schally, `Forests: 
Towards an International Legal Regime? ', at 41. 
(131) An early proposal fora global convention on forests had been made by the US at a G7 summit in 
1990; Weiss, 'Introductory Note' to a selection of UNCED documents, 31 ILM (1992), 814, at 817; 
Cameron & Yamin, '1990: the Year in Review 
- 
Forests', 1 YbIEL (1990), 201. Such initiative was 
perceived with great suspicion by developing States hosting the great majority of world forests, as a 
«crafty manipulation to avoid taking tough reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in favour of 
capitalizing on tropical forests as convenient carbon sinks'; Vander Zwaag & MacKinlay, 'Towards a 
Global Forests Convention: Getting Out of the Woods and Barking up the Right Tree', in Canadian 
Council on International Law (ed. ), Global Forests and International Environmental Law, Chap. 1, at 
1. Very illustrative of such attitude is the statement made by the Prime Minister of Malaysia at the 
Summit Segment of 1992 UNCED Conference; 1992 UNCED Report, Vol. III, at 230; reproduced infra 
Hence, the reticence of developing States towards a global forestry Convention pertains to the real 
motives behind industrialised States' concern and this appearanceof'ingerence dcologique' from the part 
of non-host States, rather than to the idea of co-operation itself; all attempts from Western powers to 
invoke the `public good' nature of the Amazon forests (to pressurise Brazil to take appropriate measures 
to preserve it) was fiercely denounced by Brazilian government as an illegitimate interference with 
Brazil's internal affairs and violation of its sovereignty, see Goldenberg & Durham, 'Amazonia and 
National Sovereignty', 2 International Environmental Affairs (1992), 22; McClearly, `The International 
Community's Claim to Rights in Brazilian Amazonia', 39 Political Studies (1991), 69; see also Baslar, 
The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Kluwer Law International, 
1998), Ph. D manuscript, at 168 et sequ., on the relevance of the concept of common heritage of mankind 
in the case of the Brazilian Amazon, and the difficulties raised by the application of such concept to 
natural resources under national jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, regional agreements have been concluded among host States, for the conservation of 
forestry resources; see for instance 1978 Amazon Treaty, whereby Amazon Basin States commit 
themselves to preserve the natural resources in the region, including the Amazon forests; Art. IV reaffirms 
nonetheless the permanent sovereignty over the natural resources located under the jurisdiction of one 
State. See also Regional Convention for the Management and Conservation of Forest Natural Ecosystems (continued) 
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and only a set of non-binding general principles was produced, which largely privileges 
the arguments put forward by developing States. Permanent sovereignty of States over 
their forestry resources is fully recognised(132), with no further restrictions than those 
already imposed under the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 
Principle 21(133)_ Priority is given to action at national level. Unlike biodiversity, 
forestry resources are not least declared common concern of mankind(134). International 
action remains confined to a matter of co-operation and, at least on paper, of equitable 
cost sharing(135). 
In fact, and this appears even more clearly from the Final International Tropical 
Timber Agreement(136), the concern of industrial countries over the degradation of 
and the Development of Forestry Plantations, concluded by Central American States in Guatemala, 29 
October 1993. In other words, host States are ready for co-operation that fully respects their sovereignty 
over their natural resources; see for instance Delhi Declaration on Forests, adopted at the First Ministerial Conference of the Forestry Forum for Developing Countries, New Delhi, 3 September 1994; reproduced 
in 24 EPL (1994), 201. 
Industrialised States insisted on introducing a clause securing the possibility to review the adequacy of 
the regime agreed, and keep forestry issues open for further discussion 'with regard to further international 
co-operation on forest issues'; preambular Para. (d); see also 1993 General Guidelines for the Sustainable 
Management ofForests in Europe, issued by the Helsinki Forest Meeting, 16-17 June 1993, point 16; 
reproduced at 23 EPL (1993), 232. 
(132) 1992 Forestry Principles, Princ. 1(a) and 2(a); see also preambular Para. (h); see also 1994 Delhi 
Declaration on Forests, reiterating that «forest resources are an inalienable national resource; Malaysia 
and Brazil had been particularly adamant on an express recognition of state sovereignty; see Eshbach, 'A 
Global Approach to the Protection of the Environment: Balancing State Sovereignty and Global 
Interests', 4 Temple ICLI (1990), 271; Mickelson, `Seeing the Forest, the Trees and the People: 
Coming to Terms with Developing Country Perspectives on the Proposed Global Forests Convention', 
in Canadian Council on International Law (ed. ), Global Forests and International Environmental Law, 
supra, Chap. 6. 
Industrialised States, whilst recognising the importance of national action, tried to circumscribe the 
sovereign power of State with reference to environmental requirements and general international law 
principles; see for example 1993 General Guidelines for the Sustainable Management of Forests in 
Europe; Brunn6e, 'A conceptual Framework for an International Forests Convention: Customary Law and 
Emerging Principles', in Canadian Council on International Law (ed. ), Global Forests and International 
Environmental Law, Chap. 2; Szekely, 'The Legal Protection of the World's Forests after Rio '92, in 
Campiglio, et al. (eds. ), The Environment after Rio, International Law and Economics, (Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijhofg 1994), Chap. 6. 
(133) prin. 21 is restated in 1992 Forestry Principles, Princ. 1(a). 
(134) On the contrary, the conservation of forests is declared to be of concern to 'the Governments of the 
countries to which they belong'; preambular Para. (f). 
(135) prin. 1(b). 
(136) Finalised in 26 January 1994; 33 ILM (1994), 1016. The entry into force of the Agreement, made 
conditional upon ratification by 12 producer countries with a voting weight of 55%, and 16 countries 
with a minimum voting weight of 70%, and initially planned for the 25 February 1995, was hampered by 
the non ratification of key countries, including the US and Brazil. A group of 18 tropical timber producer States and equal number of importing countries agreed, at a UNCTAD meeting on 13 September 1996, 
to put the Agreement provisionally into force among themselves from the 1 January 1997; 'Tropical 
Timber Agreement: Soon in Force?, 26 EPL (1996), 246. 
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biodiversity in general, and more particularly the depletion of tropical rainforests, 
provided developing States with yet another opportunity to revive their old claims for a 
new international economic order, and obtain a series of concessions from developed 
States in exchange for their co-operation in global conservation efforts(137). Developed 
States have consistently reiterated their reticence to such claims through their 
opposition or interpretative declaration(138). This does but confirm in effect McNeely's 
comment(139), that States use and interpret sovereignty in this context only to preserve 
their own individual interests in the exploitation of natural resources. 
The adoption of international rules to preserve or protect inherently `transnational' 
(migratory or transboundary) resources, on the other hand, have raised no substantial 
issue under the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. For instance, 
neither 1973 CITES, nor 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory 
Species nor 1979 Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife expressly 
refer to the Contracting States' permanent sovereignty over their natural resources as 
such(140). On the contrary, they recognise that the various protected species «in their 
innumerable forms are irreplaceable part of the earth's natural system which must be 
conserved for the good of humankind»(141). 
In a similar fashion, the 1968 African Convention on Nature recognises that nature 
and natural resources constitute «a capital of vital importance to mankind)) (preambular 
(137) Extending from financial to technical assistance and equitable sharing of the benefits derived from 
the exploitation of the resources; see Humphreys, `Hegemonic Ideology and the International Tropical 
Timber Organisation', at 217 et sequ. and 228 et sequ. Express referenceto a NIEO is made in the 1994 
Tropical Timber International Agreement, preambular Para. 1. McConnell reports similar attempts 
throughout the 1992 Biodiversity negotiations, summarising the G77 negotiating line as: «We've got 
most of it: you want it; you'll have to pay for it>>; The Biodiversity Convention, a Negotiating History 
(Kluwer Law International, 1996), at 76. 
(138) To the noticeable exception of Nordic countries, which stress, in a joint declaration made in the 
context of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, «the special obligations of developed countries to 
contribute financially and technologically to enable developing countries to fulfil their obligations under 
the Convention (... ) A fair international burden sharing according to each country's means and needs is 
therefore absolutely crucial... ». See however US Declaration, and joint Declaration of Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Malta, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States (on financial 
mechanism); all declarations made at the Nairobi Final Act Conference are reproduced in full in 
McConnell, supra n. 137, Annex I (179 et sequ. ). On the issue of financial and technological assistance 
and the respective positions of States: see infra, Chap. 5/3. The Parameters for Global Co-operation 
(13 9) Supra n. 77. 
(140) One should mention certain oblique referencesfor instance in the Preamble of 1973 CITES, Para. 3 ('... their own wild fauna... ). 
(141) 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species. 1979 Bern Convention on the Conservation of European wildlife simply provides that wild flora and fauna constitutes `a natural heritage' (Preamble). 
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Para. 1), yet contains no reference to permanent sovereignty over natural resources per 
se; neither does the 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature. More 
recently, the 1995 Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, ad Art. 3(3), makes only an 
indirect reference thereto, when it provides that a State shall pay due consideration to 
certain principles set forth in the agreement «[i]n the exercise of its sovereign rights for 
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing straddling fish stocks 
and highly migratory fish stock within areas under national jurisdiction. 
Permanent sovereignty was not particularly at issue in any of the above conventions, 
as all were construed as a joined and mutual effort between host States, or international 
co-ordination of national actions to protect `common' resources, implying no such 
substantial surrender or erosion of sovereignty as International action does. And despite 
US contentions in the Tuna/Dolphin II (Para. 3.21), none of the above agreements 
explicitly sanction extraterritorial jurisdiction of States Parties, even for the purpose of 
protection of the targeted species(142). On the contrary, and as the EC and Netherlands 
stressed rightly: 
«The signatories merely promised to take conservation measures within their 
own jurisdiction, and to help the others to supervise and enforce the export 
licence system (... ) that went with it. This [is] fundamentally different from a 
situation in which a country imposed import restrictions, not in order to help 
supervise and enforce the export licensing system or treaty partner which had 
agreed to take identical measures within its own jurisdiction, but to enforce 
measures it had established for conservation or protection outside its own 
jurisdiction and that other countries had not agreed to» (143) 
No provision either is made in the 1995 Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement for the 
extraterritorial application of the coastal State fisheries conservation measures(144) 
3. The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: a 
Principle of Customary Law 
When it comes to evaluate the legal status of the principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources, a careful distinction has to be drawn between (a) the classic 
components of the principle, as embodied in the 1962 landmark Resolution on 
(142) In practice, both individual and collective sanctions have been used inter alia under the 1973 
CITES, to encourage compliance with conventional obligations; see further Jenkins, Trade Sanctions: 
Effective Enforcement Tools', in Cameron et al. (eds. ), Improving Compliance with International 
Environmental Law (Earthscan, 1996), Chap. 10,225 et sequ. It remains to be seen, however, how fir 
such sanctions can be considered as genuine extraterritorial measures, or constitute purely domestic 
measures with incidental extraterritorial implications as developed supra p. 78 (CR). 
(143) Tuna/Dolphin II, at Para. 3.40. 
(144) Davies & Redgwell, `The International Legal Regulation of Straddling Fish Stocks', 67 British YbIL (1997), 199, at 268. 
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Sovereignty over Natural Resources and known as the `compromise solution', and (b) 
the components developed subsequently. Whereas the former are well accepted under 
international customary law, the latter remain the object of serious controversy and have 
not yet reached such status. 
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, like the principle of self-determination 
it was initially related to, emerged as a purely political concept, prompted by political 
considerations, and invoked to achieve the essentially political goal of full-scale 
independence. Early claims of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and 
accompanying measures of nationalisation reflected political more than legal concerns: 
foreign companies' monopoly over the exploitation of mineral resources was 
increasingly assimilated to an unacceptable interference in the domestic affairs of the 
host State, most notably with its economic decision-making power, and hence 
constitutive of a threat to the national interest of that State. To justify the first wave of 
nationalisation in Iran, an Iranian delegate declared at an early meeting of the Second 
Committee of the General Assembly in charge of the issue: «[Iran's] very existence (... ) 
has been threatened by the system [of monopoly by foreign owned enterprises, over the 
exploitation of Iran's natural resources] in force) )(145). 
The consensus expressed in the 1962 landmark Resolution on Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources and the related principles (inter alia nationalisation) was originally 
the result of a political compromise to solve a political issue(146), and «sovereignty over 
natural resources was therefore a political concept) )(147). It is interesting to note 
nonetheless, that France, already at the stage of negotiations of the 1962 landmark 
Resolution on Sovereignty over Natural Resources, considered the issue of sovereignty 
over natural resources as a legal issue, and indeed opposed the adoption of the 
resolution on the ground that such issue had to be dealt with by lawyers before being 
consecrated into a (political) resolution of UN General Assembly (148). By contrast, 
some countries, mostly former colonial powers, such as the UK and the Netherlands, 
(145) Quoted after Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, at 53. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
had indeed exercised strong pressures on the Iranian government to preserve its monopolistic situation 
and favour its economic and commercial interest; Rosenberg, Le Principe de souverainete des Etats sur 
leurs ressources naturelles, 95 et sequ. On the same line, the Chilean delegate emphasised, at a 
subsequent meeting of the same committee, that the issue at stake 
-sovereign economic decision-taking- 
was a `highly political one'; Rajan, ibid., 58, and similar position of other developed and developing 
and socialist States at 51 et sequ.; see further Fischer, ` La souverainet8 sur les ressources naturelles'. 
(146) Fischer, ` La souverainetd sur les ressources naturelles', at 527. 
(147) Declaration of the Swedish delegate to the Second Committee, quoted afterRajan, Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources, at 89. 
(148) Fischer, ` La souverainete sur les ressources naturelles', at 518 
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but also the US and Australia, first opposed the draft of common Article 1 of the 1966 
International Covenants when put to a vote at the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly in 1955, on the ground that the principle was a political and not a legal one, 
and hence not worthy of being enshrined in an international legal document(149). 
Nevertheless, the 1962 compromise formula of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources has been constantly reiterated in a considerable number of non-binding(150) 
and binding regional(151) and international(152) legal documents, and has thereby 
(149) For a detailed review of the debate in the Third Committee: Hyde, `Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Wealth and Resources', 50 AJIL (1956), 854. See also Cassese, `The Self-Determination of 
Peoples', in Henkin (ed. ), The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Chap. 4. 
Likewise, occidental States regarded UNGA, A/Res. /626 (VII), 21 December 1952, on the Right to 
Exploit Freely Natural Wealth Resources, as a pure political document deprived of any legally binding 
effect; Rosenberg, Le Principe de souverainete des Etats sur leurs ressources naturelles, 103 et sequ., 
119 et sequ. It has yet to be emphasised however, that the opposition of occidental States was essentially 
motivated by political rather than grounds, both during the negotiations of the 1962 landmark Resolution 
on Sovereignty over Natural Resources, and the drafting stage of the 1966 Covenants; this factor might, 
in some respect, play in favour of the legal existence of the principle: 
(a) some developing States feared that an 'internationalisation' of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources and correlated right to nationalise would weaken or cast some doubt on the existence of, or 
impose constraints to the exercise of this unlimited prerogative inherent in the sovereignty of any states; 
see Mexico, Saudi Arabia, in Rajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 82 et sequ. 
(b) developed States on the other hand, would not even try to contest the principle of sovereignty over 
natural resources itself, but battled exclusively on economic grounds, to preserve at least their vested 
economic interests, secure their future interest, and preserve a safety of transactions (against arbitrary 
nationalisation) and freely accepted co-operation on economic terms. See De Waart, 'Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources as a Cornerstone for International Economic Rights and Duties'; 
Brownlie, `Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law', 262 et sequ.; Rajan, Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources, Chap. 4. 
(150) See for instance A/Res. /2692 (XXV), 11 December 1970, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources of Developing Countries; 1972 Stockholm Action Plan for the Human Environment, 
Recommend. 51(a); 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Princ. 21; A/Res. /3016 (XXVII), 18 December 1972, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of Developing 
Countries; A/Res. /3037 (XXVII), 19 December 1972, on a Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of 
States; A/Res. /3171 (XXVIII), 17 December 1973, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources; 
A/Res. /3175 (XXVIII), 17 December 1973; A/Res. /3167 (XXVIII), 17 December 1973; 1982 World 
Charter for Nature, Para. 22; 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, preambular Para. 7; 1989 
Amazon Declaration, Para. 4. 
The principle was consistently reaffirmed in the process running up to 1992 UNCED; see 1990 Bangkok 
Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, Pam. 18; 1989 Brazilia Declaration on the 
Environment, Para. 2; Kampala Declaration on Sustainable Development in Africa; 1989 Resolution 
44/228, on United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Para. 7. The lack of reference 
to the principle in the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development reflects the bct 
that sovereignty over natural resources is perceived less as an issue by European and North American States; but the principle was endorsed in the 1975 Final Act of CSCE (Sovereign equality, respect for the 
rights inherent in sovereignty), and was reiterated in the 1983 Madrid Concluding Document on CSCE Second Follow-up Meeting (Co-operation in the field of economics, of science and technology and of the 
environment). 
(151) See for instance the 1994 European Energy Charter, Pam. 43; 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Art. 21(1); 1986 Noumea Convention on the Environment in the South Pacific, Art. (continued) 
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crystallised into a legal principle, and legal right(153). As early as in the early 1970s, the 
Under Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, declared: 
«[t]he principle of national sovereignty over natural resources has been 
proclaimed so frequently and solemnly that it has by now acquired the weight 
of a [UN] Charter principle» (154) 
The 1962 landmark Resolution on Sovereignty over Natural Resources was treated, 
by various International Arbitral Tribunals, as declaratory of international customary 
law(155). In the Topco case, the Arbitrator Dupuy found that the fact that a majority of 
developing and developed States, representative of various political and economic 
systems, including the US had voted in favour the resolution, «indicates without the 
slightest doubt universal recognition of the rules therein incorporated, which 
constitutes an opiniojuris communis(156). 
The doctrine is almost unanimous(157) that the principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources as enshrined in the 1962 landmark Resolution on Sovereignty 
4(6); 1978 Amazon Treaty, Art. IV; 1981 Lima Convention on the Marine Environment in the South- 
East Pacific, Art. 3 (5). 
(152) 1971 Ramsar Convention, Art. 2(3); Vienna Conventions on Succession of States in respect of 
Treaties (1978) and in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts (1983); 1982 UNCLOS, Art. 193; 
1989 Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Preamble; 1992 Climate 
Change Convention, Preamble; 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Art. 15(1); 1994 Tropical Timber 
International Agreement, Art. 1. 
(153) Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, Paras. 80 et sequ.; Brownlie, Principles, 595 et 
sequ.; permanent sovereignty over natural resources was already associated with right to nationalise and 
right to self-determination in early resolutions, first in UNGA, A/Res. /1515 (XV), 15 December 1960, 
and then in 1962 landmark Resolution on Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 
(154) Quoted afterRajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, at 27. 
(155) Referencesupra n. 9. 
(156) 17 ILM (1978), 1, Paras. 87; also BP case, supra. Besides, the `reservations' entered by most 
industrial States on the 1974 NIEO Declaration, whereby they regret the non reproduction of the 
consensus reached in 1962, in effect reinforced the value of 1962 landmark Resolution on Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources; see text of reservations in 13 ILM (1974), 744, and US Ambassador Scali's 
statement at 70 Department of State Bulletin (1974), No. 1822,569; on the value of such reservations, 
see supra Chap. 1/2/iii. Legal Framework. It is usually recognised that the consensus was not affected by 
the abstentions en bloc of socialist States, on the ground that such opposition was essentially ideological 
but did not concern the principle of sovereignty as such. This has been confirmed by the subsequent 
adherence of these countries to binding and non binding documents referring to sovereignty over natural 
resources as defined in 1962; Rosenberg, Le Principe de souverainete des Etats sur leurs ressources 
naturelles, 215. 
(157) See however: O'Keefe, `The United Nations and Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources', 
8 JWTL (1974), 239, at 245; in a critique of the 1962 landmark Resolution on Sovereignty over Natural Resources, the author argues that the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources «is of highly dubious legal content, representing an attempt to give legal force and validity to what is 
essentially a political goal. Elian considers that the principle «is a notion of political as well as juridical nature»; The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, at 11. Fischer sees 
the resolution not as a legal document, but as the endorsement of a doctrine by a political organ; `La (continued) 
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over Natural Resources constitutes a cornerstone of environmental and developmental 
law declarative of international customary law(158). Some authors even argue that 
sovereignty over natural resources is a peremptory rule of international law, or at least a 
candidate rule(159), owed to the international community as a whole and which cannot 
be derogated or alienated(160). 
souverainete sur les ressources naturelles', at 527. Likewise, Guess denies any legal validity to the 
resolution on its own under international law, but recognises that it restates basic principles and 
modalities of the exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural resources; 'Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources', at 411 and 414. 
(158) Cassese for example, considers that although 1962 landmark Resolution on Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources cannot be regarded per se as declaratory of customary law «nor can it be argued that its 
has gradually turned into a corpus of customary rules (... ) the Declaration [on Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources] can now be regarded as sanctioning general international law>>; Self-Determination of People: 
A Legal Reappraisal, at 100. Schrijver fully recognises the customary nature of the compromise formula 
of Sovereignty over Natural Resources, yet expresses serious doubt about its qualification for a 
peremptory norm; 'Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources versus the Common Heritage cf 
Mankind', in de Waart et al. (eds. ), International Law and Development (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 87, at 
91 et sequ. Rajan seems to recognise a certain value to the 1962 landmark Resolution on Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources, and although he admits that UNGA resolutions are not binding per se, he still 
considers that «[t]hey have at least a probative value as the only statement of legal principles supported 
by a large section of the world community; Sovereignty over Natural Resources, at 130 (emphasis 
added); see also at 122-23; adopting a similar approach, Birnie & Boyle acknowledge that «[w]hilst not 
per se binding, [1962 landmark Resolution on Sovereignty over Natural Resources] had considerable 
effect on the development of international lawn, although they do not expressly recognise its customary 
character, at 113; Birnie tends to do so in her contribution on 'International Environmental Law : its 
Adequacy for Present and Future Needs', in Hurrell & Kingsbury (eds. ), The International Politics of the 
Environment (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 2. The decisive role of the 1962 landmark Resolution on 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the recognition and codification of a new principle of international 
law is also acknowledged by Rosenberg, although the author refuses to see in that resolution a definitive 
statement of sovereignty of the law. On the contrary, he suggests that the consensus reached in the above 
resolution was purely instantaneous, hence subject to further and constant evolution; Le Principe de 
souverainete des Etats sur leurs ressources naturelles, 224. See also Beck, Die Differenzierung von 
Rechtsplichten in den Beziehungen zwischen Industrie- und Entwicklungsländern. Eine völkerrechtliche 
Untersuchung fier die Bereiche des internationalen Wirtschafts-, Arbeits- und Umweltrechts (Peter Lang, 
1994), at 184; Brownlie, Principles, 15; Flory, Droit international du developpement (PUF, 1977), 282; 
Handl, `Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transfrontier Pollution, 69 AJIL (1975), 58; 
Pineschi, 'The Antarctic Treaty System and General Rules of International Environmental Law', in 
Francioni & Scovazzi (eds. ), International Law for Antarctica (GiuM, 1987), 187; Sands, Principles 
(Vol. 1), 187 etsequ. 
(159) Brownlie, 'Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law', 294; Principles, 513. 
(160) In the sense of 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53. See Jimenez de Arechaga, 
'International Law in the Past Third of a Century', 159 RdC (1978-1), 297. Cassese admitted that the 
right of self-determination was probably part of the ius cogens, yet only to the extent it is reflected in the 
1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, construed more narrowly than under the 1966 International 
Covenants, and excluding inter alia permanent sovereignty over natural resources; 'The Self- 
Determination of People', in Henkin (ed. ), The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Chap. 4, at 111. See also Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in 
International Law (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 1988), 378-379; Hossain, Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources', in Hossain (ed. ), Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order (Frances 
Pinter/Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), at 39; Subrata Roy Chowdhury, 'Permanent Sovereignty 
Over Natural Resources' in Hossain and Chowdhury (eds. ), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources, Chap. 1, at 57. Self-determination is not however mentioned in Whiteman's projected list of 
ius cogens norms; 'Jus Cogens in International Law, with a Projected List', 7 Georgia JICL (1977), 609. (continued) 
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On the other hand, any attempts to stretch permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources beyond the control over natural wealth and resources, most notably in the 
1975 Economic Charter, have largely remained political claims de lege ferenda(161), 
supported only by some States, openly and consistently opposed by many other 
States(162). Likewise, any attempt to erode or intrude permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources for the sake of the common benefit of mankind is closer to ideology, 
than to reality. 
4. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Limits and Constraints 
i. Classic Conception of Absolute and Unlimited Sovereignty 
Like the international political system it evolved in, the management and protection 
of environmental resources was, and still is, essentially grounded in, and organised 
around the Westphalian legal concept of state sovereignty and territorial integrity(163). 
The principle of `full and absolute territorial jurisdiction (... ) of every sovereign'(164) 
meant, inter alia, that the environment was considered to be `partie integrante' of the 
state assets, and environmental issues (as far as environment was treated as an issue) a 
matter of domestic affairs over which, in the name of the non-interference principle, 
A certain number of countries, such as Algeria, Libya and Kuwait have openly endorsed the thesis of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources as a principle of ius cogens; see Topco case, supra n. 9. 
The practical utility of the qualification of ius cogens remains very disputed in the doctrine however; see 
most notably Schwarzenberger, 'InternationalJus Cogens'1', 43 Texas LR (1969), 455; Weil, 'Towards 
Relative Normativity in International Law ?' 77 AJIL (1983), 413. 
(161) See contra, Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, § 310; the authors seem to admit that the 
customary principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources includes sovereignty over economic 
resources. Similar view was taken by Jimenez de Arechaga, 'International Law in the Past Third of a 
Century', 159 RdC (1978-1), 297. 
(162) Dupuy, having carefully considered the voting records of a series of resolutions trying to alter the 
consensus formula of permanent sovereignty, inter alia in the 1975 Economic Charter, reached the 
conclusion that Art. 2 of the Economic Charter «must be analysed as a political rather than as a legal 
declaration>>, introducing new principles on which there is no opiniojuris communis; Topco case, supra 
n. 9, Para. 88. 
(163) Haas & Sundgren, `Evolving International Environmental Law: Changing Practices of National 
Sovereignty', in Choucri (ed. ), Global Accord (MIT, 1993), Chap. 12. See for instance, the Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the 7th International Conference of American 
States provides that (([n]o state has the right to intervene in the international or external affairs of 
another)) (Article 8); 26 December 1933, in force 26 December 1934,165 LNTS 19; reproduced in 28 
AJIL (1934), Suppl., 75; 15 Latin American States and the US are party; the Convention is generally 
regarded as reflecting customary International law on statehood requirements; Harris, Cases & Materials, 
at 102. 
(164) See US Supreme Court's landmark decision in The Schooner "Exchange" V. McFaddon and 
others, 11 US 116 (1812), 137. 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources 93 Chapter 2 
other States had no `droit de regard'(165). The so-called Harmon doctrine is often quoted 
in this context, as a statement of absolute sovereignty over transnational waters(166). 
Regarding the putative Mexican right to an indemnity for the harm suffered in 
connection with the diversion of the waters of the Rio Grande within the US territory 
for irrigation purposes, the United States Attorney-General Harmon, inspired by the 
Schooner "Exchange" precedent, concluded: 
«the rules, principles, and precedents of international law impose no 
liability or obligation [on the US for the effects of the diversion of waters on 
its own territories](167) 
The Harmon doctrine had been invoked by a number, of States apart from the 
US(168), and was held as an expression of the rule concerning the uses of transnational 
(165)Wolfram, 
`Die grenzüberschreitende Luftverschmutzungim Schnittpunkt von nationalem Recht und 
Völkerrecht', 99 DVBI. (1984), 492, at 494-495; also Bousek, `Ein Beitrag zum internationalen 
Wasserrecht', 7 Zeitschrii t für Völkerrecht (1913), 39, at 21. 
(166) Lammers, Pollution of International Watercourses (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 268 et sequ. 
Generally on the Harmon doctrine: Austin, `Canadian-United States Practice and Theory Respecting the 
International Law of International Rivers: A Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine', 
37 Can. Bar Rev. (1959), 393; McCaffrey, 'The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later. Buried, Not 
Praised', 36 Natural Resources Journal (1996), 725. Some authors however, question that, by this 
famous dicta, Attorney-General Harmon intended to affirm the absolute and automatic legality of any 
action of a State in relation to its territory, and suggest on the contrary, that Harmon «se bornait A 
soutenir qu'un certain usage des eaux et certaines consequences n'etaient pas regles en droit international 
et impliquaient une confrontation directe des souverainetes»; Florio, `Sur l'utilisation des eaux non 
maritimes en droit international', in Blumenwitz & Randelzhofer (eds. ), Festschrift für Friedrich Berber 
(C. H. Beck, 1973), 151, at 153. 
(167) Moore, I International Law Digest (1906), 654; also Deener, The United States Attorneys General 
and International Law (Martinus Nijhof, 1957), 254. 
(168) India relied on the doctrine in its dispute with Pakistan over the waters of the River Indus; Berber, 
`The Indus Water Dispute', 6 Indian YbL4 (1957), 46; Lammers, Pollution of International 
Watercourses (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 308 et sequ. ; McCaffrey, `Second Report on the Law of the non- 
navigational uses of international watercourses, 1986 YbILC Vol. II Part 1,87, at Paras. 88 et sequ. 
Although it is not clear how long India had effectively endorsed the doctrine, it is usually admitted that it 
had definitely abandoned it when signing the five-year 1977 Agreement on Sharing of the Ganges Waters; 
Lammers, Pollution of International Watercourses (Nijhoff, 1984), at 319. The Memorandum of 
Understanding between Bangladesh and India (1983-1984) was also geared towards the optimum 
utilisation of the Ganges water; see Asafuddowlah, 'Sharing of Transboundary Rivers: The Ganges 
Tragedy', in Blake et al. (eds. ), The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources (Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijhoil; 1995), Chap. 15. A new 30-year accord was finally signed between the two 
countries in December 1996, settling the dispute on the sharing of Ganges waters, whereby each Parties 
resolves to equitably share the 'burden of water shortage'; The Indian Express, 13 December 1996 [posted on Express India Website @ <http: //www. expressindia. com/ie/daily>; see also Sands' 
Introductory Note to the Treaty in 36 ILM (1997), 519. Under the Agreement, explicitly guided by the 
principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party (Art. I)X. ) and mutual accommodation (Preamble, 
Para. 4) each country will receive a guaranteed quantum of 35.000 cu/sec. of water during the period of 
the worst days of lean rains spell. The Treaty on Sharing of the Ganges at Farakka, which entered into 
effecton 1 January 1997, has already given ground to an official complaint from Bangladesh for India's failure to abide by the terms of the treaty, and realise the agreed amount of water from the Farakka barrage, West Bengal; The Indian Erpress, 4 April 1997. 
(continued) 
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waters by part of the doctrine at the time(169); nevertheless, state practice casts serious 
doubt about the Harmon doctrine as the expression of international river law, and 
indicates indeed that it was, and has remained, an essentially political doctrine(170). 
First, the Harmon doctrine has never been considered by States as the mandatory rule 
for transnational waters and applied consistently in this title. Rather, States tended to 
support the doctrine when upstream(171), while they would dismiss it when 
downstream(172). The Harmon doctrine had even less currency in Europe, which tends 
to confirm the lack of international recognition(173). 
Furthermore, in practice, in spite of their alleged and theoretical sovereign 
prerogatives, States have often entered into prior agreements with the potentially 
affected State(s) to regulate the intended diversion of waters flowing across their 
territory(174). Likewise, the majority of disputes arising out of the utilisation of 
transnational waters, even where the doctrine was invoked, have often been resolved by 
Likewise, the Austrian government's position in the negotiations with Bavaria over the shared water 
resources reflected, in some respects, the Harmon doctrine; reported in 1986 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1,87, at 
Paras. 90 et sequ. See also the decision of the Imperial Royal Administrative Court of Austria in 1913, 
regarding the question of territorial rights over a river flowing into a lower-lying State; translation in 7 
AJIL (1913) 653, at 658. 
To a certain extend, Canada availed itself of the doctrine in the context of a dispute with the United 
States over the exploitation of Columbia River; Bourne, `The Right to Utilize the Water of International 
Rivers', 3 Canadian YbIL (1965), 187, at 205 etsequ. 
(169) See for instance Bains, `The Diversion of International Rivers', 1 Indian JIL (1960-61), 38; 
Berber, Rivers in International Law (Stevens & Sons, 1959), 14 et sequ.; Bousek, ibid. supra n. 165; 
Briggs, The Law of Nations, 2nd edn (Stevens, 1953), 274; Fenwick, International Law (3rd edn, 
Appleton, 1948), 391; Hyde, International Law as Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United 
States, 2nd edn, Vol. 1 (Little Brown & Company, 1951), 565 et sequ.; MacKay, `The International 
Joint Commission between the United States and Canada', 22 AJIL (1928), 292. 
(170) Bourne, `The Right to Utilize the Water of International Rivers', at 204; Hohmann, Precautionary 
Legal Duties and Principles of Modern International Environmental Law (Graham, Trotman & Nijhoff, 
1994) at 15; Lipper, `Equitable Utilization', in Garretson et al. (eds. ) The Law of International 
Drainage Basins (Oceana, 1967), Chap. 2, at 22-23. 
(171) Like the US, India, Austria and Canada; supra n. 168. 
(172) Even the US, at the source of the doctrine, objected to it in the dispute with Canada over the 
diversion of the Columbia River in Canada. The US relied on the very same grounds which Mexico had 
invoked previously, namely the application of the equitable apportionment principle (then strongly 
resisted by the US, supra n. 167). The US memorandum argued that such principle had been `solidified 
in international law as it has developed in the previous years'; Arsanjani, International Regulation of 
Internal Resources (University Press of Virginia, 1981), 89; reported in 1986 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1,87, at 
Paras. 90 etsequ.; Bourne, `The Columbia River Controversy', 37 Can. Bar Rev. (1959), 444; Austin, 
`Canadian-United States Practice and Theory Respecting the International Law of International Rivers: A Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine', 411 et sequ. 
(173) Bimse & Boyle, 219; Cohen, `The Regime of Boundary Waters 
- 
the Canadian-United States Experience', 146 RdC (111-1975), 219, at 229 et sequ.; McCaffrey, YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1,105 et sequ. 
(174) Hyde, ibid supra n 169, at 565 et sequ. 
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means of treaties or agreements providing for the equitable utilisation of waters(175). 
At the other extreme, some authors have suggested a doctrine of exclusive and 
absolute territorial integrity, whereby «Jeder Staat muss Flüssen, über die er nicht, sei es 
in ihrer lange, sei es in ihrer Breite, die unbeschränkte Gebietshoheit ausübt, ihren 
natürlichen Lauf lassen»(176). Paradoxically, a similar argument was invoked by the 
'founder country' of the Harmon doctrine in its memorandum in the Trail Smelter 
arbitration. The US legal adviser hence declared it a fundamental principle of the law of 
nations that «a sovereign state is supreme within its own territorial domain and that it 
and its nationals are entitled to use and enjoy their territory and property without 
interference from an outside source»(177). 
Both `absolutist' doctrines were overruled in early national and international case- 
law, and dismissed by an overwhelming part of the contemporaneous doctrine, and by 
influential bodies in the international law-making process. They have been substituted 
by a more moderate and realistic conception of restricted territorial sovereignty and 
integrity. 
(175) See among others the Water Treaties concluded between Mexico and the US: 1906 Convention on 
the Distribution of Waters of Rio Grande, and 1944 Convention on the Utilization of Waters of the 
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande; both treaties are reproduced in Bevans (ed. ), 
Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949 Vol. 9,924 
and 1166. See also: 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, between India and Pakistan, 419 UNTS 125; reproduced 
in 1 Indian JIL (1960-1961), 341. It must be said however, that 1906 Treaty between Mexico and US 
(Art. V), the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (Art. 11(2)), and the 1996 Treaty on Sharing of the Ganges 
Waters at Farakka (preambular Para. 5) expressly provided that they were not constitutive of new legal 
rules of binding precedents; Bourne, 'The Right to Utilize the Water of International Rivers', 204-205; 
Lammers, Pollution of International Watercourses, 267 et sequ. and 308 et sequ. See further the 
agreements surveyed by Schwebel, 'Third Report on the Law of the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses', A/CN. 4/348,11 December 1981,1982 YbILC Vol. II Part 1,65, Paras. 49 et 
sequ.; and survey of bilateral and multilateral treaties in Secretary General Report on the Legal Problems 
Relating to the Utilization and Use of International Rivers, Doc. A/5409,1974 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 2,33, 
at 57 et sequ. and supplementary Report Doc. A/CN. 4/274, ibid., at 289 et sequ. 
(176) Huber, 'Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von der Gebietshoheit an Grenzflüssen', 1 Zeitschrift fir Völkerrecht 
und Bundesstaatsrecht (1907), 29 et sequ, and 159 et sequ., at 160. Although Huber's essay was 
concerned with intra-national dispute between two Swiss cantons (Zürich and Schammusen) over the 
utilisation of the Rhine, he is usually attributed the same position with respect to inter-states rivers; 
Berber, supra n. 169, at 19-20. Reid drawing an analogy with private domestic law, held that any 
obligation of a State linked to the permanent exclusive exploitation of its natural resources has the 
characterof a servitude; 'Servitudes Internationales', 45 RdC (1933-III), 1, Chap. U. 
(177) Memorandum in relation to the arbitration of the Trail Smelter case (US v. Canada), 10 August 1937, reproduced in full in 5 Whiteman's Digest, at 183; referred after McCaffrey, 'The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later. Buried, Not Praised', 36 Natural Resources Journal (1996), 725, at 758. 
Australia's argument of a 'decisional sovereignty' in the Nuclear Tests case was also close to a 
restatement of absolute territorial integrity, ICJ Pleadings, Nuclear Tests 1974, Vol. I, at 188. 
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ii. Towards a Limited Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
Although per definitionem territorially limited(178), sovereignty entails, in its relations 
to a given territory, a prima facie exclusive jurisdiction «in regard to portion of the 
globe» and involves «an exclusive right to display the activities of a State»(179). 
Nevertheless, it is no longer disputed that to the sovereign territorial jurisdiction of a 
State correspond certain sovereign responsibilities correspond, namely: (a) not to 
interfere, directly or indirectly, with other States equal prerogatives over their respective 
territories(180), and (b) to protect «the rights which each State may claim for its 
nationals in foreign territory»(181). 
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as the prime manifestation of 
sovereign territorial jurisdiction, secures a prima facie exclusive jurisdiction over the 
resources located in, above or under the national territory. The sovereign equality and 
equal sovereignty of other States on the other hand, implies a sovereign responsibility 
for each State (a) not to intervene (directly) in areas under the territorial jurisdiction of 
other sovereign States, or use its sovereignty in a way that would hamper or adversely 
affect the sovereignty of other States, and (b) to preserve the legitimate rights acquired 
by foreign nationals over its portion of territory. 
Apart from the restrictions inherent in the territorial limits of state jurisdiction, a 
number of more controversial restrictions related to the substance of sovereignty have 
emerged over the past two decades as the result of the development of international law 
and the rapid development of international environmental law(182). 
(178) Acting as arbitrator in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries dispute (UK v. US), the PCIJ stated that 
«one of the essential elements of sovereignty is that it is to be exercised within territorial limits... »; 11 
RL4A (1910), 167, at 180. 
(179) Island of Palmas arbitration (Netherlands-US), II RIAA (1928), 829, at 838-839; also: 1970 
Declaration on Friendly Relations. See further Brownlie, Principles, 287; Wolfrum, supra n. 165, at 
494. 
(180) Wolf supra n. 165, at 494; also Epiney, 'Das "Verbot erheblicher grenzüberschreitender Umweltbeeintrachtigungen" : Relikt oder konkretisierungsfähige Grundnorm 7', 33 A VR (1995), 309, at 321. 
(181) Island of Palmas arbitration, supra n. 179, at 839. 
(182) See Bedjaoui, 'Remanences de thdories sur la "souverainete limitee" sur les ressources naturelles', in Gutidrrez Girardot et al. (eds. ), New Directions in International Law, Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Abendroth, Festchrif zu seinem 75. Geburstag (Campus, 1982), 63. 
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i Equitable Utilisation, Sic Utere Tuo and Related No Substantial Transboundary 
Harm Principles 
The first radical move away from the doctrine of absolute sovereignty over natural 
resources and absolute integrity obeyed practical imperatives of coexistence and good 
neighbourliness between equal, sovereign yet interdependent States with respect to the 
use of certain shared resources, most notably transboundary waters. De facto, the equal 
and common, indeed interdependent, interests of riparian States(183) command each of 
them to use that portion of water flowing through its territory in an equitable and 
considerate way, and to refrain from using its own prerogatives in a way that would 
substantially encroach upon the equal prerogatives of other riparian States (limited 
sovereignty)(184). On the other hand, States must tolerate the unavoidable infringement 
of the prerogatives incidental to a normal and diligent use of the shared resources by 
other riparian States (limited integrity)(185). 
(183) The concept of 'community of interest of riparian States' constitutes «the basis of a common legal 
right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the user of the whole 
course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian States in relation to 
the others; Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River 
Oder, PCIJ Ser. A-No 23, at 27. In The Diversion of Water from the Meuse, the Court dismissed the 
implied contention of the Netherlands that the Treaty concerning the regime of diversions of water from 
the Meuse, concluded with Belgium in 1863, «invests either Contracting Party with a right of control 
the other party might not exercise» hence creating a situation of inequality between the Parties. Rather, 
the Court held that the actual purpose of the Treaty was to «reconcile [the practical interests of the 
Contracting Parties] with a view to improving an existing situation»; PCIJ Ser. A/B, Fascicule No 70, 
Judgment of June 28th, 1937, at 19-20. The community and equality of interest approach had been 
equally endorsed by domestic courts in the US, Switzerland, German and India to resolve disputes 
between States, Cantons, Länder and Provinces; see supra n. 176 and infra n. 200. Further references in 
Lammers, Pollution of International Watercourses, 397 et sequ.; Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties 
and Principles of Modern International Environmental Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 
1994), 18-19; Bourne, `The Right to Utilize the Water of International Rivers', at 211 et sequ. As we 
shall see, the approach is also central in the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules on the Use of Waters of 
International Rivers and ILC's drafting process on the non navigational use of transboundary 
watercourses; infra p. 99 et sequ. 
(184) Otherwise referred to as the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas principle; see Texte des 
Resolutions adoptees ä Session de Madrid, 1911, en ce qui concern la Reglementation internationale de 
l'usage des tours d'eau internationaux, in 24 Ann. 1D1(1911), 365-366. Notwithstanding its Latin name, 
the principle draw its origins in the Common law, and not in Roman law, as sometimes argued; see 
Hinds, 'Das Prinzip 'sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas' und seine Bedeutung im internationalen 
Umweltrecht', 30 A VR (1992), 298, at 301; Florio, 'Kota sull' inquinamento delle acque non marittime 
nel diritto internazionale', 46 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (1963), 588; see contra Kiss, 'Abuse of 
Rights', in Bernhardt (ed. ), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Instal. 7 (North-Holland, 1984), 
1. The principle was subsequently endorsed in civil law systems, as illustrated from its application to inter-cantons and inter-Länder disputes in Switzerland and Germany, supra n. 183. On the importance of 
the principle in international environmental law, see Epiney, supra n. 180; Hinds, supra ibid. 
(185) The qualification of the interference was omitted in 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Princ. 2, and, 
consequently, any generalisation of a duty of prevention confined to qualified harm/risk has remained largely controversial; it is well accepted however, that de minimis harm fall outside the material field of (continued) 
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The work of the IDI, the ILA and the ILC on the non navigational use of 
international waters played a decisive role in the departure from the doctrine of absolute 
sovereignty and integrity and the elaboration of a regime based on equitable 
apportionment (balancing of interests), maximum beneficial utilisation, and reasonable 
diligence(186). In 1911 already, the Institut de Droit International, officially departed 
from the absolute sovereignty/integrity doctrine on the grounds that: 
«[1]es Etats riverains d'un meme cours d'eau sont, les uns vis-ä-vis des 
autres, dans une dependance physique permanente qui exclut l'idee d'une 
entiere autonomie de chacun d'eux sur la section de la voie naturelle relevant 
de sa souverainete. » (187) 
The ILA is more particularly accountable for the development of the equitable 
utilisation principle. In 1956, the Association issued a set of Principles of the Law 
Governing the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, stating an obligation of due 
consideration (Rücksichinahmegebot) for other riparian States' interests, and the 
equitable apportionement principle(188). These Principles were elaborated further in the 
1966 ILA Helsinki Rules on the Use of Waters of International Rivers (1966 ILA 
Helsinki Rules), more particularly Arts. IV-XI (equitable utilisation of the waters of an 
international drainage basin), and were consistently reaffirmed in subsequent ILA draft 
Articles on international waters and transboundary pollution(189). 
application of the prevention and precaution; 1978 UNEP Draft Principles on Shared Natural Resources; 
according to the appended definition, the expression `significantly affect' refers to any appreciable effect on 
a shared natural resources and excludes `de minimis' effects; Birnie & Boyle, 98-99; also: 1996 ILC 
Draft Articles on International Liability (Art. 2(a)). See further infra, Precautionary Principle, 
Constitutive Elements of Precautionary Principle: Risk/Harm to be Averted/Minimised. 
(186) Equitable apportionment and utilisation are of less direct relevance in relation to the navigational 
use of watercourses in the sense that such use does not affectas significantly as non-navigational use does, 
the quantity, the flow and quality of water available. Navigational use is thus considered only insofar as 
other uses are affectedby navigation, or affect navigation; see 1987 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Art. 2(2), and commentary in 1987 YbILC Vol. II 
Pt. 2, at 26. Non navigational use includes agricultural use (irrigation, drainage... ), economic and 
commercial use (energy production, waste disposal... ), domestic and social uses (consumptive, 
recreational,... ). 
(187) Texte des Resolutions adoptees ä la Session de Madrid, 1911, en ce qui concerne la 
Reglementation internationale de l'usage des cours d'eau internationaux, in 24 Ann. IDI (1911), 365-366. 
The 'exposd des motifs' is in fact the reflection of statement in the same sense, made by one of Institute's 
member during the debate on the issue; see von Bar's statement in 24 Ann. IDI (1911), 350. See further 
von Bar's first report on the use of international watercourses to the Institut published as 'L'exploitation 
industrielle des cours d'eau internationaux', 17 RGDIP (1913), 281. This statement was fully echoed by 
Oppenheim as he underlined that «a state, in spite of territorial supremacy, is not allowed to alter the 
natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural condition of a neighbouring 
state»; International Law, A Treatise, 2nd. edn, Vol. I (Longmans Green, 1912), at 182. 
(188) ILA, Report of the Forty-seventh Conference, Dubrovnik, 1956,241, at Princ. III-V. The equitable 
apportionement doctrine had yet already been developed by Smith in the early 1930s; The Economic 
Uses of International Rivers (P. S. King & Son, 1931), 151-152. 
(189) See for instance 1980 ILA Draft Rules of International Law on Transfrontier Pollution (Art. 6), in (continued) 
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Albeit not formally binding190, the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules have often been 
regarded as the most comprehensive codification of the environmental rules available 'for 
general application to the uses of sweet water'(191), 'that fully reflected the international 
jurisprudence, and expressed the sense of the law of that time'(192). The equitable 
utilisation provisions played a significant role both in the evolution of the case-law on 
shared water resources(193), and largely inspired the development of international river 
law(194). IDI and ILA's positions were largely reflected in ILC's work on the 
codification of rules on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The 
principles of shared natural resources and community of interests were first endorsed 
by Mr Schwebel in his second report(195), whilst that of equitable utilisation (or 
ILA, Report of the Fijty-ninth Conference, Belgrade, 1980,531; 1982 ILA Montreal Rules On Water 
Pollution in an International Drainage Basin (Art. 1) in ILA, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, 
Montreal, 1982,535 et sequ. In the same line, see 1979 IDI Athens Draft Resolution on Water 
Pollution, Art. 2, in 58 Ann. IDJ (1979-II), 196; 1987 IDI Cairo Draft Resolution on air pollution across 
national frontiers, Art. 2, in 62 Ann. IDI (1987-1), 188. 
190 See supra Chap. 1/2/iii. Legal Framework in fine. 
(191) Schwebel, 'First Report on the Law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses', 
A/CN. 4/320,21 May 1979,1979 YbILC Vol. II Part 1,143, at Para. 66. 
(192) Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties (1994), 32; Handl, 'The Principle of 'Equitable Use' as 
Applied to Internationally Shared Natural Resources: Its Role in Resolving Disputes over Transfrontier 
Pollution', 14 RBDI (1978-79), 40, at 48. It must be noted however, that the Swiss Federal Council 
declared that «Helsinki Rules are essentially theoretical in character and are not per se directly binding 
upon States; reported by Caflisch, 'La pratique suisse en mati8re de droit international public 
- 
1970', 
27 ASDI (1971), 153, at 179-180. In the same spirit, a Brazilian member of the International law 
Commission once declared that the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules «utopian ventures into fields which States 
were extremely wary of entering; reported at 1971 YbILC Vol. I, 279. Helsinki Rules are nevertheless 
constantly referredto in ILC reports on the non navigational use of international watercourses, and often 
quoted in relation to the regulation of the use of transboundary waters; see Birnie & Boyle, 226 et sequ.; 
Brownlie, Principles, 275; Sands, Principles, Vol. I, 349 et sequ. Also Hinds, supra n. 184, at 319. 
(193) Both India and Bangladesh expressly referredto 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules on the Use of Waters of 
International Rivers in the pronouncements of their respective position in the dispute on the diversion of 
the waters from the Ganges (1976); relevant excerpts in 1979 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 1, at Paras. 82 et sequ., 
and the subsequent Dacca Agreement on Sharing of the Ganges Waters (1978) is geared towards optimum 
utilisation of the waters in a spirit of mutual accommodation (preambular Para. 4); 17 ILM (1978), 103. 
Hungary also explicitly refers to the Rules in its Declaration Terminating Treaty concerning the 
Construction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros system of locks; 32 ILM (1993), 1259, at 
1286, and in its original application to the ICJ; Sands, Principles (Vol. II A), No 28, at Para. 31; see 
further Eckstein, 'Application of International Water Law to Transboundary Groundwater Resources, and 
the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute Over Gabcikovo-Nagymaros', 19 Suffolk TLR (1995), 67, at 91 et sequ. 
and 110 et sequ. The rules were also mentioned in the decisions of Rotterdam Tribunal in the Mines of 
Potasse case; see for instance Handelskwerkerij G. J. Bier B. V. v. Mines de Potasse dAlsace SA, District 
Court of Rotterdam, 16 December 1983, NJ (1984), No. 341; reported in 15 Netherlands YbIL (1984), 
471, at 480. 
(194) See list of treaty provisions concerning the equitable utilisation of contiguous and successive 
watercourses (by 1985) in 1986 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1, at 134 et sequ. 
(195) Schwebel, `Second Report on the Law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses', 
A/CN. 4/332 & Addendum 1,24 April and 22 May 1980,1980 YbILC Vol. II Part 1,159, at Paras. 140 (continued) 
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equitable participation) was affirmed in his third report on the issue(196). Both 
principles have subsequently been consistently reaffirmed without substantial 
modification, and were duly reflected in the 1997 UN Convention on the Non- 
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (197). 
In this sense, even though the first international statement of the no substantial 
transboundary harm principle(198) was contained in an `air pollution' case, it emerged as 
a principle of coexistence and good neighbourliness(199), with no particular 
environmental connotation. Having to decide upon the degree of admissibility of the 
release of noxious gas by a Canadian smelter, the Arbitral Tribunal, largely inspired by 
domestic pollution cases(200), found against Canada that: 
«... under the principles of international law (... ) no State has the right to 
use, or permit to use its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes 
in or to the territory of another of the properties or the persons therein, when 
et sequ. 
(196) Schwebel, 'Third Report on the Law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses', 
A/CN. 4/348,11 December 1981,1982 YbILC Vol. II Part 1,65, at Paras. 41 et sequ. The ILC's 1994 
Draft Articles on the law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses endorses the rule of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation and participation, with the view of attaining optimum utilisation; see 
comment to the equitable utilisation provisions (draft Art. 5 and 6, initially 6 and 7) at 1987 YbILC (1991) Vol. II Pt. 2,32. 
(197) Arts. 5 and 6. The principles were already expressed in similar terms in the 1992 ECE 
Watercourses Convention (Art. 2(c)). 
(198) Terminology afterNollkaemper, `The Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law 
What's New under the Sun? ', 22 MPBul1. (1991) 107; the author also uses, apparently as a full 
synonymous, the expression of no-appreciable harm; Nollkaemper, The Legal Regime for 
Transboundary Water Pollution: Between Discretion and Constraint (Martinus Nijhoff/Graham & 
Trotman, 1993). 
(199) Principle of good neighbourliness was given clear expression in the Island of Palmas case supra n. 
179, and was subsequently formally endorsed as a Charter principle; see 1945 UN Charter, preambular 
Para. 5 and Art. 74. The importance of developing and strengthening good-neighbourliness between 
States was acknowledged in a UN General Assembly resolution in 1988, then put as an item on the 
General Assembly's agenda; see UNGA, A/Res. /43/171,9 December 1988; also A/Res. /46/62,9 
December 1991. 
(200) Hence for instance, in 1927 already, the German Staatsgerichtshof held that «[t]he exercise of 
sovereign rights by every State in regard to international rivers traversing its territory is limited by the 
duty not to injure the interest of other members of the international community. Due consideration must 
be given to another State through whose territories there flows an international river. No State may 
substantially impair the natural use of the flow of such a river by its neighbour. The principle has gained 
increased recognition in international relations... »; Donauversinkung case (Sinking of the Danube, 
Wilrttenberg & Prussia v. Baden (1927), 4 Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 1927-1928 (1931), 128, at 131. Also often quoted in this respect is the decision the Swiss Federal Court in an inter- 
cantonal noise pollution case. The Court found that a State (in that case a Canton) may freely exercise its 
sovereignty provided it does not infringes the rights derived from sovereignty of another State (Canton), 
and consequently, banned the use of shooting-butts in Aargau until appropriate protective measures had 
been introduced; Solothurn v. Aargau (1900), BGE 26 1444, at 450. 
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the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence. »(201) 
The principle of equitable utilisation of shared natural resources and the related no 
substantial transboundary harm principle have been consistently reaffirmed as the 
relevant rules in the field of water management and pollution(202), and were extended to 
(201) Trail Smelter arbitration (US v. Canada), Final Award, 35 AJIL (1941), 684, at 716 (emphasis 
added). Review of and referenceto US case-law at 714 et sequ. See also the dispute between Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein and Austria in the early 1970s, over the construction of an oil distillery on the Swiss side 
of their common border, and related risks of emissions of sulphur dioxide; summary and discussion of the 
dispute in Wildhaber, Die Öldestillerieanlage Sennwald und das Völkerrecht der Grenzüberschreitenden 
Luftverschmutzung', 31 ASDI (1975), 97. 
(202) See for instance Lac Lanoux arbitration (Spain v. France) (1957); The Gut Dam arbitration 
(Canada-US) (1968), 8 ILM (1969), 118; on which see Erades, `The Gut Dam Arbitration', 16 Ned. TIR 
(1969), 161. See also the Mines of Potasse case: Handelskwerkerij G. J. Bier B. Y. and Stichting 
'Reinwater'v. Mines de Potasse dAlsace SA, District Court of Rotterdam, 8 January 1979, NJ (1979), 
No. 113; reported in 11 Netherlands YbIL (1980), 326, at 332, and Handelskwerkerij G. J. Bier B. V v. 
Mines de Potasse dAlsace SA, District Court of Rotterdam, 16 December 1983, NJ (1984), No. 341; 
reported in 15 Netherlands YbIL (1984), 471, and 479 et sequ. The no substantial harm principle was 
also raised and unanimously endorsed in the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) dispute; 
see Hungarian Application to the International Court of Justice on the Diversion of the Danube River, 
Sands, Principles (Vol. IIA), No 28, Para. 32; Hungarian Termination of the Treaty, 32 ILM (1993), 
1260; Case concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 25 September 
1997,37 ILM (1998), 162, at Para. 85. Also Eckstein, 'Application of International Water Law to 
Transboundary Groundwater Resources, and the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute Over Gabcikovo-Nagymaros', 
19 Suffolk TLR (1995), 67, at 107 et sequ. The principle has not been further developed in case-law in 
the field of air pollution, as no dispute has been brought to an international tribunal since (and before) 
Trail Smelter case; see however 1987 IDI Cairo Draft Resolution on air pollution across national 
frontiers, Art. 2. 
The principle of equitable utilisation of water resources was reflected in 1972 Stockholm Action Plan for 
Human Environment, Recommend. 51, and in 1977 Mar del Plata Water Action Plan, Recommend. 91. 
Recommend. 51 was itself referred to in 1974 OECD Recommend. on the Eutrophication of Waters, 
preambular Para. 74, and 1974 OECD Recommend. on Principles of Transfrontier Pollution, Title B, 
Para. 1. More recently, equitable utilisation was endorsed in both 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention 
Art, 2(2)(c), and 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Arts. 
5; Art. 6 of the latter Convention sets out some factors relevant to equitable utilisation; supra p. 100. 
See also 1997 Treaty on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka, Arts. 2(111) and 9; 1995 Agreement on 
the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, Arts. 5 and 9. The validity 
of the principles of equitable utilisation and that of no transboundary harm for transboundary resources 
were recognised by most prominent publicists since the late 1920s; see inter alia Brierly, The Law of 
Nations, 5th edn (Clarendon, 1955), at 204-205; Fauchille, Traite de Droit International Public Vol. I, 
Pt. 2 (Rousseau & cie, 1925), at 448 et sequ.; Lauterpacht (ed. ), Oppenheim's International Law, 8th 
edn, Vol. I (Longman, 1955), § 178(c); Smith, The Economic Uses of International Rivers (P. S. King 
& Son, 1931), 151-152; Winiarski, 'Principes generaux du droit fluvial international', 45 RdC (1933- 
III), 75 at 81. See also recent doctrine: Birnie & Boyle, 219 et sequ. ; Caponera & Alherit6re, 'Principles 
for International Groundwater Law', in Teclaff& Utton, International Groundwater Law (Ocean, 1981), 
25; Florio, `Water Pollution and Related Principles of International Law', 17 Canadian YbIL (1979), 
134; Handl, supra n. 81, at 86, n. 181; Lammers, Pollution of International Watercourses, 583-584; 
Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. I, §§ 121 and 124; Sauser-Hall, 'L'utilisation industrielle de 
fleuves internationaux', 83 RdC (1953-II) 465, at 555 et sequ. Some authors without dismissing the 
relevance of the `equitable utilisation' approach, harbour serious reservations on its inherent vagueness, 
even as defined in 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules on the Use of Waters of International Rivers. See Bourne, 
`International Law and Pollution of International Rivers and Lakes', 21 University of Toronto LJ (1971), 
193, at 195; Handl, 'Balancing the Interests and International Liability for the Pollution of International 
Watercourses: Customary Principles of Law Revisited', 13 Canadian YbIL (1975), 156. 
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the management of shared natural resources and environmental pollution in general(203). 
Besides, subsequent references in documents regulating the use of areas beyond 
domestic jurisdiction have given a new dimension to the principle, extending it beyond a 
purely transboundary context(204) 
The principle of restricted sovereignty over natural resources and `mutual respect of 
States' sovereignty over their natural resources' was first `officially' endorsed by a large 
majority of States with the 1962 landmark Resolution on Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources(205); it was given clear international legal currency in the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment; Principle 21 provides: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility 
to ensure that their activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. » (206) 
(203) See inter alia 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Art. I(1)(b); 1968 African Conservation Convention, 
Art. XVI(1)(b). Also: 1972 Stockholm Action Plan for Human Environment, Recommend. 32 
(exploitation of migratory species). See more recently 1991 Alps Convention, Art. 2(1). Both principles 
were endorsed as the applicable laws for transboundary natural resources and environmental interference in 
the 1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development (Arts. 9 and 10), 
and in 1995 IUCN Draft Covenant on Environment and Development (Art. 11). The principle of no 
transboundary harm was particularly strongly reaffirmed in the Post-Chernobyl review of responsibility for 
transboundary harm; IAEA, Note by the Director General, 'The Question on International liability for 
Damage Arising from Nuclear Accident', IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/59,26 January 1987, at Para. 14; quoted 
after Sands, `Transboundary Nuclear Pollution: International Legal Issues', in Sands (ed. ), Chernobyl: 
Law and Communication (Grotius, 1988), Introduction, at 14, n. 68. See also G7 Statement, reprinted in 
Sands (ed. ), op. cit, at No. 18. 
In its original application to the International Court of Justice on the Diversion of the Danube River, 
Hungary stated that <<[a] number of cases and documents indicative of customary international law have 
contained this duty of states to use transboundary resources in a reasonable and equitable mannen» Pam. 
28. Also: Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment of 20 December 1974, ICJ Rep. 1974,253, 
Castro (diss. op. ), at 389, on a duty to prevent pollution released by extra-atmospheric nuclear tests; 
Fisheries case, Judgment of December 18th, 1951: ICJ Rep. 1951,116, Alvarez (sep. op. ), 148-49, and 
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, 
ICJRep. 1974,3, at Para. 72, on the preferential (fishing) rights of a coastal State as they are limited by 
«the rights of other States... ». 
(204) Inter alia 1967 Outer space Treaty, 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Princ. 21; 1979 Moon Treaty; 
1982 UNCLOS, Arts. 145 and 209; 1988 CRAMRA, Art. 2; 1991 Antarctic Treaty Environmental 
Protocol, Art. 3; 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, Art. 18(1). See Birnie & Boyle, 91; Charney, 'Third 
State Remedies for Environmental Damage to the World's Common Spaces', in Francioni & Scovazzi 
(eds. ), International Responsibilityfor Environmental Harm (Graham& Trotman, 1991), Chap. 6 (162- 
166); Fleischer, `The International Concern for the Environment: the Concept of Common Heritage', in 
Bothe, Trend in Environmental Policy and Law (IUCN, 1980), 321, at 336; Sohn, 'The Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment', 14 Harvard ILI (1973), 433, at 485 et sequ. 
(205) paras. 3,5,6,8. 
(206) Emphasis added. 
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Most international law documents, binding or not, echo, if not literally at least 
substantially, the whole or part of Principle 21(207); they sometimes simply refer to 
Principle 21 as such(208). Repeated references to Principle 21 in subsequent documents, 
and consistent States practice leaves little room for doubts about the customary nature 
of the no transboundary harm principle as set forth in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
on the Human Environment, Principle 21(209). This is also the conclusion reached by the 
International Court of Justice in 1996, in its advisory opinion on the legality of the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons: 
(207) Inter alia 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention, Art. 6; 1985 Asean Agreement on the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Art. 20(1); 1992 Climate Change Convention, preambular 
Para. 8; 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents Convention, preambular Para. 8; 1997 UN Convention on the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Art. 7. The first internationally binding documents 
to incorporate the substance of principle 21 directly in its operative part were the 1982 UNCLOS, Arts. 
192-194, and 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, Art. 3. See also 1973 Resolution 3129 
(XXVIII), on Co-operation in the Field of the Environment Concerning Natural Resources Shared by 
Two or More States; 1973 EEC Programme of Action on the Environment, Princ. 3 and 6; 1975 
Economic Charter, Arts. 2,30,30(2); 1975 CSCE Final Act; 1978 UNEP Draft Principles on Shared 
Natural Resources, Princ. 3; 1982 World Charter for Nature, Paras. 20-21; 1985 UNEP Montreal 
Guidelines on the Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution from Land-Based Resources, 
Sect. 2; US 1986 Third Restatement of Law, § 602(1); 1989 Resolution 44/228, on United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, Para. 7; 1990 Bangkok ESCAP Ministerial Declaration 
on Environmentally Sound and Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific, Para. 18; 1992 
Forestry Principles, Princ. I(a); 1992 Agenda 21, Para. 15.3. 
(208) See for instance 1979 ECE Transboundary Air Pollution Convention, preambular Para. 5, referring 
to Princ. 21 as an expression of'common conviction of States'; 1985 Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer, preambular Para. 2. Also: 1974 OECD Council Recommend. C(74)224, concerning 
Transfrontier Pollution, Para. 1; 1977 ENMOD Convention, preambular Para. 4; 1987 UNEP Cairo 
Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes, Para. 1. A 
series of documents make a general referenceto the 'relevant provisions of Stockholm Declaration': 1989 
Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Para. 13; 1991 ECE Convention 
on Environmental Impact Assessment, preambular Pam. 4; 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, 
preambularPara. 5; 1992 Baltic Sea Convention, preambularPara. 7; 1992 Climate Change Convention, 
preambular Para. 7. See also 1974 OECD Declaration on Environmental Policy, preambular Para. 4. 
(209) UNGA, A/Res. /2996 (XXVII), 15 December 1972, provides that 1972 Stockholm Declaration on 
the Human Environment Princ. 21 and 22 «lay down the basic rules governing the matten». This latter 
resolution was adopted by with no opposition; the Eastern bloc abstained, as it abstained for 1972 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (it boycotted the whole Stockholm Conference to 
manifest against the exclusion of East Germany from the Conference) and thus did to take part to the 
elaboration of Princ. 21. Nonetheless, it is usually admitted that the endorsement of numerous 
subsequent documents referringto / recognising the legal value of Stockholm Princ. 21 (1982 UNCLOS, 
Arts. 192-194 for instance) implied an a posteriori endorsement of the legally binding character of the 
principle; Birnie & Boyle, 90-91, n. 41. Several States declared at Stockholm that Principle 21 fully 
reflected the existing customary law on the issue. The customary character of the Princ. 21 was also 
recognised in 1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development (comment to Art. 10), and 1995 IUCN International Covenant on Environment and Development (comment to Art. 11). Both New Zealand and France in the latest nuclear test case appeared to share the 
view that Princ. 21 expresses 'a well established proposition of international law., although the Court 
abstained from taking position; referred after Sands, 'L'affaire des essais nucleaires II (Nouvelle-Zklande c. 
France) : Contribution de l'instance au droit international de 1'environnement', 102 RGDIP (1997), 447, 
at 462, n. 64 and 65. 
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<(The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States 
or of other areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of 
international law relating to the environment. ))(210) 
A large number of authorities in the field on international and environmental laws also 
regard Principle 21 as part of customary law(211). A serious controversy remains 
nonetheless, as to whether the no transboundary harm principle, as enshrined in the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment Principle 21, is directly 
`operational' and directly binding upon States, or whether it remains a `programmatic' 
principle which needs to translated into specific treaty provisions. 
Koskenniemi for instance, while acknowledging the international practice in support 
of the existence of `a positive duty on states to pay reasonable attention to the interests 
of other states when conducting activities that they are entitled to carry out in their 
territories', is more critical about the concrete and precise content of what he regards as 
an `undoubtedly ambiguous' standard(212). Likewise, for Quentin-Baxter, Principle 21 is 
`an imperfectly formulated obligation', `lurking in the background' of international law, 
that entails effective and concrete obligations only when, and insofar as it is 
(210) The advisory opinion is reproduced at 35 ILM (1996), 809; quotation at Para. 29. Position 
reaffirmed unequivocally in Case concerning the Gabcikovo NaSymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 
Judgment, 25 September 1997, General List, No. 92,371LM (1998), 162, at Para. 53. 
(211) See for instance Beyerlin, Rio-Konferenz 1992: Begin einer globalen Umweltrechtsordnung T, 54 
ZäoRV (1994), 124, at 128; Biermann, "Common Concern of Humankind': the Emergence of a New 
Concept of International Environmental Law'; 34 AYR (1996), 426, at 432; Birnie & Boyle, 91 et sequ.; 
Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, at 118; Brunn6e, `Common Interest- Echoes from an 
Empty Shell? Some Thoughts on Common Interests and International Environmental Law', 49 ZaoRV (1989), 791, at 795; Charney, `Third States Remedies for Environmental Damage to the World's 
Common Spaces', in Francioni & T. Scovazzi, International Responsibility for Environmental Harm 
(Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhog 1991), Chap. 6, at 163; Drogula, 'Developed and Developing 
Countries: Sharing the Burden of Protecting the Atmosphere', 4 Georgetown IELR (1992), 257, at 263; 
Dupuy, 'International Liability for Transfrontier Pollution', in Bothe (ed. ), Trends in Environmental 
Policy and Law (IUCN, 1980), 363, at 371 et sequ.; Epiney, supra n. 180, at 318; Gavouneli, The 
Obligation to Protect the Environment with Reference to Marine Pollution Regulations', 46 Revue 
Hellenique de Droit International (1993), 77, at 92; Handl, 'Balancing of Interests and International 
Liability for Pollution of International Watercourses: Customary Principles Revisited', 13 Canadian 
YbIL (1975), 156, at 160 et sequ.; Hinds, supra n. 184; Kiss, Droit International de I'Environnement (Pedone, 1983), 34; Kiss & Shelton, International Environmental Law, 107; Maffei, La protezione 
internazionale delle specie animali minacciate (CEDAM, 1992), 318-319; Rest, 'Die rechtliche 
Umsetzung der Rio-Vorgaben in der Staatenpraxis', 34 AVR (1996), 145, at 149; Sands, Principles (Vol. 
I), 190; Sohn, `The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment', 14 Harvard IL] (1972), 423, 
at 485; Wildhaber, supra n. 201, at 102-103; Wolfrum, 'Purposes and Principles of International 
Environmental Law', 33 German YbIL (1990), 308, at 310. For a different view, see Schachter, 'The 
Emergence of International Environmental Law', 44 JU (1991), 457, at 463; and more skeptikal, 
Bodansky, `Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law', 3 Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies (1995), 105. 
(212) 
'International Liability for Transfrontier Pollution Damage', 21EA (1990), 309. More particularly 
on the controversy related to the threshold of the harm, infra Chap. 3/3/ii. Risk-Harm to be Averted/Minimised 
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implemented in specific conventional norms(213). 
Another group of authors, together with certain States, consider on the contrary that 
the customary no substantial transboundary harm principle, as set forth in the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, is directly binding upon States; the 
conclusion of specific treaty provisions endorsing the principle is therefore simply a 
manifestation of States' compliance with their duty under Principle 21. Hence, such 
conventional specific obligations add to, but do not supersede, States' obligations under 
international customary law(214). 
b. Limits Flowing from General International Law 
Limits pertaining to international law in general relate essentially to the issue of 
compensation in case of nationalisation. States' exclusive territorial sovereignty, and the 
related principle of non intervention in the domestic affairs of other States implies that 
each State is responsible for the protection of the rights and interests of foreign 
nationals under its territorial jurisdiction(215). More particularly, a certain restriction 
upon state permanent sovereignty over natural resources lies in the duty to respect and 
preserve the property rights and related prerogatives of foreign nationals. 
The principle of indemnification in case of expropriation or nationalisation is more 
appropriately dealt with elsewhere(216). For the purpose of this section, it is suffient to 
(213) See Second Report on the International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts 
Not Prohibited by International Law, 1981 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 1, Para. 18; Third Report on the 
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International 
Law, 1982 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 1, Para. 46. 
(214) id,, 'National Use of Transboundary Air Resources: The International Entitlement Issue 
Reconsidered', 26 NRJ (1986), 405, at 447; Pallemaerts, `International Legal Aspects of Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution', 1 Hague YbIL (1988) 189, at 205 et sequ. See also Norway's position, in 
Pallemaerts, ibid., at 223, n. 158. 
(215) See Island of Palmas case, supra n. 179, at 839. 
(216) The principle of prompt and effective indemnification in case of expropriation was largely 
recognised as a general principle of international law by most prominent Occidental publicists; see for 
instance Kunz, `La crise et les transformations du droit des gens', 88 RdC (1955-II), 93; Sibert, 'La 
guerrecivile d'Espagne et les droits des particuliers', 44 RGDIP (1937), 505, at 527 et sequ.; Verdross, 
'Les regles internationales concernant le traitement des etrangers', 37 RdC (1931-III), 321, at 364. See 
however more reticent, Francioni, `Compensation for Nationalization of Foreign Property: the Borderland 
between Law and Equity', 24 ICLQ (1975), 255; Lapres, 'Principles of Compensation for Nationalised 
Property', 26 ICLQ (1977), 4, at 97. 
The principle of prior and effective indemnification for the expropriation of private property was also 
endorsed by the ILA, as a principle of international law; see 1926 ILA Vienna Resolution in ILA, Report 
of the Thirty-second Conference, Vienna, 1926, at 248-249, Para. 5. Early reports of the ILC on State Responsibility recognised the principle of adequate indemnification as the applicable law; see Garcia Amador, 1959 YbILC, Vol. II, at 14; 1961 YbILC Vol. II, at 49, and Jimenez de Arechaga supported the 
principle of prompt, just and effective compensation; 1963 YbILC, Vol. III, at 248. The ILC has yet been 
criticised for referring exclusively to occidental authorities, and ancient case law to support its approach. (continued) 
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underline that whilst, as a matter of principle, the right to nationalise is finally 
recognised as a prerogative inherent in state sovereignty over natural resources(217), the 
conditions of exercise of such right, and more particularly the question of 
indemnification, have remained the object of serious controversy. Occidental States, 
drawing a lesson from the Soviet nationalisation in 1917-1918, came to assert the 
principle of `prompt, full and effective indemnity', as the `minimum standard of 
civilisation' in case of nationalisation of foreign owned property(218). Third World 
countries, on the other hand, when not rejecting the principle of compensation 
altogether(219), endorsed the theory of the socialist countries of an `indemnification 
calculated in a historical perspective' which would take into account the cumulated 
benefit realised from the exploitation of the property before its nationalisation(220). 
A consensus was finally reached in the earliest resolutions, whereby nationalisation 
was to be considered as a prerogative of the State stemming from the sovereignty over 
natural resources(221), which necessitates the payment of an `appropriate compensation 
in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures (... ) and 
accordance with law'(222). Any subsequent efforts from developing States to bar 
Express referenceto state responsibility for acts of expropriation, included in early drafts articles on State 
Responsibility, have been subsequently abandoned. 
Whilst other authors considered on the contrary that the recognition of an obligation of indemnification of 
foreign owned property constituted an unacceptable infringement of state sovereignty, and that conditions 
and modalities of indemnification should be left for domestic law to solve; see most notably Fischer 
Williams, `International Law and the Property of Aliens', 9 British YbIL (1928), 1; also Bartos, 1959 
YbILC, Vol. I, at 162. 
(217) Supra n. 2,7, and 9. 
(218) Such principle was first asserted by the American Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 1938, in the 
context of the Mexican expropriation of agrarian properties owned by American Citizens; full statement in 
32 AJIL (1938), Suppl., 181. 
(219) Mexico for instance, objected to US/UK claims of indemnification for nationalised property, inter 
alia on the ground that no such indemnity had been paid either to Mexican nationals affected by the 
measures of nationalisation (principle of national treatment); see note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Mexico to the American Ambassador at Mexico City (translation), in 32 AJIL (1938) Suppl., 186. 
(220) Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, § 445. 
(221) 1962 landmark Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Sect. I, Para. 4. See 
infra: Sovereign Control over, and Exploitation of Mineral Resources and Other Natural Assets. Further 
referencesand detailed summary of the debates on indemnification leading to 1962 landmark Resolution 
on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in Rosenberg, Le Principe de la Souverainete des Etats 
sur leurs ressources Naturelles, at 159 et sequ. 
(222) UNGA, A/Res. /626 (VII), 21 December 1952, on the Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth Resources, refers to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter (preambular Para. 3); the landmark Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources repeatedly mentions international law (Prin. 2,3,7 and 8); so does equally A/Res. /2158 (3QÜ), 25 November 1966, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, confirming the landmark declaration (Prin. 1); see also Topco & BP Cases, supra n. 9. See further: 1978 Amazon Treaty, Art. IV. No consensus has been reached on the (continued) 
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reference to the general principles of international law or express reference to the 
principle of indemnification in relation to permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
were consistently opposed by developed States(223). 
c. Limits Arising from General Environmental Considerations 
Over the past two decades, the concept of state permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources has been confronted with the reality of increasingly intrusive international 
environmental regulations(224). As Birnie & Boyle note: 
«... the concept of permanent sovereignty has not prevented international 
law from treating conservation issues within a state's territory as questions cf 
modalities of compensation. However, the tendency' has been to resolve the question on a case by case 
basis, according to the specific circumstances of each case; Rosenberg underlines the lack of a consensus 
on the principle of prior effective and prompt indemnification as the rule on the issue, and points out that, 
since the Second World War, payments of the indemnity have tended to be made a posteriori, as part of 
a general lump-sum agreement between the concerned States. He suggests such tendency might be 
indicative of an emerging international custom; Rosenberg, Le Principe de souverainete des Etats sur 
leurs ressources naturelles, 169; also Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, § 445. 
(223) The lack of express referenceto the principles of international law in UNGA, A/Res. /626 (VII), 21 
December 1952, on the Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth Resources, triggered reservations from 
the part of capital-exporting countries, inter alia the USA, UK and Netherlands; see Hyde, 'Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources', 50 AJIL (1956), 854, at 857. Likewise, capital- 
exporting States found the lack of explicit referenceto international law in the 1974 NIEO Declaration and 
the 1975 Economic Charter to be an unacceptable regression as compared to the consensus reached in 
1962, and formulated some reservations in this sense as regard to the 1974 NIEO Declaration. The 
German delegation for instance, underlined that the right to nationalisation is granted by international law 
and should be exercised according to international law, see the texts of the `reservations' entered by 
USA, Germany, France, Japan and the UK in 13 ILM (1974), 744. The controversy, nonetheless, was 
not strong enough to provoke a vote. 
No such consensus could be reached six months later, when the Economic Charter was submitted to the 
approbation of the General Assembly. A group of States, including those who entered a reservation in the 
NIEO Declaration, suggested an amended version of Article 2, whereby a reference to the duty to comply 
in good faith with international duties would be expressely mentioned (Para. 3 of the amended article); 
Proposed Amendment to Article 2 in 14 ILM (1975), 262. Article 2 (c), which refers to the payment of 
indemnity as a matter of desirability (should), was finally accepted without amendment in a separate vote, 
with 16 States opposing (the 5 States which had already expressed their reservations on the question 
when the NIEO Declaration was adopted, plus Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden) and 6 abstaining (Australia, Barbados, Finland 
and Israel, New Zealand and Portugal ); voting record annexed to the Proposed Amendment. The Charter 
as a whole was adopted with 120 States in favour, 6 against (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the USA) and 10 abstentions (Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain). The economic strength of those States, major 
members of the OECD, accounting for over two-third of the world trade seriously undermines the real 
impact and credibility of the Economic Charter, which was intended to reflect a consensus between those 
major economic powers, main duty-bearers, and the developing states, principal beneficiaries of the rights 
set out in the Charter. 
(224) Supra, 2/iii. Sovereignty over Environmental Resources and Environmental Policies versus Globalisation of Environmental Standards and Policies 
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common concern in which international community possesses a legitimate 
interest. »(225) 
The dramatic increase in cross-border and global environmental problems and the 
realisation of the interrelatedness of environmental issues have constituted a particular 
challenge to the classic conception of sovereignty and sovereignty-based approach to 
environmental protection(226). No specific reference to environmental protection was 
contained in early statements of permanent sovereignty over natural resources(227). 
However, it could be argued that the reference to the `well-being of the people', 
contained inter alia in the 1962 landmark Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources(228) and in the 1974 NIEO Declaration(229), encompasses 
environmental values, it being understood that a healthy and clean environment is a 
major aspect of peoples' well-being. In this respect, it is worth recalling that early EEC 
environmental regulations in the field of the environment were justified, inter alia, as 
necessary to achieve «the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of 
[States']peoples», under the preamble and Article 2 of 1957 EEC Treaty, in the absence 
of any explicit formal basis for the exercise of Community competence on 
environmental issues. Such basis was for instance invoked for the first three EEC 
Programmes of Action on the Environment(230). 
Environmental constraints upon permanent sovereignty over natural resources were 
alluded to in 1966 Resolution 2158 (XXI) reaffirming the principle of permanent 
sovereignty, in the form of a warning that «the natural resources are limited and in many 
case exhaustible and (... ) their proper exploitation determines the conditions of the 
economic development of developing countries 
... 
»(231). The first clear and explicit 
statement, however, was contained in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment. The proclamation of state sovereignty over natural resources in Principle 
(225) Birnie & Boyle, 114. 
(226) Wolfrum, supra n. 165, at 494. 
(227) UNGA, A/Res. /523 (VI), 12 January 1952, on Integrated Economic Development and Commercial 
Agreements; UNGA, A/Res. /626 (VII), 21 December 1952, on the Right to Exploit Freely Natural 
Wealth Resources; 1962 landmark Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 
(228) Princ. 1. 
(229) Princ. 3 and 6. 
(230) First EEC Programme of Action on the Environment (1973-1976, [1973] OJ C112/1); Second 
Action Programme (1977-1982, [1977] OJ C139/1); Third Action Programme (1983-1986, [1983] OJ 
C46/1). Jans, European Environmental Law (Kluwer Law International, 1995), 7 et sequ.; Krämer, 
Focus on European Environmental Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1992), Chap. 3. 
(231) Pte. 4. 
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21 is indeed accompanied with environmental constraints pertaining to three different 
levels, namely: 
(1) domestic environmental policy; 
(2) no transboundary environmental harm; 
(3) no harm beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
The most obvious and least debated source of constraints finds expression in the no 
transboundary environmental harm principle, which represents by-and-large a 
transposition of the sic utere tuo principle from a rule of coexistence and equitable 
sharing into an environmental rule(232). More debated, on the other hand, are the two 
other sources of restriction. 
(1) However desirable, restrictions upon state exploitation and depletion of resources 
strictly located within territorial jurisdiction are perceived as unacceptable interference 
with state sovereignty, which contravene to the non-intervention principle(233). This 
was particularly clearly demonstrated with the attitude of certain States throughout the 
negotiation of a biodiversity and forestry international regime, and their insistence upon 
having their permanent sovereignty over natural resources explicitly reserved in the final 
documents(234). Principle 21, echoed with the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development Principle 2(235), is couched in similarly cautious terms, and refers to 
(232) The Lac Lanoux dictum is indeed worded in terms of injury to property, territory, and persons, 
whilst Princ. 21 refers to the environment of other States; see supra 4/1/ii/ 
a. Equitable Utilisation, Sic Utere Tuo and Related No Substantial Transboundary Harm 
Principles. 
(233) See proposal to explicitly refer to State's duty to protect the integrity of its own environment at 
1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, reported in Sohn, ` The Stockholm Declaration 
on Human Environment', 14 Harvard ILJ (1973), 433, at 488-489. 
(234) See supra 2/iii. Sovereignty over Environmental Resources and Environmental Policies versus 
Globalisation of Environmental Standards and Policies 
(235) prin. 2 reiterates States' sovereign right « to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies... »; such wording is considered by some as a regression as 
compared to Principle 21 of 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, in the sense that 
environmental consideration are put in the province of developmental law, See Kovar, `A Short Guide to 
Rio Declaration', 4 Colorado JIELP (1993), 119, at 125; Pallemaerts, `International Environmental Law 
from Stockholm to Rio: Back to the Future? ', in Sands (ed. ) Greening International Law (Earthscan, 
, 1993), Chap. 1, at 5-6; Panjabi, `From Stockholm to Rio: A Comparison of the Declaratory Principles 
of International Environmental Law', 21 Denver JILP (1993), 215, at 229. This view however seems 
unjustified, in the sense that developmental requirements have been associated with permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources even before environmental limits were even considered. First 
formulated as a matter of desirability in UNGA, A/Res. /626 (VII), 21 December 1952, on the Right to 
Exploit Freely Natural Wealth Resources, Para. 1, the exploitation of natural resources in the interests of 
economic development of the State was rapidly turned into a matter of necessity: «permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources must be exercised in the interest of th[e] national development... »; 1962 landmark 
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Princ. 1 (emphasis added). The 
development imperative has been recurrently repeated; see for instance NIEO 1974 Declaration, Princ. 1.; 
1975 Economic Charter, Art. 30; 1989 Amazon Declaration, Princ. 4; 1989 Brasilia Declaration, Princ. 1 
and 2, and was indeed mentioned in 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, albeit in a (continued) 
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domestic environmental policy, without referring to international environmental policy. 
The issue is therefore one of self-imposed restriction according to self-defined 
standards, without any guarantee that domestic standards satisfy international standards 
and with no means of international supervision(236). 
A limited number of 'international standards' might be inferred from international 
human rights standards, such as those in matter of privacy(237), to be enforced via 
human rights procedures. Yet as it shall be argued in a subsequent Chapter(238), the 
efficiency of individual-centred human rights procedures and provisions in preserving 
collective values such as environmental values is limited. In fact, it would be hazardous 
to sustain the existence of international environmental limits restricting state sovereignty 
over its domestic natural resources; the tendency lies, on the contrary, on the side of an 
international protection of the environment consistent with state sovereignty over 
natural resources. The use and protection of the domestic environment thus remains, to 
a large extent, beyond the scope of customary and treaty-based international 
separate provision. Princ. 11 states that «[t]he environmental policies of all States should enhance and 
not adversely affect the (... ) development potential of developing countries. In the same sense, Sands, 
'International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development', 65 British YbIL (1994), 303, at 343; Kiss, 
'La Contribution de la Conference de Rio de Janeiro au Developpement du Droit International 
Coutumier', in Al-Nauimi & Meese (eds. ), International Legal Issues Arising Under the Decade of 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 1079, at 1081. 
(236) Although a number of international environmental law agreements do impose standards that are, at 
least in part, determined internationnally, if only through resolutions of interpretation, as it is the case for 
instance, under the 1971 Ramsar Convention; see Bowman, The Ramsar Convention comes of Age', 42 
Netherlands ILR (1995), 1. See also the 1972 World Heritage Convention, that makes a duty of each 
State to protect cultural and natural heritage located within their jurisdiction (Art. 6); as already 
mentioned however the convention had yet little impact on environmental protection; supra n. 63. The 
applicability of some provisions (see Art. 3 referring to Arts. 6 and 7) of the Straddling Fish Agreement 
to fish stocks within areas under national jurisdiction restricts, to a certain degree, state sovereignty over 
the resources within their territorial water. In the same sense, the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, the 
International Court of Justice asserted that the preferential rights of a coastal State are to be limited, 
among others things, according to «the rights of other States and the needs of conservation... »; Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, ICJ Rep. 
1974,3, at Para. 72. The Court abstained however from specifying whether such 'needs of conservation' 
were established by international or domestic law. No further indication was provided in that sense in the 
recent ICJ order of 22 September 1995 on Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance 
with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgement of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand 
v. France) Case; the Court merely specified that its decision to reject the request against the resuming of 
Nuclear testing by France was 'without prejudice to the obligations of States to respect and protect the 
natural environment»; ICJRep. 1995,288, at Para. 64. 
(237) Hence for instance, in the famed Lopez Ostra v. Spain, the ECHR Court read in the individual 
right to privacy a certain environmental limits imposing an obligation upon Spain to abstain from 
causing environmental nuisance; 20 EURR (1995), 227. For a comment of this leading case, see for 
instance Sands, 'Human Rights, Environment and Lopez-Ostra case: Context and Consequences', 6 
EHRLR (1996), 597. Generally on the use of human rights mechanisms to safeguard environmental 
values, see infra Chap. 6/3. Towards a More Holistic Approach to International Environmental Law: the 
Environment-Human Rights Law Dimension. 
(238) Chap. 6/3/iii. Strength and Weakness of the Human Rights Mechanisms in Protecting 
Environmental Interests. 
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environmental law. 
(2) On the other hand, it is increasingly recognised, both in international 
environmental instruments(239) and in the doctrine(240), that state action in areas outside 
domestic jurisdiction is limited by a general obligation to respect the 'global environment' 
or the objects of common concern(241). Following the example of international human 
rights law, international environmental law tends to depart from the synallagmatic 
structure of traditional international rules serving and preserving reciprocal national 
interests, to address more global concerns of States as a whole: 
«Rules of international environmental law fall into the category of norms 
adopted in the common interest of humanity. They generally do not bring 
immediate advantages to the contracting states when their objective is to 
protect species of wild plant and animal life, the oceans, the air, the soil, and 
the countryside. Even in regard to treaties concluded among a small number 
of states, reciprocity normally is not the primary purpose of the contracting 
parties. » (242) 
(239) See inter alia 1985 Nairobi Convention on the Marine Environment in East Africa, preambular 
Para. 2, and 1986 Noumea Convention on the Environment in the South Pacific, preambular Para. 3. 
The obligation to protect the marine environment is equally stated in 1982 UNCLOS, Art. 192; 1985 
UNEP Montreal Guidelines on the Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution from Land- 
Based Resources, Sect. 2. See also 1986 Tunis Declaration on Environment and Development, Para. 3; 
1989 Brazilia Declaration on the Environment, Paras. 1 and 2; 1989 Amazon Declaration, Para. 4; 1991 
Beijing Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Development, Para. 1. See also political 
commitment of ECE and G7 States to assume a responsibility for the environment at a global level, 
respectively 1993 ECE Lucerne Declaration, Para. 1; 1985 Bonn Economic Declaration of the G7. 
(240) See for instance Birnie & Boyle, 92; Boyle, 'State Responsibility for Breach of Obligations to 
Protect the Global Environment', in Butler (ed. ), Control over Compliance with International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 69, and 'State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction? ', 39 ICLQ (1990), 
1; Charney, `Third States Remedies for Environmental Damage to the World's Common Spaces', in 
Francioni & Scovazzi, International Responsibility for Environmental Harm (Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) Chap. 6, at 162 et sequ.; Kiss, 'Concluding Observations on 
Transboundary Air Pollution and the Emerging Concepts of International Law', in Flinterman et al. 
(eds. ), Transboundary Air Pollution: International Legal Aspects of the Co-operation of States 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), Chap. 18, at 362; Wolfrum, 'Purposes and Principles of International 
Environmental Law', 33 German YbIL (1990), 308. Gavouneli refers to the more restricted obligation 
not to pollute global environment; 'The Obligation to Protect the Environment with Reference to Marine 
Pollution Regulations', 46 Revue Hellenique de Droit International(1993), 77, at 100. More sceptical, 
see Bodansky, 'Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law', 3 Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies (1995), 105. 
(241) Any further precision lacking, the ICJ's affirmation of a general duty of States to protect the 
environment can potentially apply to both domestic, transboundary and global environment; see 
Fisheries Jurisdiction case and order of 22 September 1995 on Request for an Examination of the 
Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgement of 20 December 1974 in the 
Nuclear Tests, supra n. 236; Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in 
Armed Conflict, ICJRep. 1996,66, at Para. 32. See also very progressive views of Judge Wecramantry 
(diss. op. ) appended to the Advisory Opinion; 35 ILM (1996), 879, at 904; and to the order, ICJ Rep. 
1995,288, at 339 et sequ.; and dissenting opinion of Judge Palmer, ICJ Rep. 1995,288, at 405, Paras. 
74 et sequ. 
(242) Kiss & Shelton, International Environmental Law, at 17. Birne & Boyle, seem to endorse the 
same view, although in the more limited context of common areas; Birnie & Boyle, 85. Also Picone, (continued) 
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The recognition of such duty however, is not without any practical difficulties most 
notably related to its implementation, in the light of the ICJ's position on actio 
popularis in international law(243), and notwithstanding a certain degree of flexibility in 
the understanding of the legal interest attached to the recognition of the standing to 
sue(244). Consequently, a number of renowned scholars(245) do not hesitate to qualify 
'Obblighi reciproci ed obblighi erga omnes degli Stati nel campo della protezione internazionale 
dell'ambiente marino dall' inquinamento', in Starace (ed. ), Diritto internazionale e protezione 
dell'ambiente marin (Giuffr 
, 
1983), 15. On the non synallagmatic nature of international environmental 
law, see infra Chap. 5/3/iii. Common But DifferentiatedResponsibility (contingent obligations). 
(243) See South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1966,6, at Para. 88; Brownlie, 
Principles, at 470; Schwelb, Actio Popularis and International Law', 2 Israel Yb on Human Rights 
(1972), 46. 
(244) The ICJ has consistently interpreted the legal interest as broader than material, pecuniary or 
tangible prejudice; The S. S. "Wimbledon". PC1J Ser. A, No. 1, August 17th, 1923, at 20; South West 
Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 
21 December 1962: ICJ Reports 1962,319, at 343, and Judge Jessup (sep. op. ), at 425; South West 
Africa, Second Phase, ibid supra n. 243, at Para. 44; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, 
Limited, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970,3, at Paras. 33 et sequ. See also Australian position on its legal 
interest in the cessation of nuclear tests, in ICJ Pleadings, Nuclear Tests 1974, Vol. 1, Paras. 408 et 
sequ.; whilst the ICJ abstained to take position on Australia (and New Zealand)'s allegation of an erga 
omnes obligation to abstain from any kind of atmospheric nuclear tests, and approached the case as a 
'prototype A v. B situation'; Sand, 'Transnational Environmental Disputes', in Bardonnet (ed. ), The 
Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in Europe: Future Prospects, Hague Academy of 
International Law Workshop 1990 (Martinus Nijho$ 1991), Chap. 7, at 131. The existence of such 
obligation as a basis for locus standi was questioned in several dissenting opinions. Hence Judge 
Ignacio-Pinto for instance, himself firmly opposed to the resuming of nuclear tests, considered 
nonetheless that «in the present state of international law, the 'apprehension' of a State, or 'anxiety' (... ) 
does not (... ) suffice to substantiate some higher law imposed on all States (... )»; Nuclear Tests 
(Australia v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, ICJRep. 1973,99, at 132; also Judge 
Petren, ibid, at 127, and his sep. op. in the judgement on the merits, Nuclear Tests (Australia v. 
France), Judgment of 20 December 1974, ICJ Rep. 1974,253, at 302-303. See also dis. op. of Judges 
Gros and Castro in judgement on the merits, ibid., respectively at 286 et sequ. and 387-88. See also 
Charney, supra n. 240. Erga omnes environmental obligations were equally invoked by New Zealand, 
(and subsequently by Solomon Islands) in its attempt to have the resuming of underground nuclear 
testing by France condemned by the ICJ; referredafter Sands, 'L'affaire des essais nucleaires II (Nouvelle- 
Zelande c. France) : Contribution de l'instance au droit international de 1'environnement', 102 RGDIP 
(1997), 447, at 459, n. 45. The Court however did not decide on the merits of the case, considering that 
the possibility left under the 1974 Judgment to have the case re-opened and reviewed applied only to 
atmospheric testing, to the exclusion of underground testing. 
(245) See Bilder, 'The Present Legal and Political Situation in Antarctic', in Charney, The New 
Nationalism and the Use of Common Spaces: Issues in Marine Pollution and the Exploitation of 
Antarctica (Allanheld Osmun, 1981), 198; Brown Weiss, 'The Planetary Trust : Conservation and 
Intergenerational Equity', 11 Ecology LQ (1984), 495, at 544; Epiney, supra n. 180, at 452; Kirgis, 
'Standing to Challenge Human Endeavours that Could Change the Climate', 84 AJIL (1990), 525, at 
527; Kiss & Shelton, International Environmental Law, at 17; Schneider, World Public Order of the 
Environment, Towards an International Ecological Law and Organization (Stevens & Sons, 1975), at 
130-131; Wolfrum, supra n. 240. See also cautious recognition by Sands, 'Compliance with 
International Environmental Obligations: Existing International Legal Arrangements', in Cameron (ed. ), 
Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law (Earthscan, 1996), Chap. 3, at 61 et sequ. 
Consider equally 1995 IUCN Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, comment 
to Art. 3. Some other authors envisages the qualification of certain environmental obligations as binding 
erga omnes as a possibility; see Brownlie, 'A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental 
Protection', 13 Natural Resources Journal (1973), 179, at 183, and his remark in ASIL, 'The (continued) 
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certain fundamental environmental obligations, including that of respecting and 
protecting the global environment, as obligations which <(by their very nature (... ) are 
the concern of all States» and in the respect of which «all States can held to have a legal 
interest» (246). 
Albeit not explicitly mentioned in the famous ICJ dictum on erga omnes and the 
subsequent restatement thereof, which all refer essentially to certain fundamental human 
rights provisions, there is no real ground against the qualification of some environmental 
obligations as erga omnes(247). On the contrary, such qualification seems to be even 
more justified from two points of view: 
(a) the non synallagmatic nature of environmental obligations similar to that of the 
human rights obligations, expressly attributes an erga omnes dimension(248), and 
(b) the mounting tendency to qualify certain global environmental issues as 'common 
concern' or'common interest' of mankind, which some authors have no difficulty in 
assimilating to the 'concern of all States' qualification of erga omnes obligations(249). 
Protection of the Global Heritage', 75 ASIL Proc. (1981), 32. Likewise, Elihu Lauterpacht contemplates 
the erga omnes alternative under the perspective of the efficiency of international environmental law; 
Aspects of the Administration of International Justice (Grotius, 1991), at 62. In the same sense, 
Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. 1, § 125 (at p. 415); O'Connell, 'Enforcing the New International 
Law of the Environment', 35 German YbIL (1992), 293, at 312. See also, more cautious, Boisson de 
Chazournes, 'La mise en oeuvre du droit international dans le domaine de la protection de 
1'environnement: enjeux et defis', 99 RGDIP (1995), 37, at 53. 
(246) Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, supra n. 244, Pam. 33; the ICJ 
endorsed again the notion of erga omnes obligations in East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 
ICJRep. 1995,90, at Para. 29, and in the recent Case ConcerningApplication of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia & 
Montenegro), Preliminary Objections, 1CJ Rep. 1996 (non definitive official version), at Para. 31. The 
existence of erga omnes obligations was already implicitly endorsed in cases prior to the Barcelona 
Traction case, and inter alia in Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory opinion: ICJ 
Reports 1951,15, at 23, and in South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South 
Africa), Preliminary Objections, supra n. 244, at 343. 
(247) Wolfrum for instance, considers that the ICJ's dictum in the Barcelona Traction case is by no 
means an isolated accident, and takes as examples of erga omnes formulation in the context of 
environmental law 1982 UNCLOS, Art. 218, recognising a right of proceedings to port States with 
respect of discharge from vessels under (reign flags on the high seas, in violation of international 
standards on environmental pollution. See Wolfrum, supra n. 240, at 326. One should perhaps underline 
that there is no generally agreed list of the erga omnes rights and obligations, the list set in the various 
ICJ decision being purely illustrative; Oppenheim'sInternational Law, Vol. 1, § 125. See also 1986 US 
Third Restatement of the Law, §902(1), providing that «a state may bring a claim against another state 
for a violation of an international obligation owned to the claimant state or to states generally 
... 
>>; the 
comment (a) to this article states further that «when a state has violated an obligation owed to the international community as a whole, any state may bring a claim in accordance with this section without 
showing that it has suffered a particular injury, and that «any state may call on violating state to 
terminate a significant injury to the general environment. 
(248) Supra n. 242, and infra Chap. 5/3/iii. Common But Differentiated Responsibility (contingent 
obligations). 
(249) See infra Chap. 5/2/iv. Common Concern, Common Interest of Mankind: Global Partnership or Global Bargain?. 
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Besides, the inclusion of 'international obligations of an essential importance for the 
safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting 
massive pollution of atmosphere or of seas' in the list of 'fundamental interests to the 
international community as a whole', and the breach of which is recognised as an 
international crime(250), might constitute an important step towards the recognition of 
the erga omnes character of certain environmental obligations still to be identified. It 
remains the case however, that States, even under the benefit of a particular locus standi 
to act on environmental issues regarding common areas or issues declared of the common 
concernrnterest of mankind, still prefer to resort to extra judicial means to act against 
other States failing to abide by fundamental international environmental obligations(251). 
5. Concluding Comments 
In the early 1970s, the UN Under Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, 
speaking on behalf of the UN Secretary-General, stated that the endorsement of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources does not constitute 
«a substitute for political and philosophical reality into which we must fit 
a natural resources policy (... ) The principle of national sovereignty should be 
considered in conjunction with another principle, that of world solidarity. It is 
the combination of these two principles that should gradually fmd expression 
in the definition of economic arrangements for this exploitation and 
distribution of natural resources. »(252) 
Since it was first invoked as a tool to complete decolonisation and full independence, 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources has been constantly reasserted, albeit not 
(250) 1980 ILC Draft Articles on International Responsibility, Art. 19(2) and (3)(d), unmodified in the 
latest (1996) version. One should note however that the threshold of environmental harm under Art. 19 is 
significantly higher than that presumably implied in a general obligation to preserve and protect the 
environment; see by analogy infra Chap. 3/3/ii. Risk-Harm to be Averted/Minimised. However, 
Arangio-Ruiz, ILC special Rapporteur on state responsibility, does not rule out the applicability of Art. 
19 to violation of erga omnes obligations towards «protected objects (human beings, groups, peoples of 
the environment) that do not qualify as international crimes; Eighth Report on State Responsibility, 
A/CN. 4/476 Add. 1, at 1. For an early comment of the elaboration of this Article in particular, see 
Dupuy, `Action publique et crime international de 1'Etat: A propos de l'article 19 du projet de la 
commission du droit international sur la responsabilite des Etats', 25 AFDI (1979), 539; Rigaux, 'Le 
crime d'Etat. R6IIexions sur l'article 19 du projet d'articles sur la responsabilite des Etats', in Il diritto 
internazionale al tempo della sua codificazione. Studi in onore di Roberto Ago, Vol. III (Giuffre, 1987), 
301. A number of authors however consider that such definition of international crime as encompassing 
serious environmental issues is more de lege ferenda than a codification of existing practice; see Boyle, 
'State Responsibility for Breach of Obligations to Protect the Global Environment', in Butler, (ed. ), 
Control over Compliance with International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 69, at 73; Gilbert, 'The 
Criminal Responsibility of States', 39 ICLQ (1990), 345, at 364; Marek, 'Criminalising State 
Responsibility', 14 RBDI (1978), 460, at 477-78. 
(251) On the reticence of States to resort to judicial means for environment-related issues, see supra 
Chap. 1/2/iii. Legal Framework n. 151 (CR). 
(252) Quoted afterRajan, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 134. 
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without some variations in its conception(253). It has also remained the starting point for 
most treaties on environmental protection and economic co-operation. Nonetheless, 
there is a clear gap between the classic conception of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources prevailing among States and part of the doctrine, and the context to 
which it applies. On the one hand, sovereignty over natural resources emerged as a tool 
of passive coexistence entailing essentially a right and a duty of non interference. On the 
other hand, partly on their own initiative and partly as the result of de facto 
circumstances, States have become increasingly interdependent and are driven out of 
their lethargic coexistence into more active co-operation(254). In this context, an 
essentially negative conception of sovereignty represents undoubtedly an obstacle to 
the intensification of the co-operation between States. The problem raised by 
contemporary environmental challenges is only one example among others(255). 
The classic conception of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and related 
no transboundary harm principle have been revealed as inappropriate essentially on two 
accounts with respect to problems such as climate change, ozone layer depletion, 
deforestation, desertification or the loss of biodiversity: 
1) The no transboundary harm principle follows the classic pattern of source-causality 
link-transboundary effect, and applies only when the source of the harm and the 
harm itself occur in a `transboundary' context; cases of self-inflicted environmental 
damages are hence not considered. Apart from the fact that such approach 
presupposes that the source of the harm is known(256), it fails to take into account 
that 'self-inflicted environmental damages' might have disastrous consequences for 
some other States, or indeed the whole international community. One could cite as an 
example massive deforestation, insofar as it contributes to the increase in carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere hence to global warming. 
2) In addition, the no transboundary harm principle is essentially construed as an 
individualistic principle entailing unilateral or bilateral environmental measures. It 
fails, however, to reflect the necessity to harmonise such measures with those taken 
by other States, and integrate domestic measures in a more common global strategy to 
effectively tackle interrelated problems. 
(253) Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, 22. 
(254) See Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, 30-32; see further infra Chap. 5/1. Introduction 
(255) See in the context of human rights: Reisman, ` Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law', 84 AJIL (1990), 866. 
(256) See infra, Chap. 3, Prevention and Precautionary Principles. 
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As a result, such common action or global action often appears to infringe and 
regulate the sovereign responsibility of States not to cause transboundary harm, while 
they should be perceived in fact as a co-ordination of sovereign responsibilities. The 
1985 OECD/Yugoslavia Declaration on Environment rightly provides that 
«responsibilities and the need for action concerning environmental protection do not end 
at national frontiers»(257). A similar conclusion was reached at the 1991 International 
Conference on Environmental Law; in its final Recommendations, the Conference 
stressed the importance to attach a three-fold responsibility to state territorial 
sovereignty: 
«Too often, the established principle of national sovereignty is interpreted 
as to neglect the interdependence of the global ecosystem, and this 
interpretation forms an obstacle to cooperation in the work of attaining 
sustainable use of natural resources and the preservation of the environment. It 
should be acknowledged as a rule that the principle of sovereignty implies 
the duty of a state to protect the environment within its jurisdiction, the duty 
to prevent transboundary harm, and the duty to preserve the global commons 
for present and future generations>> (258) 
International environmental protection, albeit guided by international or regional 
rules, principles and agendas, remains essentially national in its application. The case in 
sum, is not one of total surrender of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, or 
sovereignty in general, but one of long needed re-thinking of its outdated conception, in 
the light of its current context of application, as an effective tool of active co- 
operation(259). Writing about the principle of sovereignty in general, Handl underlines 
that: 
«... [S]overeignty signals no longer a simple status negativus, a legal 
basis for exclusion, but has become the legal basis for inclusion, or of a 
commitment to co-operate for the good of the international community at 
large: souverainete oblige. » (260) 
(257) Para (d). The `irrelevance' of political borders when it comes to environmental protection was 
equally emphasised in the Council of Europe's 1968 Water Charter, which provides that 'water knows no 
frontiers' (Art. XII) and that the management of water'should be based on their natural basins rather than 
on political and administrative boundaries' (Art. XI). 
(258) The Hague Recommendations, issued by the International Conference on Environmental Law, The 
Hague, 16 August 1991, Preamble (emphasis added). 
(259) See Alloff, 'Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea', 77 AJIL (1983), 1,27; Bmmn6e "'Common 
Interest", Echoes from an Empty Shell? ', 49 ZaÖRV (1989), 791; Bragdon, 'National Sovereignty and Global Environmental Responsibility', at 390 et sequ.; Conca, 'Rethinking the Ecology-Sovereignty 
Debate', 23 Millennium (1994), 701; Piddington, 'Sovereignty and the Environment: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? ', 31 Environment (1989), 18; Pardo & Christol, `The Common 
Interest: Tension between the Whole and the Parts', in Macdonald & Johnston (eds. ), The Structure and Process of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 643. 
(260) Handl, 'Environmental Security and Global Change: the Challenge of International Law', in Lang 
et al (eds. ), Environmental Protection and International Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, (continued) 
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More than twenty years after the UN Under Secretary-General for Economic and 
Social Affairs had issued his remark on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
the Secretary General wrote, in his Agenda for Peace: 
«The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect 
for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common 
international progress. The time of absolute sovereignty has passed; its theory 
was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to 
understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal 
governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world. 
Commerce, communications and environmental matters transcend 
administrative borders 
... 
» 
(261) 
95c CQ 
1991), Chap. 2,87. 
(261) Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, New 
York, 1992; reproduced in Roberts & Kingsbury (eds. ), United Nations, Divided World, 2nd edn (Clarendon, 1993), 470. 
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1. Introduction 
The principle of precaution(1), like the principle of intergenerational equity 
considered in the next Chapter, is inspired by long term objectives and future interests, 
(1) See generally Böhmer-Christiansen, 'The Precautionary Principle in Germany - enabling 
Government', in O'Riordan & Cameron (eds. ), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May, 
1994), Chap. 2, at 38. Generally on the precautionary principle, see Backes & Verschuuren, 'The 
Precautionary Principle in International, European, and Dutch Wildlife Law', 9 Colorado JIELP (1998), 
43; Birnie & Boyle, 89 et sequ.; Bodansky, 'Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle', 33 
Environment (1991), 4; Cameron & Abouchar, `The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of 
Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment', 14 Boston College ICLR (1991), 1 
(hereafter Cameron & Abouchar, 'The Precautionary Principle'); Cameron & Wade-Gery, Addressing 
Uncertainty: Law, Policy, and the Precautionary Principle, Centre for Social and Economic Research of 
the Global Environment Working Paper 92-43 (University of East Anglia, 1992) (hereafter, Cameron & 
Wade-Gery, Addressing Uncertainty); Freestone & Hey, Precautionary Principle in International Law 
(Kluwer Law International, 1996) (hereafter Freestone & Hey, Precautionary Principle in International 
Law); Handl, 'Environmental Security and Global Change', in Lang et al. (eds. ), Environmental (continued) 
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and relates more particularily to the environmental dimension of environmental law and 
policy. 
The principle of precaution has emerged in the international environmental sphere in 
the early 1980s, as a result of a growing awareness of the gravity and apparently 
irreversible character of the environmental crisis(2). The technological optimism 
prevailing until the early 1970s inter alia in relation to environmental matters, had 
become increasingly undermined with (a) the realisation that, by nature of its subject 
matter, science is inherently uncertain(3) and (b) a general disillusionment with regard to 
the capacity of modem technologies to solve environmental problems. The advancement 
of science has not only brought a better understanding of ecosystems and cleaner 
technologies; it has also allowed for the development of new techniques and new 
products which have given a new (dramatic) dimension to the human impact on the 
environment: 
((Traditional society could rely upon experience for policy guidance to a 
degree wholly unsafe today. The ability of contemporary science to produce 
substances and effects previously unknown on earth means that policy must 
now anticipate experience. »(4) 
This chapter sets out to examine the nature and implications of the precautionary 
principle in international law as compared to the principle of prevention. It will first 
retrace the origins and first manifestations of the principle in international law, focusing 
upon the shift away from the traditional, reactionary environmental policy to a more 
anticipatory policy(5). It will then proceed to examine the meaning of the principle, and 
try to identify its practical implications and actual limits. 
Protection and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), Chap. 2; Hey, `The Precautionary Concept 
in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution', 4 Georgetown IELR (1992), 303; 
Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles of Modern International Environmental Law 
(Graham, Trotman& Nijho$1994) (hereafter: Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties); Kiss & Shelton, 
Traite de Droit Europeen, Chap. II; Macdonald, `Appreciating the Precautionary Principle as an Ethical 
Evolution in Ocean Management', 26 ODIL (1995), 255; O'Riordan, Interpreting the Precautionary 
Principle, Centre for Social and Economic Research of the Global Environment Working Paper 92-03 
(University of East Anglia, 1992) (hereafter, O'Riordan, Interpreting the Precautionary Principle); 
O'Riordan & Cameron (eds. ), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May, 1994) (hereafter 
referredto afterthe editors); Primrosch, `Das Vorsorgeprinzip im internationalen Umweltrecht', 51 ZÖR 
(1996), 227; Rehbinder, Das Vorsorgeprinzip im internationalen Vergleich (Werner, 1991) ox=ft 
Rehbinder, Das Vorsorgeprinzip im internationalen Vergleich); Sands, Principles (Vol. I), 208-213; 
Scovazzi, `Sul principio precauzionale nel diritto internazionale dell'ambiente', 75 Rivista di Diritto 
Internazionale (1992), 699; Simonis (ed. ), Präventive Umweltpolitik (Campus, 1988). 
(2) Or environmental crises; see supra Chap. 1/3. Evolutionary Perspective of Sustainable Development. 
(3) The fundamental uncertainty of science has been fully recognised by scientists themselves; see Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edn (The University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
(4) Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, at 9. 
(5) This section, like the rest of the thesis, adopts an historical perspective, and considers treaties and (continued) 
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State practice at domestic and international levels clearly testifies to an emerging 
sense of necessity to act on certain environmental issues in spite of persistent scientific 
uncertainties. Nevertheless, it is suggested here that the lack of clear consensus on the 
core implications of the principle largely undermines its actual and potential impact, and 
affects its very legal status. 
2. Origins of the Concept 
Vorsorgeprinzip and Precautionary Principle 
The origins of the precautionary principle both in the European and international 
context are far from being unanimously established. Some, essentially Anglo-Saxon, 
authors confirmed in their opinion by the prominent role played by Germany at North 
Sea Conferences(6), held that the principle draws its origins in the German concept of 
Vorsorgeprinzip(7). Others, more particularily German authors, stress on the contrary 
that the German language makes no difference between prevention and precaution, both 
translated as Vorsorge, hence both de facto synonymous. They therefore argue that the 
German Vorsorgeprinzip has been misinterpreted by international lawyers, and dismiss 
the claim that the precautionary principle, as distinguished from the prevention 
principle, originates in German environmental law(s). They do recognise, in the light of 
other documents though their respective evolution. Accordingly, it must be born in mind, on reading 
this section, that documents referredto at early stage in the text, have often been subjected to subsequent 
modifications mentioned only at a later stage. 
(6) See infra c. Precaution and Sustainable Development. 
(7) Birnie, 'Are Twentieth-Century Marine Conservation Conventions Adaptable to Twenty-First 
Century Goals and Principles? ', 12 IJMarine & Coastal L (1997), 307 (Part I), at 310 ; Freestone, 'The 
Precautionary Principle', in Churchill & Freestone (eds. ), International Law and Global Climate 
Change (Graham & Trotman/Nijhoff, 1991), Chap. 2 (hereafter Freestone, 'The Precautionary 
Principle'); Freestone & Ryland, 'EC Environmental Law After Maastricht', 45 NILQ (1994), 152; 
Haigh, `The Introduction of the Precautionary Principle into the UK', in O'Riordan & Cameron, 20; 
Hewison, 'The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management: an Environmental Perspective', 11 1I 
Marine & Coastal L (1996), 301; Holder, 'Safe Science? The Precautionary Principle in United 
Kingdom Environmental Law', in Holder (ed. ), The Impact of EC Environmental Law in the United 
Kingdom (Wiley, forthcoming); O'Riordan & Cameron, 'The History and Contemporary Significance of 
the Precautionary Principle', in O'Riordan & Cameron, Chap. 1; McIntyre & Mosedale, `The 
Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law', 9 Journal of Environmental Law (1997), 221; O'Riordan, `Interpreting the Precautionary Principle'; Sands, 'L'affaire des essais nucleaires 
II (Nouvelle-Zklande c. France) : Contribution de l'instance au droit international de 1'environnement', 
102 RGDIP (1997), 447, at 470. Also Scovazzi, 'Sul principio precauzionale nel diritto internazionale dell'ambiente', 75 Rivista di Diritto Internationale (1992), 699; and Garcia, 'The Precautionary Principle : its Implications in Capture Fisheries Management', 22 OCM 1994), 99, at 101. Some German authors remain vague with regards to the source of the principle, but seem to admit that 
precautionary principle as known in international environmental law draws its origins in national law, in including German law, Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties, Chap. 1; Primrosch; 'Das 
Vorsorgeprinzip im internationalen Umweltrecht', 51 ZOR (1996), 227, at 229 et sequ. 
(8) Rehbinder, Das Vorsorgeprinzip im Umweltpolitik', in Simonis (ed. ) Präventive Umweltpolitik (Campus, 1988), 129; Krämer, E. C. Treaty and Environmental Law, 2nd edn (Sweet & Maxwell, (continued) 
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the distinction drawn between the English/French terms of prevention and precaution in 
international law, that the German concept of Vorsorge is more closely related to the 
English concept of precaution(9). Vorsorge clearly implies more than actual care, and 
requires careful anticipation of future and potential risks, both through scientific 
research and proper planning at all stages and in all sectors of the environment. 
Scientific uncertainties do not legitimate individuals or entities to engage into activities 
susceptible of causing serious harm to the environment. 
It seems nonetheless appropriate to consider the German Vorsorgeprinzip, alongside 
other national concepts, as cases of application of the precautionary approach; as it is 
obvious that, beyond similarities of appellation, each State has developed the principle 
in a different way, none of which has been transposed tel quel in international law. And 
whilst the principle of precaution at the national level might have evolved into a legal 
principle vested with a `managerial programmable quality', this is not necessarily true 
for the principle at the supranational level(10). In this respect, it must be clear that the 
present paper focuses on the international precautionary principle, and that the remarks 
and conclusions drawn do not necessarily apply to the principle at the domestic 
level(11). 
1995), 53 et sequ. Rehbinder stresses however, that one particularities of the German system is to make a 
clear difference between Schutz- and Vorsorgeprinzip, between the principle of protection and 
prevention/precaution; see Rehbinder, Das Vorsorgeprinzip im internationalen Vergleich, at 249. For 
closer look at the German conception of Vorsorgeprinzip, see also Biihmer-Christiansen, 'The 
Precautionary Principle in Germany 
- 
enabling Government', in O'Riordan & Cameron, Chap. 2. 
Besides, the distinction between prevention and precaution, clearly made in international environmental 
law, is not always clear-cut in domestic law, hence for instance, the three official German, French and 
Italian versions of the Swiss Federal Law on the protection of the Environment (LPE), 7 October 1983 (Recueil Systematique des Lois Federales 814 01), refer, at Arts. 1(2) 11(2) respectively to 'vorsorge', 
prevention' and'prevenzione'. In Switzerland, all texts of the law in the three official languages (German- 
French-Italian) have the same legally binding effect. One should also note that Hohmann's detailed study 
on the precautionary principle was first published under the German title Präventive Rechtspflichten und 
- 
prinzipien des modernen Umweltvölkerrechts (Dunker & Humholt, Berlin, 1992). 
(9) Von Moltke, `The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental Policy', in British Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution, Twelfth Report: Best Practicable Environmental Option (HMSO, 1988), Appendix 3. In the landmark Governmental Report to the Federal Parliament on the Protection of Air Quality, 1984, Vorsorgeprinzip commands that «the damages done to the natural world (which surrounds us all) should be avoided in advance and in accordance with opportunity and possibility. Vorsorge further means the early detection of dangers to health and environment by 
comprehensive, synchronised (harmonised) research, in particular about cause and effect relationships..., it 
also means acting when conclusively ascertained understanding by science is not yet available... »; quoted 
a$erBohmer-Christiansen, `The Precautionary Principle in Germany 
- 
Enabling Government', at 3 7. (10) O>mordan & Cameron, 'The History and Contemporary Significance of the Precautionary Principle', at 16; see infra ii/c. Precaution and Sustainable Development. (11) For an enlightening comparative study of the domestic precautionary principle as applied in a 
selected number of countries, see Rehbinder Das Vorsorgeprinzip im internationalen vergleich. See also 
referencesinfra n. 80. ' 
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ii. Precaution as a Principle of International Law 
a. Equitable Apportionment and No Substantial Harm Principles 
The relation of humans/State to nature has traditionally been dominated by two 
major principles, namely State sovereignty and the inexhaustibility of natural 
resources(12). The prime object of consideration was the preservation of such 
sovereignty, and the maximisation of the aggregatebenefits derived from the exploitation 
of the natural resources. Early `environmental' concerns have appeared essentially to 
serve those interests through the doctrine of equitable utilisation and related no 
substantial harm principle(13). 
Originally construed as a bilateral rule of coexistence and allocation of transboundary 
natural resources(14) in a spirit of maximisation of the aggregate utility and minimum 
inconvenience(15), the doctrine of equitable utilisation and related no substantial harm 
principle have first had `incidental' environmental implications. Environmental pollution 
or degradation would enter into consideration only when, and insofar as, it would 
(12) Hence for instance, Judge de Castro (concurring) in Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, stated «... fish 
stocks in the sea are inexhaustible... »; Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland Federal 
Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, ICJ Rep. 1974,3, at 80-81. 
(13) Supra, Chap. 2. Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 
(14) Most notably the utilisation of transnational waters; see Lac Lanoux arbitration (Spain v. 
France), 1957,24 ILR (1957), 101; The Gut Dam arbitration (Canada-US) (1968), 8 ILM (1969), 118; 
The Diversion of Water from the Meuse, PCIJ Ser. A/B, Fascicule No 70, Judgment of June 28th, 1937, 
at 26. Similar approach was adopted with regard to the utilisation other 'shared resources' susceptible to 
competing exploitation at the time, such as migratory species. See supra Principle of Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Towards a limited Sovereignty over Natural Resources; The Sic 
Utere Tuo and Related No Substantial Transboundary Harm Principles. 
(15) Both IDI and ILA legislative activity on the non navigational use of transboundary waters for 
instance, have been remained oriented towards the maximum utilisation of shared waters with a 
minimum of inconvenience for other riparian States; illustrative in this respect are the 1966 ILA Helsinki 
Rules on the Use of Waters of International Rivers which consecrate the idea of equitable sharing «to 
provide maximum benefit to each basin State from the uses of the waters within the minimum detriment 
to each>>, ILA, Report of the Fes-second Conference, Helsinki 1966,487; also: 1961 IDI Salzburg 
Resolution, l'utilisation des eaux internationales non maritimes (en dehors de la navigation), Preamble; 
49Ann. ID1(1961-II), 370. 
According to Lyster, the factors common to most treaties on international wildlife law negotiated in the 
50s and 60s are that (1) they were mostly concerned with economically valuable species, and (2) they 
emphasise their maximum exploitation; Lyster, International Wildlife Law (Grotius, 1985), at 14. Thus 
for instance, the original African wildlife conventions were principally motivated by the need to «preserve 
supplies of species which were economically valuable 
... 
»; ibid at 113 (emphasis added). Likewise, the 
first fisheries agreements were essentially geared to fishing of the maximum sustainable yield of the stock; 
ibid at 163. On the same line, Kiss wrote about the original 1946 Whaling Convention: «... [cc] n'est 
pas une convention de conservation au sens propre du terme, mais un traito de peche reglementant 
1'exploitation [de la baleine]»; Droit International de I'E vironnement (Podone, 1983), at 255. Indeed, 
Art. V(2) of the Convention provides for the optimum utilisation of whale resources; see also the 1957 
Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals (Preamble). 
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hamper equitable utilisation or undermine maximum exploitation; pollution rules 
remained in sum 'a mere appendage to the regulation of utilization'(16). Consequently, 
States recognised the duty to prevent or suppress only those injuries(17): 
(a) resulting from human activities(18); 
(b) having serious(19), substantial(20), or even definitive (21) consequences on the 
environment of other States(22); 
(c) provided that those injuries, together with the link between a given action(23) and 
the injuries, could be established by clear and convincing evidence(24). 
(16) Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties, 33 
(17) Trail Smelter case (Final Award), 35 AJIL 684, at 716; Lac Lanoux arbitration, refers simply to 
alteration (of waters); 241LR (1957), 101, at 129. 
(18) The duty of prevention does not extend to 'detrimental effects caused by environmental factors that 
cannot be reasonably said to have been caused by human conduct; Schachter, 'The Emergence of 
International Environmental Law', 44 JU (1991), 457, at 464. Such condition of course is tempered with 
the difficulty to identify the exact causes of the harm and attribute it exclusively to human activity 
regardless of any natural factors; see infra 3/iii. Causality Link Between the Object and the Harm/Risk. 
(19) Trail Smelter case and Lac Lanoux arbitration, supra n. 17. 
(20) 1966 Helsinki Rules, op. cit., Art. X(1)(a); States are only recommended to abate damage which is 
not substantial; Art. X(1)(b); see also ILA 1982 Rules on Water Pollution in an International Drainage 
Basin, Art. 1; ILA 1982 Montreal Rules of International Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, Art. 
3; 1987 IDI Cairo Draft Resolution on air pollution across national frontiers, Art. 9, in 62 Ann. IDI 
(1987-1), 188. 
(21) Lac Lanoux arbitration, supra n. 17, at 123 
(22) Trail Smelter case, supra n. 17; Lac Lanoux arbitration refers to downstream States, supra n. 17, at 
123, and 1966 Helsinki Rules to Co-basin States; Art. X. The transboundary harm principle fords also 
application in inter-cantons and inter-Länder disputes; see supra Chap. 2, Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources, n. 200 (CR), and Donauversinkung case, infra n. 24, and further references on early 
cases in Wildhaber, 'Die Öldestillerieanlage Sennwald und das Völkerrecht der Grenzüberschreitenden 
Luftverschmutzung', 31 ASDI (1975), 97, at 104 et sequ. 
(23) The situation is less clear in case of purely economic consequences resulting from environmental 
interference; see Schachter, supra n. 18, at 464. 
(24) Trail Smelter case and Lac Lanoux arbitration, supra n. 17. No reference is made to a clear 
established causal link between an activity and the injury in 1966 Helsinki Rules, which focus on the 
result (pollution) rather than the source (activity causing pollution). Rather, the Rules link the duty of 
prevention to the demonstration of the inequitable and unreasonable use of the shared resources (Art. 
X(1) combined with Arts. IV and VII). Accordingly, the duty to prevent pollution would (a) be 
conditioned by the demonstration that such pollution infringes the right of equitable utilisation of co- 
basin States, and (b) ford it limits in the right of equitable utilisation of the State responsible. States 
would thus be expected to tolerate even significant environmental harm as long as such harm results from 
an equitable use of the shared resources; ILA Report of the Fifty-second Conference, held at Helsinki, 
1966 (Great Britain, 1968), 499. See also Lammers' theory of the 'mitigated-no-substantial harm', that 
takes into consideration factors such as socio-economic or technical costs involved in preventing or 
abating pollution and the harm caused, to temper the operation of the no substantial harm principle so as 
not to favour in excess the victim State; 'Balancing the Equities', in Dupuy (ed. ), The Future of 
International Law of the Environment, Hague Academy of International Law Workshop 1984 (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1985), 153, at 155 et sequ. 
Such conditional approach has been criticised for failing to dissociate the no substantial harm and 
equitable utilisation principles, and for introducing dual standards of preventive environmental duties, (continued) 
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Where not appended to particular rules of exploitation or allocation, largely because 
the `common resource' was not subjected to such intensive and competitive 
exploitation, `environmental' rules have often remained `soft' and reactive, essentially 
concerned with issues of reparation of damage and liability(25); whereas the solution to 
pollution would still rest upon the assimilative and self-regenerative capacity of the 
environment itself, following the slogan «[t]he solution of pollution is dilution»(26). 
along those already set in Trail Smelter, see Handl, `National Use of Transboundary Air Resources: The 
International Entitlement Issue Reconsidered', 26 NRJ (1986), 405, at 416 et sequ.; Dickstein, 
`International Lake and River Pollution Control: Questions of Method', 12 Columbia JTL (1973), 487, 
at 497; Ando, `The Law of Pollution Prevention in International Rivers and Lakes', in Zacklin & 
Caflisch (eds. ), The Legal Regime of International Rivers and Lakes (Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 331. 
Birnie & Boyle underline that the 1966 Helsinki rules were the only international codification to make 
the obligation to prevent serious environmental harm conditional on equitable balancing; Birnie & 
Boyle, 228-29. They point out that, although such approach appears to have been originally followed by 
the International Law Commission in its attempt of codification of the non navigational uses of 
international watercourses (McCaffrey, Second Report on the Law of the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses, A/CN. 4/339 and Add. I and 2,1986 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1,87, at Paras. 184 et 
sequ.; Schwebel, Third Report on the Law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, 
A/CN. 4/348 and Corrigendum, 1982 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1,65, Paras. 156 et sequ. The latter had finally 
opted for the opposite view, i. e. the duty not to cause appreciable environmental harm as a limit to 
equitable use of shared resources (see draft Art. 8 (now Art. 7)), 1988 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 2, at 36. The 
Commission recognised however that in some instances, equitable utilisation might depend on a 
tolerance by some watercourse States of a 'measure of harm', but considered that, in that case, a special 
agreement between the source and victim States was necessary, ibid. The Commission relied inter alia 
on the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, where the International Court of Justice clearly asserted that the 
preferential rights of a coastal State are to be limited, among others things, according to «the rights of 
other States and the needs of conservation... »; Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland, 
Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, ICJ Rep. 1974,3, at 31. This option was retained in 
the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Art. 7. See also of 
the 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, Arts. 2 and 3. In the so-called Donauversinkung case (Sinking 
of the Danube) (Württenberg & Prussia v. Bade) (1927), a German Staatsgerichtshof held that the duty to 
abstain from injurious transboundary interference, as it is increasingly recognised in international law, 
was primarily related to artificial alteration in the flows of the river. The German Court underlined 
nonetheless that its conclusion did not exempt States for the responsibility «to do what civilized States 
nowadays do in regard to their rivers, even with regard to natural flows; extracts of the case in 4 Annual 
Digest of Public International Law Cases 1927-1928 (1931), 128, at 131-132. 
(25) Characteristic of such after-the-factapproach are the early norms concerning marine pollution, which 
cover `pure threat'. Thus for instance, under the 1969 Intervention Convention, Art. V), the onus lies on 
the intervening coastal State to prove that the intended intervention is both necessary and proportionate 
to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and actual, or imminent danger, see infra Causality Link. 
Likewise, the 1969 Civil Liability Convention defines preventive measures as "reasonable measures 
taken" after an incident has occurred to prevent or minimise pollution damage, Para. 7. Surprisingly, 
whereas both the 1973/78 MARPOL, and the 1972 Oslo Convention on Marine Pollution from Ships 
and Aircraft, are based on the acknowledgement that «the capacity of the sea to assimilate wastes and 
render them harmless, and its ability to regenerate natural resources, is not limited» (1973/78 MARPOL, 
preambular Para. 2), both fail to impose an absolute ban on dumping of wastes. Rather, they apply to a 
restricted category of disposal (deliberate actions to the exclusion of incidental actions; 1973/78 MARPOL Art. III; 1972 Oslo Convention Art. 19) and allows for exceptions. 
(26) Clark, as quoted in Stebbing, 'Environmental Capacity and The Precautionary Principle', 24 MPBu1I. (1992), 287, at 288. Thus for instance, early measures to abate air pollution consisted in the 
construction of tall industrial chimneys, to allow for the dispersion of industrial smokes in high altitude, hence displacing the environmental problem without resolving it; Kiss & Shelton, Traite de Droit Europeen, 8; see also Schwebel's provision for the `self-purification' of flowing waters, 1979 YbILC Vol. (continued) 
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Such `precaution' deficit comes as no surprise considering the general context of 
economic, industrial, scientific and technological development. Besides, paradoxically, 
the state of scientific and technological progress did not allow yet for an early detection 
of the `unsustainability' of the rate of exploitation. As a certain `environmental 
awareness' grew, international environmental law progressively shifted away from a 
`law of environmental allocation'(27) towards a `law of environmental protection'; as a 
result of it, most original regimes of early `environmental' treaties were subsequently 
amended to serve a more protective function. 
b. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment: 
Institutionalisation ofPrevention 
The growing awareness of the inadequacy of a `reactive' environmental policy in the 
early 1970s, illustrated by a series of made-made environmental disasters and alarming 
forecasts, created a favourable context to the endorsement of a more cautious attitude 
towards the ecosystem. The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment 
constituted a milestone in the emergence of `modern environmental law' in two major 
respects(28): 
1) it introduced a broader environmental perspective, supplementing the classic concern 
for utilisation of resources with concern for the resources per se (ecological viability) 
and for future generations (intergenerational equity)(29); 
2) it marked the departure from sectoral and bilateral towards a more global approach. 
Consequently, the no substantial transboundary harm principle and related duty to 
take preventive measures emerged beyond the context of good-neighbourliness, as a 
measure for the benefit of the international community as a whole(30). On the other 
II Pt. 1,143, at 149. 
(27) Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties, at 11-12. 
(28) See infra Chap. 1/3. Evolutionary Perspective of Sustainable Development, and Chap. 2/2/iii. 
Sovereignty over Environmental Resources and Environmental Policies versus Globalisation of 
Environmental Standards and Policies. 
(29) Such change of perspective is particularly clearly reflected in 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment, Princ. 1 and 2. 
(30) No substantial harm principle, 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Princ. 21; 
see Birnie & Boyle, 92; Charney, `Third States Remedies for Environmental Damage to the World's 
Common Spaces', in Francioni & Scovazzi, International Responsibility for Environmental Harm 
(Graham& Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff 1991) Chap. 6, at 162 et sequ. On the conception of the duty of 
prevention in the field of the `common' environment as an erga omnes obligation, see supra, Chap. 
2/4/ii/c. Limits Arising from General Environmental Considerations. 
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hand, the preventive approach has essentially remained within the existing scientific and 
technological parameters, and entails no reconsideration thereof(31)" 
The preventive approach inspired most environmental rules in the 1970s and 1980s, 
concerned both with the anticipation of the risk and minimisation of environmental 
pollution(32), and with the rational use of natural resources(33). The principle of 
prevention also laid at the centre of the work of the International Law Commission on 
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by 
International Law, and was consecrated as one basis for such a responsibility in the 
various set of principles proposed by the Commission(34). The debate on that issue 
(31) prin. 21 makes no express reference to the relevant parameters to define the harm to be prevented, 
such as scientific proof or objectiveness; see infra 3/ 
ii. Risk-Harm to be Averted/Minimised; nevertheless, as a rule, the adoption of preventive 
environmental measures has been consistently subordinated to available conclusive scientific findings. 
Admittedly, the central point of discussion throughout the drafting process of Princ. 21 was the 
consecration of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and not the no-harm principle; see supra 
Chap. 2/4/ii/a. Equitable Utilisation, Sic Utere Tuo and Related No Substantial Transboundary Harm 
Principles; also Sohn, `The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment', 14 Harvard IL I 
(1973), 433, at 485 et sequ. Besides, principle 18 states clearly the prominent role of science and 
technology in the identification, avoidance and control of environmental risks; the promotion of a science- 
based preventive policy was confirmed by 1982 Nairobi Declaration, Para. 9. 
(32) This is the case of most regional and international marine pollution documents, like for instance the 
1972 Oslo Convention on Marine Pollution from Ships and Aircraft, Art. 2; 1972 London Convention 
on Dumping of Wastes, Arts. I, II; 1973/78 MARPOL, Art. 1; 1974 Baltic Sea Convention, Art. 3; 
1982 UNCLOS, Arts. 194,207 and 208. It is also true of most of UNEP Regional Seas Conventions, 
namely: 1976 Barcelona Convention on Mediterranean Sea, Art. 4; 1978 Kuwait Convention on the 
Marine Environment in the Arabian Gulf, Art. 3; 1983 Cartagena Convention on the Marine 
Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region, Art. 4(1); 1985 Nairobi Convention on the Marine 
Environment in East Africa, Art. 4(1); and 1986 Noumea Convention on the Environment in the South 
Pacific, Art. 5(1). See also more recent documents, such as the 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, 
Arts. 2,3; the 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents Convention, Arts. 2,3. 
(33) See for instance 1968 African Convention on Nature, Preamble, Arts. II, IV-VII; 1972 World 
Heritage Convention; Preamble and arts 4,5; 1973 CITES, preambular Para. 1; 1973 Polar Bears 
Agreement; Art. II; 1974 Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Art. 1; 1978 
Amazonian Treaty, Art. 1; 1979 OECD/Yugoslavia Declaration of Anticipatory Environmental Policies; 
1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species, Arts. 111(2) and XI(3); 1980 
CCAMLR, Art. II; 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature, Art. 1(1); 1985 
OECD/Yugoslavia Declaration on Environment: Resource for the Future; 1986 US Third Restatement of 
the Law, § 601. See also more recently: 1989 Vienna Concluding Document on CSCE Third Follow-up 
Meeting, section on "Cooperation in the Field of the Economics of Science and Technology and the 
Environment', Para. 24.; 1991 Alps Convention, Art. 2; 1993 North American Agreement of 
Environmental Cooperation, Arts. 1 and 10. 
(34) The first set of Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of 
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (hereafter: First DraftArticles on International Liability (1988)) 
are reproduced in 1988 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1,254-55; the second (revised) version (hereafter: 1989 Revised 
Draft Articles on International Liability) is reproduced in 1989 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1,134; the draft articles 
have been further substantially modified in 1990 (hereafter: 1990 Draft Articles on International Liability), 
reproduced in 1990 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1,105 et sequ. The latest version provisionally adopted by the 
ILC reproduced in the Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, GAOR 
Fifty-first Session, Suppl. No 10, A/51/10, at 238 et sequ. (hereafter: 1996 Draft Articles on International 
Liability). The principle of prevention has also inspired the work of the Commission in the context of the 
Non Navigational Use of International Watercourses (supra n. 24), most notably the utilisation cf (continued) 
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within the Commission offers enlightening clarification with regard to the generally 
intended implications and limits of the principle of prevention. 
Duties related to the principle of prevention can be classified into two broad 
categories(35): unilateral duty of due diligence(36), and procedural duties. The latter may 
be further divided into two major categories: (1) duty of information and notification, 
and (2) duty of impact assessment. Although conditioned by the interpretation given to 
the unilateral duty, and most notably the selection of the relevant parameters for the 
appreciation of the risk/harm to be averted, the procedural duties entail similar 
implications and are confronted with similar limits under a preventive and a 
precautionary approach(37). 
The unilateral preventive measures, otherwise referred to as obligation of due 
diligence(38), consist essentially of legislative and administrative measures to be taken 
by a government without prior consultation with other States, to prevent ex ante the 
risk and minimise exposto, the impact of significant transboundary harm(39). It appears 
from the Draft Articles and related comments that the duty of due diligence is confined 
to objectively perceptible risk, i. e. a risk that is «appreciable according to the normal 
criteria or standards for the use of the things which are the object or product of the 
activity, or the result of the situations created»(40). The duty of due diligence commits 
State to a certain conduct confined to risk objectively predictable inter alia in the light 
of the state of scientific knowledge(41). Therefrom flows the idea that the concept of 
transnational waters... ), and was eventually incorporated in the 1997 UN Convention on the Non- 
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Art. 7(1). 
(35) Such qualification had already been adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Trail Smelter arbitration 
supra n. 17, and is usually -though not unanimously- used to classify the various implications of the 
duty of prevention; see for instance 1978 UNEP Draft Principles on Shared Natural Resources, Princ. 4-6; 
1991 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1,81. See also Wildhaber, supra n. 22. 
(36) For an exemplary list of preventive procedural duties, see the 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents 
Convention, Arts. 2,3, and Annex IV. 
(37) See infra 4. Operational Implications of the Precautionary Principle, and 5. Limits Inherent in 
the Precautionary Principle. 
(38) 1992 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1, Para. 11. 
(39) Recommendatory provisions on prevention, Art. I, in 1992 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1,67. 
(40) 1988 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1, Para. 26, and Art. 1, at Para. 17; on qualification of the risk in the 
context of ILC Draft articles on international responsibility and non navigational used of international 
watercourses, see infra n. 129. 
(41) None of the documents mentioned supra n. 32 and 33 rules out expressly scientific uncertainties or 
the state of technology as justification to the postponement of environmental measures. On the contrary, 
the need for conservation or anti-pollution measures are constantly based on reliable scientific data. The 
1968 African Convention on Nature for instance, requires scientifically-based conservation an utilisation 
and management plans, Arts. II, VI; the 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature calls 
upon States to take the measures necessary to ensure the sustainable utilisation of natural resources `in 
accordancewith scientific principles', Art. 1(1); 1982 UNCLOS provides for the conservation of living (continued) 
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prevention is a'relative notion', and that in some circumstances, 'it might be impossible 
even to forecast the consequences of a particular activity'(42). 
The prevention principle has also influenced the environmental policy of the 
European Community(43), even before such policy 
-and the principle of prevention 
itself- were formally incorporated into the EEC Treaty(44). It has since been repeatedly 
resources taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it, Art. 61(2). See infra 4/i. 
Unilateral Duty of Due Diligence. In a similar way, for those treaties which adopt the system of 
red-appendix (endangered species) or black/grey-list system (polluting substance which use is 
banned/subjected to authorisation), it is usually the task of a scientific commission to establish/amend 
those list/appendix, on a basis of conclusive `best scientific evidence available'; see for instance 1979 
Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species, Art. III; 1989 Basel Convention on 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Art. 17. Hence, in that respect, the list/appendix system 
combines prevention and precaution; see infra n. 150 and 151. 
(42) 1992 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 2, Para. 302. 
(43) The principle of prevention and reduction of pollution, and rational management of natural resources 
had already been laid down in the First EEC Programme of Action on the Environment (1973-1976, 
[1973] OJ C112/1), established in the aftermath of 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment, and was repeatedly reasserted, directly or by reference to documents asserting it, in the 
subsequent Action Programmes on the Environment: Second Action Programme (1977-1982, [1977] OJ 
C139/1); Third Action Programme (1983-1986, [1983] OJ C46/1); Fourth Action Programme (1987- 
1992, [1987] OJ C328/1), Fifth Action Programme (1993-2000, [1993] OJ C138/1). The preventive role 
assumed by EC environmental policy was particularly emphasised in Third Action Programme, and 
clearly reflected in the Restatement of the Objectives and Principles of a Community Environmental 
Policy, originally appended to the Second Programme, and later annexed to the Fourth. Although these 
Action Programmes, formulated by the Commission and approved by the Council, are non-binding 
documents, they are intended to spell out the basic consensus of member States about the community 
action on environmental matters (originally to compensate the lack of express and well defined mandate 
in the treaty of Rome); on that ground, they are indicative of the general trend in European environmental 
policy, Jans, European Environmental Law (Kluwer Law International, 1995), 273-75; Krämer, Focus 
on European Environmental Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1992), 26. 
A series of directives and regulations taken in application of the prevention principle confirm such trend; 
see for instance Regulation 259/93/EEC, on the supervision and control of shipments of waste within, 
into and out of the European Community, [1993] OJ L30; Regulation 1210/90/EEC, on the European 
Environment Agency and the European Environment Information and Observation Network, [1990] OJ 
L120/1/EEC; OJ L175; Directive 85/339/EEC, on Packaging of Liquids for Human Consumption, 
[1985] OJ L176/18; Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment, [1985] OJ L175/40, as amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC, [1997] OJ 
L73/5; Directive 82/501/EEC, on the Major Incident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities (Post- 
Seveso Directive), [1982] OJ L230/1 (later amended); Directive 76/769/EEC, relating to Restrictions on 
the Marketing and Use of Certain Dangerous Substances and Preparations, [1976] OJ L262 (later 
amended). 
Prevention was erected as the highest priority of the Community new Strategy for Waste Management, 
set out in 1989; SEC (89) 934. It was subsequently reiterated in the framework Directive 75/442/EEC on 
Wastes ([1991] OJ L377/48), and in other directives concerning more specific wastes; inter alia Directive 
91/689/EEC, on Hazardous Waste ([1991] OJ L377/20 (later amended)); Directive 91/62/EEC, on 
Packaging and Packaging Waste ([1994] OJ L365); Directive 75/439/EEC. Besides, the Regulation 
259/93/EEC on the Supervision and Control of Shipment of Waste Within, Into or Out of the European 
Community (Basel Regulation), [1993] OJ L30/1 (later amended) has been largely influenced by various 
prevention-based pieces of legislation on transfrontier shipments of waste binding upon the EC, and most 
notably the 1989 Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, and 1989 ACP- 
EEC Lomd IV, Art. 39. 
(44) The European Community had already enacted several environmental measures despite of the lack of 
provision that expressly provided for its competence in that field; most of them were based on 1957 EEC (continued) 
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reasserted as a fundamental principle of European environmental policy(45). Article 
130R (1) and (2) of 1986 EC Treaty reads: 
(1) Acting by the Community relating to environment shall have the 
following objectives: 
- 
to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment; 
- 
to contribute towards protecting human health; 
- 
to ensure a prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources. (2) Action by the Community relating to the environment shall be based on 
the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental 
damage should, as a priority be rectified at source, and that the polluter 
should pay. Environmental protection requirements shall be a component of 
the Community's other policies. 
(" 
") 
The competence of the European Community to take preventive environmental 
measures remains confined to those cases where the need for such measures is 
supported by sufficient technological and scientific evidence(46). Article 130R further 
provides: 
(3) In preparing its action relating to the environment, the Community 
shall take account of 
- 
available scientific and technical data: 
- 
... 
(omitted) 
Even though Article 130R(3) might express more of desire of Member States to limit 
the competence of the Community in the field of the environment rather than it reflects 
a narrow interpretation of the preventive approach, the fact remains that, under the 
1986 EC Treaty, preventive measures shall follow and not anticipate scientific and 
technical knowledge(47). 
Treaty, Arts. 100 and 235. A formal legal basis to community action on environmental issues was 
provided by the 1986 SEA (Title VII EC Treaty); Jans, European Environmental Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 1995), 20 et sequ.; Kiss & Shelton, Traite de Droit Europeen, 20 et sequ., 40 et sequ; 
Krämer, 'L'Acte Unique Europeen et la protection de 1'environnement', Revue Juridique de 
l'Environnement (1987-4), 449; see also Hancher, 'EC Environmental Policy 
-A Pre-cautionary Tale ? ', 
in Freestone & Hey, Precautionary Principle and International Law, Chap. 11; Vandermeersch, 'The 
Single European Act and the Environmental Policy of the European Economic Community', 12 ELR 
(1987) 407. More particularly on the role assumed by the European Court of Justice in the development 
of European environmental law, see Lord, 'Bootstrapping an Environmental Policy from an Economic 
Covenant: the Teleological Approach of the European Court of Justice', 29 Cornell IIJ (1996), 571. 
(45) The 1992 EU Treaty, Art. 130R(1) & (2) and the 1992 European Economic Area Agreement (Preamble), both of which endorse the principle, to be combined however, with the precautionary 
principle; infra n. 67. 
(46) Such an interpretation of a state-of-knowledge provision, a priori justifiable under 1986 SEA 
regime, had been ruled out by the European Court of Justice in 1990, first with regard to health-related 
preventive measures, and then with regard to environmental related preventive measures (1993); express 
referenceto the precautionary principle in the 1992 EU Treaty also excludes such a mading of 130R(3); 
Jans, European Environmental Law (Kluwer Law International, 1995), 20; references to the cases and 
consideration of 1992 EU Treaty provision, infra n. 65 to 67. 
(47) This trend is largely confirmed by the use of technical standards in most environmental directives, 
with a clause allowing for adaptation to technological and scientific knowledge; see for instance Directive (continued) 
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No mention of the anticipation of scientific technical knowledge is made either in the 
1987 WCED Report. On the contrary, the WCED integrates the idea of `limitations 
imposed by the state of technology' in its often quoted definition of sustainable 
development(48). On the other hand, the cornerstone concept of `optimum sustainable 
yield' in the 1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and 
Development allows for a certain margin of safety in the setting of the upper level of 
exploitation and pollution, to compensate, inter alia, for scientific uncertainty. 
Optimum sustainable yield does not require, however, that preventive measures be 
taken in spite of such uncertainty(49). 
86/278/EEC, on the protection of the environment, and in particular of the soil, when sewage sludge is 
used in agriculture [19861 L1981/6/EEC (later amended); Directive 80/68/EEC, on the protection of 
ground water, [ 19801 OJ L20/43 (later amended). 
(48) Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 1987), 43 (emphasis added): 
«Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs. It contains within it two key concepts: 
- 
the concept of `needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, 
to which overriding priority should be given; and 
- 
the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social 
organisation on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs. )) 
(49) 1986 WCED-WG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development, Arts. 3 to 7. In 
similar terms, the 1982 World Charter for Nature advocates the maintenance of an optimum sustainable 
productivity of natural resources, Para. 1, and the 1980 World Conservation Strategy set forth some 
conservative management objectives which should allow for `error, ignorance and uncertainty' (Chap. 7, 
Para. 2); the updated strategy for a sustainable living echoes the 1980 WCS in its regard for the 
exploitation of natural resources (1991 Caring for the Earth, at 41). 
The 1990 Draft European Conservation Strategy, which reflects most concerns expressed in the 1987 
WCED Report and 1980 WCS, contains no reference to optimum sustainable yield. On the contrary, it 
tends to rely on the maximum and minimum level of tolerance of the ecosystem (see for instance, Art. 
XIII: maximum acceptable level of wastes). So does the final version of the 1990 Draft European Charter 
on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, although it refers to documents that endorse 
the principle of optimum sustainable yield, Paras. 10,11d. The maximum acceptation level of wastes is 
also replaced by the reliance on best methods in the light of scientific and technological progress in the 
process of collecting, treating and disposing wastes of any kinds (Para. 14). See also ILC's 1987 Draft 
Articles on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, providing for the optimum 
utilisation, i. e. `the maximum possible benefit for all watercourse States while minimising the detriment 
to each'. The 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses strives 
at `an optimal and sustainable utilization of and benefit from' international watercourses; Art. 5(1). 
Reference to the optimum sustainable yield was already contained in previous documents, such as the 
1958 High Seas Conservation Convention, Art. 2; 1972 Antarctic Seals Convention, preambular Para. 4; 
US-Japan 1972 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction and 
their Environment; Art. 111(2). Departing from the majority of international fisheries agreements, striving 
to achieve the maximum sustainable yield of stock being fished, the 1980 CCAMLR strives at the 
conservation of the maximum sustainable yield (Art. II(3)(c)); in the same way, 1982 UNCLOS 
combines the conservation of a maximum sustainable yield (Art. 61(3)) of the living resources, and the 
optimum utilisation of the living resources (Art. 62(1)); on the contrast between maximum and optimum 
sustainable yield, see Birnie & Boyle, 437 et sequ.; Macdonald, `Appreciating the Precautionary 
Principle as an Ethical Evolution in Ocean Management', 26 ODIL (1995), 255, at 217 et sequ. 
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c. Precaution and Sustainable Development 
Early deliberations on the necessity to adopt a precautionary approach in relation to 
certain environmental issues occurred at series of International Ministerial Conferences 
on the Protection of the North Sea(50). The Conferences, gathering North Sea littoral 
States plus the EC Commission(51), were convened in the light of the inadequacy of the 
existing regional system for the protection of the North East Atlantic, as established in 
the early 1970s(52), to solve the pervasive problem of pollution of North Sea. Whilst 
the first Ministerial Conference seems to have adopted a classic preventive approach to 
pollution(53), a decisive move towards a precautionary approach was taken at the 1987 
London Ministerial Conference. The resulting 1987 London Ministerial Declaration on 
the North Sea contains no more than three references to precautionary action: 
... 
[1]n order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the 
most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which 
(50) A series of Conferences on the Protection of the North Sea were hold at the Ministerial level, in 
Bremen (1984), London (1987), The Hague (1990), and Esbjerg (1997); two intermediate Ministerial 
Meetings were convened, in Copenhagen, 1993, and Bergen, 1997; at the issue of each Conference, the 
Ministers issued a joint Declaration recorded as Ministerial Declaration, and usually referred to after the 
name of the host town. Those Declarations, and any further texts related to the North Sea, or other Paris 
Commission (PARCOM) or Oslo Commission (OSCOM) Recommendations or Decisions referred to in 
this sub-title are reproduced in Freestone & Ijlstra (eds. ), The North Sea; Basic Legal Documents on 
Regional Environmental Co-operation (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) unless stated 
otherwise. 
Generally on precautionary action within the context of North Sea Conferences, see Freestone, `The 
Precautionary Principle'; Gündling, 'The Status in International Law of the Precautionary Action', in 
Freestone & Ijlstra (eds. ), The North Sea: Perspectives on Regional Environmental Co-operation, 
Special Issue of the International Journal of Estuarine & Coastal Law (1990) (hereafter Freestone & Ijlstra 
(eds. ), The North Sea), Chap. 3. See also in 24 MPBu1I. (1992): Earll, `Common Sense and the 
Precautionary Principle 
- 
An Environmentalist's Perspective' (182 et sequ. ); Peterman & M'Gonigle, 
'Statistical Power Analysis and the Precautionary Principle' (231 et sequ. ); Stebbing, `Environmental 
Capacity and the Precautionary Principle', 24 MPBuII. (1992), 287. For a brief overview of the rules 
applicable to the North Sea until 1990, see Birnie, 'The North Sea Legal Regime', 16 Ocean & 
Shoreline Management (1991), 177. 
(51) Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
the UK as well as the Commission of the European Communities took initially part in the negotiation 
process; Switzerland, Oslo and Paris Commissions attended the 1990 Hague Conference as observers. 
(52) 1972 Oslo Convention on Marine Pollution from Ships and Aircraft, and 1973 Paris Convention on 
Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources 
(53) Regardless of some inconsistencies reported between the German and English versions, the 1984 
Bremen Ministerial Declaration on the North Sea is worded in terms of prevention and anticipation of the 
risk, and contains no reference to a precautionary approach or principle; the Ministers thus reaffirm their 
commitment to «timely preventive measures to maintain the quality of the North Sea and to closely 
cooperate herein o (Preamble), and declare that «damage to the marine environment can be irreversible or 
remediable only at considerable expense and over long periods and that, therefore, coastal states and the 
EEC must not wait for proof of harmful effects before taking action», A7, emphasis added. Linguistic 
inconsistencies are discussed by Gundling, 'The Status in International Law of the Precautionary 
Action', supra n. 51, at 24-25. 
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may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal 
link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence; 
... 
[B]y combining(... ) approaches based on emission standards and 
environmental duality objectives, a more precautionary approach to 
dangerous substances will be established; [The parties] [t] herefore agree to (... ) accept the principle of safeguarding 
the marine ecosystem of the North Sea by reducing polluting emissions of 
substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to bioaccumulate at the source 
by the use of the best available technology and other appropriate measures. 
This applies especially when there is reason to assume that certain damage or 
harmful effects on the living resources of the sea are likely to be caused by 
such substances, even where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal 
link between emissions and effects ('the principle of precautionary 
action )(54). 
Albeit non-binding statements issued by a political forum, the North Sea Ministerial 
Declarations embody nonetheless a strong political commitment to adopt a 
precautionary approach with respect of marine pollution and fisheries management to 
be carried out in good faith(55). More importantly, these declarations have influenced 
the elaboration of a number of European and international legal environmental 
documents that involved States and entities that took part in the North Sea 
negotiations(56). 
The legal process of renegotiation of the North East Atlantic regime(57) (including the 
North Sea) by North East littoral States has, undoubtedly, been influenced by the 
(54) 1987 London Ministerial Declaration on the North Sea, respectively Arts. VII, XV(ii) and XVI(l) 
(emphases added). A similar endorsement of the principle of precaution is contained in the 1990 Hague 
Ministerial Declaration on the North Sea, allegedly in the more restricted context of hazardous 
substances; on that controversial point, see Cameron & Abouchar, 'The Precautionary Principle', at 16- 
17; Hey, 'The Precautionary Approach: Implications of the Revision of the Oslo and Paris Conventions', 
15 Marine Policy (1991), 244, at 245. In the 1995 Esbjerg Ministerial Declaration on the North Sea 
reiterates, Ministers not only reiterate their support to the precautionary principle with respect to the 
prevention of pollution of the North Sea by hazardous substance as they did at the previous Conference (Para. 17), but indeed endorse it as the guiding principle for achieving a responsible management of 
fisheries (Para. 16); 1997 Esbjerg Ministerial Declaration on the North Sea is posted on the Conference 
website @ <http: //odin. dep. no/md/publ/conf/esbjerg. html>. At the issue of their latest Intermediate 
Meeting on the Integration of Fisheries and Environmental Issues, held in Bergen on March 1997, the 
States Ministers reaffirmed their firm commitments made at the previous Conferences, albeit 
«[r]ecognizing that further problems result from insufficient application of a precautionary approach in 
management regimes; Statement of Conclusions, preambular Para. 8; the Statement of Conclusions is 
posted on the Conference website @ <http: //odin. dep. no/md/publ/conf/soc. html>. 
(55) Van der Mensbrugghe, 'Legal Status of International North Sea Conference Declarations', in 
Freestone & Ijlstra (eds. ), The North Sea, Chap. 2. See also Boyle, 'Land-based Sources of Marine 
Pollution', 16 Marine Policy (1992), 20. 
(56) Generally on the catalytic role of'political' resolutions, supra Chap. 1/2/iii. Legal Framework. 
(57) The 1972 Oslo Convention on Marine Pollution from Ships and Aircraft and 1974 Paris Convention 
on Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources. All parties to the Oslo and Paris Conventions are entities 
involved in the North Sea negotiations save from Switzerland, Iceland, Ireland, Spain and Portugal; 
Finland is only a party to Oslo Convention, and the European Community to Paris Convention; Ehlers, 
`The History of the International North Sea Conferences', in Freestone & Ijlstra (eds. ), The North Sea, 
Chap. 1; Hayward, 'The Oslo and Paris Commissions', ibid., Chap. 8. On the relationship between (continued) 
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outcome of the North Sea Ministerial Conferences held in parallel. The resulting 1992 
OSPAR Marine Environment Convention(58), which attributes the failure of the 
previous documents to appropriately control the source of pollution to the lack of a 
precautionary approach(59), elevates the principle of precaution to the rank of general 
mandatory obligation, 
are «by virtue of which preventive measures are to be taken where there 
reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced, directly 
or indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about hazards to human 
health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems (... ), even when there is 
no conclusive evidence of causal relationship between the inputs and the 
effccts»(60). 
The Paris Commission has also incorporated the principle of precaution as a policy 
objective by means of a (non-binding) Recommendation 89/1 on the Principle of 
Precautionary Action, which largely echoes the 1987 London Declaration, Paragraph 
XVI(I)(61). The Oslo Commission integrated the principle through prior justification 
procedures(62). 
The first all-European political commitment to the principle of precaution with 
regard to the environment in general came in 1990 at the Regional Preparatory Meeting 
for the Earth Summit held in Bergen, Norway. Gathered to discuss an `Action for Our 
Common Future' for the upcoming Earth Summit, the thirty-four States of the 
Economic Commission for Europe and North America opted for a inward-looking, 
precaution-oriented approach to development and environment. The final Declaration 
on Sustainable Development is the first Ministerial Declaration to refer expressis verbis 
to the precautionary principle in general (outside the context of marine policy); it states: 
Oslo and Paris Commissions, and the North Sea Ministerial Conferences, see Hey, `The Precautionary 
Approach: Implications of the Revision of the Oslo and Paris Conventions', 15 Marine Policy (1991), 
244, at 248 et sequ. 
(58) The Convention is also referred to as the OSPAR Convention, in reference to the 1972 Oslo 
Convention on Marine Pollution from Ships and Aircraft and 1974 Paris Convention on Marine 
Pollution from Land-Based Sources it is intended to supersede, at least as between the States party. For a 
detailed commentary of the Convention, see for instance Hey et al., 'The 1992 Paris Convention on the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic: A Critical Analysis', 81JMarine & Coastal L (1993), 
1; Juste, 'La Convention pour la protection du milieu mann de l'Atlantique Nord-Est', 97 RGDIP (1992), 
365. 
(59) Preamble. 
(60) Art. 2(2)(a). 
(61) Recommend. 89/2, on the Use of Best Available Technology also refers to the precautionary 
principle. 
(62) Decision 89/1, On the Reduction and Cessation of Dumping of Industrial Wastes at Sea; the prior justification procedure remains the strongest version of the precautionary principle; see infra causality link. 
Prevention & Precaution 134 Chapter 3 
«[I] n order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on 
the precautionary principle. Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent 
and attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be 
used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental 
degradation. »(63) 
Another major regional system to adopt the principle of precaution as the 
cornerstone of its environmental policy was the European Community, following the 
modification brought by the 1992 EU Treaty. Shortly before the beginning of the EU 
Treaty negotiations, the Heads of States and Governments of the Community adopted a 
political Declaration on the Environment(64), affirming that EC environmental policy 
shall be based on sustainable development and preventive and precautionary action. The 
Declaration was, in fact, a political endorsement, for environmental issues, of a practice 
already existing in other areas of community policy to enact directives and regulations 
concerning products and activities despite the lack of conclusive scientific evidence of 
the danger such product or activity involve for the environment(65). The principle of 
(63) 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, Princ. 7; see also 1990 Bergen 
Joint Agenda for Action, Para. 8. 
(64) European Council, 5-26 June 1990, [1990] ECBuII. 18,136. 
(65) An often quoted example is Council Directive 88/146/EEC, prohibiting the use in livestock farming 
of certain substances having hormonal action, [1988] OJ L70, adopted despite the net that scientific 
research on the impact of meat fattened with hormones on human health was still on-going and its 
outcome uncertain. The directive got challenged inter alia for being founded on inconclusive scientific 
evidence of the human health-related impact of hormones, hence inconsistent with the principle according 
to which legislation must be objective and rationally justified (principle of legal certainty). Its legality of 
was upheld by the European Court of Justice, in the view of the discretionary power of the Council in the 
implementation of the common agricultural policy, on the ground that scientific evidence was one factor, 
yet by no means the sole factor in the enactment of European rules; EEC Case C-331/88, The Queen v. 
The Minister ofAgriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Secretary of State for Health, ex parte: Fedesa 
and Others, [1990] ECR 1-4023; decision of the Court, Para. 9. The Commission applied the same 
reasoning in its recent Decision 96/239/EC on the legality of the EU emergency measures to protect 
against BSE, banning the import of British beef, [1996] OJ L78/47; see Meng, 'The Hormone Conflict 
between the EEC and the United States within the Context of the Gatt', 11 Michigan JIL (1990), 819. 
This reasoning has also been followed with regard to environmental measures, and for instance with 
Council Regulation 345/92/EC, on the Conservation of Fishery Resources, that limits the maximum 
length of driftnets for tuna-fishing, and excludes any extension of such length «unless scientific opinion 
proved the absence of ecological risk>>; [1992] OJ L42/15. In a legal challenge to that Regulation, the 
Court found that (a) conservation measures need not be in conformity with scientific opinion, and (b) the 
absence of scientific opinion, or non conclusive scientific opinion does not preclude the Council from 
adopting measures deemed indispensable for the achievement of common fisheries policy, Establishments 
A. Mondietv. Armementlslais case [1993] ECR 1-6133. 
The precautionary principle constituted one ground invoked in a legal challenge against France in 
connection with the resuming of nuclear tests on Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls in 1995; the locus 
standi for action was denied by the Court of First Instance, and the case dismissed without consideration 
on the merits; EC Case T-219/95R, Danielsson and Others v. Commission; [1995] ECR 11-3052, Para. 
44; on which see Deimann, `French Nuclear Tests: Court of First Instance Dismisses Application for 
Interim Relief, 1 Environmental Law Network International (1996), 48. France dismissed similar 
allegation subsequently made in an application on the same issue under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, on the ground that the argument invoked by the applicants, viz. the threat to (continued) 
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precaution was formally endorsed, alongside other principles already embodied in the 
SEA(66), as cornerstones of European environmental policy(67). 
The precautionary approach/principle has been referred to and relied upon in various 
number of sectors of international environmental law and policy since the late 1980s, 
where justified by the irreversibility of the damage, and the importance of the reparation 
costs. It was for instance endorsed with regard to ozone layer protection(68), climate 
change(69), hazardous wastes management(70) and in relation to transboundary air 
environment and health inherent in underground nuclear testing «ne s'appuyerait sur aucune base 
scientifique s&rieuse»; Tauira et al. v. France, Application 28204/95,83 D&R (1995), 112; reproduced 
in 18 Revue Universelle de Droits de l'Homme (1996), 315, at 317. 
(66) Namely the polluter pays and the prevention principles, and the principle according to which 
pollution must be tackled at the source. 
(67) Art. 130R(2) as amended by 1992 Maastricht Treaty reads: 
«Community policy on the environment (... ) shall be based on the 
precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be 
taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source 
and that the polluter should pay)). 
See Jans, European Environmental Law (Kluwer Law International, 1995), 20 et sequ.; Freestone & 
Ryland, `EC Environmental Law after Maastricht', 45 NILQ (1994), 152; Kiss & Shelton, Traite dc 
Droit Europeen, 40 et sequ; Krämer, E. C. Treaty and Environmental Law, 2nd edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 
1995), 53 et sequ. Also Backes & Verschuuren, 'The Precautionary Principle in International, European, 
and Dutch Wildlife Law', 9 Colorado JIELP (1998), 43, at 47 et sequ. and 59 et sequ. 
(68) The hypothesis of a threat of CFC-induced ozone layer depletion was first laid by American 
scientists late 1974. While the US promptly enacted measures to curb CFCs production and 
consumption (1977 Arndt to Clean Air Act, 42 US §7457(b)), the European Community enacted the first 
set of legally binding measures in only 1980 (Directive 80/372/EEC concerning CFCs in the 
environment, [1980] OJ L90/45). Whereas the US made quick progress in the reduction of the use and 
production on CFCs, with some notable regression / set-backs during the Reagan era, the European 
Community took more time to adopt a firm stance, embroiled in economic conflicts between majors 
CFCs producers (France, UK and Italy) and proponents for a strict CFC policy (FRG, Netherlands, 
Belgium), and weakened by the decentralised policy-making system; Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy 
(Harvard University Press, 1991), Chap. 2,3; Hisschemsller, International Positions Concerning the 
Greenhouse Effect (Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 1993). An ad-hoc 
Meeting of Senior Government Officials Experts in International Environmental Law, convened in the 
early 1981 at the initiative of UNEP at Montevideo, identified the protection of the stratosphere ozone 
layer among the specific subject areas in which the development of environmental guidelines were 
urgently needed; see Montevideo Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental 
Law, adopted by UNEP Governing Council's decision 10/21,31 May 1982; a similar message was 
conveyed by UNEP's State of the Environment 1972-1982 (UNEP, 1982), at Paras. 27 et sequ. The 
1985 Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer (preambular Para. 5) and the original 1987 Montreal 
Protocol on the Ozone Layer (preambular, Para. 8) simply acknowledge that precautionary measures have 
already been taken at the national and international levels for the protection of the ozone layer. The 
determination of States to take precautionary measures to control the global emission of substances that 
deplete the ozone shield was formally incorporated in the Protocol via the 1990 Amendment (preambular 
Para. 6 and Art. 1 (A)(1)). It is usually considered however, that the very fact of that the Convention and 
Protocol had been drafted while scientific research had not covered all the effects of CFCs on the ozone 
layer reveals a precautionary approach; see Litfm, `Framing Science: Precautionary Discourse and the Ozone Treaties', 24 Millennium (1995), 251; Primrosch, 'Das Vorsorgeprinzip im internationalen 
Umweltrecht', 51 ZÖR (1996), 227, at 230. 
(69) Since the CFC-Ozone hypothesis had first been expressed (supra n. 68), there had been a growing 
consensus among scientists and policy-makers alike, on the urgent need to co-operate and address the (continued) 
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pollution(71). It was also reflected in documents regulating to marine and freshwater 
water pollution(72), as well as in the area of natural resources management(73). It was 
problem of climate change and global warming; the consensus was even strengthened when British 
scientists discovered the existence of an ozone hole over the Antarctic (1985). Nevertheless, precaution 
remained a much debated issue throughout the international negotiations on the Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (Feb. 1991-May 1992), with any formal reference to a precautionary approach being 
carefully avoided; see for instance 1988 Resolution Res. /43/53, on the Protection of Global Climate for 
Present and Future Generations of Mankind, encouraging States to treat climate change as a priority 
issue and take timely measures. See also 1989 Declaration of the Hague, urging for a new approach 
through the development of anew principles of international law including more effective decision-making 
and enforcement mechanisms, Para. 6; 1990 Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and 
Climate Change, Para. 2; 1989 Paris Economic Declaration of the G7, Paras. 39-40; 1989 Langwaki 
Declaration of the Commonwealth Heads of Governments, Para. 3; 1990 Houston Economic Declaration 
of the G7, Para. 62. The shift towards a precautionary approach was officially endorsed at the Second 
World Climate Conference (1990), with a Ministerial Declaration «[r]ecognizing that climate change is a 
global problem of unique character and taking into account the remaining uncertainties in the field of 
sciences (... ) a global response (... ) must be decided and implemented without further delay (... )»; the 
principle has since been constantly reaffirmed; see also 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on 
Sustainable Development ( Para. 14). The principle of precaution was finally incorporated in 1992 
Climate Change Convention, where there is a threat of serious and irreversible damage, Art. 3(3), how 
not without a reference to the particular responsibility of developed States, preambular Paras. 3 and 18, 
Arts. 3(1), and the cost effectiveness of the measures to be taken, Art. 3(3). See further on the Convention 
van Beukering & Vellinga, Climate Change: From Science to Global Politics (Institute for 
Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, 1993); Bodansky, 'The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary', 18 Yale JIL (1993), 451; Bodansky, 'Prologue to the 
Climate Change Convention', in Mintzer & Leonard (eds. ), Negotiating Climate Change, The Inside 
Story of the Rio Convention, Cambridge University Press, 1994, Chap. 2; Lang, 'Auf der Suche nach 
einem wirksamen Klima-Regime', 31 AVR (1993), 13; Pulvenis, 'The Framework Convention on 
Climate Change', in Campiglio et al (eds. ), The Environment After Rio: International Law and 
Economics (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), Chap. 7. 
(70) The debate on hazardous waste disposal has long been reduced to a matter of balancing industrial 
development and economic considerations, with environmental considerations; see for instance 1987 
UNEP Cairo Guidelines on Hazardous Wastes; 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Arts. 4(1), and (2)(a). In 1990, UNEP Governing 
Council passed a Decision SS. II/4 B, on a Comprehensive Approach to Hazardous Waste, urging 
Governments and international fora to implement the precautionary approach through clean production 
methods, to reduce an minimise the production of hazardous waste; reproduced in 20 EPL (1990), 157. 
The first legally binding provision on a precautionary approach to waste and clean production approach is 
contained in the 1991 Bamako Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Art. 
4(3)(f). The precautionary approach in that treaty is not linked with any serious irreversible damage, or 
any particular threshold of scientific evidence. A ban of all export of hazardous waste to African, 
Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) had already been imposed through 1989 ACP-EEC Lomd IV, Art. 
39(1), and is reiterated in 1992 Agenda 21, Para. 20.32. The latter document also urges for precautionary 
measures for the control of industrial wastes discharge generally, Para. 18.40. The Conference of the 
Parties to the 1989 Basel Convention, supra, have followed the move and have agreed, in 1994, to 
substitute regulation of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes for a complete ban from the 31 
December 1997; as noted in 24 EPL (1994), 147. In 1961 already, WHO passed a resolution requesting 
«... urgently all the Members (... ) to prohibit al discharge of radioactive wastes into watercourses or the 
sea, to the extent that the safety of such discharged has not been proved... »; WHO Res. WHA/14.56,14 
World Wealth Assembly (1961), No. 110, Pt. I, at 24; quoted after Kirgis, `Technological Challenge to 
the Shared Environment: United States Practice', 66 AJIL (1972), 290, at 297. Such resolution might 
have introduced a procedure similar to the prior justification procedures, introduced by OSCOM Decision 89/1, on the Reduction and Cessation of Dumping Industrial Wastes at Sea (1989); see infra n. 149. US 
opposed the WHO Resolution inter alia on the ground that «the resolution prejudged the question of 
whether pollution had occurred; Kirgis, ibid. 
(71) See 1994 Protocol to the 1979 ECE Transboundary Air Pollution Convention, on Further 
(continued) 
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only suggested as a general principle of international environmental and developmental 
law and policy in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which 
states: 
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, preambular Para. 3; also UN/ECE 1994 Oslo Ministerial Declaration 
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Para. 7, reproduced in 24 EPL (1994), 331. The 
negotiation of this protocol however was seriously affectedby the refusal of some countries, inter alia the 
US and UK, to commit themselves to concrete reduction targets in the light of the remaining scientific 
uncertainty in linking emission to damage; Fraenkel, The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution : Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation', 30 Harvard ILJ (1989), 447. 
(72) Already mentioned: 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Environment in the North East 
Atlantic; PARCOM Recommend. 89/1 on the Principle of Precautionary Action (1989) and PARCOM 
Recommend. 89/2, on the Use of Best Available Technology; OSCOM Decision 89/1 on the Reduction 
and Cessation of Dumping Industrial Wastes at Sea. Inspired by the work of OSCOM and PARCOM, 
the High Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against 
Pollution approved a Recommendation for the Implementation of the Precautionary Principle in the 
Mediterranean Sea Area, in 1989 (the recommendation is posted on Greenpeace Website @ 
<http: //www. greenpeace. org>. Following UNEP Governing Council's Recommendation 15/27 
advocating a Precautionary Approach to Marine Pollution with Waste-Dumping at Sea [reproduced in 19 
EPL (1989), 130], the Conference of the Contracting Parties to the 1972 London Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter adopted, in 1996, a Protocol to 
that Convention which endorses the precautionary approach; see infra n. 149; and Birnie's commentary 
'Are Twentieth-Century Marine Conservation Conventions Adaptable to Twenty-First Century Goals and 
Principles? ', 121JMarine & Coastal L (1997), 488 (Part II), at 514 et sequ. See also 1976/95 Barcelona 
Convention on Mediterranean Sea, Art. 3(a); 1994 Danube River Convention, Art. 2(4) and 3(2)(e); 1992 
ECE Watercourses Convention, Art. 2(a); 1991 OECD Recommend. C(90)164, on Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control; OECD Recommend. C(89)12, on Water Resource Management Policies, Princ. 
VII; 1990 Oil Pollution Preparedness Convention, preambularPara. 3; 1992 Baltic Sea Convention, Art. 
3(2). Likewise, 1992 Agenda 21 calls for a precautionary approach to marine and coastal areas 
management and development, Paras. 17.21 and 17.22, and freshwater quality management, Para. 18.40. 
The precautionary principle is neither explicitly referrednor implied in the 1997 UN Convention on the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. 
(73) The 1992 Biodiversity Convention provides for precaution «where there is a threat of significant 
reduction or loss of biological diversity, preambular Para. 9; 1988 CRAMRA, by contrast with the 
optimum-sustainable-yield-based 1980 CCAMLR, Art. 11(3), bans any such activity, although providing 
for exception, Art. 4. Additionally, even though they do not expressly rely on the principle of precaution, 
the 1989 Wellington Convention on Long Driftnets and EEC Regulation 345/92, on the Conservation of 
Fishery Resources prohibits drifnets longer than 2,5 km, despite the lack of conclusive evidence of the 
environmental harm caused by such nets, and, in this respect constitutes a perfect example of 
precautionary action; see Mondiet case, supra n. 65. And so were too the series of UNGA resolutions on 
Large-scale Pelagic Drißnets in High Seas Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the 
World's Oceans and Seas, recommending a moratorium on the use of large-scale pelagic driftnets in high 
seas fishing, UNGA, A/Res. /44/225,22 December 1989; UNGA, A/Res. /45/197,21 December 1990; 
UNGA, A/Res. /46/215,20 December 1991. These Resolutions have been particularly criticised for not 
being supported by the best scientific evidence available; see for instance Burke et al., 'United Nations 
Resolutions on Drifnet Fishing: an Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries 
Management', 25 ODIL (1994), 127. On the precautionary principle in fisheries management: Hewison, 
'The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management: An Environmental Perspective', 11 IJMarine & 
Coastal L (1996), 301; Garcia, 'The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in Capture Fisheries 
Management', 22 OCM (1994), 99; Cooke & Earle, `Towards a Precautionary Approach to Fisheries 
Management ? ', 2 RECIEL (1993), 252. On precautionary management of biodiversity, see Christie, 
'The Eternal Triangle: The Biodiversity Convention, Endangered Species Legislation and the 
Precautionary Principle', 10 EPLJ (1993), 470; more specially on wildlife law, see Backes & 
Verschuuren, supra n. 67. Mention of the precautionary approach in the management of natural resources 
was also contained in IUCN/UNEP/WWF, Caring for the Earth, (IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1991), at 29 
and 174 (Point 41). 
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«In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there ate 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. »(74) 
The precautionary principle is referred to in most regional and international, global 
and sectoral environmental documents negotiated and adopted during and after the Earth 
Summit(75). 
It is more particularly elaborated upon in the context of the 1995 Straddling Fish 
Stocks Agreement, which adapts the regime adopted in 1982 UNCLOS to the 1992 
Agenda 21, Chapter 17, and promotes a precautionary-based management of 
fisheries(76). The drafting of the Agreement was largely influenced by FAO's Report 
on the Issue of Responsible Fisheries(77). It sets forth a precautionary reference point 
(74) 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Princ. 15. 
(75) Several references are made to a precautionary approach in 1992 Agenda 21; see inter alia Paras. 
17.1,17.21,17.22,18.40,19.14,19.49,20.32; see also references contained in 1992 Biodiversity and 
Climate Change Conventions (supra), and 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, Art. 19(1). On the difference 
between principle and approach, see infra n. 104. 
(76) See generally Hewison, 'The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management: an Environmental 
Perspective', 11 IJ Marine & Coastal L (1996), 301; Tahindro, 'Conservation and Management of 
Transboundary Fish Stocks: Comments in Light of the Adoption of the 1995 Agreement for the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks', 28 ODIL 
(1997), 1; Davies & Redgwell, `The International Legal Regulation of Straddling Fish Stocks', 67 
British YbIL (1997), 199; Lucchini, 'Stocks Chevauchants 
- 
Grands Migrateurs', in Al-Nauimi & Meese 
(eds. ), International Legal Issues Arising Under the Decade of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1995), 513; Warbrick & McGoldrick, `The Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995 
- 
An Initial 
Assessment', 45 ICLQ (1996), 463. More generally of the shortcomings the original 1982 UNCLOS 
regime, see Meltzer, 'Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: The 
Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries', 25 ODIL (1994) 255. 
Another recent example of management rules grounded on the principle of precaution is the 1994 IWC 
New (Revised) Management Procedure for Baleen Whales, drafted by the international Whaling 
Commission Scientific Committee. The New (Revised) Management Procedure sets forth a 'catch limit 
algorithm', specifying the factors to be taken into account when calculating the catch limits, to duly 
account for uncertainty in a number of factors, such as the population size, and the real degree of depletion 
of the Baleen Whales stock. The New (Revised) Management Procedure, accepted by the International 
Whaling Commission in 1994, is reproduced in 44 Report of the International Whaling Commission 
(1994), 145 et sequ.; on which see detailed commentary by Donovan, 'The International Whaling 
Commission and the Revised Management Procedure', in European Bureau for Conservation and 
Development, Proceedings of the Conference on Responsible Wildlife Resource Management Brussels 
29-3 1993. Donovan's paper is posted on Web @ <http: //www. highnorth. no/th-in-wh. htm>. Some 
authors suggest more generally that the International Whaling Commission's Policy have been largely 
inspired by precaution since the 1982 temporary Moratorium on Commercial Whaling; see Birnie & 
Boyle, 455; Freestone, 'The Precautionary Principle', at 30. The precautionary approach has also been 
recently endorsed in the context of CITES, more particularly with regard to the listing procedures, so that 
when [available] information [is] inadequate, no trade would be allowed that could endanger a species»; 
see new Listing Criteria for the Amendment of Appendices I and II (Everglades Criteria), unanimously 
approved at the Ninth Conference of the parties to the 1973 CITES, in replacement of the 1976 Bern 
Criteria; see brief report of the measures taken at Conference in 25 EPL(1995), 88. 
(77) See also the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries; on which see Bonucci, 
Towards an International Code of Conduct forResponsible Fishing', 2 RECIEL (1993), 245. 
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or estimated value «which corresponds to the state of the resource and of the 
fishery 
... 
». It also imposes «boundaries (... ) intended to constrain harvesting within 
safe biological limits within which the stocks can produce maximum sustainable yield» 
(limit reference points), and «management objectives» (target reference points). Those 
reference points, however, are to be established through an agreed scientific procedure 
and are, therefore, expected to anticipate scientific uncertainty only to a certain 
extent(78). The endorsement of the precautionary principle as international fisheries 
resources management principle met the resistance from the part of some States and 
entities, most notoriously Japan, Korea and the EC, which held it as relevant only to 
pollution agendas. The precautionary principle is also considered in relation to the 
greening of international trade(79). 
iii. Status of Precautionary Principle under International law 
Notwithstanding the endorsement of the principle of precaution by several industrial 
States at the domestic level since the mid 1980s (80) and its application at the regional 
(78) See Agreement, Annex II: Guidelines for the Application of Precautionary Reference Points in 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. 
(79) See for instance: 1992 OECD Secretariat Draft Guidelines for the Minimising of the Negative 
Environmental Effects of Trade Policies; OECD Environment Policy Communique, 1996, Para. 27. It 
has been suggested, albeit with great caution, that the precautionary principle, once properly defined, 
might provide some guidance in the international trading system; Esty, Greening the GATT (Institute for 
International Economics, 1994), 81; OECD, Environmental Principles and Concepts, 1995, 
OECD/GD(95)124, at 15 et sequ. (Precautionary Principle and Related Concepts); Roht-Arriaza, 
`Precautionary Participation and the "Greening" of International Trade Law', 7 J. Envtl L. & Litigation 
(1992), 57. Nevertheless, the Gatt/WTO system has been closer to a preventive than a precautionary 
approach. Indeed, the environmental exception to free trade has been applied in a very restrictive way, and 
in all cases «the onus to prove a case [of necessity to enact domestic measures to conserve specific natural 
resources] lies with the party wishing to conserve the resource, not the party allegedly depleting it»; 
Humphreys, `Hegemonie Ideology an the International Tropical Timber Organisation', in Volger & 
Imber (eds. ), The Environment & International Relations (Routledge, 1996), Chap. 12, at 221. Hence 
for instance, in the `Tuna-Dolphin War' between Mexico and the US over the enactment of restrictive 
trade measures to protect dolphins from incidental catch in the tuna fishing industry, the onus rests upon 
the US to demonstrate the necessity to protect the marine mammal; see the First Gatt Panel Report in the 
matter of US-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1991), 30 ILM (1991), 1594 (Tuna/Dolphin I); Second 
Gatt Panel Report in the matter of US-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1994), 33 ILM (1994), 839 
(Tuna/Dolphin I1); see supra Chap. 2/iii. Sovereignty over Environmental Resources and Environmental 
Policies versus Globalisation of Environmental Standards and Policies. 
The 1994 Gatt Agreement has preserved unchanged the environmental exception (Art. XX); it still refers 
to the necessary test (Art. XX(h)) and relating to test, interpreted by the Gatt Panel as primarily aimed at 
test (Art. XX(g)). The only additionality consists in the chapeau of Art. XX, which states explicitly what 
was already implicitly agreed under the 1947 Gatt agreement, namely that the measures taken under the 
general exceptions shall not be applied «in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade... »; see supra Chap. 2/iii. Sovereignty over Environmental Resources 
and Environmental Policies versus Globalisation of Environmental Standards and Policies. 
(80) Although a certain caution is needed with over generalisation, as similarities in denomination do not 
necessarily denote real substantial similarities in the way each State applies the principle at the domestic (continued) 
Prevention & Precaution 140 Chapter 3 
and international level for specific environmental issues, its consecration as a general 
principle of international environmental law, and a fortiori as a principle of general or 
customary international law(81), has remained a very controversial matter. With no such 
level. And indeed, aftera thorough comparative study on the principle in a selected number of countries, 
Rehbinder reaches the conclusion that the States having endorsed the principle in their national 
environmental policy can be classified at least in two broad categories: the `precautionary States' (Vorsorgestaaten), applying to a certain degree, the precautionary principle as understood in German law, 
and the 'protection States' (Schutzstaaten), closer to the Schutzprinzip; see German differentiation 
between Schutz and Vorsorge, supra 2. Origins of the Concept; Rehbinder, Das Vorsorgeprinzip im 
internationalen Vergleich, at 237 et sequ. Accordingly, a formal reference to precautionary principle in 
domestic laws does not always means that the State actually implement a precautionary approach as 
broadly understood in this thesis, nor that their respective policy has any similarities with that adopted 
in other countries. 
On the principle of precaution in the domestic environmental policy in Australia: Dovers, Norton & 
Handmer, 'Uncertainty, Ecology, Sustainability and Policy', 5 Biodiversity Conservation (1996), 1143, 
at 1149 et sequ.; Giraud, 'Le droit et le Principe de precaution: Lecons d'Australie', Revue Juridique de 
1'Environnement (1997-1), 21; Harding & Fisher, `The Precautionary Principle in Australia', in 
O'Riordan & Cameron, Chap. 14; Young, For Our Children's Children: Some Practical Implications 
of Inter-generational Equity and the Precautionary Principle Resource Assessment Commission 
Occasional Publication No. 6 (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993). A particularly strong 
interpretation of the principle has been given by the Australian Superior Court in the Leatch case, in 
which the Court overturned the permission for a road development that was expected (but not proved) to 
disrupt the habitat of threatened species; Leatch v. Director-General, National Parks and Wildlife Service 
and Shoalhaven City Council, [1993] 81 Local Government and EnvironmentReports ofAustralia, 270. 
Less weight was given to the principle in a subsequent decision rendered on similar cases: Nicholls v. 
Director National Parks and Wildlife Service, Forestry Commission of New South Wales, Minister for 
Planning, [1994] 84 Local Government and Environment Reports ofAustralia, 397; in Canada. a 1988 
case indicates a precautionary approach at least with regard to marine pollution; see Regina v. Crown 
Zellerbach Canada Ltd, [1988] 49 Dominion Law Reports, Fourth Series, 161; see also VanderZwaag, 
Canada and Marine Environmental Protection, (Kluwer Law International, 1995), at 12 et sequ.; in 
France: Rehbinder, ibid., at 121; in Germany: supra `Vorsorgeprinzip' and Precautionary Principle; in 
Jam: Rehbinder, ibid., at 73; in The Netherlands: Rehbinder, ibid., at 147; Backes & Verschuuren, 
supra n. 67, at 64 et sequ.; in Sweden: Rehbinder, ibid., at 183; in Switzerland: Koechlin, Das 
Vorsorgeprinzip im Umweltschutzgesetz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Emmissions- und 
Immissionsgrenzwerte, (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1989), §3; Zürcher, Die vorsorgliche 
Emmissionsbegrenzung nach dem Umweltschutzgesetz (Schultess, 1996); Rehbinder, ibid., at 205; in the 
UK: Haigh, `The Introduction of the Precautionary Principle into the UK', in O'Riordan & Cameron, 
Chap. 13; Holder, `Safe Science? The Precautionary Principle in United Kingdom Environmental Law', 
in Holder (ed. ), The Impact of EC Environmental Law in the United Kingdom (Wiley, forthcoming), 
with extensive review of recent domestic case-law, Jordan & O'Riordan, 'The Precautionary Principle in 
UK Environmental Law and Policy', in Gray (ed. ), UK Environmental Law in the 1990s (Macmillan, 
1995), Chap. 5; Rehbinder, Das Vorsorgeprinzip im internationalen vergleich, 91; some authors 
suggest however that, although the British Government has formally endorsed the principle, domestic 
policies in Britain, are closer to prevention than precaution; Cameron & Abouchar, 'The Precautionary 
Principle'; in the US: Bodansky, 'The Precautionary Principle in US Environmental Law', in 
O'Riordan & Cameron, Chap. 12; Rehbinder, ibid., at 21. 
(81) In the dispute that opposed the EC to the US and Canada over the EC's ban on import of hormone 
treated meat and meat products under the 1994 GATT regime, the EC relied to a large extent upon the 
precautionary principle, which, in the view of the European communities, constituted «a general 
customary rule of international law or at least a general principle of law, the essence of which applies not 
only in the management of a risk, but also in the assessment thereof. Both the Gatt Panel and Appellate Body cautiously dismissed this argument; they noted that the status of the precautionary principle was 
already the object of a serious controversy in the restricted context of international environmental law, and 
that it appeared 'less than clear' as to whether the principle had already been widely accepted by Members 
as a'principle of general or customary international law'; WTO Appellate Body Report in the matter of (continued) 
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consecration contained in any international legally binding document, the debate 
revolves primarily around the customary character of the principle of precaution 
explicitly(82) and implicitly(83) recognised by some authorities, and by certain States(84). 
State practice constitutes the major argument invoked in support of the 
crystallisation of the precautionary principle in international customary law. As seen, 
the principle is widely reflected, directly or indirectly, at both the national and 
international levels. Firstly, regulatory action has been taken with respect to certain 
environmental issues, notwithstanding the lack of conclusive evidence, by virtue of 
necessity solely. Then, some binding and non-binding documents addressing specific 
environmental issues expressly refer to the principle, some even in mandatory terms(85). 
Finally, a number of leading international environmental fora have explicitly advocated 
the principle in relation to certain environmental problems(86). 
EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R 16 
January 1998, at Para. 123 (emphasis as in original); available on the WTO Web Site @ 
<http: //www. wto-org>. 
(82) See for instance Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties, at 12 et sequ. and 341 et sequ. ; McIntyre & 
Mosedale, `The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law', 9 Journal of 
Environmental Law (1997), 221. 
(83) ICJ Judge Weeramantry has taken a particularly `enlightened' stance on environment-related issues; 
in the recent nuclear tests and weapons cases, he suggested that the precautionary principle, alongside the 
principle of intergenerational equity and the common heritage of mankind, were part of environmental 
law, he seemed to admit however that on the contrary to the latter, the precautionary principle was 
gaining 'increasing support as part of international law of the environment', has yet to be recognised as 
such by the Court; Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the 
Court's Judgement of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, ICJ Rep. 
1995,287, (diss. op. ), at 342-344; Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conj7ict, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJRep. 1996,66,35ILM(1996), 879, (diss. op. ), 35ILM(1996), at 904. A similar 
stance is taken by Judge Palmer in ICJ Order on Nuclear Test case (diss. op. ), ibid., at 412, Para. 89. 
(84) The duty to take precautionary measures was also invoked by Hungary in its original Application to 
the International Court of Justice on the Diversion of the Danube River, as an obligation in general law. 
the terms of precaution or precautionary principle/approach were not used however in the Special 
Agreement between Hungary and the Slovak Federation for Submission to the International Court of 
Justice of the Differences between them Concerning the Gabctkovo-Nagymaros Project, which officially 
superseded Hungary's original unilateral application; Hungarian Application to the International Court of 
Justice on the Diversion of the Danube River, Sands, Principles (Vol. IIA), No 28, and Special 
Agreement between Hungary and the Slovak Federation for Submission to the International Court of 
Justice of the Differences between them Concerning the Gabclkovo Nagymaros Project, 32 ILM (1993), 
1293. Likewise, New Zealand, in its application to the ICJ concerning the French Nuclear Tests in 
Mururoa Atoll, referred to the precautionary principle as a 'very widely accepted' principle in 
contemporary international law, France, whilst insisting on the uncertain status of the principle of 
precaution in international law, argued that it had fully complied with its presumed content; Request for 
an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgement of 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, ICI Rep. 1995,288, at Para. 5; also 
Sands, 'L'affaire des essais nucleaires II (Nouvelle-Zelande c. France): Contribution de l'instance au droit 
international de 1'environnement', 102 RGDIP (1997), 447, at 471 et sequ. See also Danielsson and 
Others V. Commission, 1995, supra n. 65. 
(85) Supra n. 71 to 75. 
(86) See for instance the declarations and decisions taken by inter-governmental bodies (UNEP Governing (continued) 
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The question, however, is whether state practice, «including that of the States whose 
interests are specially affected [have been] both extensive and virtually uniform in the 
sense of the provision invoked 
- 
and [have] moreover occurred in such a way as to show 
a recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved) )(87). In this respect, the 
attitude of less industrialised countries and that of the United States and towards the 
international recognition of such principle raises serious questions, eventhough the ICJ 
has specified that the binding character of a rule is not subordinated to universal 
acceptance(88). 
Developing countries are not familiar with the principle(89), and tend to perceive it as 
yet another disguised expression of environmental neo-protectionism(90). They largely 
consider the principle of precaution as a European-made device for European problems 
otherwise fully inappropriate to satisfy their own needs and serve their self- 
interests(91), which implementation is well beyond their own financial and technological 
Council, OECD, EC/EU; Paris and Oslo Commissions; supra), inter-governmental and ministerial 
Conferences (Earth Summit, North Sea Ministerial Conferences; Conference on the Atmospheric 
Pollution and Climate Change; Bergen Ministerial Conference; see infra ). See also 1989 Paris 
Economic Declaration of the G7, Para. 34; 1989 Final Document of the Nordic Council's International 
Conference on Pollution of the Seas (relevant excerpts in Greenpeace International, 1989 
Recommendations for the Implementation of the Precautionary Principle in the Mediterranean Sea Area, 
posted on Greenpeace Website @ <httpJ/www. greenpeace. org>; Recommendations, issued by the 
International Conferenceon Environmental Law, The Hague, 1991, Para. 3(d); 1992 Decision VIII on the 
Environment, taken at CSCE Helsinki Summit, 10 July 1992, Para. 3. In its 1990 annual report on the 
law of the sea, the Secretary General had reached the conclusion that the principle had been endorsed by 
`virtually all recent international forums; UN DOC. A/45/72 1. 
(87) North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1969,3, Para. 74; see also Colombian-Peruvian 
Asylum case, Judgment of November 20th, 1950: ICJ Rep. 1950,266. 
(88) See for instance Fisheries case, Judgment of December 18th, 1951: ICJRep. 1951,116, at 128. 
(89) Most environmental co-operation treaties among developing States are geared towards the 
development of a common resource, and worded in terms of rational exploitation or harmonious use; they 
remain (realistically) modest as far as the means involved are concerned, and only provide for actions and 
measures commensurate with their financial and technological capacities, which does not usually involve 
environmental action regardless of scientific certainty; on the contrary, emphasis is put on the 
intensification of scientific research and exchange of information; see for instance the 1978 Amazon Treaty 
and subsequent 1989 Amazon Declaration, whereby riparian States of the Amazon basin commit 
themselves to promote an harmonious development of the Amazon region. Similar language is used in 
the 1989 Brazilia Declaration on the Environment, Princ. 2 in fine. 
(90) On the reticence of developing States to international environmental action most notably in the 
context of 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, see Sohn, `The Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment', 14 Harvard ILI (1973), 433, at 469, and supra Chap. 1/3. 
Evolutionary Perspective of Sustainable Development. 
(91) Chisholm & Clarke, `Natural Resource Management and the Precautionary Principle', in Dommen (ed. ), Fair Principles for Sustainable Development (Edward Elgar, for UNCTAD, 1993), Chap. 7 (116 et 
sequ. ) 
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means. They also tend to held industrialised States responsible for the current state of 
the global environment(92). 
The US position is perhaps more ambiguous. Albeit front-runner in the development 
of a domestic environmental policy based on precaution(93), the US has displayed an 
extreme reluctance to the internationalisation of the principle(94), considering it as a 
(92) Such position is particularly clearly reflected in the respective declarations issued by the various 
regional preparatory meetings organised in the process leading to the Earth Summit; see for instance 1991 
Tlatelolco Platform on Environment and Development, 1990 Bangkok Ministerial Declaration on 
Sustainable Development, and 1991 Beijing Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Development, 
which all acknowledge that the protection of the environment is in the common interest of the 
international community, but nonetheless emphasise that the main input to the effort of sustainable 
development must come from industrialised nations on the basis of their greater responsibility for the 
global process of environmental degradation (common but differentiated responsibility) or on the basis of 
their greater financial and technological resources (respectively Paras. 6-6-8; see also 1989 Brazilia 
Declaration on the Environment, supra, Princ. 12 in fine). And even though provision is made for the 
precautionary principle (Paras. 23-19-none), no further indication is given of the significance and 
implications thereof; the overall context of the various declarations suggests the principle referred to is 
closer to conservation, as understood for instance in the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment, than mal precaution as understood in the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on 
Sustainable Development. 
African States displayed less suspicion towards the principle of precaution, essentially due to the fact that 
for most of them, the principle had already been pushed through by the European Community through 
the Lome process; see the 1989 Kampala Declaration on Sustainable Development in Africa (no express 
referenceis made to the precautionary principle). As to the Arabic States, they are already less embroiled 
in the environment-versus-development conflict, and appear disposed to endorse the principle. The 1986 
Tunis Declaration on Environment and Development expresses serious concern for the preservation of the 
potential of natural resources for future generation (Para. 3), and pragmatically underlines that «[t]he 
protection of the environment against pollution and deterioration is less expensive, easier to implement 
and more beneficial than restoring it later; no express referenceis made to the then emerging principle of 
precaution. 
(93) The US had incorporated a precaution in the 1970s already, through the 1970 Clean Air Act (42 
United State Code (USC) §7412, CAA § 112), requesting from the Environment Protection Agency (EPA) an ample margin of safety standards in setting emission-limits for hazardous pollutants; 
environmental impact assessment was already made compulsory prior to the activities of all federal 
agencies that might have a significant impact on the environment by the 1970 National Environmental 
Policy Act (42 USC §4322, NEPA § 102); the 1972 Amendment to the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act set a zero-discharge goal for water pollution (33 USC § 1251, WPCA (Arndt) § 101) The US were 
also the first set aside the classic wait-and-see policy, and take regulatory action to abate greenhouse gas 
emission regardless of the scientific uncertainty still underlying the global warming debate; see 1977 Clear Air Act Amendments, which made it a duty for EPA to anticipate reasonably and assess risks 
rather than wait for proof of actual harm (42 USC §7457, CAA (Amdts) § 157). Boyden Gray and Rivkin 
qualify such approach as `no-regrets policy', or `multiple objective steps': «actions taken in this areas 
should be based upon long-term outlook, "taking into account the full range of social, economic, and 
environmental consequences of the proposed actions for this and future generations"»; `A No Regrets' Environmental Policy', 83 Foreign Policy (1991), 47, at 52. 
(94) The 1986 US Third Restatement of the Law, § 601 is worded in terms of conservation and 
prevention, and does not imply a genuine anticipatory approach; the Restatement is worded in terms of injuries to the environment rather than risk, and no referenceis made to technological progress. Likewise, 
the 1989 Draft American Declaration on the Environment, wary of mitigating the adverse effects of human 
activities, more than preventing the occurrence of the risk itself; the Draft Declaration however, provides for the prior assessment of any planned activities that might significantly affectthe environment (Para. 6). See also position of the US in the EC-US/Canada hormones case under the 1994 Gatt, infra n. 104. 
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threat to liberalism and to scientific and technological advancement(95). The US has also 
constantly opposed the idea often associated with the principle of precaution that, with 
respect to some issues, industrialised States assume a greater share of responsibility 
than developing States(96). For these and other reasons(97), the US resisted the principle 
both at the Regional Preparatory Meeting for Europe and Others, in Bergen, at the 
Second World Climate Conference, and subsequently opposed Mexico's suggestion to 
incorporate the principle as an operational principle for the decision-making under the 
1983 Cartagena Convention on the Marine Environment in the Wider Caribbean 
Region(98). 
It could probably be argued that the precautionary principle constitutes a local 
custom among States of the European Union, hence applicable in their mutual 
relations(99); but even among those States which have assumed a leading role in the 
development of the principle, there has been some serious divergence on the 
(95) See for instance the statement delivered by the US with regards to 1992 Agenda 21 and the 1992 
Forestry Principles, in UNCED Report Vol. II, at 18, and US declaration at UNEP Conference for the 
adoption of the agreed text of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, 31 ILM (1992), at 848; see further infra 
Partnership Principle: Technological and Financial Co-operation. See also O'Riordan, Interpreting the 
Precautionary Principle; Bodansky, `The Precautionary Principle in US Environmental Law', in 
O'Riordan & Cameron, Chap. 12. 
(96) At the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the US had made it clear that new 
obligations upon developed States can only result from voluntarily accepted commitment; see US 
position on 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Princ. 12, in Sohn, ' The 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment', at 472. A similar stance was taken with regard to 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development Princ. 7 (partnership & co-operation); see US 
declaration of understanding, in UNCED Report Vol. II, at 17-18. See further infra Partnership Principle: 
Technological and Financial Co-operation. 
(97) The major factors lying behind US opposition to international endorsement of the principle in the 
context of climate change relate both to economic considerations and to the lack of scientific consensus on 
global warming; Macdonald, `Appreciating the Precautionary Principle as an Ethical Evolution in Ocean 
Management', 26 ODIL (1995), 255, at 268. 
(98) Report of the Fifth Intergovernmental Meeting on the Action Plan for the Caribbean Environment 
Programme and Second Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection and 
Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Kingston, Jamaica, 1990; 
UNEP(OCA)/CAR IG 6, as reported in Freestone, `The Precautionary Principle', at 27, n. 27. The US 
delegation also questioned an express referenceto the principle of precaution at the negotiations on a 
unified convention on the protection of the North East Atlantic, this time on the grounds of redundancy 
in a convention which is, in essence, based on precaution; Cameron & Wade-Gery, Addressing 
Uncertainty, 23. It appears however that the Clinton Administration, under the influence of Vice 
President Gore, has been re evaluating the position taken under the Bush Administration, and has shown 
some signs of acceptance of the doctrine as a policy tool; US Environment Protection Agency has 
likewise expressed its support to the principle with respect to low level radioactive wastes disposal at 
sea; Macdonald, supra n. 97, at 283, n. 117. 
(99) The existence of local customs is subjected to similar formative elements, yet based on the practice 
of a more limited group of States; see Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits), 
Judgment of 12 April 1960: ICJ Rep. 1960,6. 
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interpretation and implications of the precautionary principle(100) both at the 
international(101) and national levels(102). 
This leads us to the other basic element formative of a custom, largely neglected by 
those invoking the customary character of the precautionary principle, viz. the norm- 
creating character of the candidate rule, which implies a minimum degree of precision of 
the actual content and implications thereof. In its famous dictum in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ held that «[i]t would in the first place be necessary that 
the provision concerned should, at all events, potentially be of a fundamentally norm- 
creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of 
law»(103) 
Apart from the elementary inconsistency with respect to the very denomination of 
the precautionary principle(104), the clear lack of consensus even on its basic 
(100) Most importantly, the lack of agreement on where to draw the line between an acceptable and 
unacceptable risk, as well as the lack of clarity on the degree of proof required in both case, and the nature 
and extent of the measures to be taken to address the risks. 
(101) See for instance the divergent positions of the States parties to the Second International Conference 
on the Protection of the North Sea with regard to the final declaration, in Cameron & Abouchar, 'The 
Precautionary Principle', at 4 et sequ.; see also EC reluctance to enact a precautionary policy with regard 
to the use of CFCs, in Benedick, supra n. 68, Chap. 2. 
(102) Rehbinder, Das Vorsorgeprinzip im internationalen vergleich. Although only indirectly relevant 
for the present paragraph, the divergence in States' interpretation and application of the precautionary 
principle at national level is indicative of a lack of real consensus on the meaning of the concept of 
precaution in general. 
(103) See North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICI Rep. 1969,3, Para. 72; more exactly, the 
determinacy of a norm influence its efficiency more than its legal status; Bodansky, 'Customary (and Not 
So Customary) International Environmental Law', 3 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (1995), 
105, at 118, and supra Chap. 1/2/iii. Legal Framework. The norm-creating character of a rule implies 
that the content and concrete implications of the latter are clear enough to allow the potential subject of 
the rule to foresee the consequence of their actions; see further van Dijk, 'Normative Force and 
Effectiveness of International Norms', 30 German YbIL (1987), 9. 
(104) Some documents refer to a precautionary approach, others to precaution principle approach, or 
simply to the precautionary principle. The importance to attribute to these linguistic inconsistencies is 
unclear. Some authors dismiss them as irrelevant and regard the expressions as synonymous; see for 
instance Freestone, supra n. 98; Nollkaemper, 'The Precautionary Principle in International 
Environmental Law: What's New under the Sun? ', 22 MPBull. (1991) 107; Primrosch, supra n. 68, at 
229; Stebbing, `Environmental Capacity and the Precautionary Principle', 24 MPBuII. (1992), 287. 
Other understand the reference to precautionary approach in 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development and 1992 Agenda 21, as illustrative of States' reticence to the precautionaryprinciple; Hey, 
inspired by the ordinary meaning attributed to principle and approach, suggests that precautionary 
principle constitutes «a general rule adopted as a guide for developing international environmental 
policy, while precautionary approach would represent «a way of considering or handling environmental 
problems; `The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution', 
4 Georgetown IELR (1992), 303, at 304 (emphasis added); also Kovar, `A Short Guide to Rio 
Declaration', 4 Colorado JIELP (1993), 119, at 134. Scovazzi suggests that the formula of precautionary 
approach evokes «... cosi piü una linea di condotta pratica the un principio teorico»; 'Sul Principio 
Precauzionale Nel Diritto Internazionale Dell'Ambiente', 75 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (1992), 
699, at 700. The 'approach-principle' distinction was taken as an argument by the US and Canada in the 
dispute that opposed them to the EC over EC restrictive measures concerning meat and meat products (continued) 
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substantive implications seriously undermines its effectiveness as a general principle of 
law. Indeed, while it is now recognised that, in certain circumstances and with respect to 
specific issues, States are no longer legitimated in delaying the imposition of effective 
mechanisms to minimise or suppress certain risks of pollution or depletion, the 
question of thresholds remains unclear. The degree of risk and scientific certainty that 
would require the adoption of precautionary measures is still to be clarified. 
In the running of the Bergen Ministerial meeting, the US expressed its hostility to the 
open-ended language adopted by the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on 
Sustainable Development in these words: 
«The US government strongly believes that we cannot commit ourselves 
to "anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation 
even if final scientific proof is lacking" (... ) [and] does not believe that we 
can lightly accept above language in the expectation that [the language 
proposed] will be forgotten with the passage of time. »(105) 
The US statement was a covert criticism directed at some European States which had 
abstained from formally opposing the Declaration, but clearly intended to substitute 
their own definition of the principle of precaution for that proposed in the Declaration. 
In the light of the lack of determinacy of the core concept of precautionary principle, 
part of the doctrine regards it as an overwhelmingly political principle(106) or moral 
injunction(107), or qualifies it as a new label put on the classic principle of 
prevention(108). Some other authors, while admitting a potential crystallisation of 
principle into customary law, underline that lack of coherent and converging 
(hormones). The US and Canada argued, against the EC's conclusions, that the 'precautionary principle' 
does not represents a principle of customary international law, «it may be characterized as an 'approach' - 
the content of which vary from context to context; WTO Appellate Body Report in the matter of EC 
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R 16 
January 1998, Para. 43; available on the WTO Web Site @ <http: //www. wto-org>. 
(105) ECO, May 10,1990, No. 2 ('US Memo reveals fierce opposition to the precautionary principle'), 
as referred to in Cameron & Wade-Gery, Addressing Uncertainty, 31. 
(106) Chisholm & Clarke, 'Natural Resource Management and the Precautionary Principle', in Dommen 
(cd. ), Fair Principles for Sustainable Development (Edward Elgar, for UNCTAD, 1993), Chap. 7; 
Dovers & Handmer, 'Ignorance, the Precautionary Principle, and Sustainability', 24 Ambio (1995), 92; 
O'Riordan, Interpreting the Precautionary Principle; Stebbing, 
- 
supra n. 104. In the EC context, its is 
generally recognised that 1992 EU Treaty Art. 130(r)(2) sets forth principles for EC environmental policy 
in general, but as such, imposes no concrete, immediate and justiciable obligations upon States; the 
responsibility rests upon the Council of the EC to determine the actions and measures to be taken it has 
therefore a political more than legal content; Krämer, E. C. Treaty and Environmental Law, 2nd edn 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), Paras. 2.15-2.17. Such approach has been confirmed by the European Court of 
Justice, which stated that «... Article 130r is confined to defining the general objectives of the 
Community in the matter of the environment)); EEC Peralta case, C-379/92, [19941 ECR 1-3453, Para. 
57. 
(107) Dovers, Norton & Handmer, 'Uncertainty, Ecology, Sustainability and Policy', 5 Biodiversity 
Conservation (1996), 1143. 
(108) Nollkaemper, supra n. 104. 
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interpretation «seriously undermine its normative character and practical utility»(109), 
and insist on the necessity for States to agree upon a settled meaning(110). Bodansky, 
generally sceptical of the practical usefulness of the recognition of a `declarative norms 
of behaviour' as customary law, reaches the following conclusion: 
«States are told (... ) to avoid significant transboundary pollution, but 
what constitutes `significant'? They ought to undertake precautionary action, 
but in what circumstances and to what degree? As result of this vagueness, 
states may basically do what they like and argue that their actions are 
consistent with customary international law. » (111) 
In the same spirit, some other authors stress that 
«Although the precautionary principle is useful as a general goal, it is 
unsuitable as the ultimate solution [for climate change]. As it does not 
specify how much caution should be taken, it is too vague to serve as a 
regulatory standard. In order to know how and when to apply the 
precautionary principle, one needs to know the risk and the uncertainty of an 
activity. » (112) 
It is undoubtedly premature to assert the existence under international customary 
law (and international treaty law in general) of a mandatory principle of precaution, 
whereby States are to take specific precautionary environmental measures 
notwithstanding the lack of correlational scientific evidence. Nevertheless, recurrent 
references to the precautionary principle in both political and legal documents make it 
difficult to dismiss as totally irrelevant or mere wishful thinking. There is a growing 
recognition among States and in the doctrine that, with respect to a number of 
particularly serious environmental issues such as climate change, ozone layer depletion 
(109) Beyerlin, Rio-Konferenz 1992: Begin einer globalen Umweltrechtsordnung 7', 54 ZdoRV (1994), 
124, at 243; Birnie & Boyle, 97-98; also Birnie, 'International Environmental Law : its Adequacy for 
Present and Future Needs', in Hurrell & Kingsbury (eds. ), The International Politics of the Environment 
(Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 2, at 80. 
(110) Bodansky, 'Remarks on New Developments in International Environmental Law', ASIL Proc. 
(1991), 413, at 417; Cameron, `The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law', in 
O'Riordan & Cameron, Chap. 15; Cameron & Wade-Gery, Addressing Uncertainty, Cameron & 
Abouchar, `The Precautionary Principle'; Freestone, supra n. 98; Giindling, 'The Status in International 
Law of the Precautionary Action', supra n. 51; Handl, 'Environmental Security and Global Change', in 
Lang et al. (eds. ), Environmental Protection and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), Chap. 2; 
Holder, supra n. 80; Jurgielewicz, Global Environmental Change and International Law: Prospects for 
Progress in the Legal Order (University Press of America, 1996), 65; Macdonald, supra n. 97; Porter & 
Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics (Westview, 1991), at 155; Sands, Principles (Vol. I), 
212-13. 
(111) 
'Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law', 3 Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies (1995), 105, at 118. 
(112) 
van Beukering & Vellinga, supra n. 69, at 11. 
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or fisheries management, state action can no longer be postponed on the ground of 
scientific uncertainty; in dubio pro natura(113). 
On the other hand, it is still to be clarified (a) the degree of seriousness of the issue at 
stake, (b) upon whom it falls to prove that the degree of seriousness of an issue calls for 
precautionary action, and (c) the nature and extent of the precautionary measures 
required. Meanwhile, and perhaps ironically, «the undefined nature of the principle may 
be responsible for its inclusion in various international treaties and discourse»(114). 
3. Constitutive Elements of a Precautionary Principle 
The principle of precaution shares two of the three constitutive elements of the 
principle of prevention, and can be distinguished from the latter essentially on its third 
constitutive element. 
i. Object of Precaution 
Like prevention, precaution concerns potentially any sort of product of any types of 
activity having an impact on the environment of other States or the common 
environment(' 15) which might, but need not, be prohibited by law. The toxic or 
dangerous character of a product, or the hazardous nature of an activity do not 
necessarily make such product or activity unlawful. 
(113) Backes & Verschuuren, supra n. 67, at 44. 
(114) Macdonald, supra n. 97, at 269. 
(115) Viz. areas beyond state jurisdiction. One could argue that international law precludes a State from 
causing irreversible damage to its own environment, but serious difficulties remain with regard to the 
enforcement of such prohibitory rule under the present state of international environmental law, even if the 
theory of an erga omnes obligation to protect the environment is followed, such obligation relates to 
shared or common environment, and do not apply to purely 'domestic' environment. Primrosch, 'Das 
Vorsorgeprinzip im internationalen Umweltrecht', 51 ZÖR (1996), 227, at 234; Singh, Foreword in 
Munro & Lammers, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and 
Recommendations (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhog 1987), at xi. Further infra Chap. 2/3. The 
Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: a Principle of Customary Law and Chap. 
2/4/ii/c. Limits Arising from General Environmental Considerations. 
One should note in this respect that the obligation to protect the natural environment from 'widespread, 
long-term and severe damage in time of hostilities (see 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, Art. 55(1)) does not applies in time of'non international armed conflict', as no referenceto such 
obligation is contained in 1977 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. Likewise, the obligation 
made to State 'not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques' concerns only those techniques having (widespread, long lasting and severe effects as the 
means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party»; 1977 ENMOD Convention, Art. I(1) (emphasis added). 
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ii. Risk-Harm to be Averted/Minimised 
As seen earlier on, the prevention principle was originally related to serious, 
substantial or definitive transboundary harm(116), with the noticeable exception of the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Principle 21, which omits to 
qualify the harm to be averted(117). Likewise, the majority of recent statements of the 
principle of prevention and of the principle of precaution(118), together with a nearly 
unanimous doctrine(119), link the duty to take preventive measures to qualified harm or 
risk due either to its magnitude (significant harm or risk)(120) or to the persistence 
and/or irreversibility of its effects(121). 
(116) See supra n. 19 to 21. 
(117) See supra n. 31; the qualification of the harm was also omitted in 1992 Rio Declaration, Princ. 2, 
but was clearly specified in Princ. 15. 
(118) Significant exceptions to this rule include the 1991 Bamako Convention on Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Wastes, which relates precautionary measures to wastes without any further 
qualification Art. 4(3)(f); see also 1992 OSPAR Marine Environment Convention, Art. 2. In the same 
way, some documents refer to precaution in vacuo without even linking it to a specified damage; see 
1992 Maastricht treaty, Art. 130r(2); Convention, Protocol and Amendments on the Ozone Layer (1985, 
1987,1990). At the other extreme, certain instruments relate exclusively to particularly grave damage, 
viz. to widespread, long term and severe environmental damage; see 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, Art. 55(1); 1977 ENMOD Convention, Art. I(1). See also the 'massive pollution' criterion 
under 1980 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 19(3)(d). 
(119) See contra Birnie & Boyle, 99. 
(120) See inter alia 1992 Biodiversity Convention (preambular Para. 8); 1992 Climate Change 
Convention, Art. 3(3); 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, Art. 1(2); 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents 
Convention, Art. 1(d); 1991 ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, An. 2(1); 1988 
CRAMRA, Art. 1(15), 4 and 8; 1985 Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer, Art. 1(2); 1982 
UNCLOS, Art. 206 and 220(5); 1979 ECE Transboundary Air Pollution Convention, Art. 5. See also 
1978 UNEP Draft Principles on Shared Natural Resources; 1986 US Third Restatement of the Law, § 
602(1)(b); 1987 UNEP Guideline on Environmental Impact Assessment, Para. 1; 1990 Bergen 
Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, Para. 7; 1991 OECD Recommend. C(90)164, on 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control; 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
Princ. 15. 
1982 World Charter for Nature suggested classification of the potential damage and adaptation of the 
preventive measures to be taken proportionally to the magnitude of a potential damage (irreversible, 
significant, unqualified); only those activities that are likely to cause irreversible damage (Para. 11(a)) 
and activities that are likely to pose a significant risk but where potential adverse effects are not fully 
understood (Para. 11(b)) should not proceed. Whereas the activities that are likely to pose a significant 
risk (and which effects are fully understood) should be preceded by exhaustive examination, and 
demonstration that benefits outweigh potential dangers to nature, Para. 11(b). For those activities that 
may disturb the environment, environmental impact studies shall be made sufficiently in advance, Para. 
11(c). It is also contended that the 'black and grey lists' (see infra n. 150 and 151) replace the 
qualification of 'significant adverse environmental effects; Sachariew, 'The Definition of Thresholds of 
Tolerance for Transboundary Environmental Injury under International Law: Development and Present 
Status', 37 Netherlands! LR (1990), 193, at 199. 
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Whilst a certain degree of consensus emerges on the exclusion of de minimis harm 
from the material scope of both the precautionary and prevention principles(122), the 
dividing line between serious damage and tolerable damage remains the object of an 
ongoing controversy. The major difficulty relates to the fact that 'significant harm', 
'serious harm' and'substantial harm' have been traditionally understood to signal legally 
significant injury; accordingly, they do not merely reflect a 'factual finding of a non 
substantial transboundary impact' susceptible of objective appraisal or objective 
quantification(123). No legal parameter has ever been defined to interpret this legal 
notion(124). 
One suggestion is to qualify the harm both according to its magnitude and in the light 
of the equitable utilisation principle(125). Another would consist in defining the harm in 
the light of various concrete circumstances apart from the factual seriousness of the 
harm itself, such as: 
«[T]he respective state of development of technically advanced facilities, 
the usual degree of pollution which is emitted by such facilities, the prior 
degree of pollution of the respective area and the hereby resulting restriction in 
(121) Some documents, mostly, but not only related to pollution, identify the risks to be averted by the 
persistence or irreversibility of their effects; this is the case for instance of the Ministerial Declarations on 
the Protection of the North Sea, supra n. 86; see also 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Princ. 21; 1992 Climate Change Convention, Art. 3(3). Referencewas made to 'irreparable 
damage and substantial prejudice in Nauru's claim, in Certain Phosphates Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. 
Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1992,240, and in the original Hungarian 
Application to the International Court of Justice on the Diversion of the Danube River, reproduced in 
Sands, Principles (Vol. 1IA), No 28. The irreversibility of the damage is also adopted by Judge 
Weeramantry in his dissenting opinion in Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance 
with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgement of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand 
v. France) Case, ICJRep. 1995,288, (diss. op. ) at 342. 
(122) See appended definition of 'significantly affect' in 1978 UNEP Draft Principles on Shared Natural 
Resources; definition of significant in 1986 US Third Restatement of the Law, § 601, Comment (c); 
1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles forEnvironmental Protection and Development, Art. 10 and comment; 
1988 ILC DraftArdcles on the law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Art. 8 and 
Commentary, in 1988 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 2, at 36; 1996 ILC Draft. Articles on International Liability, 
Art. 2(a). See also more generally definition of damage to Antarctica environment, 1988 CRAMRA Art. 
1(15), excluding 'negligible' damage or damage acceptable pursuant to the Convention; and 1993 ECE 
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, Art. 
8(d), excluding responsibility for damages at 'tolerable levels' under local circumstances. In the doctrine, 
see Birnie & Boyle, 98-99; Handl, 'National Use of Transboundary Air Resources : The International 
Entitlement Issue Reconsidered', 26 NRJ (1986), 405, at 412; Sands, Principles Vol. I, at 633 et sequ. 
(123) Handl, supra n. 122, at 414. 
(124) Handi, supra n. 122, at 412; Wildhaber, 'Die Öldestillerieanlage Sennwald und das Völkerrecht 
der GrenzüberschreitendenLuftverschmutzung', 31 ASDI (1975), 97, at 101. 
(125) So-called dual-test theory; supra n. 24 
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using the area by the burdened States. This means that the amount of 
pollution to be tolerated is dependent upon the extent in which technical 
development allows a reduction of emission. »(126) 
In this case, the degree of acceptability of the risk or harm would be measured 
according to similar criteria as the extent of the measures to be taken to minimise or 
avert such risk/harm(127). 
A third possibility would consist in the equation of significant harm at law and 
significant harm in fact(128). The work of the International Law Commission, both in the 
area of the non navigational use of transboundary watercourses and international 
liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international 
law, seems to indicate a 'factual yet circumstantial' evaluation of the significance of 
environmental harm. The significance would thus be determined «by factual and 
objective criteria), as well as «a value determination which depends on the 
circumstances of a particular case and the period in which such determination is 
made»(129). 
(126) Wolfrum, 'Purposes and Principles of International Environmental Law', 33 German YbIL (1990), 
308, at 311. 
(127) See infra 5/i. Financial and Technical Limits. 
(128) For a briefreview of the arguments in favour and against this approach, see Handl, supra n. 122, at 
421 et sequ. (n. 86-92). 
(129) 1996 ILC Draft Articles on International Liability, Art. 2 and commentary, UNGA, Report of the 
ILC on Its Work of its 48th Session (May 6-July 26,1996), GAOR Fifty-first Session, Suppl. No. 10 
(A/51/10), 125, at 258-259 and 261; also 1994 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses, Art. 7, kept tel quel in 1997 UN Convention on the Non- 
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Art. 7). It should be underlined however, that earlier 
ILC drafts on both issues were worded in terms of appreciable harm or risk which was explicitly used in 
the sense of 'substantial' (see infra n. 133); see for instance Barboza's fourth Report on international 
liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, 
Doc. A/CN. 4/413,1988 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 1, Commentary to Art. 2(c), Para. 30; 1988 ILC Dail 
Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Art. 8. The shift to 
significant threshold was suggested in the early 1990s, «because it conveys something rather more 
substantial or greater magnitude than does the word 'appreciable')); Barboza, seventh Report on 
international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, 
A/CN. 4/437,1991 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 1,71, at Para. 31. Appreciable harm/risk was understood as 
embodying factual standards only, hence capable of being established by objective evidence; 1988 ILC 
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, commentary to 
Art. 8. In the same vein, an appreciable risk refers to «one involves greater than normal likelihood of 
causing transboundary injury during the entire course of an activity (... ) but also visible on first 
examination; the risk must thus be 'objectively and appreciably' perceptible according to normal criteria 
or standards for the uses of the things which are the object or the product of an activity, or the result of 
the situation created»; see Barboza's fourth Report, supra, Paras. 26 and 30, commentary to Arts. 2(a)(II) 
and 2(c). 
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The international legal definition of the threshold of a tolerable transboundary harm 
or interference is further complicated by the multiplication of qualifications of the harm, 
and a not always consistent interpretation and use of such qualifications. Substantial, 
serious and significant are thus used sometimes indifferently as synonymous(130), 
whilst they are clearly differentiated in other instances. Appreciable, for instance, is 
assimilated to 'not insignificant or barely detectable but not necessarily 'serious'(131), 
and is clearly distinguished from significant(132). Other times, the words 'significant', 
'important' or 'substantial' are held for giving an idea of higher thresholds than 
'appreciable'(133). Significant is also construed as referring to any 'appreciable effect to 
the exclusion of de minimis effect'(134), or to 'effect still more than detectable but not 
necessarily at the level of serious or substantial'(135). Substantial harm equally qualifies 
a harm 'which is not minor or insignificant'(136). It is agreed, however, that the 
'significant' threshold, widely used in most recent environmental law documents, is 
lower than the 'serious' threshold developed in the Lac Lanoux and Trail Smelter 
arbitrations(137). 
Excepted from few cases where 'mathematical quantification' of a given harm or risk 
can be determined(138), it seems difficult, if not impossible, to set clear and uniform 
(130) See for instance Schwebel, third Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, A/CN. 4/348,1982 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 1,65, at 100. 
(131) 1988 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
commentary to Art. 8. 
(132) McCaffrey, fourth Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
A/CN. 4/412 and Add. 1 and Add. 2,1988 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 1,205, at 238. 
(133) Barboza, fdh Report on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not 
prohibited by international law, A/CN. 4/423,1989 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 1,131, at Para. 25. 
(134) 1978 UNEP Draft Principles on Shared Natural Resources. 
(135) 1996 ILC Draft Articles on International Liability, Art. 2 and commentary, supra n. 129; 
McCaffrey, supra n. 132. 
(136) 1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development, Art. 10. 
(137) Supra n. 19 to 21. See Sachariew, 'The Definition of Thresholds of Tolerance for Transboundary 
Environmental Injury under International Law: Development and Present Status', 37 Netherlands ILR (1990), 193; contra Handl, supra n. 122, at 412. Handl considers the international legal threshold of 
impermissible natural resource use transgressed only where 'serious', 'significant' or 'similarly qualified' 
transboundary effects occur. 
(138) Such as for instance emission standards; see the list of transboundary quantities of hazardous 
substances appended to OCED Council dec. C(88)84 (Final), on the Exchange of information concerning 
accidents capable of causing tranfrontierdamage, 28 ILM (1989), 247. The difficulty to find agreement on 
(continued) 
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thresholds of acceptable harm beyond which States are expected to take precautionary 
and preventive measures. Such thresholds imperatively to be defined on a case-by-case 
basis(139). On the other hand, the definition of some general criteria, inter alia with 
regard to the nature and weight of the values against which the importance of the harm 
is to be assessed, is a condition sine qua non to the efficiency of the principles of 
prevention and precaution. 
iii. Causality Link Between the Object and the Harm/Risk 
The major distinctive feature of a precautionary approach relates to the causal link 
between the product or activity considered, and the anticipated risk or harm. While the 
establishment of a causal link, if not by clear and convincing scientific evidence, at least 
in an objective and reasonable way, represents a important constitutive element in the 
prevention-based action(140), the existence of a causal link is presumed(141) or regarded 
as non decisive where the enactment of precautionary measures is required, «even where 
there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and the 
effects»(142); «the lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing such [precautionary] measures... »(143). 
In this respect, the approach based on the precautionary principle reflects a decisive, 
albeit not total(144), departure from the classic assimilative capacity approach prevailing 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. The latter is grounded in the following two-fold 
assumption: 
(1) the unlimited assimilative capacity and inexhaustible self-regenerative capacity of 
the ecosystem; 
compulsory emission and reduction standards however, was particularly well illustrated by the recent 
negotiation on binding target for emission reduction, and previously, on transboundary air pollution and 
cut backs in sulphur dioxides; Epiney, `Das "Verbot erheblicher grenzüberschreitender 
Umweltbeeinträchtigungen" : Relikt oder konkretisierungsfähige Grundnorm ? ', 33 AVR (1995), 309, at 
336 et sequ.; Fraenkel, The Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution: Meeting the 
Challenge of International Cooperation', 30 Harvard JIL (1989), 447, at 465 et sequ. 
(139) Epiney, ibid supra n. 138; Handl, supra n. 122; Sachariew, supra n. 137. 
(140) Supra n. 41. 
(141) As it is the case for the documents resorting to the appendix/list/annex classification; see infra n. 
150 and 151. 
(142) 1992 OSPAR Marine Environment Convention, Art. 2(2)(a). 
(143) 1992 Climate Change Convention, Art. 3(3). 
(144) Infra, Limits Pertaining to Technological and Financial Capacities 
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(2) the ability of science and modern technologies to predict accurately environmental 
threats and establish the exact measures needed to avert them. 
The preventive approach questions the first part of the assumption, without 
reconsidering however the major parameters of environmental action, namely science 
and technology. A step in this direction is taken with the precautionary principle, 
insofar as is recognised that «science does not always provide the insight needed to 
protect the environment effectively»(145). 
Under the classic preventive approach, the onus rests upon the entity that opposes a 
given action/product to establish, with `clear and convincing evidence'(146), the existence 
or likelihood of the alleged impact or effect, as well as the causality between the 
challenged action/product and the alleged impact/effect. Such approach has proved 
inappropriate. The evolution of technologies and the hypothetical environmental risks 
entailed therefrom, and widespread environmental degradation(147) have largely 
illustrated the inadequacy of such approach in a'modern' society. 
The burden of proof is reversed to a certain degree where a precautionary approach 
applies, although it remains undecided which degree of certainty is required to 
demonstrate (or dismiss) (a) the causality link and (b) the acceptability of the risk(148). 
One possible but extreme understanding of the precautionary principle would imply the 
demonstration, to an extent close to certainty, that the intended activity or particular 
product would, in the particular circumstances of the case, cause no substantial harm to 
the environment(149). A less stringent and more realistic interpretation of the reversal of 
(145) See comparative examination of the classic and precautionary approach in Hey, `The Precautionary 
Concept... ', 4 Georgetown JELR (1992), 303, at 308/9; see also Stebbing, supra n. 104. 
(146) Trail Smelter case (Final Award), 35 AJIL 684, at 716; no furthercriteria are indicated inter alia on 
the degree of clarity and certitude required. One should bear in mind, however, that the principle of 
prevention originally emerged in relation to specific and often clearly identifiable sources of pollution, as 
in the Trail Smelter case for instance; Fraenkel, supra n. 138, at 451. 
(147) See Kirgis, `Technological Challenge to the Shared Environment: United States Practice', 66 AJIL 
(1972), 290, at 294 et sequ.; also Wildhaber, supra n. 124, at 118 et sequ.; Epiney, supra n. 138, at 
352 etsequ. 
(148) See variation in qualification of the risk to be averted, supra n. 120 to 122; see also Bodansky, 
`Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle', 33 Environment (1991), 4; Cameron, `Future 
Directions in International Environmental Law: Precaution, Integration and Non-state Actors', Paper 
presented at the Read Memorial Lecture for 1995,19 Dalhousie Lf (1996), 122, at 126. 
(149) Boyle, `Land-based Sources of Marine Pollution', 16 Marine Policy (1992), 20, at 24. Hence, 
under the system of prior justification procedures, introduced by OSCOM Decision 89/1, on the 
Reduction and Cessation of Dumping Industrial Wastes at Sea (1989), it falls upon the applicant to 
demonstrate inter alia that the dumping of banned industrial wastes will, in the particular case, cause no 
harm in the marine environment. Under the 1992 OSPAR Marine Environment Convention, certain 
States (France and UK) are admitted to benefit from an exemption to the all-ban of the dumping of wastes 
into the North Sea by 1999, but shall justified such exception with regular reports to the Commission on 
the results of scientific studies which demonstrate that «any potential dumping operations would not (continued) 
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proof would require, from the part of the person or entity intending to engage into an a 
priori prohibited activity(150) or to use a banned product(151), the demonstration that 
the impact of the intended activity in the particular circumstances of the case, as it can 
be reasonably predicted(152), stays within the limits of acceptability(153). Whilst there 
is a certain agreement on the impracticability of the requirement of a rigorous proof of 
result in hazards to human health, harm to living resources or marine ecosystems... »; Annex II, Art. 
3(3)(c). Likewise, 1996 Protocol to 1972 London Convention on Dumping of Wastes abandons the 
classic black/grey lists system, based on the principle of authorised dumping except for substances listed, 
to adopt the ` reverse listing' procedure (Art. 4 ), whereby any dumping of any wastes or other matter is 
prohibited, with the exception of those exhaustively listed in Annex.; the Protocol substantially modifies 
the original regime set forth in the Convention, and provides that the High Contracting Parties shall be 
`guided by', or `apply' «a precautionary approach to environmental protection from disposal and 
incineration of wastes and other matter at sea whereby appropriate preventive are taken when there are 
reason to believe that substances or energy introduced in the marine environment are likely to cause harm 
even when there is no conclusive evidence to prove a causal relation between inputs and their effects>> (Art. 3). 
(150) Thus for instance, in the case of `species' conservation documents which adopt the `appendix' 
classification, any species included in the red appendix is presumed endangered and therefore excluded 
from any kind of exploitation, unless the best scientific evidence available indicate that the intended 
exploitation would be of no danger to the survival of the particular species. The deletion or downgrading 
of a species from appendices is submitted to similar conditions; see 1979 Bonn Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species, Art. III; 1979 Bern Convention on the Conservation of European 
Wildlife. The appendix-based documents remain more classic however with regard to the inclusion of 
species to appendix, also subjected to scientific evidence of the threat or extinction; Christie, `The 
Eternal Triangle: The Biodiversity Convention, Endangered Species Legislation and the Precautionary 
Principle', 10 EPLJ (1993), 470. Until recently, the same could be written of the 1973 CITES and 
related 1976 Bern Criteria for the Addition of Species and other Taxa to [CITES] Appendices I& II, and 
for the Transfer of Species and Other Taxa from [CITES] Appendix II to Appendix I; see CITES, 
Proceedings of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties 2-6 November 1976 (IUCN, 1977), 
31; reproduced in 2 EPL (1976) 189. The precautionary approach has been formally endorsed however, 
more particularly with regard to the listing procedures, in the new Listing Criteria for the Amendment of 
Appendices I and II (Everglades Criteria). The Everglades Criteria were unanimously approved at the 
Ninth Conference of the Parties to the 1973 CITES, in replacement of the 1976 Bern Criteria; see supra 
n. 150. See also 1988 CRAMRA, Art. 4 (3) and (4)); 1991 Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protocol, 
Art. 7. Interestingly, although the 1982 World Charter for Nature is essentially geared towards 
prevention, it provides that, for those activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature 
«... their proponents shall demonstrate that the expected benefit outweigh potential damage to nature, and 
where potential adverse are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed, Sect. I, Para 11(b). 
(151) In a similar way to the appendix-based conservation, the anti-pollution documents which resort to 
the system of lists to eliminate (black list) or control and minimise (grey list) pollution by 
substances/activities in the respective lists, create a presumption with respect to those activities, which 
can be reversed by the applicant only with due evidence of the lack of causality between the banned 
product, and the anticipated risk/harm. Like the conservation documents however, such lists are drafted 
on the basis scientific evidence; see for instance the Basel Hazardous Wastes Convention (1989); see also 
Framework Directive 76/464/EEC, on Pollution Caused by Certain Dangerous Substances Discharged 
into the Aquatic Environment of the Community, [1976] OJ L129/23 (later amended); Framework 
Directive 80/68/EEC, on the Protection of Groundwater, lists I and II (appended), [1980] OJ L20/43 (later amended). 
(152) Most documents referred here which advocate a precautionary approach provides for the assessment 
of the environmental risk/harm according to the best availablelpracticable means; see infra 4/i. Unilateral Duty of Due Diligence and 5/ii. Preservation of Incentives. 
(153) Hence still allowing fora certain degree of uncertainty, Birnie & Boyle, 97. 
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causation and irrefutable evidence, the degree of proof sufficient to allow for a 
potentially hazardous activity to be carried out is still to be clarified. 
Considering both the pervasive scientific uncertainty and the multiplicity of causes 
of environmental damages(154), it is often difficult to rigorously identify and regulate all 
sources of environmental degradation. Consequently, the adoption of a causality-based 
(classic) definition of environmental harm, and the subordination of the enactment of 
preventive measures to the proof of a clear causal link between an action and an 
environmental injury, means that in practice and for'most cases of `modern' pollution, 
no preventive measure is to be taken before the damage has actually occurred. 
4. Operational Implications of the Precautionary Principle 
The `relativisation' of the importance of science and technologies as relevant 
parameters to assess and react to environmental risks have also certain implications 
with regards to the operational measures implied by a precautionary environmental 
policy. The measures entailed by precaution are, by-and-large, similar to those flowing 
from prevention; with the major difference lies with the degree of certainty of the risks 
such measures are related to. 
i. Unilateral Duty of Due Diligence 
The similarities in nature and differences in extent between the operational measures 
flowing from prevention and precaution is particularly blatant in the case of the 
unilateral duty of due diligence. In both instances, States are expected to enact some 
legal and administrative measures to prevent ex ante the occurrence and minimise ex 
posto the impact of significant environmental harm ex proprio motu, according to the 
`objective standards of diligent behaviour' under general international law(155). In the 
(154) As Wolfrum pointed out, «... die Schädigung [wird sich nicht in der Regel] auf eine bestimmte 
Quelle zurückMhren lassen»; `Die grenzüberschreitende Luftverschmutzung im Schnittpunkt von 
nationalem Recht und Völkerrecht', 99 DVBI. (1984), 492,495-496; Epiney, supra n. 138, at 351 et 
sequ. The problem of causality link is at the heart of a serious debate with respect to civil responsibility 
for environmental injuries in domestic law. The issue was has been considered recently in Switzerland, 
within the frame of a general revision of the Swiss law of torts; see Revision Haftpflichtrecht, Wessner- 
Wiedmer Vorentwurf 18.12.1996; unpublished); see also Loser, Kausalitätsprobleme bei der Haftung 
für Umweltschaden, Ph. D thesis (Paul Haupt, 1994). 
(155) Pisillo-Mazzeschi, `The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of International Responsibility of 
States', 35 German YbIL (1992), 9, at 42; Dupuy, Due Diligence in International Law of Liability', in 
OECD (ed. ), Legal Aspects of Transfrontier Pollution (OECD, 1977), 369. Although there remains 
some doctrinal controversies on the objective or fault-related nature of diligence, international practice 
tend to favour the former conception, and assess diligence according to objective standards of behaviour, 
and 'such care as governments ordinarily employ in their domestic concern; 1994 ILC Draft Articles on 
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, commentary to Art. 7. Such interpretation is for instance reflected in the 1986 US Third Restatement of the Law, which provides that (continued) 
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context of a preventive approach, the duty of due diligence is bound to activities or 
products which can objectively be linked to a substantial risk or harm(156). By contrast, 
the due diligence of the State under a precautionary approach might be committed at an 
earlier stage, when the causal link between an uncertain risk or harm and a product or 
activity has not yet been demonstrated with conclusive scientific evidence. In any case, 
States cannot be expected to anticipate the unpredictable(157) and is not committed to 
any specific result(158). In this respect, even a precautionary duty of due diligence is 
essentially relative and flexible, paradoxically conditioned and constrained by scientific 
and technological limits(159). 
ii. Prior Information, Notification and Consultation 
The duties of information and consultation(160) were extensively discussed and 
progressively accepted as a general rule under the `regime of good neighbourliness' 
diligence has to be measured by "generally accepted international rules and standards" (§ 601). This does 
not mean however, that any subjective elements is excluded from the evaluation of a diligent conduct and 
that State are bound by a universally equal duty of diligence; on the contrary, there are different degrees of 
diligence, each assessed in the light of such factors as the means and capacities of the State involved, the 
general state of knowledge, or the nature of the intended activity, Birnie & Boyle, 92-93; Pisillo- 
Mazzeschi, ibid., at 43 et sequ. The flexibility of the diligence criterion had already been clearly 
expressed in the landmarkAlabama Claims arbitration, defining due diligence, as <( 
... 
proportioned to the 
magnitude of the subject and to the dignity and strength of the power which is exercising ii»; (1872), 
Alabama Claims arbitration (1872), in 4 Moore International Arbitations, 4144. Although stated in the 
context of the duties of neutral States in time of civil war, such definition can also apply to the context of 
environmental obligations; see ILC 1996 Draft Articles on International Liability, GA OR, F(ly-first 
Session, Suppl. No. 10 (A/51/10), at 266 et sequ. (Art. 4); 1994 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, commentary to Art. 7. 
(156) See supra 2/b. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment: 
Institutionalisation cf Prevention. 
(157) The maxim of ad impossibilia nemo tenatur (one cannot be obliged to perform the impossible) was 
invoked by Hungary in its Declaration Terminating Treaty concerning the Construction and Operation of 
the Gabcikovo Nagymaros system of locks, as a principle accepted under international law, 32 ILM (1993), 1259, at 1283. See also Dovers & Handmer, 'Ignorance, the Precautionary Principle, and 
Sustainability', 24 Ambio (1995), 92. 
(158) 1LC 1996 Draft Articles on International Liability, GAOR, Fifty-first Session, Suppl. No. 10 (A/51/10), at 266. 
(159) Epiney, supra n. 138, at 346 et sequ.; Hinds, 'Das Prinzip 'sic utere tuo ut alicnum non laedas' 
und seine Bedeutung im internationalen Umweltrecht', 30 AVR (1992), 298, at 323 et sequ. See infra 
5/i. Financial and Technical Limits. In the comments on its suggested 1995 Draft International 
Covenant on Environment and Development, the IUCN opts for a conception of preventive duty as duty 
of conduct exclusively, and rejects that it implies a minimum threshold of harm; on the other hand, the 
IUCN appears to accept the existence of a maximum threshold of harm or tolerance, whereby States inc 
due to ban totally certain particularly hazardous activities. In other words, the standard of diligence 
expected from States varies depending on the seriousness of the environmental risks incurred by a certain 
activity; IUCN & Environmental Law Center, Drag? International Covenant on Environment and 
Development, Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 31 (IUCN, 1995), 38, commentary to Art. 6 (Prevention). 
(160) The consideration of prior information, notification and consultation under one single heading is (continued) 
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within the context of shared natural resource and under the general `regime of 
prevention'. Such duties address the obligations of the source State to report to the 
potentially affected State on those activities performed within its territory or under its 
control(161), which cause, or may cause, substantial harm beyond national borders or 
otherwise affect, or may affect, to a substantial measure, the equal right of other States 
to use the shared or common resources. Information duties have also long been 
established in situations of environmental emergency('62). 
The duty to notify or inform about hazardous activities in general (outside the 
environmental context) lay at the heart of the Corfu Channel case, in which the 
International Court of Justice opted for a restrictive conception of such duty limited to 
those facts that States know or have the means of knowing(163). Whilst the 
not meant to suggest that all three notions can be assimilated, nor that all are recognised as of an equally 
binding character. On the contrary, the controversy that took place most notably on the (in)admissibility 
of the linking of information and consultation (see infra 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment, draft Art. 20), testifies to a parallel yet distinct evolution and final endorsement. 
Nevertheless, in the face of the increasing tendency to treat information, notification and consultation as 
necessary corollaries in treaty law (including in most of the documents considered here, apart from 1972 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment; see also 1982 Geneva Protocol Concerning 
Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas, Art. 6, imposing a duty of notification without prior 
information being prescribed), it appears both justified and convenient to address those duties as a whole 
rather than separately. 
On the duty to inform in transboundary context, see Partan, "`The Duty to Inform" in International 
Environmental Law', 6 Boston University ILI (1989), 43; also Gündling, `Prior Notification and 
Consultation', in Handl & Lutz (eds. ), Transferring Hazardous Technologies and Substances, The 
International Legal Challenge (Graham & Trotman, 1989), Chap. 3; Handl, `The Principle of 
`Equitable Use' as Applied to Internationally Shared Natural Resources: Its Role in Resolving Disputes 
over Transfrontier Pollution', 14 RBDI (1978-79), 40, at 57; Wildhaber, supra n. 124, at 107 et sequ. 
See more generally Kirgis, Prior Consultation in International Law: A Study of State Practice 
(University Press of Virginia, 1983). 
(161) States are also held accountable both for their own state-action, and the non-state actions or 
activities performed by public or private entities under their jurisdiction. 
(162) See for instance: OECD Recommend. C(74)224 on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, 
Princ. 9; 1978 UNEP Draft Principles on Shared Natural Resources, Princ. 9(1); 1982 UNCLOS, Art. 
198; 1990 Oil Pollution Preparedness Convention, Art. 5(1)(c); see also UNEP Regional Seas regime: 
1978 Kuwait Protocol concerning Co-operation on the Protection in Combating Pollution by Oil and 
Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, 1981 Abidjan Protocol concerning Co-operation in 
Combating Pollution in Cases of Emergency; 1982 Jeddah Protocol concerning Regional Co-operation in 
Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Case of Emergency, 1981 Lima 
Agreement on Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution of the South-East Pacific by Hydrocarbon 
or Other Harmful Substances in Case of Emergency, Lima; 1985 Nairobi Protocol Concerning Co- 
operation in Combating Pollution in Case of Emergency, Nairobi; 1986 Noumea Protocol Concerning 
Co-operation in Combating Pollution Emergencies. See more recently 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, Princ. 18; 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Arts. 14(1)(d) and 14(3); 
1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Art. 28. In certain 
cases, the duty of notification might be linked to close co-operation and assistance between responsible 
and potentially affected States (emergency notification system); 1982 UNCLOS, Art. 199; 1986 Early 
Notification Convention; 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents Convention, Art. 10; 1992 ECE Watercourses 
Convention, Arts. 14 and 15. 
(163) Corfu Channel case, Judgment ofApril 9th 1949: ICJRep. 1949,4, at 19 et sequ 
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transposition of the Corfu dictum to environmental cases can be seriously questioned 
considering the difference in context of application(164), it is interesting to note that the 
International Law Commission had initially subordinated state liability for injurious 
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law to the `had-the- 
means-of-knowing' clause, referring expressly to the Court's dicta(165). The comment to 
that article further stated that «the Corfu Channel ruling was correct. It is applicable to 
the present topic if it is adapted to the circumstances involving liability under the draft 
articles and if it is based, in turn, on a further presumption: that in principle a State has 
the means of knowing, unless there is proof to the contrary»(166). 
The existence of a general duty to negotiate according to the rules of good faith had 
already been clearly stated in an advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the early 1930s. The Court pointed out that such duty implies a 
duty to `enter into negotiations' and pursue them `as far as possible with a view of 
concluding agreements', but entails no duty to reach and conclude such agreements(167). 
The duty to resort to negotiation among other peaceful means for the settlement of 
dispute was subsequently incorporated in the UN Charter(168). Nevertheless, the 
extension of such general duty to environmental matters has met a strong opposition 
from the part of certain States, and was consequently substituted for the milder notion 
of `consultation'(169). 
The duty to inform and consult on environmental issues implicitly underlay the Trail 
Smelter arbitration, but was best expressed and developed in the Lac Lanoux 
arbitration. In the latter case, the Arbitral Tribunal endorsed the view that riparian 
States had a duty (a) to inform other riparian States on projects that will affect an 
international watercourse, and (b) to enter into comprehensive consultation before any 
substantial change in the regime of an international watercourse is actually undertaken. 
(164) Birnie & Boyle, 90. 
(165) First (1988) Draft Articles on International Liability, Art. 3 
(166) 1988 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1, at 262, Para. 70. The `had-the-means-of-knowing' clause was 
maintained in the 1989 and 1990 Draft Articles on International Liability (Art. 3(1)), with however 
explicit statement of the existing presumption (Art. 3(2)); the clause was abandoned in the 1996 version 
(see Arts. 3 and 4). 
(167) Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and Poland (Railway Sector Landwaröw-Kaisiadorys), PCIJ 
Ser. A/B, Fascicule No 42, Advisory Opinion of October 15th, 1931, at 108 et sequ.; see also Tacna- 
Arica arbitration (Chile v. Peru) (1922), II RIAA, 921, at 929-930. 
(168) Art. 33. 
(169) The debates of ILC on International Liability are particularily informative on that issue; see for instance Barboza, 'Seventh Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law', 16 April 1991, A/CN. 4/437,1991 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1,71, at 
Para. 39. 
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The Tribunal, inspired from the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
in the Raihvay Traffic Between Lithuania and Poland case, made it clear that information 
and prior consultation were not merely formal procedural conditions to any such change 
in the watercourse; the States are indeed expected to conduct consultations according to 
the rule of reason and good faith (obligation of means/conduct). The Tribunal also 
dismissed the contention of a prior mandatory consent (obligation of result)(170). Such 
conception of an international duty to inform and consult has been consistently 
reaffirmed in subsequent case-law(171), and still prevails today(172). It must be 
underlined, however, that the theory of mandatory prior consent is applied for certain 
cases, most notably in the field waste management and trading of toxic substances(173). 
The duty to inform is also, to a certain extent, made compulsory where the obligation of 
prior environmental impact assessment applies(174). 
Notwithstanding a clear recognition of a mandatory duty to inform, notify and 
consult in early case-law, any formal endorsement thereof in binding or non-binding 
rules met a certain opposition. It was extensively discussed at the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment, although any reference to either duty in the 
final declaration (draft art. 20) was finally abandoned, over a dispute between Argentina 
and Brazil. While the former would tolerate no compromise over the full endorsement of 
a combined duty of prior information and consultation, Brazil pleaded for a limited duty 
of information, and a total exoneration «under conditions that, in [State's] founded 
(170) 24 ILR (1957), 101, at 128 et sequ. Similar position was followed in the Gut Dam arbitration, 
supra n. 14; see also Bourne, 'The Right to Utilize the Water of International Rivers', 3 Canadian YbIL (1965), 187; Wildhaber, supra n. 124, at 113. The argument of mandatory prior consent is also brought 
forward by Hungary in its Declaration Terminating Treaty concerning the Construction and Operation of 
the GabcikovoNagymaros system of locks, which it considers enshrined in the bilateral treaty between 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, regulating the question of water management of boundary rivers; 32 ILM (1993), 1259, at 1286. 
(171) Inter alia North Sea Continental Shell, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1969,3, at Paras. 86-87); Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland, Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, ICJ Rep. 
1974,3, at Para. 75. Some Judges however consider that a duty to negotiate and related obligations exist 
only with regard to disputes and within the limits of existing procedure for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes; see Judges Ammoun (sep. op. ) and Morelli (diss. op. ) in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, 
ibid., at Para. 47 and Para. 21; also Gros (diss. op. ) in Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, ibid., at Para. 27. 
Generally on the obligation to negotiate on international environmental issues, see Rogoff, 'The 
Obligation to Negotiate in International Law: Rules and Realities', 16 Michigan JIL (1994), 141, at 157 
et sequ. 
(172) See for instance the original 1987 Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer, Art. 2(9); 1995 
Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 8(2). 
(173) See 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal (Art. 4(1)(c)); 1989 UNEP Governing Council Amended London Guidelines for the 
Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade; 1989 FAO Amended International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Uses of Pesticides, Art. 2 (prior consent procedure). 
(174) See infra iii. Prior Environmental Impact Assessment. 
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judgement, may jeopardise its national security, economic development or its national 
effort to improve [the] environment»(175). The duty to inform, notify and co-operate 
was couched, albeit in recommendatory terms, in the Programme of Action appended to 
the Declaration(176), and subsequently acknowledged in the 1972 UNGA Resolution 
2995 (XXVII) on Co-operation Between States in the Field of the Environment. The 
Resolution was adopted on the initiative of Brazil, in an attempt to revive some of the 
ideas abandoned with the aborted 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment, draft Principle 20(177); it provides that: 
«[C]o-operation between States in the field of the environment, including 
co-operation towards the implementation of principles 21 and 22 of the 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
will be effectively achieved if official and public knowledge is provided of the 
technical data relating to the work to be carried out by States within their 
national jurisdiction, with a view to avoiding significant harm that may 
occur in the environment of the adjacent area; 
(... ) technical data referred to in paragraph 2 above will be given and 
received in the best spirit of co-operation and good-neighbourliness, without 
this being constructed as enabling each State to delay or impede the 
programmes and projects of exploration, exploitation and development of the 
natural resources of the States in whose territories such programmes and 
projects are carried out. » 
A more assertive expression of the need to inform, this time linked to prior 
consultation, is contained in a subsequent resolution on Co-operation on the Field of the 
Environment Concerning Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States(178). The 
duty to inform, consult and negotiate according to the rule of good faith were 
subsequently consistently reaffirmed in (often non-binding) documents providing for 
equitable utilisation and substantial harm prevention(179). Repeated references in 
(175) UN Doc. A/Conf. 48/14, at 119, as reported in Sohn, `The Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment', at 499. A dispute over the construction of an hydroelectric facility upstream in Brazil, on 
a river that then flows into Argentina constituted the background of the intransigence of both States. 
(176) Inter alia with respect to those activities carrying the risk of climatic effects (Recommend. 70), 
planned major water resource activities that may have a significant transboundary environmental ef& t 
(Recommend. 51) and the management of contiguous protected areas (Recommend. 37). In other areas, 
the Programme of Action would only urge for exchange of information often through competent 
institutions (existing or to be created) rather than directly between States (Recommend. 58, energy, 
Recommend. 56, mining and mineral processing; Recommend. 45, genetic resources management; 
Recommend. 35, national parks management), or it would provide for notification without referring to 
further consultation (Recommend. 51, major resource activities). Consultation and co-ordination are 
called for in the control of marine pollution (Recommend. 92). 
(177) Sohn, ibid supra n. 175. 
(178) UNGA Res. A/3129 (XXVIII), on Co-operation on the Field of the Environment Concerning 
Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States (1973). 
(179) Inter alia; 1974 NIEO Declaration, Art. 3; 1975 Economic Charter, Art. 3; 1974 OECD 
Recommend. C(74)224 on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, Princ. E and Annex `Principle 
of Information and Consultation', Paras. 6-8; 1978 UNEP Draft Principles on Shared Natural Resources (Prin. 5-9); 1982 World Charter for Nature, Paras. 16 and 23; 1990 ECE Code of Conduct on (continued) 
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binding documents(180) and a consistent pattern of state practice suggest that a duty to 
inform and consult has now emerged in customary international law that is independent 
from any specific treaty commitment(181). Some authors express little doubt as to the 
existence of such an international legal duty to inform and consult «even in absence of 
an applicable treaty regime featuring such obligations, and infer a legal character of 
such duty from its necessary association to the well-established principle of equitable 
utilisation(182). 
The procedural `informational' duties are essentially three-fold: 
(1) Information on any reasonably available data that might be useful for prevention 
purposes in general, not necessarily in relation to a particular activity, such as the 
state or degree of pollution of shared area, or the degree of depletion of a particular 
resource or species. 
(2) Notification of planned activities that cause, or might cause, a significant adverse 
impact, and of environmental emergencies. 
(3) Consultation with the view of defining appropriate preventive measures to avoid or 
minimise the realisation of the risk(183). 
In that respect, the precautionary approach brings no substantial innovations, except 
from the fact that, in theory, information and notification are due even with respect to 
potential risks the occurrence of which has not yet been demonstrated by conclusive 
evidence. However, it is obvious that no State is expected to communicate information 
Accidental Pollution of Transboundary Inland Waters, Princ. IV; see also series of ILA rules and 
transboundary resources or pollution: 1966 Helsinki Rules, Arts. XXIX and XX ; 1982 Rules on Water 
Pollution in an International Drainage Basin, Arts. 5 and 6; 1982 Montreal Rules of International Law 
Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, Arts. 5-7; 1984 DraftRules on Legal Aspects of Long-Distance Air 
Pollution (Arts. 5-8); 1986 ILA Rules on the Law of International Groundwater Resources, Art. 3(2). 
(180) Inter alia 1971 Ramsar Convention, Art. 5; 1974 Nordic Convention on the Protection of the 
Environment, underlying principle; 1979 ECE Transboundary Air Pollution Convention, Arts. 3-5; 
1982 UNCLOS, Art. 142(2); 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature, Art. 20; 1991 
ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, Arts. 3 and 5; 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents 
Convention, Arts. 4,10 and 15; 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, Arts. 6 and 10; 1997 UN 
Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Arts. 8-19. See also 1986 
WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development, Arts. 15 and 17; ILC Dmft 
Articles on International Liability (1988, Arts. 10-12; 1996, Arts. 11,13,14,17,18). 
(181) Birnie & Boyle, 108; Dupuy, 'Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment', 12 
Michigan JIL (1991), 420, at 425-426; Partan, Duty to Inform in International Environmental Law, at 72 
et sequ. See contra: Gundling, supra n. 160, at 82; Wolfrum, 'Purposes and Principles of International 
Environmental Law', 33 German YbIL (1990), 308, at 313 et sequ. 
(182) See for instance Handl, supra n. 160. 
(183) As Kirgis puts it, «consultation means something more than notification, but less than consent; 
Prior Consultation in International Law, supra n. 160, at 11. 
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which is not yet available; it can at most be expected to deliver data which remain 
scientifically uncertain(184). 
Information, and to some extent negotiation(185), are not exclusively a matter of 
State-to-State exchange; it implies information of the public, and inter alia of NGOs and 
private individuals, on products or activities which have, or might have, a substantial 
harmful impact on the environment. As extensively illustrated in the Chapter dealing 
with the principle pertaining to public participation, information and involvement of the 
public constitutes a key element of an efficient environmental strategy(186). 
(184) Whilst under prevention, `informational' duties relate to `objectively' likely harm. Nevertheless, 
most documents, and 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and 1992 Agenda 21 in 
the first place, require information and notification with respect to potentially harmful activities without 
expressly providing that the uncertain realisation of such harm or uncertain causality link between a 
product/activity an such harm do not constitute reasonable ground to postpone the information and 
notification; see for instance: 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Princ. 18; 1992 
ECE Watercourses Convention, Art. 10; 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Princ. 14(l)(d) and (e). None of 
the ` activities' (including 'informational activities') listed in 1992 Agenda 21 for each `area of concern' 
(Sect. II) reflect a real sense of precaution; see for instance Paras. 9.28 (transboundary air pollution) and 
16.40 (biotechnology). 
(185) Information, notification and consultation are no longer necessarily linked at the State to non-state 
entity level. Indeed, while public information is sometimes expressed in mandatory terms directly in the 
international documents, consultation of the public is essentially called for in hortatory terms, if 
mentioned at all, hence left to the appreciation of the State concerned, according to the ordinary domestic 
rules in matter of consultation of public opinion; see for instance 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, Princ. 10; 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents Convention, Art. 9; 1990 Bangkok 
Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, Para. 27; 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on 
Sustainable Development, Princ. V. 
(186) The importance of popular participation and the role of NGOs in this respect, to stimulate 
environmental awareness, was raised at 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, and has 
since been recurrently underlined; see 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Princ. 
19, and 1972 Programme of Action for Human Environment, Recommend. 97; 1987 Environmental 
Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond, Paras. 105-120; 1990 ECE Code of Conduct on Accidental 
Pollution of Transboundary Inland Waters, Princ. VII(I) and VII(2); 1991 ECE Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment, Art. 3(8); 1991 Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protocol, Annex I: 
Arts. 3(3) and 3(4); 1992 Agenda 21, Paras. 19.8 and 19.50(c); 1992 Convention on Transboundary 
Effects of Industrial Accidents, Art. 9 and Annex VIII; 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, Art. 16; 
1996 ILC Draft Articles on International Liability, Art. 15. For anextremely well informed account of the 
implications in chain and dramatic consequences of the lack of information of people by public authorities 
after Chernobyl accident, see Yarochinskaya, Tchernobyl verite Interdite (Transl. from Russian by Kahn) (Artel-Edn de L'Aube, 1993). 
In the process running to the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development, the importance of a due 
consultation of local NGOs had particularly been stressed by WCED, which pointed that those 
organisations are usually better informed of the environmental needs and limits, than Governments are 
themselves. The commission equally underlined the importance of an on-going dialogue with industries 
and scientific community; Our Common Future, op. cit., at 326; see also 1986 WCED-EG Legal 
Principles for Environmental Protection and Development, Art. 6. WCED's recommendations are duly 
reflected in 1992 Agenda 21, which attributes particular importance to public participation in general, an 
of certain groups in particular; see 1992 Agenda 21, Section III: Strengthen the Role of Major Groups, 
and systematic Terence with respect to each `area of concern' (e. g.: Paras. 17.6, management of marine 
and coastal areas; 18.12, freshwater resource management); see also 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, Princ. 10; 1992 Climate Change Convention, Art. 6. The importance of 
public awareness and involvement is also reflected in the various regional declarations adopted at the 
regional preparatory meetings to Rio; see for instance 1990 Bangkok Ministerial Declaration on (continued) 
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iii. Prior Environmental Impact Assessment 
The importance of a comprehensive study of the impact of certain activities or 
products on the environment was arealdy acknowledged by the Arbitral Tribunal in the 
Trail Smelter case(187). The US was first to endorse the environmental impact 
assessment (statement) procedure as a key component of environmental planning and 
decision-making process; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 makes it a 
formal prior requirement to any major federal actions that might significantly affect the 
quality of the environment(188). The concept of prior environmental impact study 
however, has really emerged both at national(189) and international level in the aftermath 
of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment(190). 
Early prior-impact-assessment clauses in international documents have remained 
essentially generic clauses of style, with no definition of the actual content and practical 
Sustainable Development, Para. 27; 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, 
Princ. V and Joint Agenda for Action, Para. 5; 1990 Bangkok Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable 
Development, Para. 27. However, between the general acknowledgement of the necessity to inform 
public, and the recognition of a right of the public to have access to environmental information, there is a 
step which States are not ready to take yet; see infra Chap. 6/3/i. Use of Human Rights Mechanisms to 
Preserve Individual Environmental Interests. 
(187) The decision of the Tribunal in that case had to be postponed for 3 years, to allow for the collection 
of sufficient data on the environmental impact or Trail Smelter's activities. 
(188) 1969 NEPA, 42 USC §§4321-4370; on the environmental impact assessment in the NEPA, see 
generally Gilpin, Environmental Impact Assessment, Cutting Edge for the Twenty-First Century 
(Cambridge University Press, 1995), at 3; Goldie, `A General View of International Environmental Law. 
A survey of Capabilities, Trends and Limits', in Kiss (ed. ), La Protection de l'environnement et le droit 
international/The Protection of Environment and International Law, Acaddmie de Droit International de 
La Haye, Colloque 1973 (Sijthoff, 1975), 25, at 124 et sequ.; see also Wirth, `International Technology 
Transfer and Environmental Impact Assessement', in Handl & Lutz (eds. ), Transferring Hazardous 
Technologies and Substances, The International Legal Challenge (Graham & Trotman, 1989), Chap. 4. 
(189) A number of States introduced a formal requirement of environmental impact assessment in their 
environmental policy in the 1970s (Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore, in 1972; Canada, 1973; Australia, 
1974; Germany, 1975; France, 1976; the Philippines, 1977; Taiwan, 1979. The majority of European 
States however introduced the environmental impact assessment procedure in the mid 1980s, to comply 
with 1985 Directive 85/337/EEC; see Gilpin, Environmental Impact Assessment, Cutting Edge for the 
21st Century, supra Also Roe, Dalal-Clayton & Hughes, A Directory of Impact Assessment Guidelines 
(IIED/WRUIUCN for OECD DAC, 1995), at 6-7. 
(190) Although no express referenceis made to environmental impact assessment in the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment; such referencewas contained in the controversial draft Princ. 20 
which was finally abandoned; see supra ii. Prior Information, Notification and Consultation. 1972 
Stockholm Action Plan for the Human Environment contains several references to prior environmental 
impact assessment, see Recommend. 51, water uses management; Recommend. 55, effects of water 
management upon oceans; Recommend. 70, activities likely to have an impact on climate; Recommend. 
74, pollution control. However, by-en-large, the Action Plan provides for the general impact assessment 
of on-going activities (for instance Recommend. 21, ecological effects of pesticides) or inventories of 
endangered species (Recommend. 40), without trying to use such assessments or inventories as planning 
tools. 
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implications of such impact studies. The 1978 UNEP Draft Principles on Shared 
Natural Resources thus reads: 
«States should make environmental assessments before engaging in any 
activity with respect to shared natural resources which may create risks of 
significantly affecting the environment of another State or States sharing that 
resource. »(191) 
(191) Princ. 4 (emphasis added); see also OECD Recommend. C(74)216, on Analysis of the 
Environmental Consequences of Significant Public and Private Projects; OECD Recommend. C(79)116, 
on the Assessment of Projects with Significant Impact on the Environment. A more mandatory language 
was adopted in the non-binding 1982 World Charter for Nature, requiring 'an exhaustive examination' 
for those activities likely to pose a significant risk, which demonstrate that «the expected benefits 
outweigh potential damage to nature», Art. 11(b); the Charter also provides for environmental impact 
studies sufficiently in advance with respect to activities that may disturb the environment, Art. 11(c). 
Hortatory prior-impact-assessment clauses abound in treaty law, inter alia 1974 Nordic Convention on 
the Protection of the Environment, Art. 6; 1982 UNCLOS, Art. 206, provides for EIA «when reasonable 
grounds for believing that planned activities under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial 
pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment >; the 1994 UNCLOS 
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI also provides for impact studies to be made in 
accordance with the rules and guidelines set by the Authority, Annex, Sect. 1, Para. 7; 1985 ASEAN 
Agreement on the Conservation of the Nature, Art. 14(1). See also UNEP Regional Seas Conventions; 
1976 Barcelona Protocol on Dumping in Mediterranean Sea, Annex III; 1981 Abidjan Convention on the 
Marine Environment in West and Central Africa, Art. 13; 1981 Lima Convention on the Marine 
Environment in the South-East Pacific, Art. 8; 1982 Jeddah Convention for the Conservation of the Red 
Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Art. XI; 1983 Cartagena Convention on the Marine Environment in 
the Wider Caribbean Region, Art. 12; 1985 Nairobi Convention on the Marine Environment in East 
Africa, Art. 13; 1986 Noumea Convention on the Environment in the South Pacific, Art. 16. The same 
is true of 1978 Kuwait Convention on the Marine Environment in the Arabian Gulf, Art. XI, although 
the action plan appended to the Convention, For the Protection and Development of the Marine 
Environment and the Coastal Areas, sets some guidelines for co-ordinated regional environmental 
assessment programmes; the action plan is reproduced in 171LM (1978), 501, see Chap. I. 
The prior-impact-assessment clause is a clause of style common to most recent documents (although 
substantial guidelines have now been made available through 1991 ECE Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment, infra p. 166), inter alia: 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
Print. 17; 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Art. 14(1)(a) and (b), 1992 Forestry Principles, Princ. 8(h); 
1992 Baltic Sea Convention, Art. 7; 1990 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife 
to the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider 
Caribbean Region, Art. 13; 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, Para. 
16(f); ILC 1996 Draft Articles on International Liability, Art. 10. Prior impact assessment is also called 
for, but not further defined, in the context of most of 1992 Agenda 21 special areas of concern, Section II: 
protection of the atmosphere (Para. 9.12(b)); deforestation (Para. 11.24(a)); fragile ecosystems (Para. 
13.17(a); preservation of biodiversity (Para. 15.5(k)) and sound management of biotechnology (Para. 
16.45(c)); protection of seas and Oceans (Para. 17.5(d)); management of freshwater resources (Para. 
18.22(c)); and sustainable management of toxic chemicals (Para. 19.21(d)), solid wastes (Para. 21.31(a)) 
and radioactive wastes (Para. 22.4(d); see some other references in Sands & Bulatao, International 
Procedural Aspects of Atmospheric Protection: Environmental Impact Assessment and Access to 
Information, CIEL Background Papers on International Environmental Law No. 2/1991 (Center for 
International Law, School of Law, King's College London, 1991), at 5 et sequ. See also EC Directives 
on genetically modified micro-organisms: Directive 90/219(EEC, on the contained use of genetically 
modified micro-organisms, [1990] OJ L117/1 (Arts. 7-12), and Directive 90/220/EEC, on the deliberate 
release into the environment of genetically modified organisms, [1990] OJ L117/15 (Arts. 1-12). 
The duty to perform an environmental impact assessment prior to nuclear testing, grounded both in treaty (in that case 1986 Noumea Convention on the Environment in the South Pacific, Art. 16) and customary 
international law `derived from widespread international practice', constituted a major argument invoked by New Zealand in its Request for an Examination of the Situation on the French nuclear tests in 
Mururoa and Fangataufa; Requestfor an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 (continued) 
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The nature and extent of such assessment were the object of a more comprehensive 
elaboration in the mid 1980s, with the adoption of the 1985 EEC Directive on the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment(192), 
the 1987 UNEP Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment(193) and 
with the negotiations of the 1991 Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment(194). 
Environmental impact study can be defined in a more `economic' perspective as «a 
generic term that embraces both an administrative process and a set of analytical 
techniques designed to predict and appraise environmental impacts of (... ) proposals 
(... ) put forward by the private and public sector»(195); it consists in fact in a 
procedure (196) the purpose of which is: 
«[T]o identify, describe and assess in an appropriate manner, in the light 
of each individual case (... ) the direct and indirect effects of a project on the 
following factors: 
- 
human beings, fauna and flora; 
- 
soil, water, air, climate and the landscape; 
- 
material assets and the cultural heritage; 
- 
the interaction between the factors mentioned in the first and second 
indents. » (197) 
of the Court's Judgement of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, ICJ 
Rep. 1995,288, Para. 5; yet only Judge Palmer adopted the view that the duty to perform an 
environmental impact assessment «where activities may have a significant effect on the environment» 
constituted a principle of customary law related to the environment; ICJ Rep. 1995, ibid., (diss. op. ) at 
Para. 91. Similar argument was put forward in the Danielsson case supra n. 65, Para. 45. 
(192) Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment, [1985] OJ L175/40, as amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC, [1997] OJ L73/5. 
(193) UNEP Governing Council Decision 14/25,14 June 1987, reproduced in 17 EPL (1987), 36, 
commented by Bonine, 'Environmental Impact Assessment 
- 
Principles Developed', 17 EPL (1987), 5. 
(194) See also 1988 CRAMRA, Art. 4, although this provision is superseded by 1991 Antarctic Treaty 
Environmental Protocol, Annex I, due to French and Australian persistent opposition to CRAMRA 
preventing it from entering into force; 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents Convention, Annex V. 
(195) James, The Application of Economic Techniques in Environmental Impact Assessment (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1994), at 1. 
(196) Or process; Sands, Principles (Vol. I), Chap. 15. 
(197) Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment (as amended), Art. 3; the European Court of Justice interpreted Art. 3 of the Directive as a 
prescription of the content of the assessment and the factors to be taken into account; EEC Case C- 431/92, Commission v. FRG (Grosskrotzenburg case), [1995] ECR 1-2189, §§ 39-40. In the same case, 
the Court hold that Art. 2 of the Directive, which inquires environmental impact assessment for the 
projects likely to have a significant impact on the environment, lays down an unequivocal obligation incumbent on the competent authority in each States for approval of projects to make certain projects 
subject to an assessment of their effects; ibid. The Court subsequently confirmed its approach; see EC Case C-133/94, Commission v. Belgium, 2 May 1996, reproduced in 5 EELR (1996), 216. The European Court of Justice also recognised the direct effect of the directive, hence susceptible of being invoked directly by individuals against a State; EC Case C-72/95, Aannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld BV et al. 
v. Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland, 1996, §§ 56-59; for a review of the recent case-law related to 1985 EC Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment, see Garcia Ureta, 'The E. C. Environmental (continued) 
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The term of environmental impact is understood largo sensu to encompass not only 
the direct effects on biological resources, but also the social and economic impact 
thereof(198). Without going into too many details, the environmental impact assessment 
procedure can be schematically presented as a seven-stage process(199): 
(1) In a preliminary stage, the proposed activity is described and the actors involved 
and the relevant legal framework identified. (2) The environmental impact of the 
proposed activity is then anticipated, and (3) a baseline study made, which describes 
the existing environment before the contemplated activity. (4) The impact is quantified 
as precisely as possible; a degree of uncertainty remains, which is inherent in any 
evaluation based on predictions rather than on actual evidence. (5) The measures 
contemplated to mitigate the environmental impact are listed and priced, and (6) the 
envisaged activity is compared and assessed in terms of environmental and financial 
costs and benefits with the possible alternatives, including the no-action alternative. (7) 
Where necessary, further documentation is provided to allow a full impact assessment. 
Whole or part of the outcome of such impact studies is communicated to the potentially 
affected State(s) as part of the `relevant and reasonably accessible information' to be 
notified(200). Environmental impact assessement studies constitute the ground basis in 
the consultations held with the view of defining the appropriate measures of prevention 
and mitigation of the potential risk in relation to the proposed activity(201). 
The impact assessment process remains an essentially domestic (or internal) 
procedure, conducted according to domestic rules, in the light of international minimum 
standards(202), whereby the applicant planning a potentially environmentally 
Impact Assessment Directive Before the European Court of Justice', 5 Environmental Liability (1997), 1. 
(198) Ahmad & Sammy, Guidelines to Environmental Impact Assessment in Developing Countries 
(Hodder & Stoughton, 1985). 
(199) Classification after Ahmad & Sammy, Guidelines to Environmental Impact Assessment in 
Developing Countries, supra; also Roe, Dalal-Clayton & Hughes, A Directory of Impact Assessment 
Guidelines (IIED/WRIIIUCN for OECD DAC, 1995). 
(200) Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment, (as amended), Art. 7; 1991 ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, Art. 5; 
1991 Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protocol, Annex I, Arts. 3(3) and 3(4). In that latter case, 
information are to be passed on to all contracting parties. 
(201) Supra ii. Prior Information, Notification and Consultation; Directive 85/337/EEC on the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (as amended), ibid.; 
1991 ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, ibid.; 1991 Antarctic Treaty 
Environmental Protocol, Annex I, Art. 4. 
(202) 1985 EEC Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment, Art. 5 and Annex III; 1991 ECE 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, Arts. 2(7) and 4(1) and Appendix II; 1991 Antarctic 
Treaty Environmental Protocol, Annex I, Art. 3. Even though 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents 
Convention cross refersto 1991 ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment as applicable to 
define which activities are to be subjected to mandatory prior assessment, as well as the minima of such 
assessment, Art. 4(4), it also provides a complementary set of issues to be addressed in the analysis and (continued) 
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hazardous(203) or otherwise listed activity(204) is required to demonstrate to the 
competent authority the harmlessness of the intended activity in the particular 
circumstances of the case in order to obtain the authorisation to proceed. Environmental 
impact assessment is exclusively contemplated in relation to concrete projects, or in 
relation to specific activities. It do not apply to general policy, plan or programme(205). 
The process of prior impact assessment is a common feature of both preventive and 
precautionary policy. The major difference between a preventive and precautionary 
impact assessment does not lie in the accuracy of the assessment, in any case based on 
predictions, neither does it pertain to the nature of the activity targeted, nor to the 
nature of the risk to be averted. It relates, once more, to the degree of certainty of the 
causality link between the activity envisaged and the risk to be avoided. From the 
evaluation process, Annex V. 
(203) Environmental impact assessment is to be integrated in the preparation and planning of an activity, 
and does obviously not relates to emergency situation or otherwise unplanned activities. It has to be 
mentioned here that the concept of prior impact assessment has extended well beyond substantially 
hazardous activities or projects in a transboundary context, and has become an important tool of 
development policy, whereby the environmental and social impact of development projects is thoroughly 
evaluated before being launched or funded. Prior impact assessment for development projects was already 
envisaged, albeit in a very elusive way, in 1972 Stockholm Action Plan for the Human Environment 
(Recommend. 63, broadening of criteria for development projects analysis, to encompass environmental 
considerations), and more clearly in 1982 World Charter for Nature, Para. 11(c). OECD Members have 
agreed, in principle, to ensure that «development assistance projects and programmes, which because of 
their nature, size and/or location, could significantly affect the environment, should be assessed at as early 
a stage as possible and to an appropriate degree from an environmental standpoint; OECD Recommend. 
C(85)104, on Environmental Assessment of Development Assistance Projects and Programmes; see also 
OECD Recommend. C(86)26 (final), On Measures Required to Facilitate the Environmental Assessment 
of Development Assistance Projects and Programmes. A set of guidelines was rafted by OECD DAC, to 
ensure due consideration for all environmental aspects in domestic environmental impact assessment 
procedures and internal procedure of multilateral development assistance institutions; see OECD 
Recommend. C(89)2 Concerning an Environmental Checklist for Development Assistance; (Annex 1, 
more particularly section I). See also OECD DAC Guidelines on Environment and Aid (OECD/OCDE, 
1992), endorsed by OECD Ministers of Environment and Development Cooperation, 3 December 1991, 
OECD/GD(91)200. 
The World Bank has also integrated environmental impact assessment to the assess its own investment 
lending operations; see 1989 Operational Directive 4.00, Annex A: Environmental Assessment. 1992 
Agenda 21 also refers to prior impact assessment in the context of development of human settlements 
infrastructure (Para. 7.41(b)) and the general development and environment integrated decision-making 
process (Para. 8.4). 1992 Agenda 21 provides for environmental impact assessment for development 
project (Para. 8.5) and industrial development in general (Para. 9.18). 
(204) Infra note 191. 
(205) Extension of environmental impact assessment to the level of policy, plan and programme was 
contemplated at the drafting stage of 1985 EEC Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment, but was finally abandoned. A draft proposal to amend the directive in that sense was submitted again by the 
European Commission in 1992, as part of a general revision of the Directive, but was not retained in the Council Directive 97/11/EC, [1997] OJ L73/5 amending Directive 85/337/EEC, which is still focused on 
projects; see Art. 6(1); Cerny & Sheate, 'Strategic Environmental Assessement in the European 
Community: Amending the EA Directive', 22 EPL (1992), 154; Sheate, `Amending the EC Directive (85/337/EEC) on Environmental Impact Assessement', 2 Environmental Law Network International 
Newsletter (1994), 17. 
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perspective of pure prevention, prior impact assessment is requested essentially for 
those activities or projects (objectively) likely to incur serious impact on the 
environment(206). From a perspective of precaution, environmental impact assessment 
can be required(207) for those activities which are presumed to have substantial harm, or 
might cause substantial harm, even if the link between the intended activity and the 
predicted impact is not definitely established by clear and convincing evidence(208). 
5. Limits Inherent in the Precautionary Principle 
It is stating the obvious that precaution does not require complete and absolute 
eradication of all substantial environmental risks, nor impose universal and absolute 
standards. There are maximum limits beyond which pollution irreversibly affects the 
environment, and minimum limits below which environmental measures are obviously 
excessive. Those are the upper and lower limits in-between which the natural 
environment can survive the human impact. And there are self-evident constraints upon 
these limits, flowing both from financial and technological availability, and from the 
(206) See documents listed at note 191. 
(207) In practice, most recent documents endorsing the precautionary principle still provide for an 
environmental impact assessment procedure with respect to activities likely to incur transboundary harn 
and do not expressly state that the lack of conclusive evidence of a link between activity and harm/risk 
shall not justify the postponing of such prior assessment; see documents referredto at note 121. Princ. 4; 
see also OECD Recommend. C(74)216, on Analysis 
... 
). 
(208) Thus, Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects 
on the environment (as amended), 1991 ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment and 
1991 Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protocol set a list of certain activities or projects for which there is 
a presumption of serious impacts (respectively: Annex I/ Appendix I/ Annex I) for which prior 
environmental impact assessment is mandatory (Arts. 4(1) / 2(2) and 2(3) / 8). Interestingly, none of the 
above mentioned documents contain any specific nference to the precautionary principle. It must be 
noted, against the distinction drawn here between a preventive and precautionary environmental impact 
assessment, that some authors held the requirements of environmental impact assessment defined in the 
1985 EEC Directive as encompassing the principle of precaution; see Peters, `The Significance of 
Environmental Precaution in the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive', 5 EELR (1996), 210, and 
references contained in that article. The wording of 1991 ECE Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment is ambiguous however, as it requests from States the establishment of an environmental 
impact assessment procedure «with respect to proposed activities listed in Appendix I that are likely to 
cause significant adverse transboundary harm 
... 
», but fails to state whether such harm is presumed for the 
activities in referredAppendix, or is still to be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis, as a condition to a 
prior impact assessment. Nonetheless, considering that above mentioned bracketed terms are used as an 
en-bloc expression throughout the Convention, and that the general criteria to assist in the determination 
of the environmental significance of activities (Appendix III) are expressly designated to help States with 
those activities not listed in Appendix I (and not those listed), it can be reasonably concluded the listed 
activities are likely to cause significant adverse transboundary harm and, therefore, require mandatory 
previous impact assessment. 
See also 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents Convention, Art. 4(4), cross referringto «hazardous activity (... ) 
subject to an environmental impact assessment in accordance with the Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context... »). The 1988 CRAMRA sets environmental impact 
assessment as a condition to the resuming of the banned activities, that would demonstrate the 
harmlessness of the intended activity, Art. 4(2). 
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need to preserve certain incentives to perpetuate development and conservation of the 
environment. 
i. Financial and Technical Limits 
Precaution, and a fortiori prevention, impose a duty of diligent conduct upon States, 
but do not commit them to a specific result regardless of individual capacities and 
available means(209). While precaution strives to bypass the limits of science and 
overcome its uncertainties, it cannot realistically claim to ignore the financial and 
technological limits. 
Those limits and constraints strongly influenced States throughout the negotiations 
of recent international environmental instruments(210), and even more so with respect to 
the precautionary principle. Such limits are not only a matter of less developed States' 
reticence towards an extremely intrusive concept that might seriously undermine their 
own aspirations to development and industrialisation; it is also a matter of industrialised 
States and the industrial sector, eager to keep the minimum sacrifice necessary at 
minimum expenses(211). 
A precautionary approach can have far reaching consequences in terms of costs and 
technical means it involves. It implies the enactment of legislative and judicial measures 
to anticipate a potential, yet unproved, harm or risk, the renunciation of certain 
activities or products susceptible of causing substantial harm to the environment 
despite scientific uncertainty, and costly prior environmental impact assessment 
studies. Needless to say, not all countries are on an equal footing to prevent a risk from 
realising and to anticipate the occurence of environmental harms. To accommodate the 
various positions and reservations of States, most environmental instruments entailing 
substantial technical or financial input tend to link the duty to take 
preventive/precautionary measures with a reasonable-measure(212) or an effective- 
(209) Supra 4/i. Unilateral Duty of Due Diligence. 
(210) See infra Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership. 
(211) The lengthy debate concerning the North Sea, as well as discussion a Bergen Ministerial 
Conference are very illustrative of this tendency (supra). Very illustrative too, is the attitude of the major 
CFCs producer countries, inter alia UK, Italy and France, at the ozone layer Convention and Protocol 
negotiations. Such tendency also prevails at the domestic level, where best practical means 
environmental-legislation are commonplace. In Britain, early best-practical-means legislation was passed 
in the context of air pollution (Alkali Act, 1874), and was later to become the rule for the control of 
noxious and offensive emissions for each individual medium; see further: Ball & Bell, Environmental 
Law 4th edn (Blackstone, 1997), 285 and 323. 
(212) Preventive measures were often interpreted as implying all reasonable measures to 
protect/prevent...; see for instance 1969 Civil Liability Convention, Art. 1(7); 1991 Antarctic Treaty 
Environmental Protocol, Annex IV, Arts. 3(2), 5(5). 
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measure clause(213), or with similar clauses calling for appropriate measures(214), all 
necessary/requisite measures(215), all possible steps(216), or measures according to 
capabilities(217). Some documents simply omit to qualify the measures to be taken(218), 
whilst other resort to more compelling clauses that combine scientific criteria with a 
certain discretion, such as best available means and best practicable steps(219), best 
available technologies(220), or best available technologies not entailing excessive 
costs(221). 
(213) See for instance 1968 African Convention on Nature, Art. IV; 1972 London Convention on 
Prevention of Marine Pollution, Art. II; 1972 World Heritage Convention, Art. 5; 1988 Sofia Protocol to 
the 1979 ECE Transboundary Air Pollution Convention, concerning the Control of Emissions of 
Nitrogen Oxides, Art. 2(1). 
(214) See 1972 World Heritage Convention, Art. 5(d); 1979 Bonn Convention on Conservation of 
Migratory Species, Art. III; 1979 Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife, Arts. 4-7; 
1985 Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer, Art. 2(1); 1990 ECE Code of Conduct on Accidental 
Pollution of Transboundary Inland Waters, Sect. II, Art. 1; 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, Arts. 2 
and 3(1)(f) and (g); 1992 Forestry Principles, Princ. 2(b) and 8(a); 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Arts. 
7-11; 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Arts 7 and 27. 
All but one ILC Draft Articles on Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by 
International Law refer to appropriate measures, Draft Art. 1989,1990: Art. 8; Draft Art. 1996, Art. 4; 
Draft Articles 1988 referred to reasonable preventive measures, Art. 9; vain attempts had been made to 
insert a best available technology clause (1992 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1,68). 
(215) 1968 African Convention on Nature, Art. VI; 1979 Bern Convention on the Conservation of 
European Wildlife, Art. 2; 1982 UNCLOS, Art. 194; 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of 
Nature, Arts. 1 and 2. (216) 1972 Oslo Convention on Marine Pollution from Ships and Aircraft, Art. 1; 1974 Paris 
Convention on Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, Art. 2(1)(a); 1992 OSPAR Marine 
Environment Convention, Arts. 3-5. 
(217) UNEP Regional Seas Conventions, supra; 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Princ. 15; 1992 Climate Change Convention, Art. 3(1); 1992 Biodiversity Convention, 
Art. 6.1992 Agenda 21 constantly qualifies suggested measures and duties concerning the special areas of 
concern (Section II) with the expression «according to [State] capacities and available resources. (218) 1958 Convention on the High Seas, Art. 25; 1958 High Seas Conservation Convention, Art. 2. 
(219) 1972 Stockholm Action Plan for the Human Environment, Recommend. 71, reduction of the 
release of dangerous substances in the environment; most of UNEP Regional Seas Conventions contains 
a provision which refers to the best practical means, in accordance with States capabilities: 1976 
Barcelona Convention on Mediterranean Sea, Art. 4(1); 1981 Abidjan Convention on the Marine 
Environment in West and Central Africa, Art. 4(1); 1983 Cartagena Convention on the Marine 
Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region, Art. 4(1); 1985 Nairobi Convention on the Marine 
Environment in East Africa, Art. 4(1); and 1986 Noumea Convention on the Environment in the South 
Pacific, Art. 5(1); see also 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution, Art. I; 1989 
Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Arts. 4(4), 4(9), 10(2)(c); 1991 
Bamako Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Arts. 1(10) and 4(1), (2), and (3)(n); 1991 Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protocol, Annex III (wastes production and disposal); 1992 
ECE Industrial Accidents Convention, Arts. 3(1), 6, and 8. 
(220) 1972 Stockholm Action Plan for the Human Environment (Recommend. 53, appropriate 
technologies in water resources management); 1979 ECE Transboundary Air Pollution Convention (Art. 
6); 1982 World Charter for Nature (Para. 11); PARCOM Recommend. 89/2, to Use Best Available 
Technologies, and PARCOM Recommend. 90/1, on the Definition of the of the Best Available 
Technology for Secondary Iron and Steel Plants; 1991 ECE Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment, Art. 2(1); 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents Convention, Annex IV, Para. 6; 1992 ECE 
Watercourses Convention, Art. 3(2); 1992 OSPAR Marine Environment Convention, Annex I, Art. 1(1) (continued) 
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What constitute appropriate, reasonable, effective or best available, practicable 
measures have remained undefined and therefore a matter for States' appreciation(222). 
By contrast, the terms of best available technologies are more concisely construed, and 
are clarified further with the elaboration of various of criteria to be taken into 
consideration, pertaining among others to the actual availability of a technique and to its 
economic viability. The 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, Annex I, suggests the 
following definition of best available technology: 
«1. The term "best available technology" is taken to mean the latest 
stage of development of processes, facilities or methods of operation which 
indicate the practicable suitability or a particular measure for limiting 
discharges, emissions and waste. In determining whether a set of processes, 
facilities and methods of operation constitute the best available technology in 
general or individual cases, special consideration is to be given to: (a) Comparable processes, facilities or methods of operation which have 
recently been successfully tried out; (b) Technological advances and changes in scientific knowledge and 
understanding; (c) The Economic viability of such technology; (d) Time limits for installation in both new and existing plants; (e) The nature and volume of the discharge and effluents concerned; (f) Low- and non-waste technology. 
2. It therefore follows that what is "best available technology" for a 
particular process will change with time in the light of technological 
advances, economic and social factors, as well as in the light of changes in 
scientific knowledge and understanding. » (223) 
Some scholars, on the contrary, have made it clear that best does not mean the latest 
available technology or sophisticated equipment, but relates rather to «the effectiveness 
of the techniques in minimising, preventing or rendering harmless noxious emissions. 
and Annex III, Art. 2(1); 1992 Baltic Sea Convention, Art. 3; 1997 Esbjerg Ministerial Declaration on 
the North Sea, Para. 212. 
(221) The concept was originated in the Directive 84/360/EEC on the Combating of Air Pollution from 
Industrial Plants ([1984] OJ L188/20). See also 1992 Climate Change Convention, Art. 3(3), and 1992 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Princ. 15, referto cost-effective measures. 
The best available technique not entailing excessive cost was also endorsed at national level, most 
notably Britain (see Environmental Protection Act 1990 (Sect. 7)) and Ireland; see further: Ball & Bell, 
ibid supra n. 211, at 308 et sequ. 
(222) See for instance a BPM Note of the British Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate, defines 
`practicable', in the expression of Best Practicable Means as used in the Clean Air Act 1956, as 
`reasonably practicable, having regard, amongst other things, to local conditions and circumstances, to 
the financial implications and to the current state of technical knowledge'; Industrial Air Pollution 
Inspectorate, Best Practicable Means: General Principles and Practice, BPM Note 1 (Health & Safety 
Executive, 1984). 
(223) 1992 OSPAR Marine Environment Convention states a similar definition; Appendix 1. So does 
the 1992 Baltic Sea Convention, Annex II, Regu1.3, and PARCOM Recommend. 89/2, on the Use of Best Available Technologies, although referenceis made to the economic feasibility rather than viability 
of the measures. 
Prevention & Precaution 173 Chapter 3 
"Best" is not an absolute term and it has been indicated that there may well be a number 
of different techniques which qualify under this particular word»(224). 
Best is thus essentially relative and variable both in space and time(225). 
«There will be changes in scientific knowledge and in the means of 
avoiding or reducing hazards to the environment There will be also shifts in 
Popular Perceptions. Old fears may prove groundless, or new concerns 
arise... »(226) 
The `economic viability' aspect of the best available technology was further 
emphasised with the idea of best available technology not entailing excessive cost. The 
concept represented the key element of European Council Directive 84/360 on the 
Combating of Air Pollution from' Industrial Plants; a technical note referring to the 
directive states: 
«BAT is to be interpreted as the technology (or set of technologies) 
which operating experience has adequately demonstrated to be the best 
technology commercially available as regards the minimisation of 
emissions to atmosphere, providing it has proven to be economically viable 
when applied to the industrial sector concerned. »(227) 
The best available technology not entailing excessive or disproportionate costs is, 
accordingly, determined on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, and ought to represent a 
balanced solution in terms of both the financial costs incurred(228), and the resulting 
(224) Ball & Bell, ibid supra n. 211, at 309 (emphasis added). It was clearly stated in the context of the 
negotiations on a World Charter for Nature, that best did not necessarily mean most sophisticated and 
advanced technologies, in response to the arguments put forward by some developing States, that any 
referenceto best appropriate means would remain non practicable considering their lack of technologies at 
all (India); Amazonian countries expressed their fear of an infinite dependence on more advanced countries 
for such technologies; Burhenne & Irwin, The World Charter for Nature, Beiträge Zur 
Umweltgestaltung Vol. A90/Erich, 2nd edn, (Schmidt Verlag, 1986), 64 et sequ. 
(225) The 1990 Adjustments and Amendments to Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer 
-enacted less 
than three years after the signing of the Montreal Protocol- and the 1992 Adjustments and Amendment 
constitute an example of adaptation of regulatory action to evolving scientific knowledge. Scientific data 
have shown indeed that (a) the time schedule of phasing out key ozone-depleting substances had to be 
tightened, and that (b) the range of controlled substances had to be expanded; see Handl, 'International 
Efforts to Protect the Global Atmosphere: a Case of Too Little, Too Late? ', 1 EIIL (1990), 250. 
Likewise, the 1974 Baltic Sea Convention had to be reviewed in the light of the evolution of the 
knowledge concerning the environment (as well as the political changes in the region); the 1992 Baltic 
Sea Convention hence (a) aims at a total eradication of pollution (as opposed to a mere reduction in the 
1974 Baltic Sea Convention), (b) endorses a precautionary approach (as opposed to prevention), and (c) 
targets a wider circle of riparian and non riparian States; see Kiss & Shelton, Traite de Droit Europßen, 
320. 
(226) British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Twelfth Report: Best Practicable 
Environmental Option (HMSO, 1988), Para. 2.9 (hereafterreferredafterthe title). 
(227) Zierock (ed. ), Technical Note on Best Available Technologies Not Entailing Excessive Costs (European Commission, 1991), at 1 (emphasis as in original). 
(228) Apart from the costs generated by the implementation of such approach the alternative solution to 
an activity or product rejected under such principles frequently generates either a reduction of the a 
potential economic productivity (lucrum cessans, mainly imposed by the lower limit) or additional costs (continued) 
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environmental benefits; the weight to be attributed to each of these two factors, 
however, remains uncertain(229). 
ii. Preservation of Incentives 
To contribute to rather than hamper development, the principle of precaution is to 
be construed in a way that would preserve incentives. In the words of the then U. N. 
Secretary General: (([w]hile ensuring the preservation of natural resources implies 
certain limitations, it also provides many valuable incentives and opportunities for new 
thinking»(230). 
A precautionary approach cannot, realistically, be an `all-or-nothing' deal, obeying 
the `zero-harm rule'(231). An impact of human activities on both the sink and source 
functions of the ecosystem is unavoidable; human beings live on the natural resources, 
and to try to annihilate all adverse environmental effects is unacceptable, not affordable 
and, in fact, undesirable. Not only would an ultra-cautious approach suppress all 
incentives to develop further, both economically and technologically; it would also 
neglect the essential function of the ecosystem, that is its assimilative capacity(232). 
Finally, it was appropriately underlined that precaution should enter international law 
(damnum emergens, mainly raised by the upper limit). 
(229) Ball & Bell, ibid. supra n. 211, at 310. Hence, the BPM Note of the British Industrial Air 
Pollution Inspectorate offerthe following guidance: «[t]he words 'financial implications' can relate both 
to the direct capital and to the revenue costs borne by the operator of the process. In deciding whether 
such costs of prevention are practicable in any given circumstances the aim is to achieve a reasonable 
balance between the costs of prevention and/or dispersion and the benefits. 
(230) UNSG Agenda for development (1994), Para. 74. 
(231) Bodansky, ` The Precautionary Principle in US Environmental Law', in O'Riordan & Cameron, 
Chap. 12. 
(232) As rightly pointed out by Stebbing, «[m]arine populations have recovered from many natural 
disasters (... ), which has been as great or greater than those mortalities resulting from human activities. 
Toxic material antedated man on this planet and predated biological system with a capacity to resist 
toxic stress. The point here is that we must not become too protectionist. While we must refine our 
capacity to identify and control quickly new synthetic compounds which are toxic at low concentrations, 
we should not consider the 'zero discharge' option as necessary even if it were attainable and affordable; 
Stebbing, ` Environmental Capacity and the Precautionary Principle', 24 MPBull. (1992) 287, at 291, 
2nd col. Although made in the very different context of a zero nuclear risk, the remarks made by the 
Professor Funk-Brentano are to a certain extent also applicable to the zero environmental impact ideal. Such a no risk ideal, he argues, is both absurd because inaccessible, and unreasonable because 
unnecessary. The radicalisation of the pollution norms by virtue of precaution would not only be financially excessively costly, but it might also cost their credibility to scientific experts as well as dishearten research of new techniques and solutions to environmental challenges; «[lies constquences qui decoulent d'une application abusive du «principe de precaution » revelent notre dillicultd ä prendre une decision raisonable Bans un contexte d'incertitude. Elles nous invitent ä eviter des decisions hätives qui 
risqueraient de nous faire depenser de l'argent inutilement et de freiner Ic dCveloppement d'innovations 
qui sont le meilleur garant de l'amelioration de nos conditions de vie»; Le Monde, Oct. 29/30,1995, 13. See also: British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Twelfth Report: Best Practicable Environmental Option, Para. 2.29; Cameron & Wade-Gory, Addressing Uncertainty, 9. 
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'by stealth, not by force; by supportive adjustment, not by brazen entry; by 
enlightened self-interest, not by magisterial command'(233). 
Precaution, in fact, is about a proper balancing of the risks and a clear definition of 
thresholds. As a principle of international environmental law, precaution assumes two 
major roles: 
(a) a balancing role, to distinguish the risks which are objectively and reasonably 
acceptable, from those which are excessive both in terms of their magnitude and the 
probability of their occurrence; 
(b) a constructive role, to identify the feasible alternatives to those activities entailing 
unreasonable risks, bearing in mind that, by-and-large, no alternative is deemed 
acceptable to States, to the private sectors and to some extent to the public, unless 
it is not only economically viable, but indeed profitable in a foreseeable term(234). 
In that perspective, the concept of best environmental option has emerged 
increasingly linked to precaution and prevention(235). Whilst the various international 
(233) O'Riordan, Interpreting the Precautionary Principle, 8. 
(234) The questioning of the Canadian Ocean Dumping Control Act (since 1988, incorporated into the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, Part VI) setting an all-ban on the dumping of any substance at 
sea, pollutant or not except in accordance with the terms and conditions of a permit, is one example of 
the controversy raised by an overcautious legislation, inter alia the lack of concrete link between the 
proscribed conduct and the actual or potential harm to the environment. The concept or precaution 
underpins the ban, albeit the term of precaution is not actually used in the contested act. In that particular 
case however, no decision was made regarding the legality of the total ban. Rather, the Court confined 
their review to the alleged ultra vires character of the Act, and decided that, although the Act would fall 
outside the ordinary constitutional jurisdiction of the Federal Parliament, it was nevertheless upheld as 
constitutional under the national concern for peace, order and good government doctrine; Regina v. 
Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., 49 Dominion Law Reports, Fourth Series (1988), 161. Only dissenting 
Justice La Forest underlined the «importance of linking the prohibition to the purpose sought to be 
achieved. At time, that link can be inferred (... ). In other cases, cogent proof will be required; id. at 
196. See generally VanderZwaag, Canada and Marine Environmental Protection, (Kluwer Law 
International, 1995). 
(235) Or best environmental practice(s): 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, Art. 3(1)(g); 1992 OSPAR 
Marine Environment Convention, Annex I, Art. 1(1) and Annex III, Art. 2(1); 1992 Baltic Sea 
Convention, Art. 3, and Annex I, Regul. 3.1991 Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protocol provides that 
the duty to remove certain kinds of wastes disposal shall not apply «in circumstances where the removal 
of such wastes by any practical option would result in greater adverse environmental impact than leaving 
them in their existing locations, Annex III, Art. 2(1). While no express provision is made to it, choice 
of best environmental option is actually implied in the prior justification procedure set forth by OSCOM, 
which requires the demonstration (a) of the lack of other practicable alternative to the envisaged dumping 
of industrial waste, and (b) the harmlessness to the environment of the materials to be dumped, before any 
authorisation to proceed is given; OSCOM Recommend. 89/1, on the Reduction and Cessation of 
Dumping Industrial Wastes at Sea. PARCOM Technical Working Group issued recommendations for 
the elaboration of best environmental practices for the agricultural sector, to reflect a precautionary and 
clean production approach, and address all pollution and resources-related problems; Recommendations 
for Establishing the Best Environment Practices for the Agricultural Sector, prepared for the Nineteenth 
Meeting of the Technical Working Group of the Paris Commission (1992); posted on Greenpeace 
Website @ <http: //www. greenpeace. org>. 
See constant direct or indirect referenceto best environmental option/practices in 1992 Agenda 21, inter 
alia, Para. 9.12, calling for the identification of `economically viable and environmentally sound energy (continued) 
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documents which refer to a best (practicable) environmental option remain evasive on 
the meaning of the expression(236), its development and interpretation in the UK is 
enlightening regarding both its implications and the difficulties associated with its 
implementation(237). The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution defines the 
concept as: 
«... [T]he outcome of a systematic consultative and decision-making 
procedure which emphasises the protection and conservation of the 
environment across land, air and water. The BPEO procedure established, for 
a given set of objectives, the option that provides the most benefit or least 
damage to the environment as a whole, at acceptable cost, in the long term as 
in the short term. » (23g) 
The best environmental option emerged in the UK and other indutrialised States in 
the context of industrial pollution control, as the most viable and efficient alternative to 
the classic assessment techniques traditionally focused on the impact of industrial 
processes on particular environmental media individually considered without particular 
consideration paid to potential transfer of pollution from one medium to another via 
contamination or dispersion. The need for cross-media pollution control was 
increasingly recognised in the mid 1980s, with the establishment of a link between air, 
water and land pollution(239) of environmental impact; this led to the endorsement of 
the concept of best practicable environmental option in national and international 
environmental law. 
The implications of the principle of best environmental option has yet proved far 
more problematic than originally envisaged. To be fully operational, the principle 
requires extensive research and studies, which are often complex, lengthy and costly, 
namely: 
sources; Para. 9.15, concerning the development of cost effective, more efficient, less polluting and safer 
transport systems; Para. 11.22, on environmentally sound and economically viable methods and practices 
of forests harvesting; Para. 18.40, calling for the adoption of best environmental practices at reasonable 
cost to avoid freshwaterpollution; Para. 20.13, on cost-effective alternatives for processes and substances 
that generate hazardous wastes; Para. 21.20, on identification of promising socially acceptable and cost- 
effective forms of solid wastes reuse and recycling. 
(236) Most of the international documents referred to set a number of criteria to be considered when 
selecting the best environmental practices/option, which are only indirectly precautionary. 
(237) Ball & Bell, ibid supra n. 211, at 289-290. 
(238) Twelj? h Report: Best Practicable Environmental Option, at Para. 2.1. 
(239) See for instance EEC Fourth Environmental Action Programme (1987-1992). See also British 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution's Fifth Report: Air Pollution Control: An Integrated 
Approach, published in 1976 already and drwing a clear link between the pollution of air, water and land. 
In the UK, a unified inspectorate of pollution was set in 1987, to replace the various 'medium-specific' 
inspectorates; it was vested with the responsibility to tackle more efficiently environmental pollution, 
resorting inter alia to best practicable environmental option; the concept was endorsed in the Environment Protection Act 1990, S. 7. 
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(1) a study on the cross-media pollution transfer, which requires availability of, and 
access to, numerous data often temporally and spatially arbitrary; 
(2) an 'imaginative' identification of other feasible options, and comparative cost- 
benefit analysis with respect to general environmental considerations, which also 
means a not always appropriate, or even feasible, economic valuation of 
environmental resources and impact; 
(3) finally, the notion of best environmental option raises a dilemma of subjective 
choices that would favour one aspect of the environmental against another, or any 
socio-economic aspect against environmental aspect, or vice-versa. 
An excellent illustration of the preservation of one environmental element at the 
expense of another was provided with the recent controversy concerning the disposal of 
the Brent Spar in the North Sea. In that case, a choice had to be taken between deep-sea 
pollution and on-land pollution. Although a best practicable environmental option 
study established in compliance with the UK standards had concluded in favour of 
deep-sea disposal, popular pressure forced the owning company Shell to have it 
dismantled and disposed ashore. As an author rightly pointed, one of the difficulties for 
the scientific community in that case was that '«in any evaluation of options for the 
abandonment of an offshore installation it has to be assumed that all options considered 
are acceptable to the public. Scientific assessment may be able to distinguish between 
options in an evaluative manner but it cannot (... ) determine that any one of the options 
is acceptable when other societal values and criteria are invoked»(240). 
Certain guidelines have been set, for the selection of best environmental practices or 
options(241), but further clarification is still awaited to effectively reflect the necessary 
limits to the principle of precaution. 
6. Concluding Comments 
The rapidity of the world evolution, the potential impact of human action on the 
environment and the development of new technologies call for more precaution at an 
earlier stage of potential environmental degradation or depletion, viz, at the stage of risk, 
rather than danger, of potentiality rather than fatality. Certain risks are the result of 
(240) Side, 'The Future of North Sea Oil Industry Abandonment in the Light of the Brcnt Spar 
Decision', 21 Marine Policy (1997), 45, at 47. It is in this respect very significant to note that 1997 
Esbjerg Ministerial Declaration on the North Sea, although formally (re)endorsing the precautionary 
principle, provides for the disposal of decommissioned offshore installation on land (Para. 54); UK, 
alongside France and Norway, entered a 'reservation' on that paragraph, on the ground that disposal on land was not always necessarily the best practicable environmental option. 
(241) See Twelfth Report: Best Practicable Environmental Option, at Chap. 3 (summary table page 14); 
see also relevant annexes of the international treaties referred above. 
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complex processes which require years of research before science can possibly offer 
some explanation and suggest some elements of solution. Meanwhile, those risks are 
just too consequential to speculate on their non-realisation, and measures are promptly 
needed, at least to prevent the situation from deteriorating further or the risk to be 
realised. 
It can be gleaned from state practice, both at domestic and international level, that 
there is a growing consensus on the need to act and take concrete measures with regards 
to certain environmental threats despite the lack of scientific certainty. It is still too 
early, however, to decide how far States, and any other non-state entities involved in 
hazardous activities, are ready to go in the implementation of precautionary measures to 
avert uncertain risks, for the sake of the long term hypothetical benefit of mankind, 
often at the expense of their own immediate and very concrete benefit. Nor is it clear 
how far developed countries' apparent commitment to the principle of precaution will 
encourage them to overcome their traditional reticence effectively to assist, financially 
and technically, less developed countries in implementing a precautionary policy. 
Whilst it seems evident that the principle of precaution, at least in the context of 
international environmental law, cannot have the ambition of setting rigid, definitive and 
universal criteria to distinguish those risks which are acceptable from those which are 
not, the actual efficiency of the principle in the long run, and indeed its legal significance, 
will depend upon a clarification of the circumstances and conditions of its application. 
F'x 
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1. Introduction 
In 1893, the US representative Carter justified seizure of a British vessel taking seals 
on the high seas as a measure necessary to preserve fur seals from over exploitation, 
rightfully taken by the US as the 'trustee of the herd for the benefit of mankind'; he 
stated: 
«The Earth being designed for the permanent abode of man, each 
generation is entitled to its use, and the law of nature forbids that any 
waste should be committed to the disadvantage of the succeeding 
tenants. )XI) 
(1) Pacific Fur Seals arbitration (1893), 1 Moore International Arbitrations, 755, at 843; for a commcnt 
on the case, Birnie & Boyle, 492 et sequ. 
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Over a century later, a Supreme Court Judge in the Philippines recognised locus 
standi to children acting for themselves, for others of their generations and for future 
generations; he affirmed that 
«Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only 
be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right 
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. »(2) 
The argument of equity for future generations is by no means recent(3), nor is it the 
exclusive attribute of environmental law(4). Nevertheless, recent developments in this 
area of law, most notably the emergence of the paradigm of sustainable development 
integrating intergenerational equity in its very definition(s), has turned intergenerational 
equity into an unavoidable principle of international environmental law, regularly cited 
(2) Minor Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Supreme Court 
of the Philippines (Justice Davide), 30 July 1993; 33 IL f (1994), 173, at 185 (hereaferMinors Oposa 
case). 
(3) Hence for instance, the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Para. 1, 
recognises « 
... 
the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding for future generations the great 
natural resources represented by the whales... »; likewise, the 1968 African Convention on Nature, Para. 
6, expresses States' desire to a joint action for the conservation and utilisation of environment assets «by 
establishing and maintaining their rational utilization for the present and future welfare of mankind. 
Brown Weiss found that intergenerational equity, and to a certain extend, the idea that the earth is held in 
trust for future generations, are deeply anchored in the Judeo-Christian traditions and various Asian non 
theistic traditions, and are reflected in Islamic law, in most African systems, and in certain social and 
civil legal systems, as illustrated by the numerous States Constitutions referring expressly to 
intergenerational equity, or more globally, to a generic right to a clan and healthy environment; Brown 
Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and 
Intergenerational Equity (United Nations University Press/Transnational Publisher, 1989) (here! cr 
referred to after the title), 18 et sequ. A number of national constitutional provisions on environmental 
rights and duties are reproduced in In Fairness to Future Generations, Appendix B. 
(4) The 1945 Charter of the United Nations for instance, expresses the commitment of States «to save 
succeeding enerations from the scourge of war... » (Para. 1). Reference to intergenerational equity is also 
made in the area of economic development; hence for instance, the 1974 NIEO Declaration mentions, in 
introduction to its operational part, States' determination to work urgently for the establishment of a 
NIEO inter alia «... to ensure (... ) peace and justice for present and future generations. Along the same 
line, the 1970 Strategy for the Second Development Decade provides that «... the 1970s must make a step 
forward in securing the well-being and happiness not only of the present generation but also of the 
generations to come» (Para. 4); see also 1980 Strategy for the Third Development Decade, Pam. 41. No 
referenceto intergenerational equity was contained either in the 1961 Strategy for the First Development, 
or in the 1990 Strategy for the Fourth Development Decade (although the latter make reference to the 
future world; Paras. 19 and 20). Brown Weiss argues, in a rather disputable fashion, in favour of the 
inherently intergenerational nature of certain human rights documents referring to peoples, human family 
or mankind; see infra Legal Basis for a Planetary Trust: Intcrgcnerational Equity as a Fundamental 
Principle Deeply Rooted in International Law. At a more philosophical level, intergenerational equity 
was associated to the indirectly environment-related debate on population control; see Parfit's path- breaking contribution on the issue, 'Overpopulation and the Quality of Life', in Singer (ed. ), Applied 
Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1985), Chap. X; see infra n. 89. 
(5) See infra iii. Intergenerational Equity as a Normative Framework for Sustainable Development. 
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in declarations(6) and treaties(7). The extremely vague wording of intergenerational 
equity clauses, inter alia their lack of clearly articulated implications, reveals the 
essentially inspirational nature of their message calling for a long-term perspective on 
environmental issues and policies(8). Some authors, however(9), consider that 
(6) Inter alia 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, prcambular Paras. 6 and 7, and 
operational Princ. 1 and 2; 1975 Economic Charter, Art. 30; 1975 Helsinki Final Act of CSCE, Sect. on 
the Environment, preambularPara. 1; Res. 3384 (XXX), 10 November 1975, proclaiming the Declaration 
of the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interest of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind, 
Art. 4; 1980 Resolution on the Historical Responsibility of States for the Preservation of Nature for 
Present and Future Generations, Para. 1; 1980 Salzburg Declaration, Para. 1.1; 1982 World Charter for 
Nature, preambular Para. 5; 1986 Tunis Declaration on Environment and Development, 1(3); 1986 
WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development, Art. 2; 1982 Nairobi 
Declaration, Para. 10; 1988 Resolution Res. /43/53, on the Protection of Global Climate for Present and 
Future Generations of Mankind; 1989 Paris Economic Declaration of the G7, Sect. on the Environment, 
Para. 33; 1989 Langkawi Declaration of the Commonwealth Heads of Governments, Para. 1; 1989 
Brasilia Declaration on the Environment, Para. 1; 1990 Conclusion of the Siena Forum on International 
Law of the Environment, Para. 13(f); 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, 
Preamble, and Para. 5; 1990 Bangkok Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, Para. 15; 
1990 Tlatelolco Platform on Environment and Development, Pam. 7; Para. 2; 1991 ECE Draft Charter on 
Environmental Rights and Obligations, Princ. 1; 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Princ. 3; 1992 Forestry Principles, Princ. 2(b); 1995 IUCN Draft International Covenant 
on Environment and Development, Art. 5; 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
Management, Introduction and Art. 6(2); Statement of Conclusions of the intermediate Ministerial 
Meetings on the Protection of the North Sea, Bergen, March 1997, Princ. 2.1; the Statement of 
Conclusions is posted on the North Sea Conference website @ 
<http: //odin. dep. no/md/pubi/conf/soc. htnd>. 
(7) See for instance 1972 World Heritage Convention, Art. 4; 1972 London Convention on Dumping of 
Wastes, implicitly; 1973 CITES, preambular Para. 1; 1976 Apia Convention on Nature in the South 
Pacific, preambular Para. 6; 1976 Barcelona Convention on Mediterranean Sea, preambular Para. 2; 1977 
ENMOD Convention, Preamble; 1978 Kuwait Convention on the Marine Environment in the Arabian 
Gulf, Preamble; 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species, preambular Pam. 2; 
1979 Moon Treaty, Art. 4(1); 1979 Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife, 
preambular Para. 3; 1982 Jeddah Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 
Environment, Art. 1(1); 1983 Cartagena Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Oil Spills in 
the Wider Caribbean Region, Preamble; 1985 Nairobi Convention on the Marine Environment in East 
Africa, Para. 2; 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature, preambular Para. 1; 1986 
Noumea Convention on the Environment in the South Pacific, preambular Para. 3; 1987 Montreal 
Protocol on the Ozone Layer, implicitly; 1989 ACP-EEC Lomb IV, Art. 33; 1992 ECE Watercourses 
Convention, Art. 2(5); 1992 Biodiversity Convention, preambular Para. 23; 1992 Climate Change 
Convention, Art. 3(1) (no reference to future generations is contained in 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 
Climate Change Convention); 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents Convention, prcambular Para. 1; 1992 
OSPAR Marine Environment Convention, preambular Pam. 3; 1992 Baltic Sea Convention, implicit in 
Preamble; 1994 Desertification Convention, preambular Paras. 15 and 26; 1997 UN Convention on the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, preambular Para. 5; 1976/95 Barcelona Convention 
on Mediterranean Sea, preambular Para. 2, Art. 4(2). 
(8) See Birnie & Boyle, 210-212; Birnie, 'International Environmental Law: its Adequacy for Present 
and Future Needs', in Huffell & Kingsbury (eds. ), The International Politics of the Environment 
(Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 2, at 79; Boyle, Review of In Fairness To Future Generations, 40 ICLQ 
(1991), 230; Jurgielewicz, Global Environmental Change and International Law: Prospects for 
Progress in the Legal Order (University Press of America, 1996), 65; Pasck, 'Obligations to Future 
Generations: A Philosophical Note', 20 World Development (1992), 513. Sands takes a more cautious 
stance, and while recognising that the principle is now 'firmly implemented in international law', he 
believes that the principle could have been accepted as «an article of good faith, drawing on pre-existing 
language in earlier treaty and other soft-law developments; see infra n. 169. Some scholars dismiss the (continued) 
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intergenerational equity is a source of legally binding rights and obligations between 
successive generations, which is most frequently institutionalised in the form of a 
planetary trust(10), or more rarely stewardship(11), parens patriae(12) or partnership(13) 
very idea of a moral obligation to future generations, let alone that of a legal obligation, as complete 
incoherence; D'Amato, 'Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global 
Environment? ', Agora 
- 
What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to 
Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AJIL (1990), 190; Schwartz, 'Obligations to Posterity', in 
Sikora & Barry (eds. ), Obligations to Future Generations (Temple University Press, 1978), 3; Warren, 
'Do Potential People Have Moral Rights? ', in Sikora & Barry (eds. ), Obligations to Future Generations 
(Temple University Press, 1978), 14. 
(9) Brown Weiss, `The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 11 Ecology LQ 
(1984), 495 (hereafter referred to after the title); Gündling, `Our Responsibility to Future Generations', 
Agora 
- 
What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental 
Responsibility, 84 AJIL (1990), 206; Kavka, 'The Futurity Problem', in Sikora & Barry (eds. ), 
Obligations to Future Generations (Temple University Press, 1978), 180; Singh, 'Sustainable 
Development as a Principle of International Law', in De Waart et al. (ed. ), International Law and 
Development (Martinus Nijhog 1988), Chap. 1.1; Redgwell, 'Intergenerational Equity and Global 
Warming', in Churchill & Freestone (eds. ), International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijholf, 1991), Chap. 3; Young, For Our Children's Children : Some Practical 
Implications of Inter-Generational Equity and the Precautionary Principle, Resource Assessment 
Commission Occasional Publication No. 6 (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993); 
Chowdhury apparently concurs with the idea of a planetary trust, although he harbours certain reservations 
as to the practical utility ofBrown Weiss' theory, 'Intergenerational Equity: Substratum of the Right to 
Sustainable Development', in Chowdhury et al. (eds. ), The Right to Development in International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), Chap. 3.1. The theory of intergenerational equity and planetary trust has also 
found strong support in the Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (see Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development (Graham & 
Trotman/Nijhoff, 1987), at 43), as well as in the progressive ICJ Judge Weeramantry, see his separate and 
dissenting opinions in Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment, 
ICJ Rep. 1993,38, Weeramantry (sep. op. ), at Paras. 240 et sequ.; ICJ's order on the Request for an 
Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgement of 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, ICJ Rep. 1995,288, at 341; 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Rep. 1996,1, 
Weeramantry (dis. op. ), Point II(3)(b). See also Saladin & Zenger's advocacy for a declaration on the 
rights of future generations, in Rechte Künftiger Generationen (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1988), at 46-47. 
10) 'The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity'. 
(11) Supanich, 'The Legal Basis of Intergenerational Responsibility: An Alternative View 
- 
The Sense 
of Intergenerational Identity', 3 Yb1EL (1992), 94; see also Clingan, 'The Law of the Sea Convention : 
International Obligations and Stewardship Responsibilities of Coastal Nations', 17 OCM (1992), 201; 
Dan Tarlock, 'Stewardship Sovereignty: The Next Step in Former Prime Minister Palmer's Logic', 42 
Washington University Journal of Urban & Contemporary Law (1992), 21, at 26; Hamrin, `A New 
Paradigm for Global Justice and Stewardship', 21 Future (1989), 608; Redgwell, 'Energy and 
Environment: From State Sovereignty to National/International Stewardship 7', Conference Paper, 
Aberdeen, 1996; Van Dyke, The Rio Principles and our Responsibilities of Ocean Stewardship', 31 
OCM(1996), 1. Redgwell regards the principle of stewardship or custodianship, which she bases upon 
WCED's definition of sustainable development, as the antidote for still prevailing international legal 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, that leaves States free to exhaust domestic non- 
renewable energy resources. It is unclear whether Redgwell, and indeed the other authors referring to a 
stewardship, construe it in the sense of a trust, or as a mere expression of the necessity to consider the 
interests of generations to come even in the exploitation of resources under State jurisdiction. 
(12) Minors Oposa case, supra n. 2. 
(13) Brown Weiss, `Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment', Agora - What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental (continued) 
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The purpose of this Chapter is not to offer a comprehensive picture, nor to compile a 
detailed analysis of the planetary trust theory and related controversies. It sets out, in a 
first stage, to evaluate the extent to which an hypothetical planetary trust could fulfil 
the same functions as the domestic institution, and effectively compel the present 
generation to preserve the corpus of the environment held in trust for future generations, 
and thereby secure an equitable satisfaction of immediate needs 'without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'(14) 
In the light of the fundamental contextual differences existing between the domestic 
institution and the proposed international institution, relating to the 'object' in trust and 
tothe implementation and supervision mechanism, any attempt to create an international 
institution similar to the domestic institution to ensure a sustainable management of 
environmental resources appears particularly hazardous, if not a purely theoretical 
exercise. 
It is argued that, albeit short of constituting a genuine source of rights and obligations, 
the principle of intergenerational equity represents nonetheless a valuable inspirational 
principle of international environmental law, that could 'revive' the often neglected (but 
existing) temporal dimension of the law. As underlined by Mostafa Tolba such 
dimension is particularly relevant in the area of the environment: 
«The ecological inter-dependence, which transpierces the world 
community, has obtained not only spatial, but also temporal (inter. 
generational) parameters. »(15) 
This chapter is more particularily concerned with the so-called intergenerational 
(temporal) dimension of equity; intragenerational equity and partnership are more 
appropriately dealt with in other Chapters(16). 
Responsibility, 84 AJIL (1990), 198; In Fairness of Future Generations, 23.1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development refers in very vague terms, to a global partnership to ensure better future 
for all (Princ. 21). See also Young, supra n. 9, at 3. The theory of a 'partnership' between generations, 
mentioned but otherwise not elaborated upon by Brown Weiss, is not directly considered in the present 
chapter, although most of the remarks made with regard to a planetary trust equally applies to an 
intergenerational partnership. One could perhaps add that such partnership appears even less realistic than 
a planetary trust, as it is particularly difficult to conceive a partnership relation between an existing and a 
not yet existing entity; a partnership is really based on the co-operation of the partners; see infra Chap. 5, 
Principle of Partnership. 
(14) See infra C) Intergenerational Equity as a Normative Framework for Sustainable Development. 
(15) Note of UNEP Executive Director on the Implications of the "Common Concern of Mankind" 
Concept on Global Environmental Issues to the UNEP Group of Legal Experts Meeting of Malta, 13-15 
December 1990, reproduced in Cancado Trindade (ed. ), Human Rights, Sustainable Development and 
Environment (Instituto Interamericano de Desarrollo, 1995), 318. 
(16) On equity and solidarity between States, see infra Chap. 5 Principle of Partnership; on the so-called 
'infra-State' partnership, or partnership between States and individuals, and between individuals, see infra Chap. 6, Principe Pertaining to Public Participation. 
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2. Environmental Fairness 
Intergenerational equity in the field of the environment is based on the fundamental 
tenet that human beings today (the present generation) are due to preserve a certain 
environmental quality to human beings yet to come (future generations). To attribute a 
legal framework to the argument of intergenerational responsibility, the proponents of a 
legal conception of intergenerational equity resort to the fiction of a planetary trust 
modelled upon the Common law institution of trust and more particularly that of the 
charitable trust(17). 
One should perhaps mention from the outset that references to domestic institutions 
in international law are not rare; Judge McNair pointed out in his separate opinion in the 
ICJ advisory opinion concerning the Status of South-West Africa that «international law 
has recruited and continues to recruit many of its rules and institutions from private 
systems of law»(18). In the same vein, the International Court of Justice recognised the 
importance of institutions of municipal law in international law in the Barcelona 
Traction Ltd case, stressing however that «[the recognition of the importance of 
institutions of municipal law] does not necessarily imply drawing any analogy between 
[international law] institutions and those of municipal law, nor does it amount to making 
rules of international law dependent upon categories of municipal law»(19) 
It is also worth mentioning that only few references are made by the tenants of the 
planetary trust theory to the trusteeship system provided for under the 1945 UN 
Charter, Chapters 12 and 13(20). It is accurate to argue that UN trusteeship is closer to a 
'tutelle internationale' to foster smooth transition from colonial rule to self-government, 
than it is to a genuine trust as understood in domestic law. Trusteeship agreements 
would provide for all legal, administrative and juridical powers of the trustee in the non 
(17) In fact, even the moral nature of intergenerational obligations is the object of a very sharp 
philosophical debate; see infra, i. Moral Foundations for Planetary Rights and Obligations: the Moral 
Sense of Obligations to Future Generations. 
(18) ICJ Rep. 1950,128, McNair (sep. op. ), at 148. 
(19) ICJ Rep. 1970,3, Paras. 37-38. 
(20) Some authors consider that the trust is already firmly implanted in international law in the form of 
the mandate system set up under the League of Nations, and constitute therefore a 'general principle of 
law' under 1945 ICJ Statute, Art. 38(1)(c); see for instance Redgwell, `Intergenerational Equity and 
Global Warming', in Churchill & Freestone (eds. ), International Law and Global Climate Change 
(Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), Chap. 3, at 43. Others on the other hand, without 
invoking the mandate system set up under the League of Nations, simply referto the increasing tendency, 
more particularly in international environmental law, to set up trust funds to finance the implementation 
of specific conventions, or environmentally friendly projects; see on that point inter alia Sand, Trusts for 
the Earth, New Financial Mechanisms for International Environmental Protection, Occasional Paper 
(Hull University Press, 1994), and infra Chap. 5/3/i. Financial Assistance: Additionally and Compensation. 
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self-governing territory, but entailed no dissociation of the beneficial and legal ownership 
as such. 
The trusteeship system was primarily concerned with international peace and 
security, economic, political, social and educational advancement, and respect for human 
rights(21). Nonetheless, the ICJ stated that the mandate system established under the 
Covenant of League of Nations «was created in the interests of the inhabitants of a 
territory and of humanity in general, as an international institution with an international 
object 
-a sacred trust of civilization(22). Judge McNair, dissenting from the advisory 
opinion on the Status of South-West Africa, drew upon the American and English laws 
on trust to outline the main characteristics of the lease under the league of Nations 
mandate system(23). 
The planetary trust theory postulates that each generation receives a natural and 
cultural legacy in trust from previous generations and holds it in trust for future 
generations(24). Hence the duties borne by the present generation with respect to the 
(21) See the reproduction of texts of the various trusteeship agreements concluded under the aegis of the 
UN Charter in Ku (ed. ), A Comprehensive Handbook of the United Nations, a Documentary Presentation 
in Two Volumes (Monarch Press, 1979), 594 et sequ. For a comprehensive reading of the UN Charter 
provisions on trusteeship, see Simma (ed. ), The Charter of the United Nations, a Commentary (Oxford 
University Press, 1995), at 933 et sequ. 
(22) Advisory opinion concerning the Status of South-West Africa, ICI Rep. 1950,128, at 132; South 
West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1966,6, at Para. 51. 
(23) ICI Rep. 1950,128, at 148-149. 
(24) In Fairness to Future Generations, 2. Brown Weiss offered the most comprehensive and acclaimed 
contribution to the legal debate on intergenerational equity, and is accountable for a great part of the 
planetary trust theory, inter alia with her path-breaking article entitled 'The Planetary Trust: 
Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 11 Ecology LQ (1984), 495, subsequently further elaborated 
in In Fairness to Future Generations. See also from the same author: 'Conflicts Between Present and 
Future Generations Over New Natural Resources', in Dupuy (ed. ), The Settlement of Disputes on the New 
Natural Resources, Hague Academy of International Law Workshop 1982 (Martinus Nijhog 1983), 177; 
'Conservation and Equity Between Generations', in Buergenthal (ed. ), Contemporary Issues in 
International Law: Essays in Honour of L. B. Sohn, (N. P. Engel Publisher, 1984), 245; 'International 
Law, Common Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity: Research in Progress', in Dupuy (ed. ), The 
Future of International Law of the Environment', Hague Academy of International Law Workshop 1984 (Martinus Nijhofl; 1985), 445; Intergenerational Justice and Intergencrational Law', in Busuttil et al. (eds. ), Our Responsibilities Towards Future Generations, A Programme of UNESCO and the 
International Environment Institute (Foundation for International Studies & UNESCO, 1990), 95; 'Our 
Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment', Agora 
- 
What Obligation Does Our 
Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AJIL (1990), 
198; 'Intergenerational Equity: Legal Framework for Global Environmental Change', in Brown Weiss 
(ed. ), Environmental Change and International Law: New Challenges (United Nations University Press, 
1992), Chap. 12; 'Intergenerational Equity: Towards International Legal Framework', in Choucri (ed. ), 
Global Accord: Environmental Challenges and International Responses (MIT, 1993), Chap. 10; 
'International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order', 81 Georgetown LJ (1993), 676; 'Environmental Equity: the Imperative for the Twenty-First Century', in 
Lang (ed. ), Sustainable Development and International Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), Chap. 3; 'Environmental Equity and International Law', in UNEP (ed. ), UNEP's New Way Forward: Environmental Law and Sustainable (UNEP, 1995), Chap. 2; Intergenerational Equity and Rights of Future Generations', in Cancado Trindade (ed. ), Human Rights, Sustainable Development and (continued) 
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management of the corpus of the trust flow from its quality of trustee, whilst the rights 
vested in future (and present) generations inhere in their status as beneficiaries of the 
trust; intergenerational rights and obligations have therefore a legal as much as moral 
value. The prime objective of the planetary trust is «to sustain the welfare of future 
generations» (25). 
i. Generalities on the Institution of Trust in English Law 
The trust is a mechanism proper to the systems of Common law(26), which was 
created, developed and originally enforced on the basis of equitable and just 
the Environment, Seminärio de Brasilia de 1992 (Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, Banco 
Interamericano de Desarrollo, 1995), 71; Intergenerational Fairness for Fresh Water Resources', 25 EPL 
(1995), 231. The planetary trust theory presented in this chapter draws essentially from Brown Weiss' 
theory, insofar as it is not substantially departed from by the other tenants of the theory. 
(25) ` The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', at 508. 
(26) By 'Common law systems', one ought to understand those legal systems progressively built upon 
decisions of superior courts as source of law, as opposed to civil continental systems based upon various 
codes elaborated in the previous and present centuries, and themselves inspired by Roman Law; see 
Bailey & Gunn, Smith & Bailey on the Modern English Legal System (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) 
(hereafterreferredto afterthe title), 4 et sequ. For practical reasons, and although the planetary trust theory 
was primarily developed by American scholars hence based on American Common law and jurisprudence, 
major focus is laid in the present chapter on the English Common law and the English system of equity jurisprudence. The English trust was adopted, with some qualification, by the Crown colonies, and the 
13 original American States, and constitutes the very foundation of American trust law. Notwithstanding 
minor differences subsequently introduced as a result of separate evolution of the American and English 
Common and Equity law, the American trust has remained very similar to its original model; Bogert, 
Trusts, 6th edn (West Publishing Co., 1987), 5 et sequ. (hereafterBogert, Trusts). 
Despite the fact that a small number of civil law countries have introduced the institution of trust in their 
legal system by the means of legislation (for instance Puerto Rico, Cuba, Mexico, and in the US, 
Louisiana, which legal system is founded on the civil law, reported in Bogert, Trusts, 7), the trust 
remains a peculiarity of Common law systems. And indeed, the lack of acquaintance with the long 
tradition and precedents related to the trust of civilian lawyers often means that the trust in civil legal 
systems differs from the Common law trust; see Fratcher, 'Trust', in International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, Vol. V, Chap. 11 (J. C. B. Mohr, 1972), Sect. 100-123; Spirou, 'Une lacune du droit 
civil: Le Trust', 45 Revue Hellenique de Droit International (1992), 195; see also Dreyer, Le Trust en 
droit suisse (Etudes suisse de droit international, Vol. 21,1981). Nevertheless, several 'civil law' 
institutions sharing some of the features of the trust, or other legal situations, provide close comparison 
with the way trusts operate; Fratcher, 'Trust', ibid., Sect. 124-141. See also Merryman's enlightening 
comparative study of the principal institutions of property law under Italian law and English Common 
law, 'Ownership and Estate (Variations on a theme by Lawson)', 48 Tulane LR (1974), 916. For a brief 
review of trust-like devices under German, Danish and French systems, see Wilson (ed. ), Trusts and 
Trust-Like Devices, United Kingdom Comparative Law Series, Vol. 5 (The Chameleon Press, 1981). 
The unfamiliarity of civil practitioners with the institution of trust was particularly clearly illustrated with 
the difficulty met by the Swiss Federal Court (Schweizerischer Bundesgericht; Tribunal F6ddral) when 
faced with the question of the validity and effects of a trust constituted in Zurich, by an American citizen, 
appointing a Swiss Bank as trustee. Not acquainted with the institution, the Federal Court finally decided 
to resort to analogies and assimilated the reality of the trust in that particular case, to a combination of no 
less than three Swiss private law institutions, viz. (1) fiduciary agreement (fiduziarische 
Eigentumsübertragung); (2) undertaking to give (Schenkungsversprechen); (3) provision in favour of a 
third party (Vertrag zugunsten Dritter); Harrison v. Schweizerische Kreditanstalt (1970), BGE 96 11 79, 
partly translated in French at JT 1971 1322, see more particularly Para. 8. For a thorough study of the (continued) 
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considerations(27) rather on the basis of legal considerations(28). For this reason, the 
institution of trust is regarded as the 'outstanding creation of equity'(29). 
For want of a unanimous definition of trust(30), the trust can be defined after the 
1985 Hague Convention of the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition(31): 
difficulties to apprehend the institution under Swiss law, see Dreyer, Le Trust en droit suisse (Georg, 
1981); Flattet, 'Le Trust en droit suisse', in La fiducie ou du trust dans les droits occidentaux 
francophones, 44 Revuejuridique et politique, independance et cooperation (1990), 263. The suggestion 
was also made by certain civil law scholars, to model the right to use environmental heritage on the 
Roman law institution of ususfructus; see Sambon, 'L'usufruit, un modele pour le droit d'usage du 
patrimoine environmental', in Ost & Gutwirth (eds. ), Quel avenir pour le droit de I'environnement ?, 
Actes du colloque organisd par le Centre d'8tude du droit de 1'environnement et le Centrum interactie 
recht en technologie (Facultes Universitaires Saint-Louis, 1996), 173. For a description of the main 
features of the institution of ususfructus in Roman law: Schmidlin & Cannata, Droit Prive Romain, Vol. 
I (Payot, 1984), 200 et sequ. 
(27) In Common law systems, a classic eighteenth century dictum is usually quoted, which defines equity 
as «... not part of the law, but a moral virtue, which qualifies, moderates, and reforms the rigour, 
hardness, and edge of the law, and is universal truth; it also assists the law where it is defective and weak 
in the constitution (... ) and defends the law from crafty evasions, delusions, and new subtleties, invented 
and contrived to evade and elude the common law, whereby such as have undoubted rights are made 
remedyless; and this is the office of equity, to support and protect the common law from shifts and crafty 
contrivances against justice of the law>>; Lord Dudley and Ward v. Lady Dudley (1705), Prec. Ch. 241, at 
241, relevant extracts in Snell's Principles of Equity, 6. Contrast this definition with the definition of 
equity in international law, infra ii. Elements of a Planetary Trust. 
(28) Equity Courts developed in England in the late sixteenth century, as a mechanism to correct or 
mitigate the rigidity of Common law principles developed and enforced by the Courts of Common law. 
The Courts of Equity, the Chancery Courts, would reach a decision on equitable considerations where a 
strict compliance with the precedent developed by superior courts would lead to unfair or absurd results. 
For a brief historical overview of development of Equity in parallel to the Common law, see Smith & 
Bailey on the Modern English Legal System, 4 et sequ. See further on equity as a source of law in the 
English legal system, Baker & Langan, Snell's Principles of Equity, 28th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 1982) 
(hereafter referred to after the title), Chap. 1; Martin, Hanbury & Maudsley: Modern Equity, 13th edn (Stevens & Sons, 1989) (hereafter referred to after the title), Chap. 1; Pettit, Equity and the Law of 
Trusts, 8th edn (Butterworths, 1997), Chap. 1. 
(29) One could perhaps note that the ancestor to the trusts, the uses, were introduced into England Mar 
the Norman Conquest, in 1066 ADD, but were not enforced by the Courts before the fifteenth century. 
Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts, supra n. 28, at 10. On the historical sources of the institution of 
trust in English law, see Moffat, Trusts Law, Text and Materials, 2nd edn (Butterworths, 1994), Chap. 
1; Parker & Mellows: The Modern Law of Trust, Chap. 1. There has been a tendency to codify parts 
- 
yet not all- of the judicial decisions composing the body of trust law, both in England and in the US; see 
in England, the Trustee Act 1925; the Judicial Trustees Act 1896; the Perpetuities and Accumulations 
Act 1964; the Public Trustee Act 1966; the Variation of Trusts Act 1958; the Charitable Trusts Act 
1853-1860; The Charitable Trusts (Validation) Act 1954; the Charities Acts 1960,1985,1992,1993. In 
the US, trust codes have been enacted in several States, and some attempts were made to have a uniform 
codification of parts of the trust law, see Bogert, Trusts, Sect. 7. The only comprehensive, yet private, 
initiative to codify American trust law was made by the American Law Institute, with its Restatement of 
the American Law of Trust, first compiled in 1935 and revised in 1957 (Restatement of Trust, Second; 
hereinafterrefen-edto as 1957 US Second Restatement of Trust). 
(30) The old controversy with respect to the very definition of trust is but an illustration of the 
complexity of the institution itself; for a review of the most common definitions of trust, see Parker & 
Mellows: The Modern Law of Trusts, 7. See also the 'compiled' definition proposed by Pettit, Equity 
and the Law of Trusts, supra n. 28, at 22. 
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«[T]he term 'trust' refers to the legal relationships created 
-inter vivos or 
on death- by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the 
control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose. A 
trust has the following characteristics 
-a the assets constitute a separate fund 
and are not part of the trustee's own estate; b title to the trust assets stands in 
the name of the trustee or in the name of another person on behalf of the 
trustee; c the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is 
accountable, to manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance with 
the terms of the trust and the special duties imposed upon him by law. » 
The trust thus refers to a form of property holding, purported to conciliate 
successive (essentially patrimonial) interests and built upon the dissociation between 
legal title and beneficial or equitable title over a same property(32). The dissociation of 
interests (a) ensures a disinterested management of the trust, freed from any personal 
interests of the person or entity in charge; and (b) allows the creation of equitable 
beneficial interests recognised and protected by law, without complicating the legal title 
to the element in trust(33). 
The trustee, as the 'holder of property belonging beneficially to others'(34), is vested 
with the authority necessary to maintain and advance the trust res, including that of 
selling and mortgaging the property in trust(35). On the other hand, the trustee is bound 
by a number of duties inherent to a proper management of the trust. Apart from the 
specific duties associated with, or imposed by each particular trust, three substratum 
duties can be identified(36): 
(31) Art. 2. The Convention purports to establish common principles between States on the law 
applicable to trust. The quoted definition does not significantly differ from that given in the 1957 US 
Second Restatement of Trust, § 2. 
(32) Generally on the institution of trust in English law, see inter alia Hayton, Underhill & Hayton: 
Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, 14th edn (Butterworths, 1987) (hereafter referred to after the title); 
Moffat, Trusts Law, Text and Materials, ibid supra n. 29; Oakley, Parker & Mellows: The Modem 
Law of Trusts, 6th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 1994) (hereafter referred to after title); Pettit, Equity and the 
Law of Trusts, ibid supra n. 28. For a more concise presentation, Fratcher, 'Trust', in International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. V, Chap. 11 (J. C. B. Mohr, 1972), Sect. 1-100; Redgwell, `Le 
concept de trust en droit anglais', in Ost & Gutwirth (eds. ), Quel avenir pour le droit de 
1 environnement ?, Actes du colloque organise par le Centre d'etude du droit de 1'environnement et le 
Centrum interactie recht en technologie (Facultes Universitaires Saint-Louis, 1996), 211. 
(33) Hanbury& Maudsley: Modem Equity, 42. 
(34) Moffat, Trusts Law, Text and Materials, supra n. 29,316. 
(35) Trustee Act 1925, Part II; more extensive powers can be conferred by the terms of the trust; Moffat, 
Trusts Law, Text and Materials, supra n. 29,321 et sequ.; Parker & Mellows: The Modern Law of 
Trusts, Chap. 12; Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts, supra n. 28, Chap. 17; Snell's Principles of Equity, Chap. 8; Underhill & Hayton: Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, Chap. 12. See also the 
1957 US Second Restatement of Trust, §§ 186-196 
(36) Moffat, Trusts Law, Text and Materials, supra n. 29,316 et sequ.; Parker & Mellows: The Modem 
Law of Trusts, Chap. 12; Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts, supra n. 28, Chap. 17; Snell's Principles of Equity, Chap. 7; Underhill & Hayton: Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, Chap. 11. 
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1) Personal execution of the functions of trustee(37); 
2) Management of the trust for the sole benefit of the beneficiary, without the influence 
of a prospective personal profit. This 'fiduciary dimension' of the trust precludes the 
trustee «to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict) )(38); 
3) Honesty, loyalty, and standards of skill and prudence that can be expected from a 
reasonable person in the management of his own affairs(39). 
The beneficial interest varies according to the subject matter and nature of the 
trust(40), and is to be specified, with a sufficient degree of certainty, in the trust 
agreement(41) 
The planetary trust theory draws more particularly upon charitable trust(42), which 
is a special form of trust set up ((for the benefit of large and changing groups of people, 
(37) The trust deed being based upon a particular relationship of confidence existing between the settlor 
and the trustee, the latter is not allowed to delegate his functions; Parker & Mellows: The Modern Law 
of Trusts, Chap. 13. See also 1957 US the Second Restatement of Trust, § 171. 
(38) Bray v. Ford, [1896] AC 44, at 51-52; relevant extracts in Moffat, Trusts Law, Text and Materials, 
supra n. 29, at 545. See also 1957 the US Second Restatement of Trust, § 170. 
(39) Snell's Principles of Equity, 212, refers to the duty of 'utmost diligence' or 'exacta diligentia' of the 
trustee in the performance of his duties and exercise of powers. Also the 1957 US Second Restatement of 
Trust, § 174. 
(40) Where the trust is 'fixed', the beneficial interest is also fixed, whilst it is essentially variable in case 
of discretionary trust; see Hanbury & Maudsley: Modern Equity, 199; also the 1957 US Second 
Restatement of Trust, § 128. 
(41) The requirement of the certainty of the subject matter also implies the clear identification of the 
property in trust. On the three certainties, mentioned below in the text, required for a trust to be valid. 
See also the 1957 US Second Restatement of Trust, § 74. 
(42) The public trust doctrine is also commonly referredto at the national level, and more particularly in 
the US, as a'repository for substantive principles that provide guidance regarding how conflicts in ocean 
and coastal areas should be resolved!; Van Dyke, 'The Rio Principles and our Responsibilities of Ocean 
Stewardship', 31 OCM (1996), 1, at 15. The Roman and Common law theory was revived by Sax's 
leading and widely commented analysis entitled 'The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law. 
Effective Judicial Intervention', 68 Michigan LR (1969-1970), 471; see also Delgado, `Our Better 
Natures :A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and 
Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform', 44 Vanderbilt LR (1991), 1209; Redgwell, 'Le 
concept de trust en droit anglais', supra n. 32,224 et sequ. Originally restrictively applied to the 
traditional uses of navigation, commerce and fishing, the doctrine was expanded in the 1960s, to 
encompass wider uses, such as purely recreational uses, protection and conservation; it emerged more 
recently as a resource planning and management tool. According to that theory, the State acts as a trustee 
with regard to certain common properties, such as shorelands, parklands, navigable waters, and non- 
renewable resources, hence manage and protect them for the use and benefit of the public at large; Archer 
& Casey Jarman, 'Sovereign Rights & Responsibilities : Applying Public Trust Principles to the 
Management of EEZ Space and Resources', 17 OCM (1992), 253. Despite the fact that the public trust 
doctrine draws its origins in the trust doctrine, it has evolved separately to the latter, and inter alia the 
potential intergenerational dimension of the public trust were less exploited, if at all. The public trust 
doctrine is therefore not particularly considered here, although it could constitute a more realistic and 
viable alternative to the planetary trust doctrine, at least as faras the protection of environmental resources 
under domestic jurisdiction is concerned; see Archer& Casey Jarman, ibid.; Nanda, & Ris, 'The Public 
Trust Doctrine :A Viable Approach to International Environmental Protection', 5 Ecology LQ (continued) 
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or to carry out certain exclusively charitable purposes which are beneficial to the 
community at large» (43). With no statutory definition provided of the 'charitable 
purposes' attached to charitable trusts, reference is often made to Lord Macnaghten's 
four-fold classification: 
«'Charity' in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for 
the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the 
advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the 
community, not falling under any of the preceding heads. » (44) 
Lord Macnaghten's residuary class has been interpreted as encompassing trusts for 
environmental purposes(45) 
The charitable trust presents three major advantages compared with the private trust: 
1) Its validity is not conditional upon the adequate certainty of the persons intended 
to benefit from the trust (rule of certainty of object)(46), so long as the charitable 
purpose of the trust is sufficiently clearly set out(47). It also means that, whilst 
the private trust can be enforced by the beneficiaries, it rests upon a specially 
appointed guardian to ensure the enforcement of the charitable trust(48). 
2) It can be set up for a perpetual or indefinite duration(49). 
(1975/76), 291. It is interesting to note that the project of codification of the Swiss torts law embraces the 
so far unknown public trust concept, that would allow not only public authorities, but also environmental 
groups, to claim compensation for the prevention, reparation and compensation costs from the polluter; 
see Revision Haftpflichtrecht, Vorentwurf, drafted by P. Widmer & P. A. Wessner, 18 December 1996. I 
am indebted to Prof. Wessner for providing with a copy of the draft bill. 
(43) Snell's Principles of Equity, 145. Generally on charitable trusts, see Hanbury & Maudsley: Modern 
Equity, Chap. 15; Moffat, Trusts Law, Text and Materials, supra n. 29, Chap. 17 to 19; Parker & 
Mellows: The Modern Law of Trusts, Chap. 9; Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts, supra n. 28, Chap. 
9. Also the 1957 US Second Restatement of Trust, Chap. 11 (§§ 384 et sequ. ) 
(44) Commissioners oflncomev. Pemsel, [1891] AC 531, at 583, relevant extracts in Snell's Principles 
of Equity, 148. The 1957 US Second Restatement of Trust, § 368, echoes word per word the above 
classification to which it adds two more charitable purposes, namely promotion of health, and 
governmental and municipal purposes. 
(45) Moffat, Trusts Law, Text and Materials, supra n. 29,663; Parker & Mellows: The Modern Law of 
Trusts, 333; Redgwell, `Le concept de trust en droit anglais', supra n. 32,217 et sequ. See equally the 
1957 US Second Restatement of Trust, § 374, comment. 
(46) See the 1957 US Second Restatement of Trust, § 112; on the contrary, the Restatement considers 
that «a trust is not a charitable trust if the persons who are set to benefit are not of a sufficiently large or 
indefinite class so that the community is interested in the enforcementof the trust»; ibid. § 375. 
(47) Moffat, Trusts Law, Text and Materials, supra n. 29,628 et sequ.; Pettit, Equity and the Law of 
Trusts, supra n. 28, Chap. 13; Snell's Principles of Equity, 145 et sequ. 
(48) In England, the Attorney General, acting as representative of the Crown, is appointed guardian of all 
charitable trusts; Redgwell, 'Le concept de trust en droit anglais', supra n. 32,215 et sequ. 
(49) The capital in trust only is exempted from the rule against perpetuities; time limits are imposed in 
private as in charitable trusts on the accumulation of the income of the trust; Moffat, Trusts Law, Text 
and Materials, supra n. 29,230. See the 1957 US Second Restatement of Trust, §§ 65b and 112. 
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3) In case of objective impossibility to fulfil the original purpose of the trust, the 
charitable trust avoids the doctrine of lapse; its fund can be affected again to a 
similar charitable purpose (cy-pres rule)(50). 
The duties of the trustee do not differ substantially under a private or charitable 
trust(51), and his powers are limited to those expressly provided for in the terms of the 
trust in addition to those necessary or appropriate to carry out the purpose of the 
trust(52). 
ii. Elements of a Planetary Trust 
The Planetary trust, like the domestic institution it is modelled upon, is based on 
considerations of both spatial and temporal equity(53). By contrast with equity in 
Common law systems, equity in international law does not, in principle(54), constitute a 
source of law distinct from conventional or customary law. Rather, it is an integral part 
of that law, and inspires the judge when dispensing justice and declaring law «on a 
foundation of very general precepts of justice and good faith»(55). The importance of 
equity in the allocation of natural resources was emphasised by Judge Dillard, as 
«particularly relevant when the issues focus on the common use of limited resources and 
the applicable norm of international law is couched in the form of a'standard'»(56). 
The analogy between the proposed planetary trust and the domestic institution 
outlined above is particularly clearly reflected in the statement that «the present 
(50) Moffat, Trusts Law, Text and Materials, supra n. 29,230. Also the 1957 US Second Restatement 
of Trust, § 399. 
(51) See the 1957 US Second Restatement of Trust, § 379. 
(52) See the 1957 US Second Restatement of Trust, § 380. 
(53) In Fairness to Future Generations; see also Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland 
and Jan Mayen, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1993,38, Judge Weeramantry (sep. op. ), at Paras. 242. 
(54) See 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(2), decision ex aequo et bono with the 
consent of the parties to the dispute. 
(55) North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1969,3, at Para. 85. See also The Diversion of 
Water from the Meuse, PCIJ Ser. A/B, Fascicule No 70, Judgment of June 28th, 1937, Judge Huckson 
(sep. op. ), at 76-77. For an extensive review of the role of equity in the decision-making of the ICJ, see 
Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1993,38, 
Judge Weeramantry (sep. op. ). See also Weil, "Towards Relative Normativity in International Law 7' 77 
AJIL (1983), 413. 
(56) Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland, Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), 
Merits, ICI Rep. 1974,3, Judge Dillard (sep. op. ), at 64, n. 1. See also ICJ judgement, Paras. 48-50. 
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generation holds legal title to the resources of the trust, while future generations, 
together with the present generation, share the equitable title... » (57). 
a Framework Criteria 
To facilitate a definition of the terms of the planetary trust within the limits of equity 
and fairness, the following four framework criteria are generally suggested(58): 
1) The leading criterion is that of equity between generations; it commands (a) the 
burden placed upon the present generation to be commensurate with the 
indeterminate future needs and interests, and conversely (b) the cost of the choices of 
the present generation must not be borne disproportionately by future generations. 
Anticipating the critique that intergenerational equity is biased in favour of (future) 
environment, against (immediate) development(59), Brown Weiss affirms that both 
present and future generations are beneficiaries of the trust, thereby putting the needs 
and interests of all generations on the same level(60), and that inter- and 
(57) 
`The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', at 499, n. 15. 
(58) Supra n. 57, at 525 et sequ. 
(59) A classic argument against the planetary trust theory is that «survival until next week is more 
important than the survival of the next generation»; MacNeill, 'Sustainable Development, Meeting the 
Growth Imperative for the 21st Century', in Angell et al. (eds. ), Sustaining Earth: Response to the 
Environmental Threat (Macmillan, 1990), Chap. 17, at 175; the same remark was contained in 
IUCN/WWF/UNEP, Sustaining the Earth (IUCN/WWF/UNEP, 1990), at 175. Gündling, albeit rather 
supportive ofBrown Weiss theory, recognises that «[t]he most difficult challenge to all efforts to define 
and achieve 'intergenerational equity' will turn out to be that we have failed to achieve equity within our 
own generation»; 'Our Responsibility to Future Generations', Agora 
- 
What Obligation Does Our 
Generation Owe to the Next ? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AJIL (1990), 
206, at 211; in the same sense, Boyle notes that «it is already an intractable task to reconcile the 
environmental interests of those here and now in a weak international legal political system, without also 
embracing the interests of the future»; Review of In Fairness To Future Generations, 40 ICLQ (1991), 
230. 
(60) In this respect, Brown Weiss' definition of the purpose of the planetary trust as «to sustain the 
welfare of future generations» is perplexing, supra n. 57, at 523. Although the vast majority of documents 
referring to intergenerational equity relate it to the benefit of present and future generations, certain 
mention expressly only future generations; hence for instance, the 1946 International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling only recognises « 
... 
the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding for 
future generations the great natural resources represented by the whales 
... 
» (preambular Para. 1). 
Likewise, the States party to the 1972 World Heritage acknowledge that «... the duty of ensuring the 
identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural 
and natural heritage 
... 
» belongs primarily to the host State (Art. 4). The 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species uses a similar wording and states that «... each generation of man 
holds the resources of the earth for future generations and has an obligation to ensure that this legacy is 
conserved and, where utilized, is used widely» (pr ambularPara. 2). 
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intragenerational are interrelated, indeed interdependent(61). She also undermines the 
risk of potential conflicts between the needs of successive generations, and assumes 
that as a rule, «the actions to meet the basic needs of the present generation and 
future generations are the Same» (62). 
2) A second criterion pertains to the preservation of sufficient flexibility for future 
generations to define and achieve their own goals and values. Due consideration for 
the interests and needs of future generations does not imply the prediction, by the 
present generation, of the values of future generations(63). In theory, the planetary 
obligations and related rights are not commensurate with anticipated future subjective 
needs; they are determined according to the objective standard referring to the existing 
past, of'an environment in no worse condition than originally received'(64) 
3) In addition, the planetary trust must not strive at imposing universal standards; it is 
to be constructed in such a way as to reflect the various cultures, traditions, social, 
political and cultural systems. 
4) Finally, despite the inherent uncertainty pertaining to the very object and subject 
matters of the planetary trust, the rights and obligations flowing from the trust must 
be reasonably foreseeable and their content sufficiently clear, in accordance with the 
principles of accessibility and foreseeability of the law. 
b. Basic Principles 
Brown Weiss identifies three framework principles of a planetary trust (65) in the 
light of the criteria mentioned above, namely: 
1) The conservation of options, viz. the conservation of the diversity of the natural 
resource base, so as not pre-empt or constrict the environmental options of future 
generations; 
(61) Brown Weiss, 'Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment', Agora 
- What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental 
Responsibility, 84 AJIL (1990), 198,201 et sequ. 
(62) Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Fairness for Fresh Water Resources', 25 EPL (1995), 231, at 233; 
fora criticism of this assumption, see infra, 3/iii. Operational Implications of a Planetary Trust. 
(63) Supra n. 57, at 526; also Brown Weiss, 'Intergenerational Equity. Towards International Legal 
Framework', in Choucri (ed), Global Accord: Environmental Challenges and International Responses (MIT, 1993), Chap. 10, at 343. 
(64) Infra, b. Basic Principles (conservation of quality). 
(65) 
'The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', at 525 et sequ.; In Fairness to Future Generations, 34 et sequ. 
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2) The conservation of quality, viz. the preservation of the planet in no worse 
conditions than originally received. Brown Weiss makes it clear, however, that the 
preservation of quality does not mean that the environment must remain unchanged; 
rather, it signifies that the situation of 
, 
future generations with regard to the 
environment must be similar to the 'original' position of the present generation, either 
in terms of environmental quality or diversity, or in terms of both financial and 
technological capacity to achieve such quality or diversity. 
«We may exhaust more reserves of a natural resource and cause modest 
levels of pollution, but pass a higher level of income, capital and knowledge 
sufficient to enable future generations to develop substitutes for the depleted 
resources and methods for abating or removing pollutants. » (66) 
3) The conservation of access, viz. the maintenance of a 'reasonable and non 
discriminatory right of access' to natural resources to both present and future 
generations(67). 
G Planetary Rights and Obligations 
The above principles are more concretely spelled out in terms of fiduciary rights and 
obligations. Both rights and obligations are construed in collective terms, hence imposed 
upon, or attributed, to present or future generations as a whole rather than vested in 
individual members(68). The planetary duties (duties of use) that rest upon the present 
generation in its capacity of trustee can be classified in five generic categories(69), namely 
(66) In Fairness to Future Generations, 43; also Young, For Our Children's Children : Some Practical 
Implications of Inter-Generational Equity and the Precautionary Principle, Resource Assessment 
Commission Occasional Publication No. 6 (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993), 8 et sequ. 
Young is already more detailed in his consideration of what he calls the 'maintenance of natural capital 
rule, and suggests (economic) ways of calculating the standards of proof. 
(67) This last criterion, albeit implicit, was not expressly mentioned in Brown Weiss earliest 
presentation of the planetary trust theory, it was an addendum of In Fairness to Future Generations, 43. 
(68) In Fairness to Future Generations, at 98. 
(69) Planetary duties are not elaborated upon here, as it is argued later in the thesis that they add nothing 
or little to existing environmental obligations in general, or as related to particular sectors of 
environmental law, see infra iv. Pertinence of the Planetary Trust Theory to Preserve a Certain Quality 
Environment For a more detailed picture of the various duties, see In Fairness to Future Generations, Chap. III; for a more specific consideration of these duties with respect of diverse environmental issues (nuclear wastes, biodiveristy, and renewable resources), ibid. Part II. See also Berkovitz, Pariahs and 
Prophets : Nuclear Energy, Global Warming, and Intergenerational Justice', 17 Columbia JEL (1992), 
245; Redgwell, `Intergenerational Equity and Global Warming', in Churchill & Freestone (eds. ), International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijho$ 1991), Chap. 3, 
at 51 et sequ.; Redgwell, 'Energy and Environment: From State Sovereignty to National/International Stewardship 7, Conference Paper, Aberdeen, 1996, manuscript Sect. VI; Yamin, Principles of Equity in International Environmental Agreements with Special Reference to the Climate Change Convention (FIELD Working Paper, 1994), at 35-36. 
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(1) the duty to take positive steps to conserve natural resources; (2) the duty to ensure 
equitable access to the use and benefit of natural resources; (3) the duty to prevent and 
mitigate adverse impacts on natural resources and environmental quality; (4) the duty to 
minimise disasters and provide emergency assistance; and (5) the duty to bear the 
cleaning and restoration costs of environmental damage. 
Utilisation rights' correspond to the duties of use and secure each generation with a 
right «to receive the planet in no worse condition than that of the previous generation, to 
inherit comparable diversity in the natural and cultural resource bases, and to have 
equitable access to the use and benefits of the legacy»C70). Notwithstanding the inherent 
uncertainty and indeterminacy of the planetary rights, Brown Weiss dismisses the 
theory of 'absolute' planetary obligations, viz. obligations existing independently of 
corresponding rights(71), and stresses on the contrary the vital importance of planetary 
rights against the temptation of present generation «to bias the definition [of planetary 
rights] in favour of itself at the expense of future generations. Intergenerational rights 
have greater moral force than do obligations)>(72). On other hand, quite surprisingly, the 
Brown Weiss leaves it to each generation «the responsibility to set the criteria for 
(70) In Fairness to Future Generations, 95; see further ibid., Chap. IV. 
(71) This point raises the vexed question of the correlatively of rights and obligations, which is the object 
of a old (apparently endless) debate in the doctrine. The debate relates to the question of legal rights 
necessarily implying legal duties as much as to the necessary inference of legal rights from legal duties. 
With regard to the former dimension of the correlation, Brown Weiss takes side with Ago, Donnelly, 
Dworkin, and Raz and argues that «a right (... ) is always associated with a duty or obligation. Ifa person 
has a right, he or she has an interest that is sufficient ground for holding another subject to a duty; In 
Fairness to Future Generations, 99. See also Ago, infra; Donnelly, 'How Are Rights and Duties 
Correlative ? ', 16 Journal of Value Inquiry (1982), 287; Raz, 'Legal Rights', 4 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies (1984), 1. Dworkin cautiously distinguishes between right in the strong sense, viz. legal 
entitlement, and righteousness, in the sense 'right thing for a person to do'; Taking Rights Seriously, 
revised edn, (Duckworth, 1978), Chap. 7. Lyons on the other hand, contends that some, but not all, 
rights have correlative obligations; 'The Correlativity of Rights and Duties', 4 No12s (1970), 45. 
Brown Weiss however, apparently dissents from Ago's view that in international law «the correlation 
between a legal obligation on the one hand and a subjective right on the other admits no exception; as 
distinct from what is said to be the situation in municipal law, there are certainly no obligations 
incumbent on a subject which are not matched an international subjective right of another subject or even (... ) of the totality of the other subjects of the law of nations»; 1970 YbILC Vol. II, Pt. 1, at 192-193. On 
the contrary, she follows the Kelsien argument that not all obligations entail rights, mentioning for 
instance the purely moral obligations. Her dissent might yet be purely apparent, as such moral obligation 
does probably not qualify as legal obligations in the sense understood by Ago. This also means that 
Brown Weiss considers planetary obligations as genuine legal obligations and not merely moral 
commitments. 
(72) ` Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment', Agora - What Obligation 
Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AJIL 
(1990), 198, at 204. According to Brown Weiss' theory, not only future but also the present generations 
would be the holder of planetary rights. Considering that the rights of the present generation have the 
same weight as those of future generations, the deterrent effect of future generations rights might, to a 
certain extent, be undermined by the necessity to satisfy present rights too. 
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defining the action that infringe upon those rights»(73), without any substantive 
guidelines being provided in the balancing of the rights and interests of the (present and 
future) beneficiaries. 
Just as the charitable trust is enforced by a specially appointed guardian of the 
interests of the trust beneficiaries, so would the planetary trust be enforced by local, 
regional, national and international ombudsmen acting proprio motu as some kind of 
'public watchdog', or upon individual complaints from citizens or other States in the 
same way as the various commissions and committees set up in international and 
regional human rights mechanisms(74). 
iii. Intergenerational Equity as a Normative Framework for Sustainable 
Development 
In the area of international environmental law, the emergence of intergenerational 
equity preceded that of sustainable development(75); it originally reflected essentially 
environmental concerns, with no particular considerations paid to the developmental 
needs, more particularly the needs (and constraints) of less developed countries(76). The 
association of the two notions results principally from the integration of 
intergenerational equity as a constitutive component of the classic definition of 
sustainable development: 
(73) In Fairness to Future Generations, 104. 
(74) 
`The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 572 et sequ. Brown Weiss 
proposes also other strategies for implementing the planetary trust, namely (a) the establishment of a 
global network to monitor the diversity of the natural heritage; (b) the setting of a program of scientific 
research and development; (c) a trust fund for future generations to insure against the effects of particular 
hazardous activities. 
(75) Brown Weiss' earlier contributions on planetary trust make only few references to sustainable 
development, then arguably not yet popularised by WCED's Our Common Future; sustainable economic 
development is mentioned once in `The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 
540. Often stressed on the other hand, is the necessity to sustain a healthy and decent environment. 
(76) Although this aspect would be a matter of intragenerational equity, which Brown Weiss has 
expressly reserved for separate consideration; `The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational 
Equity', 499, n. 15. The intragenerational dimension of equity was more particularly considered in 
Fairness to Future Generations; see for instance 157 et sequ. (debt for conservation swap); 222 et sequ. 
(depletion of forestry resources); 239 et sequ. (water resources); 250 et sequ. (soil management); see also 
frequent references to sustainable development throughout the book (see index). The intragenerational 
dimension was further developed in 'International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the 
Emergence of a New World Order', 81 Georgetown LJ (1993), 676, and subsequent related articles; see 
'Environmental Equity: the Imperative for the Twenty-First Century', in Lang (cd. ), Sustainable 
Development and International Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhofl; 1995), Chap. 3; 
'Environmental Equity and International Law', in UNEP (ed. ), UNEP's New Way Forward. - 
Environmental Law and Sustainable (UNEP, 1995), Chap. 2. Brown Weiss' considerations on 
intragenerational equity are addressed more particularly in partnership, infra Chap. 5, Principle of 
Partnership (especially Common But Differentiated Responsibility). 
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«Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: 
" the concept of `needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's 
poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and 
" the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social 
organisation on the environment's ability to meet present and future 
needs. » (77) 
In the light of the above definition, Brown Weiss maintains that the commitment 
which countries made to sustainable development is inherently intergenerational(78). She 
argues further that the recognition of a binding commitment to intergenerational equity, 
which she concedes is " still based essentially on a moral sense of noblesse oblige(79), 
would confer a firm philosophical and legal basis to sustainable development(80). 
". 
(77) Report of the World Commission on Environment & Development, Our Common Future (Oxford 
University Press, 1987), at 43. See also similar definition of sustainable development inter alia in 1992 
OSPAR Marine Environment Convention, Preambular Para. 3; 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Art. 3 in 
fine; 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, introductory Para. 
Reference to future generations is equally, contained in previous and subsequent reports implicitly or 
explicitly endorsing sustainable development; hence the Independent Commission on International 
Development Issues (Brandt Commission), the Commission appointed by the United Nations in the late 
1970s to study the development dimension of the world crisis, concluded inter alia that « (... ) that the 
growth and development of the world economy must be in the future less destructive to natural resources 
and the environment so that the rights of future generations are protected»; North-South: A Programme 
for Survival (Pan Books, 1980), 115. Likewise, the South Commission formally established in 1987 to 
analyse the problems faced duly emphasised that «[t]he challenge to the South is to pursue its 
development with due concern for the protection of the natural environment so that it may sustain the 
present and future generations, stressing further that « [t] he South must not shirk its [environmcntal] 
responsibilities towards future generations; The Challenge to the South (Oxford University Press, 1990), 
23 and 280. More recently, the Commission on Global Governance warned that «[i]ncreasing population 
and economic growth have placed additional pressure on natural resources and the environment, and the 
management ofboth demographic and economic change to safeguard the interests of future generations has 
become an issue of paramount importance»; Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford University Press, 
1995), 27. Among many other instances, one should mention perhaps that Brown Weiss' theory was 
endorsed 'en bloc' by the UN Experts Group on the Identification of the Principles International Law for 
Sustainable Development, convened in Geneva, 26-28 September 1995, under the chairmanship of Brown 
Weiss herself; see Report of the meeting, Paras. 41 et sequ. The Report is posted on the UN Website @ 
[gopher: //gopher. un. org/00/ESC/CN17/1996/background/law. txt]. 
(78) 7ntergenerational Fairness for Fresh Water Resources', 25 EPL (1995), 231; also 'Environmental 
Equity and International Law', in UNEP (ed. ), UNEP's New Way Forward: Environmental Law and 
Sustainable (UNEP, 1995), Chap. 2, at 13. See in the same sense Singh, 'Sustainable Development as a 
Principle of International Law', in de Waart et al. (ed. ), International Law and Development (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1988), Chap. 1.1. 
(79) See infra i. Moral Foundations for Planetary Rights and Obligations: the Moral Sense cf 
Obligations to Future Generations. 
(80) In the same sense, Redgwell considers that intergenerational equity is the 'international legal 
articulation' of the principle of sustainable development; 'Intergenerational Equity and Global Warming', 
in Churchill & Freestone (eds. ), International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijhog 1991), Chap. 3, at 42. 
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As underlined in the introduction to this Chapter, intergenerational equity is referred 
to in the great majority of documents, treaties or declarations negotiated and adopted on 
the eve and in the aftermath of the 1992 Rio Conference on Development and 
Environment(81); it is yet unclear what value to attribute to such references. On the one 
hand, they could be understood as enhancing further the moral grounds of the various 
measures and principles imposed for the sake of 'sustainable development'. It may also 
be interpreted as a source of autonomous rights and obligations, or as a supplementary 
legal basis to sustainable development. 
3. Major Shortcomings of the Planetary Trust Theory 
Attractive for the simplicity of its content, the high morality of its spirit and the 
nobility of its purpose, the planetary trust theory suffers nonetheless major drawbacks 
that genuinely undermine its potential qualification as a source of legal planetary rights 
and obligations in the area of the protection of the environment(82). 
It is first very important to draw a clear distinction between: 
(a)the concept of intergenerational equity, which the tenants of the planetary trust 
theory consider deeply anchored in our moral values and well-embedded in 
international law; 
(b)the more concrete intergenerational binding commitments, expressed in terms of 
planetary rights and obligations. Such rights and obligations are built upon the 
inherent and solid sense of equity towards future generations, and are usually 
considered as primarily moral obligations 'in the formative stage of becoming legal 
rights and obligations', the transposition of which into normative obligations 'still 
needs to be done'(83). 
(81) Whilst reference to intergenerational equity remains occasional in early environmental law 
documents, it is nearly systematic in documents adopted since the beginning of the 1990s; see documents 
supra n. 6 and 7. 
(82) Brown Weiss did not a priori exclude the application of the planetary trust theory to other areas of 
law. 
(83) In Fairness to Future Generations, 26,30 and 103; 'Our Rights and Obligations to Future 
Generations for the Environment', Agora 
- 
What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An 
Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AJIL (1990), 198,200; also Redgwell, supra n. 
80, at 47. Likewise, Weeramantry qualifies the principle of intergenerational equity as an 'important and 
rapidly developing principle of contemporary environmental law'; Request for an Examination of the 
Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgement of 20 December 1974 in the 
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, ICI Rep. 1995,288, Weeramantry(dis. op. ), at 341. On the 
other hand, the further implications of the equitable principles which the trustee is expected to respect, 
«are equitable principles stressed by those traditions 
- 
principles whose further implications have yet to 
be woven into the fabric of international law»; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and 
Jan Mayen, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1993,38, Weeramantry (sep. op. ), Para. 240 (n. omitted). Less than three 
year later however, Judge Weeramantry appears convinced that the crystallisation has taken place and note (continued) 
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The next two paragraphs focus on the assumption of an 'inherent and solid sense of 
equity' towards future generations allegedly 'deeply anchored in our moral values', and 
'well-embedded in international law' lying at the heart of the planetary trust theory. The 
last paragraph considers more particularly the lack of determinacy of planetary rights 
and obligations. 
i. Moral Foundations for Planetary Rights and Obligations: the Moral Sense of 
Obligations to Future Generations 
The whole theory of a planetary trust is based upon the fundamental postulate that 
intergenerational equity in general, and more particularly the protection of the natural 
and cultural heritage for future generations, «is deeply rooted in human behaviour and in 
religious and cultural norms of communities; it is expressed in basic political 
documents) )(84); «[t]he concern [for future generations] reflects a deeply held value 
which society wants to protect) )(85). 
This postulate is disputable. However desirable a deeply anchored sense of concern 
for our posterity might be, history in the past few centuries hardly provides concurring 
evidence of our possessing such noble sense of responsibility. On the contrary, in 
Brown Weiss' own words: 
«[OJur natural instincts are self-indulgent. We have desecrated 
environments, wasted resources and slaughtered animals purely for pleasure 
or for modest personal gain. It may be that the human species carries both a 
selfish gene and an altruistic one (... ) but it is hardly sufficient to rely on the 
that, at least in the context of the use nuclear weaponry, « the rights of future generations have passed the 
stage when they were merely an embryonic right struggling for recognition. They have woven themselves 
into international law through major treaties, through juristic opinion and through general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations. [All the treaties that expressly incorporate the principle of protecting 
the natural resources for future generations] elevate the concept to the level of binding state obligation»; 
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, IC/Rep. 1996, 
66, Weeramantry (dis. op. ), point II (3)(b)). 
(84) ` The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 500. 
(85) Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Justice and Intergenerational Law', in Busuttil et al. (eds. ), Our 
Responsibilities Towards Future Generations, A Programme of UNESCO and the International 
Environment Institute (Foundation for International Studies & UNESCO, 1990), 95. Our moral 
obligation to 'our descendants and to other creatures' to 'act prudently' with regard to the environment 
heritage was also recognised Inter alia in IUCN/UNEPIWWF, World Conservation Strategy 
(IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1980), Chap. 3, Para. 2 One should also note that in Hungary invoked inter alia 
the preservation of species for future generations as a moral obligation in the context of the Gabclkovo- 
Nagymaros dispute that opposes it to the Slovak Federation; see Hungary Declaration, 32 JLM (1993), 
1247. The Court merely reported the argument and mentioned future generations in relation to sustainable 
development without further elaboration; see Case concerning the Gabclkovo Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 25 September 1997,37 ILM (1998), 162, at Para. 140. 
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generous gene to build a theory of morality to overcome the selfish genes, 
without more. » (86) 
The recognition of moral obligations to our posterity is not only disputable in the 
light of the behaviour of this and the precedent generations, as displaying little 
consideration for future needs and interests; the existence of moral duties and 
responsibilities to future generations is far from being settled even at the philosophical 
level. 
The philosophical debate on intergenerational equity started in the mid 1970s(87), 
essentially in relation to the problem of population control(88). It revolves around three 
main issues, namely: 
(1)the identification of future peoples (contingency issue), and the possible 
contradiction between the obligation to take certain measures to ensure the well-being 
of future generations and the rights of future generations to exist (quality of existence 
versus existence dilemma)(89); 
(86) 
'Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment', Agora 
- 
What Obligation 
Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AJIL 
(1990), 198, at 207 (n. omitted). 
(87) Although one could perhaps find the first 'roots' of such debate in the fourth century BC Aristotelian 
conception of distributive justice, developed in Nicomachean Ethics, and Rawls' Theory of Justice, it is 
important to note that both theories concentrate upon justice between living people and neither 
particularly develop a potential intergenerational dimension; Aristote, Ethique a Nicomaque, Trad. 
Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire, (Livre de Poche, 1992), Livre V, Chap. III; Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford 
University Press, 1973), more particularly Paras. 24 and 44. Rawls dedicates one paragraph to the 
problem of justice between generation (Para. 44), without elaborating it much however, considering that 
his conception of Justice based upon principles decided by his 'ideal observers' inter alia unaware of 
which generation they belong to, would secure the interests of present and future generation alike. The 
intergenerational dimension of Rawls' theory has been more particularly exploited by other authors; see 
Norton, 'Intergenerational Equity and Environmental Decisions :A Model Using Rawls' Veil of 
Ignorance', 1 Ecological Economics (1989), 137. Also Brown Weiss' reference to the just saving 
principle in 'The PlanetaryTrust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 532, n. 179; see infra iii. 
Operational Implications of a Planetary Trust. 
(88) Supra, n. 4. 
(89) Or put otherwise, «could the loss in the quality of people's lives be outweighed by a sufficient 
increase in the quantity of worthwhile life lived ? »; Parfit, 'Overpopulation and the Quality of Life', in 
Singer (ed. ), Applied Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1985), Chap. X, at 147 et sequ.; Sikora, 'Is It 
Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations ? ', in Sikora & Barry (eds. ), Obligations to 
Future Generations (Temple University Press, 1978), 112; Warren, 'Do Potential People Have Moral 
Rights ? ', Sikora & Barry (eds. ), ibid., 14; see also D'Amato, `Do We Owe a Duty to Future 
Generations to Preserve the Global Environment? ', Agora 
- 
What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe 
to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AJIL (1990), 190. D'Amato's 
contribution is a particularly clear illustration of the tendency of legal scholars to resort, on this issue, to 
philosophical rather than legal arguments both to support or attack the theory of intergenerational equity. 
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(2)the moral or affective nature of obligations to future generations, and related time- 
limit to such obligations(90); 
(3)the balancing of the needs of the present generation with needs of future generations, 
in the light of the non-reciprocity of our concern to future generations(91)" 
Without entering the heart of the philosophical debate(92), the factual evidence of 
human beings' self-indulgence and the existence of a philosophical controversy seriously 
undermine the allegation that a sense of intergenerational equity inhere in men's nature 
and fundamental morality. 
ii. Legal Basis for a Planetary Trust: Intergenerational Equity as a Fundamental 
Principle Deeply Rooted in International Law 
The lack of moral basis does not necessarily affects the legal value of an obligation, 
in the sense that 'a legal right may not be the giving of legal force to a pre-existing moral 
right'(93). Legal rules and related obligations can obey purely practical considerations(94) 
(90) Moral obligations are usually considered to be owed regardless of time-limit, whilst affective 
obligations, as the by-product of our bond of love between us and our offspring, are essentially limited to 
our immediate descendants; Cameron, 'Do Future Generations Matter ? ', Dower (ed. ), Ethics and 
Environmental Responsibility (Adlershot, 1989), Chap. 4; Feinberg, 'The Rights of Animals and Unborn 
Generations', in Blackstone (ed. ), Philosophy & Environmental Crisis (University of Georgia Press, 
1974), 43. 
(91) Issue often summarised in the question 'what will future generations ever do for us? ', commonly 
attributed, albeit without certainty, to Groucho Marx; Young, For Our Children's Children : Some 
Practical Implications of Inter-Generational Equity and the Precautionary Principle, Resource 
Assessment Commission Occasional Publication No. 6 (Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1993), 1, n. 2; Cameron, ibid supra n. 90; Kavka, 'The Futurity Problem', in Sikora & Barry (eds. ), 
ibid supra n. 89,180; Narveson, 'Future People and Us', ibid., 38. 
(92) The spectrum of the dissension is particularly well illustrated in the collection of essays edited by 
Sikora & Barry, Obligations to Future Generations (Temple University Press, 1978). For a briefer 
account of the major theories, see Berkovitz, 'Pariahs and Prophets : Nuclear Energy, Global Warming, 
and Intergenerational Justice', 17 Columbia JEL (1992), 245, at 296 et sequ.; Gillespie, International 
Environmental Ethics: Value and Methods in International Environmental Law and Policy, Ph. D. 
Thesis (Nottingham University, 1994), first part published under the title International Environmental 
Law, Policy, and Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1998), Ph. D. manuscript, 170 et sequ.; Pasek, 
`Obligations to Future Generations :A Philosophical Note', 20 World Development (1992), 513; Agius, 
'Towards a Relational Theory of Intergenerational Ethics', in Busuttil et al. (eds. ), Our Responsibilities 
Towards Future Generations, A Programme of UNESCO and the International Environment Institute (Foundation for International Studies & UNESCO, 1990), 73; Serracino Inglott, The Rights of Future 
Generations : Some Socio-Philosophical Considerations', ibid., 17. 
(93) Raz, supra n. 71, at 15; approach endorsed by Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations, at 
102. 
(94) See for instance international rules in matter of succession of States to treaties and debts, or even 
more generally, the rules on the law of treaties. 
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or serve exclusively the self-interest of its subjects(95). It could thus still be contended 
that intergenerational equity is deeply anchored in international law regardless of moral 
conviction. Roots to intergenerational equity in international law can allegedly be found 
in the references to mankind in various legal instruments. Such expressions as 'common 
heritage', 'common concern' or 'common interest of mankind' in international 
environmental law(96), or that of 'humanity', 'human family', or 'peoples' in international 
human rights law(97) and general international law(98) can be assimilated to long-settled 
precursors «that evidence concern for future generations and establish precepts intended 
to protect and enhance the welfare of both present and future generations»(99). 
This is not the proper place to discuss the rather contentious assertion that 
international human rights are directed to the protection of future generations as much as 
they are to the present generation, and that the human rights provisions referring to 
children and elderly, to education and training, are 'implicitly temporally oriented'(100). 
(95) The importance of States' self interest was particularly illustrated by the negotiation and 
renegotiation of 1982 UNCLOS Part XI; see infra Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership. 
(96) For the linking of these expressions to specific regimes environmental, see infra Chap. 5, Principle 
of Partnership. 
(97) In Fairness to Future Generations, 25 et sequ.; `Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations 
for the Environment', Agora 
- 
What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to 
Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AJIL (1990), 198,203 et sequ. See for instance the referencesto 
mankind and the human family in 1968 Proclamation of Teheran, respectively preambular Para. 7 and 
operational Para. 2; to human family and all peoples in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child common preambularPara. 1; to American peoples and all men, in 
1948 American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, respectively introductory Para. 1 and 
preambularPara. 1; and referenceto humanity in the context of crimes against humanity, like in the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the 1973 International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. One should also note the 
proposal considered at the World Alliance of Reformed Churches general assembly, in Seoul, in August 
1989, for enlarging the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to encompass both the rights of future 
generations, and the rights of nature; proposal reproduced in Vischer (ed. ), Rights of Future Generations 
Rights of Nature, Studies from the World Alliance of Reformed No. 19 (World Alliance of Reformed 
Churches, 1990), 11. 
(98) See referencessupra n. 4. 
(99) 
'The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 542; In Fairness to Future 
Generations, 48. 
(100) 
'Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment', Agora 
- 
What Obligation 
Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AJIL 
(1990), 198, at 203. Such assertion is questionable in our sense in that the protection granted to children 
and elderly flows their particular vulnerability, rather than fom the fact that they represent the future or 
past generations. Human rights mechanisms are, pre definitionem, purported to preserve the interests of 
living individuals (and in limited number of cases groups), including foetuses and dead people, against 
States' arbitrary. Such conception tends to be confirmed by actual victim-based individual complaint 
mechanisms set up in the majority of international and regional human rights considered above; on the 
definition of victim in human rights mechanisms, see infra Chap. 6, Principe Pertaining to Public 
Participation. Brown Weiss' assertion of the 'intergenerational' nature of human rights provision would be (continued) 
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But it is doubtful whether the concepts of common heritage, common concern and 
common interest of mankind constitute particularly strong precedents of 
intergenerational equity as a source of international rights and obligations, owing to their 
disputed legal status, and more importantly to their lack of clearly defined and 
unanimously agreed substantive content(101)" 
The intergenerational dimension of common heritage of mankind in its original form is 
not open to question; both scholars(102) and the earliest legal expressions of the 
concept(103) confirm that common heritage encompasses the idea that natural resources 
are to be used with due regard for the interests of future generations(104). It is also 
accurate on the other hand, if by this she means that the commitments assumed by one State under 
international law is not, prima facie, limited in the time, hence bind that State towards any living (or 
already conceived) individual, including the members of future generations once they are born or 
conceived, regardless of the fact that they were not alive at the time of the ratification of the treaty; the 
argument of the absence of prima facie limitation ratione temporis of the commitments assumed under 
international law is developed further in the text; infra iv. Pertinence of the Planetary Trust Theory to 
Preserve a Certain Quality Environment. 
(101) See infra Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership. 
(102) One out of five implications identified by Pardo in his original proposal of a common heritage of 
mankind was indeed the reservation for future generations, implying environmental considerations; Pardo, 
'Law of the Sea- What Went Wrong', in Friedheim (ed. ), Managing Ocean Resources, A Primer 
(Westview, 1979), Chap. 9, at 141; Pardo also construed the international seabed authority under 1982 
UNCLOS, Part XI, as 'the trustee of all States'; ibid., at 96. See also Agius, 'From Individual to 
Collective Rights, to the Rights of Mankind', in Busuttil et al. (eds. ), Our Responsibilities Towards 
Future Generations, A Programme of UNESCO and the International Environment Institute (Foundation 
for International Studies & UNESCO, 1990), 27, at 39; Fleischer, "The International Concern for the 
Environment: The Concept of Common Heritage', in Bothe (ed. ), Trends in Environmental Policy and 
Law (IUCN, 1980), 321, at 338; Handl, 'Environmental Security and Global Change : the Challenge to 
International Law', in Lang et al. (eds. ) Environmental Protection and International Law (Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijho$ 1991), Chap. 2, at 82; Kiss, 'La Notion de Patrimoine Commun de 
1'Humanite', 175 RdC (1982-II), 99, at 128 et sequ. ; de Klemm, 'Environnement et patrimoine', in Ost 
& Gutwirth (eds. ), Quel avenir pour le droit de 1 environnement 7, Actes du colloque organise par le 
Centre d'etude du droit de 1'environnement et Ic Centrum interactie recht en technologie (Facultds 
Universitaires Saint-Louis, 1996), 145, at 147; Serracino Inglott, 'The Common Heritage and the Rights 
of Future Generations', in Busuttil et al. (eds. ) ibid. op. cit., at 67; Wolfrum, 'The Principle of Common 
Heritage of Mankind', 43 ZaOR V (1983), 312, at 318. 
(103) Hence the 1979 Moon Treaty provides, Art. 4(1), «The exploitation of the moon shall be the 
province of all mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, 
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. Due regard shall be paid to the interest 
of present and future generations as well as to the need to promote higher standards of living and 
conditions of economic and social progress and development in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations». It should be noted however, that no express referenceto future generations is made in any other 
treaties endorsing the common heritage of mankind No reference either is contained in UNGA 
A/Res. /2749 (XXV), 17 December 1970, Declaration of Principles Governing the Deep-Sea nd the Ocean 
Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, consecrating the Pardo's 
suggestion of the principle of common heritage of mankind for the law of the sea. 
(104) Notwithstanding this apparent consensus on the intergenerational dimension of the expression of 
'common heritage of mankind', one should acknowledge the lack of clear and unanimous understanding of 
the word 'mankind'. Some authors assimilate mankind to the community of States; see for instance Quoc 
Dinh: Droit International Public; §§ 266-267. Others on the contrary, understand mankind as referring to 
peoples, which might, occasionally encompass previous and future generations; see inter alia Gorove, (continued) 
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obvious that such dimension was subsequently overshadowed by the controversy 
concerning the intragenerational dimension of the concept, and has consequently 
remained virtually unexplored(105). Only one out of the three treaties endorsing the 
concept of common heritage of mankind explicitly refers to future generations, and none 
set forth criteria or standards of intergenerational equity to be applied. On the other 
hand, all three specify, using a similar wording, that: 
«[t]he main purpose of the international regime to be established shall be (omitted) 
(d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from 
those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries, 
as well as the efforts of these countries which had contributed either directly 
or indirectly to the exploration of the Moon, shall be given special 
consideration. »(106) 
The marginality of the consideration paid to intergenerational equity, as compared to 
that paid to intragenerational equity, is even more striking in those conventions 
addressing issues declared a 'common concern of mankind', such as the 1992 Climate 
Change Convention(107). There are serious indications suggesting that the opposition 
raised by the idea of an 'exploitation for the common benefit of the present generation' 
would be echoed in the case of an 'exploitation for the common benefit of present and 
future generations'. So would be the reticence of developing States to sacrifice some of 
'The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind; A Political, Moral, and legal Innovation 7', 9 San 
Diego LR (1972), 390, at 394. Other still hold that the international community is the group of 
contemporaneous States, whereas mankind encompasses also future generations, and is therefore a trans 
temporal concept; Dupuy, 'Communaute internationale et disparitds de dtveloppement', Cours gdneral de 
droit international public, 165 RdC (1979-IV), 9, at 219 et sequ.; see also from the same author, 
'Humanite et environnement', XIIAnnuaire de Droit Maritime & Aero-Spatial (1993), 493. Besides, 
some authors take the extreme view that mankind constitutes a new subject of international law 
'transcending state boundaries; see most notably Cocca, 'The Law of Mankind : Ius Inter Gentes Again', 
12 Annuaire de Droit Maritime & Aero-Spatial (1993), 507; also Baslar, The Concept of the Common 
Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Kluwer Law International, forthcoming), Ph. D. manuscript, 
at 90 et sequ.; and contra Pardo & Christol, 'The Common Interest : Tension between the Whole and 
the Parts', in Macdonald & Johnston (eds. ), The Structure and Process of International Law : Essays in 
Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 643, at 656. The only express 
definition of mankind in an international document is contained in Resolution 3384 (XXX), 10 
November 1975, proclaiming the Declaration of the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the 
Interest of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind; Art. 4 provides that the use of scientific and 
technological achievements for the purpose of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other 
States «constitutes an inadmissible distortion of the purposes that should guide scientific and 
technological development for the benefit of mankind (i. e. the present and future generations))). The ICJ 
has confirmed such an understanding of mankind in its recent decision in the Case concerning the 
Gabcikovo IVagymarosProject (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 25 September 1997, General List, No. 92, 
37 ILM (1998), 162, at 201. 
(105) None of the articles dedicated to either common concern, common interest, or common heritage 
develop further the intergenerational dimension. See literature referred to above, supra n. 102 and 104, 
and infra Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership. 
(106)1979 Moon Treaty, Art. 11(7). See also 1967 Outer Space Treaty, Art. I; 1982 UNCLOS, Art. 140. 
(107) Compare Art. 3.1 with Art. 4. See further infra Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership. 
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their actual and immediate developmental needs for the sake of hypothetical 
environmental gain, even though concern for future generations could appear less as an 
external interference into domestic affairs. Similar remarks apply to the related concepts 
of common concern and common interest of mankind(108). 
In the light of the controversy attached to their nature and concrete implications, and 
the uncertainty with regard to their inter-temporal dimension, neither of the three 
concepts considered above constitutes a reliable precedent of well-settled 
intergenerational equity in international environmental law, 
It is contended in the same spirit , that «certain environmental standards of 
environmental protection may be viewed as rules of customary international law and 
treated as obligations erga omnes)>(109). In line with her interpretation of humanity as a 
cross-temporal concept, Brown Weiss interprets the 'fundamental interest of the 
international community as a whole'(110) and 'concern of all States'(111) as extending 
across time. The weight of, and criticisms against, such argument are similar to those 
discussed above, namely that whilst there is nothing to argue against the 
intergenerational dimension of erga omnes obligations(112), the, alleged erga omnes 
obligation constitutes a rather weak precedent of intergenerational equity, due both to 
the controversial erga omnes character of the obligation to assure 'certain standards of 
(108) With regard to common concern, clear indications were given by UNEP that it has both a spatial 
and temporal facets; see Note of UNEP Executive Director on the Implications of the "Common Concern 
of Mankind" Concept on Global Environmental Issues to the UNEP Group of Legal Experts Meeting of 
Malta, 13-15 December 1990, reproduced in Cancado Trindade (ed. ), Human Rights, Sustainable 
Development and Environment (Instituto Interamericano de Desarrollo, 1995), 318, Para. 5. 
(109) 
'The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', at 544; in In Fairness of Future 
Generations; 122, Brown Weiss is even more assertive and argues that there is «[a]iready considerable 
opiniojuris that States may already have an obligation to the international community at large to protect 
the environment>>. 
(110) TLC's definition of international crimes, Draft Articles on the International Responsibility, Art. 
19(2), in 1980 Yb1LC Vol. II, Pt. 2, at 32. The commentary to that Article explains the expression of 
international crime on the grounds that the violations it encompasses «inficts kinds of damage which 
would be fearfully destructive not only of man's potential for economic and social development but also of 
his health and the very possibility of survival for the present and future generations»; ibid at 108; see 
further infra Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership. 
. 
(111) Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1970,3, at Para. 
33; see infra Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership. 
(112) In fact, as a rule, there is nothing inherent in customary or conventional international law in 
general, that suggest that the synallagmatic or erga omnes obligations arising from that law are assumed 
only in relation to the 'generation' living at the time ratification of the conclusion of the treaty, or 
recognition of the customary norm; see infra iv. Pertinence of the Planetary Trust Theory to Preserve a 
Certain Quality Environment 
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environmental protection'(113), and to the uncertainty regarding the minimum 
environmental standards to be secured(114). 
The third controversial aspect of the planetary trust is the reliance upon the human 
rights model, which pertains more to the legal conceptualisation of intergenerational 
equity in terms of planetary rights and obligations. It is thereby suggested that «[t]he 
extension of human rights law to embrace environmental security may accelerate the 
realisation of the purposes of the planetary trust by encouraging communities to fulfil 
their obligations to future generations..: »(115). Some international documents might 
confer a certain credit to this argument, insofar as they explicitly associate 
intergenerational equity with the right to a healthy environment or the right to 
development. The 1986 Tunis Declaration on Environment and Development for 
instance, provides that: 
«Every individual has a basic right to live in an environment that is 
compatible with human dignity. He has a responsibility, in return, to protect 
this environment and enhance it both for himself and for his 
descendants» (116) 
Likewise, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development solemny 
declares: 
«The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations. » (117) 
The pros and cons of a human rights approach to environmental protection will be 
detailed later in the thesis and shall not be anticipated here(118). However, the suggested 
link to an inter-temporal extension of human rights to accelerate the realisation of the 
purpose of a planetary trust is rather disconcerting, considering the clearly collective 
character of the suggested planetary rights, held by a generation taken as a group (and 
(113) See supra Chap. 2/3. The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: a Principle 
of Customary Law. 
(114) Ibid. supra n. 113; this point is further elaborated infra iii. Operational Implications of a Planetary 
Trust. 
(115) 
'The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 558. 
(116) Sect. 1(3); see also 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Princ. 1. The link 
was also made by Justice Davide in Minor Oposa case, supra n. 2. 
(117) prin. 3. No reference to future generations is contained however in the 1986 Declaration on the 
Right to Development, which simply provides for States duty to formulate appropriate national 
development policies aiming at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and 
of all individuals; Art. 2(3). 
(118) See infra Chap. 6/3 Towards a More Holistic Approach to International Environmental Law: the 
Environment-Human Rights Law Dimension. 
Intergenerational Equity 207 Chapter 4 
not individually by each of its members) in relation to other generations also taken as 
groups(119). Classic human rights(120), in effect, are primarily intended to preserve 
individual interests (individualistic human rights), and are particularily ill-suited to 
pursue collective interests of a group (communal human rights), such as environmental 
interests of future generations(121). 
Against this conclusion, one should mention various attempts at the international and 
national levels to rely on classic human rights provisions, alongside the so-called right to 
a healthy environment, to preserve environmental interests. In the well-kown Port Hope 
Environmental Group v. Canada communication to the UN Human Rights Committee, 
the rights to life, health and property of both present and future generations were 
invoked in relation to the dumping of nuclear wastes. The Committee had finally not to 
decide on the locus standi, as some of the applicants were living persons; it nonetheless 
qualified the reference to future generations as 'an expression of concern purporting to 
put into due perspective the importance of the matter raised in the communication'. The 
case was finally dismissed for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies(122). 
The locus standi of the present generation to invoke its own interests and the 
interests of future generations was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on 
the basis of both 'highest law of mankind' and domestic law in the matter Minors Oposa 
v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (1993)(123). 
(119) This is true for the so-called solidarity or third generation human rights in general, that would 
include a potential right to environment and right to development; see supra Chap. 6, Principles 
Pertaining to Public Participation. One should perhaps specify that Brown Weiss apparently considers 
that planetary rights acquire some attributes of individual rights once held by the present generation, 
although they remain collective in essence, and the remedies for they violation benefit not individual 
members, but the whole generation(s); `Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the 
Environment', Agora 
- 
What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global 
Environmental Responsibility, 84 AJIL (1990), 198, at 203. 
(120) This excludes the 'third generation' human rights mentioned above, n. 119; 'third generation' 
human rights, including the right to a healthy and clean environment, are not sufficiently clear as to their 
substantive content to be of any significant practical support to further planetary rights; See infra Chap. 
6/3/iii. Strength and Weakness of the Human Rights Mechanisms in Protecting Environmental 
Interests. 
(121) Supanich, 'The Legal Basis of Intergenerational Responsibility: An Alternative View 
- 
The Sense 
of Intergenerational Identity', 3 Yb1EL (1992), 94, at 97 et sequ; Waldron, 'Can Communal Goods be 
Human Rights?, 28 European Journal of Sociology (1987), 296. The tension between the collective and 
individual interests in human rights mechanism is more particularly developed in Chap. 6, Principles 
Pertaining to Public Participation. 
(122) Communic. No. 67/1980, reprinted in SelectedDecisions of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. 2 
(Seventeenth to Thirty-second sessions), 20. 
(123) Supra n. 2. Contrast the position of the Philippines Supreme Court in the Minors Oposa case with 
that of the US Supreme Court in the Lujan case; Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 91 F 2d 117 (8th 
Cir. 1990), reversed by US Supreme Court, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992); on (continued) 
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Frequently invoked by international lawyers to substantiate their revendication for 
intergenerational rights and obligations(124), this case should nonetheless be considered 
in its legal context. 
The admissibility of the case was decided in a jurisdiction allowing, to a certain 
degree, class action or even actiopopularis. Under Sect. 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules 
of Court in the Philippines, all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines and taxpayers, 
are entitled to full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the 
country's virgin tropical rainforests (taxpayers' class suit). Similar action would have 
been more difficult to justify under a legal system applying a more restrictive 
conception of victim, more particularly the actual injury component. 
Besides, the practical importance of the Minors Oposa case should not be overstated, 
considering that the Court's decision exclusively concerned the admissibility of the 
application. The case was never decided on the merits, since the logging licenses that 
triggered the case had been cancelled administratively before the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision(125). 
In last resort, it is suggested, in support of the planetary trust' theory, that the 
numerous treaties expressly incorporating the principle of natural resources preservation 
for future generations «elevate the concept to the level of binding state obligatiorn>(126). 
It should be underlined that these numerous references to intergenerational equity (1) are 
very often contained either in preambular clauses of treaty-law setting the overall spirit 
of the treaty but as such not source of binding rules(127) or in non-binding declarations 
which see Just, 'Intergenerational Standing under the Endangered Species Act : Giving Back the Right to 
Biodiversity afterLujan v. Defenders of Wildlife', 71 Tulane LR (1996), 597. 
(124) See Allen `The Philippine Children's Case: Recognizing Legal Standing for Future Generations', 
6 Georgetown ILR (1994), 713; Rest, 'Implementing the Principles of Intergenerational Equity and 
Responsibility', 24 EPL (1994), 314. 
(125) We are indebted to Prof. G. Handl, Tulane Law School, for sharing with us this information. In an 
e-mail of March 18,1998, Prof. Handl confirmed that the case had finally never been decided on the 
merits. He also reported that the lead attorney, Tony Oposa admitted that any decision on the merits by 
the Court would have been extremely difficult to enforce. On the other hand, it seems that the Supreme 
Court of the Philippines has since used the argument of intergenerational equity and sustainable 
development in a couple of other cases, 'but rather as reinforcing existing normative provisions' and not 
'to create novel entitlements or obligations'; Prof. Handl, ibid. 
(126) Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Rep. 1996,1, 
Weeramantry (diss. op. ), Point II (3)(b)); also Brown Weiss, 'Intergenerational Fairness for Fresh Water 
Resources', 25 EPL (1995), 231; WCED-EG, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development (Graham& Trotman/Nijhof, 1987), at 44-45; WCED-EG however recognises such obligation to protect 
the environment for future generations only as far as international or transboundary resources or 
transboundary interferenceare concerned, and excluding the 'domestic environment'. 
(127) 1970 Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(2); see also Case concerning the Rights of 
nationals of the United States ofAmerica in Morocco, Judgment of August 27th, 1952: ICJ Rep. 1952, 
176, at 196-197; South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa), (continued) 
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and other political statement S(128), and (2) are always construed in general terms, 
without any guidelines or criteria being provided to help to identify the operational 
content of such clauses(129). This tendency to refer to equity in very programmatic 
terms in the 'soft part' of international law indicates probably that intergenerational 
equity is well accepted as an 'inspirational' principle, whilst its legal status as a norm- 
creating concept is doubtful. 
iii. Operational Implications of a Planetary Trust 
As mentioned earlier on, the elementary characteristic of an international legal 
concept, customary or conventional, pertains to its norm-creating character, viz. the 
minimum degree of precision of its actual content and implications(130). Little indication 
is given in the planetary trust theory of how far the present generation is expected to 
preserve environmental resources for itself and for future generations. No criteria of 
assessment, no equitable minimum standards, no guidelines are spelt out, that could 
indicate which degree of fairness the present generation is accountable for. Rather, the 
planetary trust theory is based upon the broadly construed objective to pass the planet 
on to future generations'in no worse conditions' than received(13 1), or 'in approximately 
the same conditions' as received(132), with 'at least the same level of resources(133)', but 
not necessarily 'an equal amount of resources'(134) as that enjoyed by the initial 
generation. A 'reasonable diversity' of the resource base(135) shall be maintained, and a 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962: ICJ Rep. 1962,319, at 330-331; see supra Chap. 1/2/iii. Legal Framework. 
(128) See referencesn. 4,6,7. Among the treaties referringto intergenerational equity in their body text, 
one could mention the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, Art. I; 1972 World Heritage Convention, Art. 4; 1979 
Moon Treaty, Art. 4(1); 1982 Jeddah Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 
Environment, Art. 1(1); 1989 ACP-EEC Lome IV, Art. 33; 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, Art. 
2(5); 1992 Climate Change Convention, Art. 3(1); and 1976/95 Barcelona Convention on Mediterranean 
Sea, Art. 4(2). 
(129) See infra n. 155 to 166. 
(130) See standards set forth in North Sea Continental Shelj cases in the context of the formation of a 
customary rule, supra Chap. 1/2/iii. Legal Framework, and Chap. 3/2/iii. Status of Precautionary 
Principle under International Law. 
(131) Conservation of quality; 'The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 531 
and 581; In Fairness to Future Generations, 24. 
(132) 
'The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 510. 
(133) In Fairness to Future Generations, 25. h 
(134) 
'The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 532. 
(135) Conservation of option; 'The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 527. 
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'reasonable access' to the legacy of present generation(136) shall be guaranteed, based not 
on the prediction of the preferences of future generations, but on the presumption that 
future generations would want at least 'as a minimum', a 'reasonably secure and flexible' 
resource base(137), and a 'reasonably decent' natural environment, in which they can 
pursue their goals according to their own values(138). The reference to Rawls' just saving 
principle(139), based on a 'fair equivalent in real capital'(140) does not offer particularly 
helpful objective criteria(141). 
Such conception of 'reasonable equity'(142) leaves plenty of room for the subjective 
arithmetic of the present generation paradoxically vested with the entire responsibility 
«to set the criteria for defining the actions that infringe upon [rights of future 
generations]) )(143). It finally rests upon the present generation (1) to define whether, and 
to what extent, its own actions bear in an unreasonable or inequitable fashion upon 
future generations inasmuch as the consequence of its actions can be predicted, and (2) 
to decide on the opportunity and nature of the equitable measures to be taken. The 
margin of appreciation left to the 'trustee' of natural resources, not circumscribed by 
clear guidelines, is particularly striking on three accounts: 
1) The tendency to self-indulgence of men is indisputable and undisputed by the 
proponents of the planetary trust theory(144); 
(136) Conservation of access: In Fairness to Future Generations, 38 
(137) In Fairness to Future Generations, 24-25; Kavka, like Brown Weiss, considers that there is no 
objective reason to expect that the basic biological needs and interests of future generations, otherwise 
called the biologically obvious, will substantially differ from ours; 'The Futurity Problem', in Sikora & 
Barry (eds. ), Obligations to Future Generations (Temple University Press, 1978), 180, at 189. See also 
Gillespie, supra n. 92, Ph. D. manuscript, 190. Problems with the evaluation of future generations needs 
of course, arise for the needs beyond the biologically obvious; as it is suspected that Brown Weiss' theory 
planetary trust targets the satisfaction of higher needs than the biologically obvious. 
(138) 'The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 526. 
(139) 
'The Planetary Trust: Conservation and IntergenerationalEquity', 532. 
(140) Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1973), 288. 
(141) The major difference between Brown Weiss' reasonable equity principle, and Rawls' just saving 
principle is that the latter principle is chosen by the 'ideal observers', which should guarantee (inasmuch 
as ideal observers really exist) a total objectivity and disinterest in the definition of the just saving 
principle. Definition of the reasonable equity criteria on the other hand, is left to the appreciation of a 
trustee having legitimate vested interests not always compatible with those of the future beneficiaries of 
the trust; see below in the text. 
(142) The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 525. 
(143) In Fairness to Future Generations, 104. 
(144) See supra n. 86. 
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2) Besides, the present generation is not even a shadow of Rawls' 'ideal observers' who, 
placed 'behind the veil of ignorance'(145), will choose and define principles of justice, 
in our case the just saving principle', «the consequences of which they are prepared 
to live with whatever generations they turn to belong to»(146). Quite the contrary, the 
present generation stands in a highly self-interested position, as it combines the 
functions of trustee and beneficiary of the same trust res. As a trustee, the present 
generation is expected to act with 'honesty, loyalty, and standards of skill and 
prudence that can be expected from a reasonable person managing his own 
affairs'(147). Its fiduciary obligation commands it not to put itself in a position where 
its interest and duties conflict(148). As the beneficiary of the trust, it has an interest 
to maximise the benefit derived from the trust res(149). 
It is usually agreed in the context of the domestic institution of trust, that the fact 
that the trustee may also have rights as beneficiary of the trust is not necessarily 
inconsistent with existence of a trust('50). Based on the simplistic general assumption 
that the preservation and satisfaction of the actual interests of the present generation 
do not, as a rule, conflict with hypothetical needs and interests of future generations, 
but imply on the contrary similar measures(151), the planetary trust theory (a) 
envisages no particular risk of conflict in the function of trustee and that of trust 
beneficiary(152), and (b) provides no specific guideline to equitably balance the 
(145) Viz. not knowing one's personal traits such as wealth or intelligence, one's social position, the 
society which one's belong to, the political and economic situation. The ideal observer is thus placed in 
an objective position, to guarantee that (s)he takes the decision of a free reasonable and rational person in 
a fairand just society, Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra n. 140, at 136 et sequ. 
(146) Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra n. 140, at 137. 
(147) Supra. n. 39. In his separate opinion in the Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland 
and Jan Mayen Justice Weeramantry refers (without elaborating further) to the 'standards of due diligence 
expected of a trustee'; Judgment, ICJRep. 1993,38, Weeramantry (dis. op. ), at Para. 240. 
(148) Supra. n. 38. 
(149) Supra. n. 40. 
(150) See the 1985 Hague Convention of the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition, Art. 2; 
see further Underhill & Hayton: Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, 3 and 208; see also the 1957 US 
Second Restatement of Trust, § 99. 
(151) And inter alia that the satisfaction of developmental needs are not incompatible with the 
preservation of the environment; 'Intergenerational Fairness for Fresh Water Resources', 25 EPL (1995), 
231, at 233. 
(152) Brown Weiss recognises however that certain conflicts could occur in few cases, and would therefore 
require specific guidelines; she provides none however; Intergenerational Fairness for Fresh Water 
Resources', 25 EPL (1995), 231, at 233. Van Dyke is probably closer to reality as he suggests that 
conflict between present and future generations' needs and interests are likely to be frequent, if not the rule 
rather than the exception. The issue is therefore one of balancing the conflicting needs and interests, and (continued) 
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interests and needs to avoid that one generation bears in a disproportionate manner 
the consequences of the decisions taken for the benefit of the other. 
3) Finally, the planetary trust theory raises the issue of foreseeability of the long-term 
effects of our actions upon the environment and related predictive uncertainty. No 
indication is given of whether our responsibility to future generations shall be based 
on a mere intuition, prima facie evidence, or the reasonably foreseeable adverse 
environmental implications of our actions(153). In the light of such indeterminacy, one 
could argue for instance, that our responsibility to future generations is, at least to a 
certain extent, circumscribed by our ability to foresee the effects of our actions on 
future generations(154). 
No further clarification concerning any of these three aspects is contained in the very 
rhetorical 1988 Goa Guidelines on Intergenerational Equity, prepared by an Experts 
Group set up by the UN University in the context of its research project on 
international law, common patrimony and intergovernmental equity, and chaired by 
Brown Weiss. Likewise, the vast majority of the intergenerational clauses in 
international documents are worded in vague terms of 'rational'(155), 'equitable'(156), or 
'wise exploitation(157), of 'doing all that can be done' to preserve the heritage of future 
generations(158), of 'appropriate action'(159), of 'due consideration' for the needs of 
where necessary, establishing criteria ofpriority; Van Dyke, The Rio Principles and our Responsibilities 
of Ocean Stewardship', 31 OCM (1996), 1, at 4. The 'energy dilemma' constitutes a particularly evident 
example of conflicting environmental interests of present and future generations; the interest of the present 
generation to rely on nuclear power as the most technically feasible non-fossil alternative source of energy, 
and thereby reduce the amount of carbon dioxide released in the atmosphere and related adverse 
environmental effects in the short, medium and long terms, conflicts with future generations interests not 
to suffer from the long term toxic release of nuclear wastes dumping sites; Berkovitz, 'Pariahs and 
Prophets : Nuclear Energy, Global Warming, and Intergenerational Justice', 17 Columbia JEL (1992), 
245. 
(153) This question could probably be clarified resorting by analogy to the criteria applied in the context 
of the precautionary principle; supra Chap. 2/3 Constitutive Elements of a Precautionary Principle. 
(154) This argument is endorsed for instance by Berkovitz, ibid supra n. 152, at 320; Cameron, 'Do 
Future Generations Matter ? ', Dower (ed. ), Ethics and Environmental Responsibility (Adlershot, 1989), 
Chap. 4; Kavka, 'The Futurity Problem', in Sikora & Barry (eds. ), Obligations to Future Generations 
(Temple University Press, 1978), 180; Narveson, 'Future People and Us', ibid., 38; Pasek, 'Obligations 
to Future Generations: A Philosophical Note', 20 World Development (1992), 513. See also supra Chap. 
3, Prevention and Precautionary Principles. 
(155) 1968 African Convention on Nature, preambularPara. 6; 1975 Helsinki Final Act of CSCE, Sect. 
on the Environment, preambularPam. 1; 1989 Brasilia Declaration on the Environment, Para. 1. 
(156) 1976/95 Barcelona Convention on Mediterranean Sea, Art. 4(2); also 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, Princ. 3. 
(157) 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species, preambular Para. 2. 
(158) 1989 Hague Declaration on the Environment, Para. 5. 
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present and future generations(160), of preservation of the planet 'in a condition which 
guarantee life in human dignity for all'(161) or 'the well-being' of all(162), or of a 'healthy 
environment'(163). Reference is also made to 'sustainably use' the environment for the 
benefit of present and future generations(164) or, by analogy to the definition of 
sustainable development, to the necessity 'to meet the needs of the present generation 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'(165). In 
a large number of cases, intergenerational equity clauses express in a very neutral way 
the necessity to 'preserve (or safeguard) and improve the environment' for the benefit 
and enjoyment of present and future generations(166). In sum, «[w]hat we owe to future 
generations is neither Everything nor Nothing, but merely Something»(167), and this 
something is still unclear. 
As previously stated, the tenants of the planetary trust theory do not deny that 
further implications of planetary obligations and rights 'have yet to be woven into the 
fabric of international law'(168). No attempt was really made in the negotiations of recent 
documents containing an 'intergenerational equity clause' to identify the practical 
implications attached to the recognition of the needs of future generations. Rather, «in 
each case the principle appears to have been accepted as an article of faith, drawing on 
(159) 1994 Desertification Convention, preambularPara. 26. 
(160) 1979 Moon Treaty, Art. 4(1). 
(161) 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Princ. 1 and 2; 1986 Tunis Declaration 
on Environment and Development, 1(3); 1982 Nairobi Declaration, Pam. 10. 
(162) 1970 Strategy for the Second Development Decade, preambularPara. 4. 
(163) 1989 Paris Economic Declaration of the G7, Sect. on the Environment, Para. 33. 
(164) 1992 Biodiversity Convention, preambular Para. 23; 1992 OSPAR Marine Environment 
Convention, preambular Para. 3; 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, preambular Para. 5.; 1976/95 Barcelona Convention on Mediterranean Sea, preambular 
Para. 2; 1992 Forestry Principles, Princ. 2(b). 
(165) 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, Art. 2(5); also 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on 
Sustainable Development; 1990 Bangkok Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, Para. 15. 
(166) 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, preambular Para. 1; 1972 World 
Heritage Convention, Art. 4; 1973 CITES, preambular Pam. 1; 1976 Barcelona Convention on 
Mediterranean Sea, preambular Para. 2; 1985 Nairobi Convention on the Marine Environment in East 
Africa, preambularPara. 2; 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature, preambular Pam. 1; 
1986 Noumea Convention on the Environment in the South Pacific, preambular Para. 3; 1992 Climate 
Change Convention, Art. 3(1). See also 1975 Economic Charter, Art. 30; 1982 World Charter for Nature, 
preambular Pam. 5; 1989 Amazon Declaration, Para. 2; 1990 Tlatelolco Platform on Environment and 
Development, Para. 7. 
(167) Narveson, 'Future People and Us', in Sikora & Barry (eds. ), Obligations to Future Generations (Temple University Press, 1978), 38. 
(168) Supra. n. 83. 
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pre-existing language in earlier treaty and other soft-law developments) )(169). In fact, as 
was concluded in respect of the principle of precaution, it is probable that the lack of 
clearly identified implications attached to intergenerational equity, and hence the lack of 
potential normative implications, constituted a decisive factor behind the frequent 
references thereto in recent documents. 
iv. Pertinence of the Planetary Trust Theory to Preserve a Certain Quality 
Environment 
Notwithstanding the uncertainty pertaining to the moral and legal foundations of 
intergenerational equity and to the substantive implications of a planetary trust, the 
very necessity of such complex theoretical juridical construction, and the no less fictive 
categorisation of human beings into successive generations( 170), to ensure the 
perpetuation of an environment of a certain quality through time is open to question. 
The planetary trust theory is presented as «a systematic effort to develop the inter 
temporal dimension of international law» (171). A preliminary question to answer before 
even considering such argument, is whether such dimension of international law has not 
already been developed, and needs only to be actually implemented. 
There is nothing in international environmental law to indicate, prima facie (172), that 
conventional or customary commitments assumed by States engage their responsibility 
only towards the 'present generation', that is towards the persons living at the time of 
recognition of the customary character of a norm or at the time of ratification of a treaty. 
International obligations are primarily assumed in relation to a certain object 
- 
in the 
present case the protection of the environment in general, or the reduction of ozone 
layer depletion, air and marine pollution and loss of biodiversity in particular 
- 
without 
being necessarily attached to specific 'beneficiaries' or 'destinataires'. 
(169) Sands, 'Protecting Future Generations : Precedents and Practicalities', (FIELD, 1994), Working 
Draft at 6 (n. omitted); also from the same author 'International Law in the Field of Sustainable 
Development', 65 British YbIL (1994), 303, at 342; Principles (Vol. I), 199-220. 
(170) Brown Weiss does not specify how many years one generation encompasses; according to the 
Oxford Dictionary, one generation covers the average time in which children are ready to take the place of 
their parents, that is approximately 30 years. As pointed out by Young, should one accept such 
definition, it practically means that three generations will always coexist, namely the retiring, the present 
and the emerging generations; Young, For Our Children's Children : Some Practical Implications of 
Inter-Generational Equity and the Precautionary Principle, Resource Assessment Commission 
Occasional Publication No. 6 (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993), 2. 
(171) In Fairness to Future Generations, 2. 
(172) Unless the validity of the treaty ratified is explicitly limited in time and provides for no possibility 
of renewal, or the subject matter of commitments assumed, under customary or treaty law, is per definitionem, limited in time. 
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Hence for instance, the no substantial harm principle(173) commands States to abstain 
from any activities that could harm the environment of other existing countries, and 
precludes them from engaging into activities that will or could have, as far as it is 
possible to predict with a certain degree of certainty(174), an adverse transboundary 
impact in the future. This obligation, however, is owed by States to other potentially 
affected States existing today, and not hypothetical future generations, represented by a 
no less hypothetical ombudsman(175). The State engaging nonetheless into such 
activities commits not merely a potential violation of customary international 
environmental law to be concretised in the future, but indeed an actual violation thereof, 
it can therefore be held responsible on this account by affected States within the same 
degree of certainty as mentioned above(176). This is not tantamount to saying that the 
existence of a damage is irrelevant to the establishment of the responsibility of the State 
for the consequence of its acts(177). It is only argued that, where a damage to the 
environment can be attached, with a certain degree of certainty(178), to a given activity, 
(173) See supra Chap. 2/4/ii/a. Equitable utilisation, Sic Utere Tuo and related No Substantial 
Transboundary Harm Principles. 
(174) A prima facie case not necessarily confirmed on a scientific point of view could even suffice where 
the precautionary principle is applicable; supra Chap. 3. Prevention and Precautionary Principles. 
(175) On the various attempts and suggestions to appoint a UN Representative of the interests of future 
generations in the context of the 1992 Conference on the Environment and Development, see infra Title 
3. Beyond the Rhetoric of a Planetary Trust: Intergenerational Equity as an Inspirational Principle of 
Modern International Environmental Law. 
(176) In this respect, it is interesting to note that whereas Trail Smelter dictum is worded in terms of 
'duty not to cause injury', hence focuses on the injury, 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment, Princ. 21 focuses on the 'activities causing transboundary harm'; see supra Chap. 3/2/ii. 
Precaution as a Principle of International Law. 
(177) The importance of the realisation of the harm as a precondition to responsibility is particularly 
debated in relation to ILC's definition of the internationally wrongful act, in the context of the codification 
of state responsibility, an excellent synthesis of this aspect of the discussion of the Draft Articles is made 
by Tanzi, 'Is Damage a Distinct Condition for the Existence of an Internationally Wrongful Act ? ', in 
Spindi & Simma, United Nations Codification of State Responsibility (Oceana, 1987), 1. The element 
of harm/damage is not included among the essential elements of ILC's definition; Art. 3 provides that 
«[t]here is a an internationally wrongful act of a state when: (a) conduct consisting of an action or 
omission is attributable to the state under international law, and (b) that conduct constitutes a breach on 
an international obligation of the state. The comment to that provision expressly excludes the damage 
as a constituent of the internationally wrongful act; see 1973 YbILC Vol. II, 183. Art. 3 was kept 
unmodified in 1996 Draft Articles; UNGA, Report of the ILC on Its Work of its 48th Session (May 6- 
July 26,1996), GAOR Fifty-first Session, Suppl. No. 10 (A/51/10), 125, at 126. Some scholars however 
consider damage as an essential therefore necessary component of an internationally wrongful act; see for 
instance Ross, A Textbook of International Law, General Part (Longmans, Green & Co., 1947), 242; 
Guggenheim, Traith de droit international public, Tome II (Librairie de 1'Universit6, Georg & Cie, 
1954), at 1. 
(178) According to the criteria of reasonable foreseeability and due diligence developed in the context of 
the prevention and precautionary principle; supra Chap. 3/4/i. Unilateral Duty of Due Diligence. 
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the actualisation of a the damage is not necessary to engage the responsibility of a State 
in relation to such activity(179). 
In fact, by focusing on artificial duty-bearers and right-holders in international 
environmental law(180), the planetary trust theory introduces some temporal limits with 
regard to the commitments assumed under this area of law, when neither expressly 
specified nor inherent in the subject matter of that law, which hamper more than 
enhance a proper implementation of international environmental law. Birnie is 
particularily sceptical about the practical utility of an 'institutionalised' intergenerational 
equity and planetary trust theory, and comments that: 
«It is doubtful (... ) whether adoption of such futurological concepts as 
inter- or intra-generational rights (... ) will enhance the existing methods of 
developing the necessary regulatory regime, although they clearly play 
political, publicizing, educative roles in raising public awareness and 
generating the debate that cranks the existing mechanisms into action (... ) 
There are too many scientific uncertainties, too many development 
differences, too wide a range of political interests in every state for it to be 
otherwise. States have the will to protect the environment on their terms and 
by the methods preferredby them, under which they have some control over 
the pace of regime change. They are not yet ready to abandon theoretical 
notions of sovereignty (... ) in favour of the amorphous demands of future 
generations or allegedly vested environmental rights of an indeterminate and 
limitless character. »(181) 
4. Beyond the Rhetoric of a Planetary Trust: Intergenerational Equity as an 
Inspirational Principle of Modern International Environmental law 
It is difficult to deny all currency to the principle of intergenerational equity when 
considering a concept which is, per definitionem, resolutely oriented towards the welfare 
of future as much as present generations. 1992 Agenda 21 is itself defined as a strategy 
for 'the twenty first century, or more exactly towards the next century. However, 
between the acknowledgement of the importance to consider the interests and 
anticipated basic needs of hypothetical future generations, and the recognition of rights 
to future generations and corresponding duties of the present generation, there is a 
(179) Although not a successful example, Australia's application against France's resumption of 
atmospheric nuclear tests was based on Australia's legal interest in the observance of the alleged erga 
omnes obligation to refrainfrom atmospheric nuclear testing, irrespective of concrete injury suffered from 
its violation; see Nuclear Tests case (Australia v. France), ICJ Pleadings, Vol. I, Para. 437. 
(180) This approach also fails to reflect the factual reality that States, rather than 'peoples', or 
'generations', primarily bear the responsibility and rights imposed or granted by international 
environmental law. 
(181) Bimse, 'International Environmental Law: its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs', in Hurrell 
& Kingsbury (eds. ), The International Politics of the Environment (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 2, at 83-84. 
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considerable step which States are clearly not prepared to take. As clearly pointed out 
by Sands: 
«[A]ll States have now accepted the general principle that the activities of 
present generations are limited by the obligation to take into account and 
safeguard the developmental and environmental needs of future generations. 
Evidence of the broad acceptance of that principle does not, however, translate 
easily into prescriptions as to what the principle means in practise. » (182) 
Since the first clear expression of intergenerational equity was made in relation to the 
environment, in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, any 
reference to trust, intergenerational rights, obligations or even responsibility, has been 
purposely avoided in the international documents referring to intergenerational equity or 
future generations(183). A first draft of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 2, 
presented by the Inter-Governmental Working Group set up by the Preparatory 
Committee of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment and 
supported by the Secretary General provided that the natural resources of the earth 
«shall be hold in trust for present and future generations. The reference to trust was 
strongly opposed by States as `unduly restrictive of the concept of national 
sovereignty', and was eventually replaced by the more neutral formulation of «natural 
resources (... ) must be safeguarded for the benefit of the present and future 
generation... »(184). The use of the passive form to avoid any mention of rights and 
duties, rights holders and duty bearers turned the whole issue into a matter of benefit, 
interest or concern(185). 
The term of 'trust' was also avoided in 1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles for 
Environmental Protection and Development, even though WCED Group of Experts 
referred to the idea of trust in their comment to Principle 2(186). In the same spirit, the 
historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future 
(182) Sands, `Protecting Future Generations-. Precedents and Practicalities', (FIELD, 1994), Working 
Draft at 6. 
(183) See documents refereedto supra n. 4,6 and 7. 
(184) See further on this initiative: Sohn, `The Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment', 14 
HarvardlU (1973), 433, at 456. 
(185) Boyle, 'International Law and the Protection of the Global Atmosphere: Concepts, Categories and 
Principles', in Churchill & Freestone (eds. ), International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijhof 1991), Chap. 1,12-13. 
(186) WCED-EG, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development (Graham & Trotman/Nijhof, 
1987), at 43. 
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generations was solemnly proclaimed as «a prerequisite for the normal life of man» (187), 
and was not explicitly based on an hypothetical planetary trust. Reference to a 
planetary trust is cautiously avoided in the 1992 Rio Declaration on the Environment 
and Development and, as already mentioned, in 1992 Agenda 21. 
Malta's suggestion to appoint a Trusteeship Council or a High Commissioner that 
would assume, inter alia, the task of a trustee made at the occasion of the 1992 
Conference on the Environment and Development was finally abandoned(188). The 
Commission on Sustainable Development, set up to monitor, review and consider 
progress in the implementation of the international environmental policy and law set out 
Agenda 21, does indirectly consider the interest of future generations inasmuch as it is 
implied in the Agenda; it has not the mandate, however, to act as a genuine ombudsman 
for future generations(189). 
One merit of the planetary trust theory has been to highlight the often neglected 
inter-temporal dimension of international law in general, and of international 
environmental law in particular. As Kiss pointed out, international environmental law is 
(187) Resolution 35/8,30 October 1980. 
(188) For a fora critical view on the various attempt to setup a UN Guardian for Future Generations, see 
Sands, 'Protecting Future Generations : Precedents and Practicalities', (FIELD, 1994), Working Draft 
Equally critical of the practicability of such organ, Birnie points out that the only existing international 
example of such ombudsman for future generations are the supervisory authorities, established by States 
party to the 1974 Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment (Art 4) to 'safeguard general 
environmental interests insofar as nuisance arising out of environmentally harmful activities in another 
Contracting State ; the supervisory authority is allowed inter alia to institute proceedings, and to be 
heard directly before the competent administrative or judicial authority of another Contracting States 
regarding the permissibility of environmentally harmful activities, or to lodge a complaint against the 
decision of such authority taken in application of the law, Broms, The Nordic Convention on the 
Protection of the Environment', in Flinterman et al. (eds. ), Transboundary Air Pollution (Martins 
Nijho$ 1986), Chap. 8, at 146 et sequ. No report was made of any of these authorities being actually 
activated however; 'International Environmental Law: its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs', in 
Hurrell & Kingsbury (eds. ), The International Politics of the Environment (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 2, 
at 84. Another 'domestic' example of ombudsman for future generations is the French Conseil pour les 
droits des gdnerations futures, established by presidential decree as a presidential consultative instance 
body, to ensure that due consideration is paid to environmental issues in public policies and the 
coherence of the latter with the goals set up at the 1992 Conference on the Environment and 
Development. The Council can take action and report to the President proprio motu, or upon request 
from members of government, the presidents of parliamentary assemblies, and recognised associations for 
the protection of nature. No indication is given of the success and actual impact of the institution; see 
constitutive decree, Decret No. 93-298,8 March 1993, Arts. 1&2; the decree is reproduced in extenso in 
Kiss & Shelton, Traite de Droit Europeen, at 36. For a presentation of the various arguments and 
counter-arguments for direct representation of future generations, see further Kavka & Warren, 'Political 
Representation for Future Generations', in Elliot & Gare (eds. ), Environmental Philosophy, A Collection 
of Readings (The Open University Press, 1983), 21. 
(189) No explicit reference to future generations is made in Agenda 21, Para 38.11, providing its 
appointment (although nference in made to the proposal to appoint a guardian for future generations at 
Para. 38.45) or in the founding resolutions, ECOSOC Res. /E/1993/207, endorsed by UNGA 
A/Res. /47/191,22 December 1992. Generally on the Commission, see Orliange, 'La commission du 
developpement durable', 39 AFDI (1993), 820. 
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inherently 'future oriented' in the sense that it contemplates measures affecting, or on 
the contrary preserving, environmental resources related to present activities, which 
effects often occur in the near or far future(190). The issue, therefore, is not to create and 
develop new principles and new institutions to enforce those principles, but to 
implement and exploit existing devices and rules(191). 
A more effective exploitation of the existing inter temporal dimension of international 
law could pass by a redefinition of the quality to act in environment related cases, both 
at the inter-state level and at the level of individual action at the domestic level or in the 
human rights procedures, by the intensification of the participation of non-governmental 
actors in the national and international decision-making and policy-shaping(192), by a 
greater accountability of governments for their own environment(193), and a more 
effective co-operation between States, all sectors and every level of society on 
environmental issues(194), and by the clarification and proper implementation of the 
precautionary principle(195). 
MOO 
(190) Kiss, 'Le droit international de 1'environnement, un aspect du droit international de 1'avenir ? ', in 
Dupuy (ed. ), The Future of International Law of the Environment', Hague Academy of International Law 
Workshop 1984 (Martinus Nijhog 1985), 471, at 477. 
(191) Sands, 'Protecting Future Generations : Precedents and Practicalities', (FIELD, 1994), Working 
Draft, 11. 
(192) See infra Chap. 6, Principles Pertaining to Public Participation. 
(193) See supra Chap. 2, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 
(194) See infra Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership. 
(195) See supra Chap. 3, Prevention and Precautionary Principles. 
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1. Introduction 
Reference to partnership in international law in general, and international 
environmental law in particular, is recent. Apart from isolated allusions thereto 
essentially in the context of decolonisation and development(s), the concept of 
(1) In an article entitled 'The Passing of the European Order' published in the late 1950s, H. ý Luthy 
called upon European States «to fmd the road from tutelage to partnership 
... 
»; 8 Encounter (1957), 3, at 
12, referredafterRÖling, International Law in an Expanded World (Djambatan, 1960), at 86, n. 18. One 
of the earliest express reference to partnership was made in Reference the 1970 Strategy for the Second 
Development Decade, Para. 84 in fine; such referencereflected the widespread belief that the failure of the 
first UN development decade (in the 1960s) 
- 
sometimes called the 'lost decade' or the 'development 
decade without a development policy', was largely due to the lack of common strategy and real 
partnership; UNGA, A/Res. /2219 (XXI), December 19,1966; Verwey, Economic Development, Peace 
and International Law (VanGorcum, 1972), 284; see also Bouveresse, Droit et politiques du 
developpementet de la cooperation (Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), Part 4, Chap. 1&2; Flory, 
Droit international du developpement (Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), Chap. III. The necessity 
of a real partnership to promote economic development was clearly underlined in the final report of the 
Pearson Commission, called after the name of its chairman, requested by the World Bank to elaborate 
some guidelines for development strategies; Pearson & Boyle et al., Partners in Development, Report of 
the Commission on International Development (Pall Mall, 1969). Interestingly, the reference to partners 
was dropped in the French version, entitled Vers une action commune pour le developpement du tiers- 
monde (Denoel, 1969). Similar conclusions were reached by the UN appointed Jackson Commission, (continued) 
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partnership was really given international currency at the 1992 Rio Conference on 
Development and Environment, convened `with the goal of establishing a new and 
equitable global partnership'(2). 1992 Agenda 21, often referred to as a 'blueprint for a 
renewed partnership towards sustainable development in the next century'(3), contains, 
in its English version, over thirty references to partnership(s), some of them worded in 
general terms of 'global partnership for sustainable development'(4), others relating to 
more specific subject matters(5) or to specific groups(6). 
Nevertheless, the concept of partnership as used at the international level has 
remained largely ill-defined in terms of its actual meaning and practical implications. The 
overall context within which it was formulated(7) tends to suggest that partnership as 
understood in the present state of international environmental law has little in common 
with the domestic institution of the same name. Rather, it appears to be yet another 
expression for co-operation. 
Like international law in general(8), international environmental law has evolved from 
a law of coexistence to a law of co-operation, from a law of bilateral co-operation based 
monde (Denoel, 1969). Similar conclusions were reached by the UN appointed Jackson Commission, 
vested with the responsibility to report upon the overall capacity of the UN development system, and by 
the ECOSOC appointed Tinbergen Committee; see Jackson et al., A Study of the Capacity of the United 
Nations Development System, E. 701 10 (United Nations, 1969); and Tinbergen et al., Report on 
Planning and Development (1970); see also various national reports on bilateral aid, mentioned in Flory, 
ibid supra, at 161 et sequ. 
(2) 1992 Rio Declaration on Development and Environment, preambularPara. 3. 
(3) United Nations, The Global Partnership for Environment and Development (United Nations, 1993), 
at 15. 
(4) See Paras. 1.1,1.2,1.6,2.1. 
(5) Namely human settlements (7.4,7.9(e), 7.30(d), 7.45(c), 7.77(b)), decision-making (8.2), sustainable 
mountain development (13.18(c)), biotechnology (16.1), hazardous wastes (20.18(c)), financial resources (33.9), education (36.5(c) and (i)), capacity building (37.2,37.5). 
(6) See infra n. 12. 
(7) Infra 2/ü. Partnership-like Concept in International Law: the Case of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind; 2/iii. Common Heritage of Mankind under the 1982 UNCLOS: Attempt to Set up a Marine 
Partnership () ; see also supra Chap. 2/2/iii. Sovereignty over Environmental Resources and 
Environmental Policies versus Globalisation of Environmental Standards and Policies. 
(8) On the evolution of 'modem' international law and the emergence of a `positive peace' and 
'international law of welfare', see Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Clarendon, 1986), 
Chapters 3,12 and 13; Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Stevens & Sons, 
1964); Friedmann, `The Changing Structure of International Law', in Falk et al. (eds. ), International 
Law, a Contemporary Perspective (Westview, 1985), 142; Henkin, 'General Course on Public 
International Law', 216 RdC (1989-IV), 9; Rdling, International Law in an Expanded World 
(Djambatan, 1960). On `renewed' co-operation afterthe cold-war diplomacy, see for instance McWhinncy 
et al. (eds. ), From Coexistence to Co-operation: International Law and Organization in the Post Cold 
War Era (Martinus Nij hoff, 19 9 1). 
The classic conception of international rules as static rules of coexistence principally concerned with peace 
and security issues has been particularly criticised by developing States, as being geared towards the 
interests of developed States, and being inappropriate to serve their own needs and interests; De Waart, (continued) 
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on reciprocity to a law of non-reciprocal global action, from a law of efficient allocation 
of natural resources (effizienten Allokation von natürlichen Ressourcen) to an 
environmental protection law (Umeltschutzrecht) involving a co-operative management 
of nature(9). Originally limited to the management and protection of specific shared 
environment media (water, air,... ), inter-state co-operation has progressively extended 
to the management and protection of the so-called `global commons'(10), and recently to 
'Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources as a Cornerstone for International Economic Rights and 
Duties', 14 Netherlands ILl (1977), 304; Schrijver, 'The Dynamics of Sovereignty in a Changing 
World', in Ginther et al. (eds. ), Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1995), Chap. 5; see supra Chap. 2, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, note 46 (CR). 
(9) Picone, 'Obblighi reciproci ed obblighi erga omnes degli statt nel campo della protezione 
internationale dell'ambiente marino dall' inquinamento', in Starace (ed. ), Diritto internazionale e 
protezione dell'ambiente marino (Giuffre, 1983), 15, at 26, and remarks on the no transboundary harm 
principle as a rule of coexistence, with initially no particular environmental dimensions supra, Chap. 2/2 
Objects of Permanent Sovereignty: From Mineral Resources to Environmental Policy 
, 
Chap. 2/4/ii/a. 
Equitable Utilisation, Sic Utere Tuo and Related No Substantial Transboundary Harm Principles and 
Chap. 2/4/ii/c. Limits Arising from General Environmental Considerations. Such distinction was 
originally adopted to describe the evolution of domestic environmental law, see Winter, 'Perspektiven 
des Umweltrecht', 13 DVB1. (1988), 659; it is equally suitable to describe the general evolution of 
international environmental law. See also Caldwell's distinction between the 'old' geopolitics, concerned 
with control over territory, natural resources and strategic locations, and 'newer' geopolitics, more 
concerned with the implications of national security and economy, health and quality of life; 
International Environmental Policy (Duke University Press, 1990), Chap. 1; 'The Geopolitics of 
Environmental Policy : Transnational Modification of National Sovereignty', 59 Revista Juridica de la 
Univerisdad de Puerto Rico (1990), 693, at 694 et sequ.; and 'Beyond Environmental Diplomacy: the 
Changing Institutional Structure of International Cooperation', in Hurrell & Kingsbury (eds. ), The 
International Politics of the Environment (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 2; Caldwell focuses on the post- 
Stockholm development, and does not really consider Winter's 'allocation' phase. See further Beyerlin, 
'Rio-Konferenz 1992: Begin einer globalen Umweltrechtsordnung ? ', 54 ZdoRV (1994), 124, at 127; 
Dupuy, 'Humanit6 et environnment', XII Annuaire de Droit Maritime & Aero-Spatial (1993), 493; 
Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles of Modern International Environmental Law 
(Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhofl 1994), 7-8; Hurrell & Kingsbury (eds. ), The International 
Politics of the Environment (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 1; Lang, 'Luft und Ozon 
- 
Schutzobjekte des 
Völkerrechts', 46 ZaÖRV (1986), 261. On the factors leading to the proliferation of international 
environmental law documents, see for instance Hahn & Richards, The Internationalization of 
Environmental Regulation', 30 Harvard ILI (1989), 421. For a comprehensive view of the evolution of 
certain sectors of international environmental law, see for instance Pannatier, L'antarctique et la 
protection internationale de l'environnement (Schulthess Polygraphischer, 1994), Part I. 
(10) The expression refers to those areas or resources which, by their very nature, fall beyond the 
sovereign jurisdiction of States; it encompasses the oceans, Antarctica (although certain States do claim 
territorial jurisdiction), Outer space, and the atmosphere; Volger, The Global Commons, A Regime 
Analysis (John Wiley & Sons, 1995), at 2. Although regulatory regimes for certain global commons had 
already been enacted in the late 1950s, a turning point in the management of the global commons, 
traditionally subjected to a res communis type of regime open to free exploitation, was Hardin's famed 
'apocalyptic metaphor of the selfish profit-maximising rationale of medieval herdsmen', conducive to the 
destruction of the common grazing land as a consequence of excessive population growth and pollution; 
see Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons', 162 Science (1968), 1243, reprinted in Hardin & Baden, 
Managing the Commons (Freeman & Co, 1977), Chap. 3; the bracketed expression is inspired from 
Bretherton, 'Gender and Environmental Change, Are Women the Key to Safeguarding the Planet? ', in 
Vogler & Imber (eds. ), The Environment & International Relations (Routledge, 1996), Chap. 6,107. 
Hardin's path-breaking article triggered an abundant literature; see for instance Crowe, 'The Tragedy of 
the Commons Revisited', 166 Science (1969), 1103, reprinted in Hardin & Baden, op. cit., Chap. 8; 
Feeny et al., `The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later', 18 Human Ecology (1990), 1; 
Morse, 'Managing International Commons', 31 JIA (1977), 1. See also Caldwell, International (continued) 
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more general environmental issues considered to be the 'common concern of the whole of 
mankind'(11). 
This Chapter is concerned with inter-state co-operation(12) on `global' environmental 
issues extending beyond the pure transboundary context(13), constituting a common 
concern or common interest of mankind. In a first stage, it considers in what respect the 
global environmental partnership referred to in 1992 Agenda 21 and sporadically 
Environmental Policy (Duke University Press, 1990), Chap. 8; Nanda, International Environmental 
Policy (Transnational Publishers, 1995), Chap. 2; Sooros, Beyond Sovereignty: The Challenge of Global 
Policy (University of South Carolina Press, 1986); Stone, 'Defending the Global Commons', in Sands 
(ed. ), Greening International Law (Earthscan, 1993), Chap. 3; Vogler, The Global Commons, A Regime 
Analysis, op. cit.; Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the 
Environment (Cornell University Press, 1989). 
(11) Such as loss of biodiversity, global warming, or deforestation. Whilst the management of global 
commons essentially involves States' actions beyond their sovereign jurisdiction with regard to resources 
beyond national jurisdiction, issues declared the common concern of mankind often involve States' 
action within their national jurisdiction, often, as in the case of forestry and biodiversity, with respect to 
resources under undisputed national jurisdiction; Wolfrum, 'Purposes and Principles of International 
Environmental Law', 33 German YbIL (1990), 308. 
The largely rhetorical debate on scope and nature of the expressions of common heritage, common 
concern or common interest of mankind falls outside the ambit of this thesis. All three expressions are 
used here essentially in an attempt to differentiate the degree of commitment by States with respect to 
certain environmental issues, with no attempt being made to either endorse or refute any of them as the 
expression of a legal concept. For an extremely thorough and up-to-date study of the concepts in 
international law (with a strong albeit non exclusive focus on international environmental law), see 
Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 1998). For a brief outlook of the concept of common heritage in international environmental 
law, see Birnie & Boyle, 112; Boyle, 'International Law and the Protection of the Global Atmosphere', 
in Churchill & Freestone (eds. ), International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham & Trotman / 
Martinus Nijhoff: 1991), Chap. 1; Fleischer, 'The International Concern for the Environment: The 
Concept of Common Heritage', in Bothe (ed. ), Trends in Environmental Policy and Law (IUCN, 1980), 
321. 
(12) The partnership(s) in 1992 Agenda 21 and subsequent documents refer not only to the relations 
between, but also within States. Hence, referenceto partnership is made in relation to some of 1992 
Agenda 21's specific groups, namely indigenous peoples (26.3,26.6), local authorities (28.4), NGOs (27.2,27.5,27.10(b), 27.11(a), 27.12), business and industry (30.2,3.7,3.23), and scientific and 
technological community (31.1,31.4(b)). The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action the Advancement of 
Women refers to partnership in relation to women's involvement in the development and environment 
process (Para. 17). `Infra-state' partnerships are considered in Chap. 6, Principles Pertaining to Public 
Participation. Part of the doctrine attribute an inter-temporal dimension to partnership, hence considering 
successive generations as partners; Brown Weiss, 'Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for 
the Environment', Agora 
- 
What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next ? An Approach to 
Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AJIL (1990), 198; and 'Environmental Equity and 
International Law', in UNEP (ed. ), UNEP's New Way Forward : Environmental Law and Sustainable (UNEP, 1995), Chap. 2, at 15. Such an inter-temporal or intergenerationalpartnership appearprima facie 
less realistic than an 'intra-generational' or an inter-States partnership, in that partnership, at least as 
understood in domestic law, rests upon a special fiduciary relationship between the partners and entails a 
sharing of obligations and responsibilities as well as benefits difficult to conceive between 'non- 
contemporaneous' actors; infra n. 21. The inter-temporal dimension of partnership is more particularly 
considered above at Chap. 4, Intergenerational Equity. 
(13) On co-operation with respect of transboundary resources and resources under domestic jurisdiction 
exclusively, see supra Title 1, supra, on Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty and Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources. 
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mentioned in subsequent international environmental documents can be associated to or 
should be distinguished from the domestic institution of the same name. In the light of 
the controversy revolving around the implications of the common heritage of mankind, 
that is the closest formulation of partnership made so far in international law, most 
notoriously in the context of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea(14), it seems 
reasonable to conclude that States are far from ready to enter a genuine partnership to 
`manage the global environment' in common and share both responsibilities and 
interests. 
Based on the assumption that partnership reformulates, in fact, the necessity of 
global co-operation on environmental issues of common concern of mankind, such as 
atmospheric pollution, climate change, loss of biodiversity or deforestation, this 
Chapter endeavours to find out how far and on what terms both developed and 
developing countries are committed to co-operating. Contrary to early international 
environmental rules and to a certain number of `regional' environmental rules applying 
among States that dispose of broadly similar financial and technological abilities, a 
`global partnership towards sustainable development' would necessarily involve 
developed as much as developing States, and therefore entails a certain degree of 
assistance and co-operation. Behind such new attractive formula as partnership or 
common concern of mankind, the discourse revolves in fact around the same old 
parameters of financial and technical co-operation and assistance that were characteristic 
of the debates on the new international economic and marine orders. 
The discussion in the context of the protection of the global environment, however, 
differs from that in the context of economic development (including deep seabed 
mining). Assistance, in the latter case, has been mostly considered as a matter of 
`charitable action' for the sole benefit of recipient States. In the area of global 
environmental protection, by contrast, financial and technological assistance is viewed 
as a necessary preliminary and component to assure the essential contribution of 
developing States to address issues not only of their concern, but of the concern of 
(14) And more generally the debate on a new international economic order, of which the common heritage 
of mankind concept in the context of the law of the sea is usually regarded as the most comprehensive 
expression at the international level; comment and references on the new international economic order 
ideology and the common heritage of mankind concept, supra, Chap. 2/2/ii. Sovereignty over Economic 
Assets and Policy in a New International Economic Order, and Chap. 5/2 Partnership in National and 
International Law. 
The concept of common heritage was also used with regard to the moon and other celestial bodies, infra 
n. 48, the concept and associated mechanism however, have been more developed in the context of the 
law of the sea, and therefore provide a better case study. It must be noted that the US refused to ratify the 
1979 Moon Treaty, although it had ratified the 1967 Space Treaty, as seen, the former incorporates the 
concept of common heritage of mankind in a more explicit and comprehensive way than the latter, 
directly in the text. 
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paper, their effective commitment to environmental action against developed States' 
commitment to appropriate financial and technological assistance to provide them with 
the means of fulfilling their commitments. 
In practice however, despite the general recognition of the urgent need for common 
action with respect to certain environmental issues, the lack of a genuine sense of 
common interest (as opposed to individual interest) and, therefore, the lack of common 
benefit and common responsibility, has failed in the first attempt at `bargained co- 
operation'. As particularly clearly summarised by Porter and Welsh Brown: 
«Hopes for a North-South partnership approach depend on a recognition of 
mutual dependence and self-interest among countries, both North and South. 
The highly industrialized countries must accept the fact that they cannot solve 
environmental problems without the cooperation of the developing countries. 
The developing nations must recognize that they cannot pursue a sustainable 
development strategy without the cooperation of the partnership [sic] of the 
highly industrialized countries of the North. » (15) 
2. Partnership in National and International Law 
i. Domestic Institution of Partnership: the English Example 
Partnership as an institution of domestic law(16) is broadly defined as «a relation 
which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view of a 
profit»(17). A partnership is a loose association of persons or other legal entities, such 
as institutions, public or private companies, deprived of legal personality distinct from 
that of its members(18). The following major features of partnership can be 
identified(19): 
1) Co-ownership: any `property' of the partnership is, in fact, jointly held and 
administered by the partners(20). 
(15) Global Environmental Politics (Westview, 1991), at 152. 
(16) On the relevance of domestic institutions in international law, see supra Chap. 4/2. Environmental 
Fairness. 
(17) UK Partnership Act 1890, Sect. 1(1); generally on partnership law in the United Kingdom, see 
L'Anson Banks, Lindley & Banks On Partnership, 17th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) (hereafter rcfernd 
to after the title); Morse, Partnership Law, 3rd edn (Blackstone, 1995) (hereafter referred to after the 
author); Prime & Scanlan, The Law of Partnership (Butterworths, 1995) (hereafter referred to after the 
authors). 
(18) As opposed to the company, which is a legal entity on its own, vested with most of the attributes cf 
the legal personality. Partnership is translated in French with the expression of societe/association de 
personnes sans personnalite morale, and company, societe commerciale or personne morale; see 
Navarre Economic and Legal Dictionary, 4th edn (LGDJ, 1995), 535. 
(19) UK Partnership Act 1890, Sect. 1; see Lindley & Banks On Partnership, Chap. 5. 
(20) UK Partnership Act 1890, Sect. 20-21; Lindley & Banks On Partnership, Chap. 18; Prime & 
Scanlan, Chap. 9. 
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1) Co-ownership: any `property' of the partnership is, in fact, jointly held and 
administered by the partners(20). 
2) Co-benefit: each partner is in a fiduciary relationship with the co-partners, viz. under 
a certain duty of loyalty to them(21). He has for instance to disclose to his co- 
partners, honestly and in good faith, all matters concerning the partnership(22), and 
has no exclusive right to personal profit derived from any transaction concerning the 
partnership(23). 
3) Co-responsibility: «each partner is an agent of his fellow partners simply by virtue 
of the relationship»(24); accordingly, any wrongful action or omission of the one 
partner acting within the limits of the fiduciary relation (i. e. the ordinary course of 
the business or with the authority of co-partners) engages prima facie the unlimited 
joint and/or several liability of the others(25). 
Clearly, the implications of the domestic institution of partnership go beyond a mere 
co-operation between the partners; they involve a large degree of sharing of ownership, 
benefits, and responsibilities, and imply a sense of solidarity between the partners. 
Apart from cases of transnational partnerships, which remain an institution of private 
(international) law, no such institution as partnership exists in international law(26). In 
this respect, the references contained in 1992 Agenda 21 are innovative(27). A closer look 
(20) UK Partnership Act 1890, Sect. 20-21; Lindley & Banks On Partnership, Chap. 18; Prime & 
Scanlan, Chap. 9. 
(21) Prime & Scanlan, at 170; also Thompson's Trustee v. Heaton, [1974] 1 WLR 605, at 613. Moffat 
defines the term 'fiduciary' as «an abstract term, but one possessing a 'core' meaning, namely that the 
person in that position is under a duty of loyalty to some other person or body. This duty is then 
translated into a fundamental legal principle that a fiduciary should not allow his personal interest to 
conflict with that duty; Trusts Law, Text and Materials, 2nd edn (Butterworths, 1994), 545. Moffat 
underlines however that the partnership fiduciary relationship is more of a 'collaborative fiduciary 
relationship', in the sense that «[it] is born out of the mutual trust and confidence between parties 
combining for common end and are roughly equal in status», whilst a typical fiduciary relationship is 
characterised by the unequal status of the parties; ibid. 547. 
(22) UK Partnership Act 1890, Sect. 28; Morse, at 112; Prime & Scanlan, Chap. 16. 
(23) UK Partnership Act 1890, Sect. 29; Lindley & Banks On Partnership, Chap. 16; Prime & Scanlan, 
at 172. 
(24) UK Partnership Act 1890, Sect. 5-8; Morse, at 74. 
(25) UK Partnership Act 1890, Sect. 
-10 to 12, provides for the joint and several liability of partners for 
torts, frauds, and the misappropriation of money and property, Lindley & Banks On Partnership, Chap. 
12 and 13; Morse, at 90; Prime & Scanlan, at 135. 
(26) There is no Chapter on partnership, and no referencein the index in Bernhardt (ed. ), Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, neither is there any mention in Lauterpacht's albeit non exhaustive study on 
the analogies between public international law and private domestic law; Private International Law 
Sources and Analogies of International Law, with Special Reference to International Arbitration 
(Archon Books, 1970). 
(27) Reference to domestic institutions in international law is commonplace. Generally on the relevance 
of domestic institutions in international law, see supra Chap. 4/2. Environmental Fairness. 
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at these international references, however, reveals a rather loose conception of 
partnership. One of the most comprehensive definition in 1992 Agenda 21 reads as 
follows: 
« In order to meet the challenges of environment and development, States 
have decided to establish a new global partnership. This partnership 
commits all States to engage in a continuous and constructive dialogue, 
inspired by the need to achieve a more efficient and equitable world 
economy, keeping in view the increasing interdependence of the community 
of nations (... ) It is recognised that, for the success of this new partnership, it 
is important to overcome confrontation and to foster a climate of genuine 
cooperation and solidarity. It is equally important to strengthen national and 
international policies and multinational cooperation to adapt to the new 
realities. »(28) 
In similar terms, the 1993 ECE Lucerne Declaration provides that the partnership 
between Central and Eastern Europe, and Western Europe on environmental issues 
«should include cooperation between different levels of government, local authorities, 
local financial institutions, private industry, and the indispensable participation of the 
informal sector»(29). Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of the identity of the 
partners, there is no indication that partnership mentioned in international legal 
instruments is understood as entailing a degree of sharing of ownership, responsibilities 
and benefits. 
The closest reference to the domestic institution at the international level is contained 
in 1992 Agenda 21, with regard to popular participation in desertification control: « [I]t 
is necessary to go beyond the active popular involvement, rooted in the concept of 
partnership. This implies the sharing of responsibilities and the mutual involvement of 
all parties»(30). Likewise, the comment to the preambular reference to partnership in 
1995 IUCN Draft International Covenant of Environment and Development provides 
that «'partnership' is based upon the existing fundamental obligation between States 
(... ) implying a greater interdependence and joint responsibility for the well-being of 
all»(31). As Bachelet rightly points out, under a real environmental partnership, any 
State or international organ would be justified to intervene in the management of the 
object of the partnership for the purpose of protecting it; «l'ingerence [ecologique] est 
donc licite et plus excatement il n'y a plus d'ingerence, mais un contröle legitime de la 
part dun partenaire qui s'estime lese dans 1'execution, ou plus exactement, l'inexecution 
d'un engagement entre Etats» (32). 
(28) Para 2.1. 
(29) Para. 9.2. 
(30) Para. 12.55. 
(31) At p. 26-27 (notes omitted). 
(32) L'ingerence ecologique, at 205; see remarks on erga omnes obligation to protect the environment, (continued) 
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Quite the contrary, the `international conception' of partnership appears closer to 
give-and-take co-operation and assistance between various States, and between the 
various sectors and levels of the State. Some authors, whilst recognising that the 
'partnership' referred to in international environmental law cannot be assimilated to the 
domestic institution, find nonetheless certain features of the latter in the former, like for 
instance the equal participation of the partners, the common but differentiated 
responsibility(33). 
At least three sets of arguments can be invoked in support of such an understanding 
of partnership in international law: 
1) The 1992 Rio Declaration on Development and Environment expressly links the 
concept of partnership and the concept of international co-operation, urging the 
establishment of a new global partnership `through the creation of new levels of 
cooperation among States, key sectors of societies and people'(34). 
2) The majority of environmental documents adopted since the 1992 Rio Conference on 
Development and Environment are worded in terms of co-operation(35), occasionally 
in terms of assistance(36), but rarely refer to partnership as such. When reference is 
made to partnership, (a) it is often associated with the general objective of the 
promotion of sustainable development rather than with more specific obligations, and 
(b) it is commonly included in the title or the preamble of the documents, whilst 
more detailed provisions on specific issues remain worded in terms of co- 
supra Chap. 2/4/c. Limits Arising from General Environmental Considerations. The partnership(s) 
referredto in 1994 Desertification Convention, Art. 18, are also closer to the domestic institution. 
(33) See for instance Chengyuan, 'Legal Aspects of the Global Partnership Between North and South', in 
Al-Nauimi & Meese (eds. ), International Legal Issues Arising Under the Decade of International Law 
(Martinus Nijhofg 1995), 203. 
(34) preambular Para 3; see also UNSG Report to the Commission on Sustainable Development on Rio 
Declaration on the Environment and Development: application and implementation, E/CN. 17/1997/8, 
10 February 1997, Para. 44. Similar link is contained inter alia in 1995 OECD Policy Statement on 
Sustainable Development, section entitled Partners in Cooperation: Resources; 1994 Miami Declaration 
of Principles, referring to co-operative partnerships to strengthen the capacity to prevent and control 
pollution; 34 ILM (1995), at 813; 1990 Strategy for the Fourth Development Decade, Para. 16. 
(35) See inter alia 1992 Climate Change Convention, preambular Para. 6, and Art. 3(5); 1992 
Biodiversity Convention preambular Para. 14 and Art. 5; 1992 Forestry Principles. See also various 
declarations issued in the running to Rio Conference: 1989 Sofia Recommendations on the Protection of 
the Environment, Part I, Para. 3; 1990 Bangkok Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development; 
1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, Para. 18,19,20; 1991 Beijing 
Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Development, Preamble; 1991, Tlatelolco Platform on 
Environment and Development, Para. 16. On the other hand, references to co-operation in a spirit cf 
partnership and partnership arrangements are made in the 1994 Desertification Convention, Arts. 2(1), 
3(b) and (c), and Annex I, Art. 18. One should note that 1989 Resolution 44/228, on United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, setting the premises upon a global partnership must be built under 1992 Agenda 21 (see preamble of that Agenda) is exclusively worded in terms of Cooperation 
and contains no mention of partnership as such. 
(36) See for instance 1989 Hague Declaration on the Environment, Para. 7 
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operation(37). In a general way, the definition of partnership which can be inferred 
from the various references thereto is closer to some form of multi-level, cross- 
sectoral co-operation than it is to the domestic institution of partnership(38). At a 
meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the Convention to 
Combat Desertification in January 1997, the G77 stated that «the test of partnership 
called for in the Convention lies in the mobilisation of sufficient financial resources, 
provision of new and additional funding, and the transfer of ecologically sound 
technologies» (39) 
3) The lack of consistency between the English and French versions of the 1992 Agenda 
21 is yet another factor against the assimilation of international partnership with the 
domestic institution(40). The term association, the accurate French translation of the 
legal (domestic) institution of partnership(41), is used in the French version in less 
than half of the cases where the English version resorts to the term of partnership(42); 
in the other cases, and with no apparent reason justifying such distinction, 
partnership is loosely translated as participation(43) or more literally as 
partenariat(44). 
(37) See for instance, 1994 Miami Declaration of Principles, issued at the Summit of the Americas, 
entitled Partnership for Development and Prosperity: Democracy, Free Trade and Sustainable 
Development in theAmericas; 1994 CSCE Budapest Summit Declaration, entitled Towards a Genuine 
Partnership in a New Era. One could also mention a series of bilateral 'environmental' or 'global 
partnership agreements' passed between the US and various countries, all closer to mutual co-operation 
and assistance than to relations of partnership in the legal sense, and involving some training 
programmes, financial assistance, and technical co-operation; see for instance US-Asia Environmental 
Partnership, 4 January 1992, reproduced in 3 Department of State Dispatch (1992), 22; Tokyo 
Declaration on US-Japan Global Partnership, 9 January 1992, in ibid., at 44; Enhanced US-Turkish 
Partnership, 11 February 1992, in ibid at 109; Declaration on US-Ukrainian Relations: Building A 
Democratic Partnership, 6, May 1992, ibid., at 366; Democratic Partnership between the US and Russia, 
a April 1993, in 4 Department of State Dispatch (1993), 225; Partnership with South Africa, 6 October 
1994, in 5 Department of State Dispatch (1994), 723; Partnership Progress in Haiti, 7 October 1994, 
ibid., 697; US-Australia Environmental Partnership, 26 July 1996, in 7 Department of State Dispatch 
(1996), 396. 
(38) See supra i. Domestic Institution of Partnership: the English Example. 
(39) As reported in 27 EPL (1997), 88. 
(40) The lack of coherence in the use of terms to translate a same concept used in the same context, as it 
is the case for partnership, is also an indication of the political, sometimes extremely rhetorical, nature of 
1992 Agenda 21. 
(41) See Navarre Economic and Legal Dictionary, 4th edn (LGDJ, 1995); Lindbergh, International Law 
Dictionary (Blackstone, 1992); Le Robert & Collins, Le Petit Robert Bilingue, 2nd edn (Dictionnaires 
Le Robert, 1990). 
(42) See Paras. 7.77(b), 26.6,31.4(b), 34.4,34.5,34.16,34.19,34.26(b), 36.5(c) and (i), 40.29. 
Partnership is occasionally translated as liens d 'association, an expression not commonly used in legal 
or ordinary French; see Paras. 7.4,7.9(e). 
(43) Paras. 30.2,30.23 (accords de participation). 
(44) The term ofpartenariat, albeit increasingly used in written and spoken French, in legal and ordinary (continued) 
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Besides, should an international parallel exist, with the domestic institution of 
partnership, its actual efficiency, at least in the area of environmental management and 
protection, would be particularly doubtful considering the lack of real joint commitment 
and perceived common interests in making it work, where necessary in disregard of 
individual national interests. 
H. Partnership-like Concept in International Law: the Case of the Common Heritage 
of Mankind 
The closest international formula to the domestic institution of partnership would be 
the very controversial common heritage of mankind, introduced in the international legal 
vocabulary in the late 1960s, nearly simultaneously in the context of the space and law 
of the sea negotiations(45). Beyond the large degree of uncertainty as to what are the 
contexts (see for instance Bachelet, L ingerence 6cologique (Frison-Roche, 1995), at 207), has not (yet) 
been formally accepted as part of the official language; ordinary or legal dictionaries only recognise the 
term ofpartenaires also derived from English; see for instance Le Petit Robert Vol. 1 (Dictionnaires Le 
Robert, 1989). The only reference to partenariat was found in an English edited dictionary: Oxford- 
Hachette French Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1994). Partnership is translated as Partenariat at 
Paras 1.1,1.2,1.6,2.1,7.30(d), 12.55,12.56(b), 13.18(c), 20.18(c), 23.4,27.10(b), 27(11), 28.4,31.1, 
33.9,34.14(e). All references to partnership in 1992 Rio Declaration on Human Environment and 
Development are translated as partenariat; Preambular, and Princ. 7 and 21. 
(45) Argentinean Ambassador to the United Nations Cocca used the expression speaking before United 
Nations Committee on Outer Space; Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub- 
Committee, Summary Record of the 75th Meeting, UN Doc. A/AC. 105/C. 2/SR 75 (1968), at 7-8, 
referredafter Cocca, `The Advances In International Law Through the Law of Outer Space', 9 Journal of 
Space Law (1981), 13, at 15. Two months later, on 17 August 1967, Malta's Ambassador to the United 
Nations delivered to the Secretary General, on the behalf of his country, a note verbale entitled 
Declaration and Treaty Concerning the Reservation Ezclusivelyfor Peaceful Purposes of the Seabed and 
of the ocean Floor, Underlying the Seas Beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, and the 
Uses of their Resources in the Interests of Mankind, UN Doc. A/6695; see also Pardo's speech at 
UNGA's First Committee, 1 November 1967, A/C. 1/PV. 151; references after Brown, `Neither Necessary 
Nor Prudent at this Stage: the Regime of Seabed Mining and its Impact on the Universality of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea', 17 Marine Policy (1993), 81, at 82 n. 12. For rationale 
behind Malta's action: Pardo, `The Emerging Law of the Sea', in Walsh (ed. ), The Law of the Sea: 
Issues in Ocean ResourcesManagement (Praeger, 1977), 33, at 36; Pardo, `Law of the Sea- What Went 
Wrong', in Friedheim (ed. ), Managing Ocean Resources, A Primer (Westview, 1979), Chap. 9, at 139. 
The principle of exploitation of the seabed and ocean floor for the common benefit of mankind was put on 
UN Agenda in the late 1960s, see Res. 2340 (X3üI), 18 December 1967; Res. 2467 (XXIII), 21 
December 1968; Res. 2574 (XXIV), 15 December 1969; it was solemnly set forth as an international 
principle in Resolution 2749 (XXV), 17 December 1970, adopted with 108 votes with no opposition, 
and 14 abstentions (the group of socialist States, except Yugoslavia), and reiterated in the 1975 
Economic Charter (Art. 29); on the Soviet position, see Joyner, 'Towards a Legal Regime for the 
International Seabed, the Soviet Union Evolving Perspective', 15 Virginia JIL (1975), 871. 
The literature on the common heritage of mankind is voluminous, reflecting the degree of controversy 
surrounding the concept; see for instance: Danilenko, `The Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind in 
International Law', 13 Annals of Air & Space Law (1988), 247; Kiss, 'La Notion de Patrimoine 
Commun de 1'Humanite', 175 RdC (1982-II), 99; De Klemm, 'Le patrimoine naturel de 1'humanite', in 
Dupuy (ed. ) The Future of International Law of the Environment', Workshop 1984, (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1985), 117; Riphagen, `The International Concern or the Environment as Expressed in the Concepts of 
the "Common Heritage of Mankind" and of "Shared Natural Resources"', in Bothe (cd. ), Trends in 
Environmental Policy and Law (IUCN, 1980), 343; Sucharitkul, `Evolution continue d'une notion 
nouvelle: le patrimoine commun de l'humanite', in Dinstein (ed. ), International Law at a Time of (continued) 
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scope(46) and the legal status of the common heritage of mankind(47) and which elements 
qualify as such under international law(48), there seems to be a general consensus on the 
following basic constitutive characteristics of the concept(49): 
Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Nijho1 1989), 887; White, `The Common Heritage 
of Mankind: An Assessment', 14 Case Western Reserve JIL (1982), 509; Wolfrum, `The Principle of 
Common Heritage of Mankind', 43 Za6RV (1983), 312. For furtherreferencesand a thorough appraisal of 
the concept, see Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Kluwer 
Law International, 1998), Ph. D manuscript, Part I. 
(46) Dolman, Resources, Regimes and World Order (Pergamon Policy Studies, 1981); Goldie, `A Note 
on Some Diverse Meanings of the Common Heritage of Mankind', 10 Syracuse JIL & Commerce 
(1983), 69; Myers, `Is There a «Common Heritage of Mankind»? ', Proceedings of the 31 th Colloquium 
on the Law of Outerspace (1990), 335; Porritt, `The Common Heritage: What Heritage, Common to 
Whom? ', 1 Environmental Values (1992), 256. 
(47) Arnold, `Common Heritage of Mankind as a Legal Concept', 9 International Lawyer (1975), 153; 
Brown, `The Consequences of Non Agreement', in Alexander, The Law of the Sea: A New Geneva 
Conference, Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode 
Island, Rhode Island, Kingstone, 21-24 June 1971,14, at 16 et sequ; Danilenko, `The Concept of 
Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law', 13 Annals of Air & Space Law (1988), 247; 
Gorove, `The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind; A Political, Moral, and legal Innovation? ', 
9 San Diego LR (1972), 390; van Hoof, `Legal Status of the Concept of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind', 7 Grotiana New Series (1986), 49, at 56 et sequ.; Joyner, `Legal Implications of the Concept 
of Common Heritage of Mankind', 35 ICLQ (1986), 190; Kewenig, `Common Heritage of Mankind 
- 
politischer Slogan oder völkerrechtlicher Schlüsselbegriff? ', in von München (ed. ), Staatrecht- 
Volketrecht-Europarecht: Festschrill für Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer (Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 235; 
Larschan & Brennan, `The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in International Law', 21 Columbia 
JTL (1983), 305; Song, `Common Heritage of Mankind as a Customary International Norm', 8 Korea 
WorldAffairs (1984), 665; Wolfrum, supra n. 45; see also infra n. 74. 
(48) Formally only the moon and its resources and the deep seabed are have been declared common 
heritage of mankind; see 1979 Moon Treaty, Art. 11; 1982 UNCLOS, Art. 136, and 1994 UNCLOS 
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI, Preambular Para. 2. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty 
is less clear-cut, and whilst it provides that the moon and other celestial bodies are `only' the province of 
mankind (Art. 1), it sets forth a regime for outer space similar to that subsequently adopted in the 1979 
Moon Treaty, see Christol, `Province of Mankind Concept', in Christol, Space Law: Past, Present and 
Future (Kluwer Law & Taxation Deventer, 1991), 67. The 1981 African Charter on Human and 
Peoples'Rights, Art. 22(1) recognises the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind as a right 
of all peoples; it gives no further precision however, as to what common heritage of mankind 
encompasses. 
A Malaysian attempt failed, in 1982, to have the Antarctic proclaimed common heritage of mankind; 
both the 1988 CRAMRA and the 1991 Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protocol avoid any direct 
analogy with 1982 UNCLOS or 1979 Moon Treaty, and provide that the development of a 
comprehensive regime for the protection of the Antarctic environment is 'in the interest of mankind' 
(preambular Para. 7). No provision is made for an equitable sharing of benefit; see Boyle, 'From 
Sovereignty to Common Heritage: International Law for Antarctica', 25 Texas JIL (1990), 309, at 312; 
Charney, `The Antarctic System and Customary International Law', in Francioni & Scovazzi (eds. ), 
International Law for Antarctica, 2nd edn (Kluwer Law International, 1996), Chap. 3; Chopra, 
`Antarctica as a Commons Regime: A Conceptual Framework for Cooperation and Coexistence', in 
Joyner & Chopra (eds. ), The Antarctic Legal Regime (Nijhoff, 1988), 163; Francioni, `Antarctica and the 
Common Heritage of Mankind', in Francioni & Scovazzi (eds. ), International Law for Antarctica 
(Giuffr8,1987), 101; Herber, `The Common Heritage Principle: Antarctica and the Developing Nations', 
50 American Journal of Economics and Sociology (1991), 391; Keyuan, `The Common Heritage of 
Mankind and the Antarctic Treaty System', 38 NetherlandsILR (1991), 173; Suter, Antarctica: Private 
Poverty or Public Heritage? (Zed Books, 1991); Hussain, `The Antarctic: Common Heritage of 
Mankind? ', in Verhoeven et al. (eds. ), The Antarctic Environment and International Law (Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijhog 1992), Chap. 12; Pannatier, supra n. 9, Part II; Suy, `Antarctica: Common (continued) 
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(1) non appropriation(50); 
(2) international management(51); 
Heritage of Mankind? ', ibid., Chap. 13. 
Other candidates to the qualification of common heritage of mankind include: the atmosphere, infra n. 
101 ; biodiversity, see infra n. 103; the tropical forests, see infra n. 104; the world food resources, see 
Bedjaoui, `Are the World's Food Resources the Common Heritage of Mankind? ', 24 Indian JIL (1984), 
459; solar energy, see Rosenfield, 'Solar Energy "The Common Heritage of Mankind"', Proceedings of 
the 21st Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (1978), 58; technology, infra n. 161; or cultural 
heritage, see 1966 UNESCO Declaration of the Principle of International Cultural Cooperation, which 
provides, in its first article, that «all cultures form part of the common heritage of mankind belonging to 
mankind»; UNESCO, General Conference Resolutions, 14th Session, 4 November 1966; referred after 
Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and 
Intergenerational Equity (United Nations University Press/Transnational Publisher, 1989), at 25 n. 26; 
also 1994 Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples affirms in general terms 
that «the diversity and richness of civilizations and cultures (... ) constitute the common heritage of 
humankind»; preambularPara. 2. For some consideration on certain animal species as 'common heritage 
of mankind', see Maffei, La protezione internationale delle specie animali minacciate (CEDAM, 1992), 
at 350 et sequ. Other suggested elements of common heritage of mankind are reviewed in Cocca, 'The 
Law of Mankind : lus Inter Gentes Again', 12 Annuaire de Droit Maritime & Aero-Spatial (1993), 507, 
at 532 etsequ. 
(49) The reservation for peaceful purposes is also generally regarded as an element of the common heritage 
of mankind (see 1979 Moon Treaty, Art. 3(1); 1982 UNCLOS Arts. 141 and 143) but is of a lesser 
relevance for our purpose. These essential elements of the common heritage concept were clearly singled 
out by the Maltese Ambassador to the United Nations, Arvid Pardo, as he proposed to replace the 
customary principle of freedom of the seas by the principle of common heritage of mankind; see Pardo, 
'Law of the Sea- What Went Wrong', in Friedheim (ed. ), Managing Ocean Resources, A Primer 
(Westview, 1979), Chap. 9, at 139. Pardo suggested equally that the common heritage implied the 
reservation for future generations, although that latter dimension has been largely overshadowed by the 
discussions over the inter-spatial dimension of common heritage of mankind. See also Baslar, The 
Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Kluwer Law International, 1998), 
Ph. D manuscript, at 100 etsequ.; Birnie & Boyle, 120 et sequ.; Boyle, supra n. 11; Goedhuis, 'Some 
Recent Trends in the Interpretation and the Implementation of the Rules of International Space Law', 19 
Columbia JTL (1981), 213. An interesting parallel is sometimes drawn between the common heritage 
regime and the socialist concept of social ownership, both characterised by the element of non 
appropriation, participatory management and sharing of benefit; see Serracino Inglott, The Rights of 
Future Generations : Some Socio-Philosophical Considerations', in Busuttil et al. (eds. ), Our 
Responsibilities Towards Future Generations, A Programme of UNESCO and the International 
Environment Institute (Foundation for International Studies & UNESCO, 1990), 17, at 23. 
(50) The common heritage of mankind is open to free access by all States, but is not susceptible of 
individual ownership or other sort of monopoly, or as Pardo & Christol put it, 'interdependence founded 
on a sense of sharing' should predominate over 'an anachronistic divine right of grab'; supra n. 47, at 
658. See 1979 Moon Treaty, Art. 11(2) and (3); 1982 UNCLOS Art. 137(3) in conjunction with Art. 
153. In his separate opinion in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, Judge Castro made it clear that «la haute 
mer nest pas res nullius que le premier occupant ou le plus fort puisse s'approprier. Elle appartient ä ]a 
communaute des peuples ou A 1'humanite (... ) son usage appartient egalement ä tous les peuples»; 
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland, Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, 
ICI Rep. 1974,3, (sep. op. ), at 97. Some authors prefer the term of non exclusive use to that of non 
appropriation, which they regard as a barrier to the extension of the common heritage approach to arils 
within the domestic jurisdiction, like tropical forests; see Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage 
of Mankind in International Law (Kluwer Law International, 1998), Ph. D manuscript, at 103 et sequ. 
and references contained therein. In this respect, the common heritage of mankind 'partnership' 
distinguishes itself form the domestic institution of partnership, the latter entailing ownership. 
(51) 1979 Moon Treaty, Art. 11(5) and (6), provides for an international regime, leaving to the discretion 
of States Party to decide of a mechanism of enforcement of such regime once the exploitation of the moon 
and celestial bodies has become feasible; see Wolfrum, supra n. 45, at 335; 1982 UNCLOS Art. 156, on (continued) 
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(3) equitable sharing of benefits derived from the exploitation of the common heritage of 
mankind, regardless of States' ability to contribute to the actual exploitation, i. e. 
capital and technologies(52). 
An active sharing of the benefit implies, in Pardo's words, «... not only financial but 
also benefits derived from shared management and transfer of technology, thus radically 
transforming the conventional relationships between states and traditional concepts of 
development aid»(53). The two latter characteristics distinguish the common heritage of 
mankind from the traditional res communis: 
«While territorium extra commercium [or res communis] and territorium 
commune humanitatis [or CHM] shared the same characteristic that they 
cannot be territorially appropriated by any State, they differ in that the former 
is essentially a negative concept, whereas the latter is a positive one. In the 
former, in time of peace (... ) general international law allows [the State] to 
use the area or even to abuse it more or less as it wishes, including the 
appropriation of its natural resources (... ). The emergent concept of common 
heritage of mankind, on the other hand, while it still lacks precise definition, 
wishes basically to convey the idea that the management, exploitation and 
distribution of the natural resources of the area in question are matters to be 
decided by the international community (... ) and are not to be left to the 
initiative and discretion of individual States or their nationals. »(54) 
Environmental considerations were clearly a `peripheral issue in the formulation of 
the common heritage of mankind'(55) which Brownlie qualifies as a «formula for 
exploitation, defining who [has] the right to exploit, [rather] than a concept for the 
conservation and preservation of the common heritage) )(56). Nevertheless, even though 
the contrary, sets up an international mechanism the International Seabed Institution, a sort of global 
environmental authority to manage the deep seabed on behalf of mankind, and guarantee an equitable 
sharing of financial and economic benefits derived from the area, as provided under 140(2). 
(52) Herber, ` The Common Heritage Principle: Antarctica and the Developing Nations', 50 American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology (1991), 391, at 392; Juda, 'UNCLOS III and the New International 
Economic Order', 7 ODIL (1979), 221, at 228; Birnie & Boyle, 120; 1979 Moon Treaty, Art. 11(7)(d); 
1982 UNCLOS Art. 140(2); both Conventions provide for equitable sharing with due consideration for 
the needs of developing States. 
(53) Pardo, 'Law of the Sea- What Went Wrong', in Friedheim (ed. ), Managing Ocean Resources, A 
Primer (Westview, 1979), Chap. 9, at 141. 
(54) Cheng, 'The Legal Regime of Airspace and Outer Space: The Boundary Problem, Functionalism 
versus Spatialism: The Major Premises', 5 Annals ofAir & Space Law (1980), 323, at 337. 
(55) Ramakrishna, 'North-South Issues, Common Heritage of Mankind and Global Climate Change', 19 
Millennium (1990), 429, at 435. And indeed, all but one implication of common heritage of mankind 
relates to the equitable exploitation and equitable distribution of the benefit of exploitation, with no real 
concern for environmental issues. The only environmental dimension flows from the reference to future 
generations; supra n. 49. 
(56) 1981 ASIL meeting on 'The Protection of the Global Heritage', 75 ASIL Proc. (1981), at 53; see 
also Birnie, ibid., at 53-54; see also de Klemm, 'Le Patrimoine Naturel de 1'Humanitd', in Dupuy (ed. ), 
The Future of International Law of the Environment, Workshop 1984, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), 117, at 
139. In this respect, common heritage of mankind, like the community of interests of riparian States (see 
infra Title 1, Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty and Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources) 
would appear more of a rule of allocation of natural resources than a rule of conservation. Some authors on (continued) 
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the relevance and effectiveness of the common heritage of mankind concept to 
environmental protection of global commons remains open to question, the concept as 
originally construed in the 1982 UNCLOS with regard to the deep seabed resources is, 
in theory, the most developed application of fiduciary relationship in international 
law(57). Accordingly, the position adopted by States and most importantly 
technologically advanced States, during the negotiation of the principle in the context of 
the law of the sea is, albeit indirectly, indicative of their position towards a real 
partnership to manage, exploit or indeed conserve common environmental resources or 
the global environment. 
iii. Common Heritage of Mankind under the 1982 UNCLOS: Attempt to Set up a 
Marine Partnership(58) 
The following key features of the 1982 UNCLOS regime for deep seabed mining 
suggest a certain analogy with the domestic institution of partnership: 
(1) The common management of the deep seabed by an intergovernmental body (the 
Authority) acting as some sort of `agent of humanity'(59) and applying decision- 
the contrary consider that the common heritage of mankind is mainly a 'concept of conservation ; Brown 
Weiss, `The Planetary Trust : Conservation and Intergenerational Equity', 11 Ecology LQ (1984), 495, 
at 554; Kiss, 'Conserving the Common Heritage of Mankind', 59 RevistaJurldica de la Univerisdad de 
Puerto Rico (1990), 773, at 776. To a certain extend however, the 1994 UNCLOS Agreement Relating 
to the Implementation of Part XI has reinforced the conservation measures of the original regime. On the 
other hand, it must be underlined that the common heritage of mankind concept in the context of the law 
of the sea applies exclusively to non-living (mineral) resources (see definition of the 'Area and its 
resources', 1982 UNCLOS Art. 133(a) and 136); accordingly, the 'riotisation' of the Law of the Sea, via 
the adoption documents geared towards the protection of environmental resources as much as their 
exploitation (see 1995 Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement), had no impact on the common heritage of 
mankind concept. 
(57) Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and 
Intergenerational Equity (United Nations University Press/Transnational Publisher, 1989), Chap. III; 
Kiss, 'La Notion de Patrimoine Commun de 1'Humanitd', 175 RdC (1982-II), 99, at 128 et sequ. 
(58) On the concept of common heritage of mankind in the specific context of the law of the sea 
negotiations, see inter alia Beer-Gabel, 'L'exploitation du fonds des mers dans 1'interet de 1'humanite: 
chimere ou realite? ', 81 RGDIP (1977), 167; Goldwin, 'Le droit de la mer: Sens commun contre 
«patrimoine commun»', 89 RGDIP (1985), 719; Hossain (ed. ), Legal Aspects of the New International 
Economic Order (Frances Pinter/Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), Part III; Imnadze, 'Common 
Heritage of Mankind: A Concept of Cooperation in Our Interdependent World? ', Kuribayshi & Miles 
(eds. ), The Law of the Sea in the 1990s: A Framework for Further International Cooperation (The Law 
of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1992), 312; Li, The Transfer of Technologyfor Deep Sea-Bed 
Mining, the Law of the sea Convention and Beyond (Martinus Nijhog 1994); Mahmoudi, The law of 
Deep SeaBedMining (Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), Chap. 4; Pardo & Christol, supra n. 
47; Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden? (Clarendon, 1989); Scovazzi, 'Fondi marini e 
patrimonio comune dell'umanitä', 67 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (1984), 249; Schrijver, 'Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources versus the Common Heritage of Mankind', in De Waart eta!. (eds. ), 
International Law and Development (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 87; Wolfram, supra n. 45. 
(59) Maoudi, supra n. 58, at 181. 
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making procedures reflecting the interests of the majority of contracting States and 
not only those of a mighty minority(60). 
(2) The common exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed area in the benefit of 
mankind as a whole(61). The exploitation would be planned and controlled by the 
Authority, and carried out on the ground concurrently by: 
- 
the `operating mining arm' of the Authority, viz. the Enterprise, and 
- 
individual contractors licensed by the Authority(62). 
(3) The fair and equitable redistribution of financial and other economic benefits derived 
from seabed mining activities to all contracting parties(63), including the transfer of 
(60) A major controversy arose in respect of the role and power of the Assembly and of the Council, two 
main organs of the Authority. The G77 envisioned the Assembly, the sole organ composed of all 
Member States, taking decisions on the basis of a one-State one-vote procedure, as the supreme policy- 
making organ of the Authority, whilst the Council would be a mere executive organ with no actual 
independent power. On the contrary, technologically advanced States, outnumbered by developing States 
in the Assembly, maintained their position that no single organ should dominate; see Adede, `The 
Group of 77 and the Establishment of the International Sea-Bed Authority', 7 ODIL (1979), 31. The 
Assembly, sole organ of the Authority where all States Party are represented, was finally formally 
recognised the supreme organ of the Authority (although the qualification of policy-making was 
eventually dropped; Art. 160); in practice however, the 36-Member strong Council is the most powerful 
organ, vested with very broad administrative powers; under the original regime, the Council was to take 
its decision by consensus or qualified majority depending the issue (Art. 161); see Larschan & Brennan, 
supra n. 47, at 323. See also Mann-Borgese, 'The Role of the International Seabed Authority in the 
1980's', 18 San Diego LR (1981), 395. 
(61) Arts. 140(1) and 155(2). 
(62) Art. 153(2), and Part XI, Sect. 3; the original idea of Latin American States, at the source of the 
concept of the Enterprise, was to reserve the exploitation of the deep sea-bed to the monopoly of the 
Enterprise, thereby guaranteeing absolute fairness among all States. The so-called 'parallel system' of 
common/individual exploitation was introduced at the initiative of the US, and undermined the ideal of a 
common exploitation for the common benefit of mankind; Galindo Pohl, 'Latin America's Influence and 
Role in the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea', 7 ODIL (1979), 65, at 82 et sequ.; Grolin, 'The 
Deep Seabed :A North-South Perspective', in Laursen (ed. ), Towards a New International Marine 
Order (Nijhog 1982), Chap. 9, at 131 et sequ.; Larschan & Brennan, supra n. 47, at 322; Li, supra n. 
58, at 65 et sequ, and 81 et sequ.; Mahmoudi, supra n. 58,180 et sequ.; Mann-Borgese, `The New 
International Economic Order and the Law of the Sea', 14 San Diego LR (1977), 584, at 590. 
On the other hand, a series of restrictive measures are imposed upon States and private entities, and 
certain privileges granted to the Enterprise, ranging from financial and technological assistance, to 
immunities on the territory of the States parties (including taxation exemption), hence bolstering 
common exploitation of the deep seabed; on the range of preferential measures granted to the Enterprise, 
see Wolfram, supra n. 45, at 331; on the restrictive measures imposed on the private sector and States, 
Mahmoudi, supra n. 58, at 215 et sequ. The de lege privileged status of the Enterprise has been justified 
as necessary to compensate its de facto inequalities with other 'individual' companies, in terms of 
technological and financial availability, and institutional structure (incgalite compensatrice); Li, ibid., 
Chap. V; Mahmoudi, ibid., 218 et sequ. 
(63) Art. 140(2). The Convention leaves it to the International Seabed Authority to elaborate some rules 
and procedures to assure an equitable sharing of the financial and other economic benefits, 'taking into 
particular consideration the interests and needs of developing States'; Arts. 140 and 160(1)(g) and 
160(2)(f)(i). The silence of the Convention reflects a serious disagreement between developing States, 
which regard their share to the benefit as a right flowing from their 'co-ownership' of the deep seabed, and 
developed States, which regard the sharing of benefit as an measure of aid to development; Li, supra n. 
58, at 41 et sequ. Only the benefit made by the Enterprise is shared among States; on the other hand, the 
financial burden put on private contractors (joining fee, annual fee, compulsory transfer of technology on (continued) 
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technology and scientific knowledge with regard to activities in the Area to the 
Enterprise and to developing States under more favourable terms than the market 
conditions(64) 
(4) The joint responsibility (responsabilite solidaire) of all States for the exploitation of 
the seabed area, inter alia for the financial costs(65) and economic losses(66) incurred 
by such exploitation. 
Such a partnership-like conception of the common heritage of mankind has remained 
essentially a theoretical construction(67), an 'exercice de laboratoire juridique'(68); in 
favourable terms) compensate, to a certain extent, the reduction of common benefit 
A certain contribution in kind or payment is also expected from coastal States, in relation to the 
exploitation of non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond their exclusive economic zone (Art. 
82(1)). A suggestion was made to set up a fund that would be financed with a portion of the revenue 
realised by each coastal States from the exploitation of its off-shore sea-bed mineral resources within the 
exclusive economic zone, considering that a large proportion of ocean mineral resources being found 
within the EEZ rather than within the Area. The fund would have been used to help developing States to 
fight marine pollution, and finance the transferof marine technology, see Logue, 'The Nepal Proposal for 
a Common Heritage Fund', 9 California Western ILl (1979), 598. The proposition was largely 
dismissed as unrealistic; see Lynch, 'The Nepal Proposal for a Common Heritage Fund: Panacea or 
Pipedream? ' 10 California Western ILl (1980), 25. 
(64) Art. 144 (2)(a) provides States have to make available to the Authority technical expertise employed 
in mining activities «under fair and reasonable terms and conditions», whilst Art. 5(3) of Annex III 
provides for the transfer of deep-sea mining technologies directly by deep-seabed mining operators o under 
fairand reasonable commercial terms and conditions» (emphasis added). Some authors have justified this 
apparent differencein standards on the ground that Art. 144 was a promotional provision, setting upon 
States 'general duties of cooperation and good conduct', whilst Art. 5(3) would impose strict and 
extensive obligations directly upon contractors, hence requiring a stronger wording; Hauser, The Legal 
Regimefor Deep Seabed Mining under the Law of the Sea Convention (Kluwer & Metzner, 1983), 102; 
see also Li, supra n. 58,153 et sequ. (on Art. 144), and Chap. VI (Art. 5 Annex III). In any case, the 
transfer of technology would take place under conditions more favourable than the market conditions, 
hence putting the Enterprise on a privileged position as compared to other 'individual public or private 
exploiting companies both with respect to access to technologies, and conditions of access; on the issue 
of technology transfer, see Charney, 'Technology and International Negotiations', 76 AJIL (1982), 78; 
Treves, 'Le transferde technologic et la Conferencesur le droit de la mer', 104 JDI (1977), 43. 
(65) The duty rests mostly on developed States to assist and finance the Enterprise; Art. 173(2) and 
Annex IV Art. 11. 
(66) The prospect of a new source of minerals gave rise to fears among land-based producers countries of 
oversupply and related fall in price of minerals, hence indeed, in substantial reduction of their minerals 
related export receipts. To stabilise and compensate the losses of income suffered most seriously by 
developing States involved with land-based mining and exporters of minerals, 1982 UNCLOS imposes 
production ceilings (Art. 151) and provides for compensatory economic assistance (Art. 151(10)); list of 
land based producers in Beer-Gabel, 'L'exploitation du fonds des mers dans l'intbret de 1'humanit6: 
chimere ou rdalitd? ', 81 RGDIP (1977), 167, at 179; see also Hegwood, 'Deep Seabed Mining: 
Alternative Schemes for Protecting Developing Countries from Adverse Impacts', 12 Georgia JICL 
(1982), 173; Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden? (Clarendon, 1989), Chap. 6. 
(67) In Boyle's words, `a concept of potential rather than actual legal significance'; 'International Law 
and the Protection of the Global Atmosphere', in Churchill & Freestone (eds. ), International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), Chap. 1, at 10. See in contrast 
the particularly enthusiastic assessment from Canada's Ambassador to UNCLOS III and Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee of the Conference, Beesley, 'The Negotiating Strategy of UNCLOS III, Developing 
and Developed Countries As Partners 
-A Pattern for Future Multilateral Conferences? ', 46 Law & Contemporary Problems (1983), 183. 
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practice, it was seriously paralysed by the conflicting interests between developing 
States, having most to gain from a regime of controlled exploitation as embodied in the 
convention, Part XI(69), and technologically advanced States, most of them net 
importers of minerals(70I, and thus having more to benefit from a res communis type of 
free exploitation regime(71). Under a res communis regime, the prevailing first-come 
first-served rule and the technological superiority and financial means of developed 
States would assure them a de facto monopoly over the deep seabed resources(72). 
Most deep seabed mining States enacted interim unilateral legal measures to govern 
access by their national private or public companies to deep seabed minerals for 
commercial purposes, pending a consensus among States on some international rules; 
(68) Bachelet, L ingerence ecologique (Frison-Roche, 1995), 207. 
(69) In terms of access to seabed mining technology, sharing of benefit from seabed mining and, for those 
involved in land-based mining, limitation of sea-mining competition and stabilisation of export receipts; 
Beer-Gabel, 'L'exploitation du fonds des mers dans l'interet de l'humanite: chime're ou realite? ', 81 
RGDIP (1977), 167,179; Friedman & Williams, `The Group of 77 at the United Nations: an Emergent 
Force in the Law of the Sea', 16 San Diego LR (1979), 555. 
(70) The US, Japan, USSR/Russia, EC; the US has assumed a prominent role in the opposition to the 
1982 UNCLOS, Part XI. Whilst the previous administrations involved in UNCLOS III might have been 
inclined to compromise on the deep seabed mining as part of a `global package deal' on ocean issues that 
would be more protective of US general interests, the Reagan administration remained uncompromising 
on the deep seabed mining regime, and made it a condition of acceptability of the whole convention. 
Hence, as soon as in office, in January 1981, President Reagan undertook to review most provisions that 
had been negotiated under his predecessor, and tried, in vain, to obtain more satisfactory accommodation 
of US interests; on 9 July 1982, Reagan officially announced that the US would not ratify 1982 
UNCLOS «because the deep seabed mining part of the convention does not meet US objectives»; see 
text of the presidential statement to the Senate in 82 Department of State Dispatch (1982), No. 2065,71; 
and US Ambassador Malone, Special Representative to the President for the third UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, before the House of Foreign Affairs Committee, 21 August 1982, ibid., No. 2067,48. 
For a detailed account of Reagan Administration's attitude towards the emerging deep seabed mining at 
the third Conference on the Law of the Sea, see Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden? 
(Clarendon, 1989), Chap. 7. 
The US boycotted all subsequent international negotiations on the deep seabed regime, and argued 
instead (a) that the right to explore and exploit deep-sea bed resources beyond national jurisdiction flows 
from the principle of freedom of the high seas, and (b) that no provision in international law prohibits the 
free exploitation of the deep seabed with reserve to reasonable regard for other States' interests (res 
communis); see Dug 'UNCLOS and the New Deep Seabed Mining Regime: the Risk of Refuting the 
Treaty', 19 Suffolk TLR (1995), 1, at 7 et sequ.; Li, supra n. 58, at 30 et sequ.; Mahmoudi, supra n. 
58, at 138 et sequ. More generally on US position in UNCLOS negotiations, see for instance Anand, 
'UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United States', 24 Indian JIL (1984), 153; Chamcy, 
`United States Interests in a Convention on the Law of the Sea: the Case for Continued Efforts', 11 
Vanderbilt JTL (1978), 39; Joyner, 'The United States and the New Law of the Sea', 24 ODIL (1996), 
41; Larson, `The United States Position on the Deep Seabed', 3 Suffolk TLJ (1978-79), 1; Larson, 'The 
Reagan Administration and the Law of the Sea, 11 ODIL (1982), 297; Larson, 'The Reagan Rejection cC 
the U. N. Convention', 14 ODIL (1985), 337; Malone, 'The United States and the Law of the Sea', 24 
Virginia JIL (1984), 785; Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden? (Clarendon, 1989). 
(7 1) On the differencebetween the res communis and common heritage regimes, see supra n. 54. 
(72) Larschan & Brennan, supra n. 47, at 316; Feischer, `The International Concern for the 
Environment: The concept of Common Heritage of Mankind', in Bothe (cd. ), Trends in Environmental 
Policy and Law (IUCN, 1980), 321, at 334 et sequ. 
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none of the domestic legislation expresses a claim of sovereign rights over the deep 
seabed. Rather, the latter is 
-implicitly- treated as a res communis, hence open to free 
exploitation with reasonable regard for other States' interests(73). The ratification record 
of 1982 UNCLOS is illustrative of such cleavage. From the time of opening to signature 
to the time of deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification (Guyana, 1993) required for 
the entry into force of the Convention, only one was made by a developed State, 
Iceland. The deep seabed regime was the major cause for most seabed mining States not 
signing and/or ratifying the Convention(74). 
(73) See US Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 28 June 1980, reproduced in 19 ILM (1980), 
1003; FRG. Act on the Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining, 19 ILM (1980), 1330, amended in 
1982; UUK Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provision) Act 1981,201LM (1981), 1218; France. Law on 
the Exploration and Exploitation of Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, 21 ILM (1982), 808; Soviet 
Union. Edict on Provisional Measures to Regulate Soviet Enterprises for the Exploration and 
Exploitation of Mineral Resources, 21 ILM (1982), 551; Janan" Law on Interim Measures for Deep 
Seabed Mining, 221LM (1983), 102; and Italy. Law on the Exploration and Exploitation of the Mineral 
Resources of the Deep Seabed, 24 ILM (1985), 983. On the national legislation and their compatibility 
under International Law, see Li, supra n. 58, Chap. III; Mahmoudi, supra n. 58, at 225 et sequ.; see 
also Briggs, 'Deep Seabed Mining and Unilateral Legislation', 8 ODIL (1980), 223; Caron, 'Municipal 
Legislation for Exploitation of Deep Seabed', 8 ODIL (1980), 259; Caron, 'Deep Seabed Mining: A 
comparative Study of U. S. and West GermanMunicipal Legislation', 5 Marine Policy (1981), 4; Orrego 
Vicuna, `Les legislations nationales pour 1'exploitation des fonds des mers et leur compatibilit6 avec le 
droit international', 24 AFDI (1978), 810; Oxman, 'La legislation amdricaine sur les ressources 
minerales solides des fonds ockaniques', 26 AFDI (1980), 700. 
In 1984, the so-called `like-minded States', Belgium, France, FRG, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the 
US and UK entered into a Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Mining, to prevent 
overlapping mine site claims; 231LM (1984), 1354; Dug'UNCLOS and the New Deep Seabed Mining 
Regime: the Risk of Refuting the Treaty', 19 Suffolk TLR (1995), 1, at 9. France, FRG, the US and the 
UK had previously passed an agreement to facilitate the identification and resolution of conflicts that may 
arise from deep seabed mining activities; Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relating to 
Polymetallic Nodules of the Seabed, 2 September 1982,21 ILM (1982), 950, and Agreed Minute to the 
agreement, 23 ILAI (1984), 1365. 
(74) On the legal implication of the signature of the 1982 UNCLOS during the period prior to its entry 
into force, see King Gamble & Frankowska, 'The Significance of Signature of the 1982 Montego Bay 
Convention on the Law of the Sea', 14 ODIL (1984), 121. 
The rejection of the concept of common heritage of mankind within the context of the new law of the sea, 
by the US and some other developed States has often been used as an argument to dismiss the legal 
status of the principle; See Birnie & Boyle, 121; Boyle, supra n. 11, at 10. Such argument has lost 
ground with the signature by most developed States of the 1994 UNCLOS Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI, which reaffirms in its Preamble that «... the seabed and ocean floor and 
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the Area), as well as 
the resources of the Area, are the common heritage of mankind. Nevertheless, doubts regarding the 
status of the common heritage of mankind in international law (and its practical utility for the purpose of 
environmental protection) pertain to the lack precision of the actual content and implications of the norm, 
that would allow for its actualisation ('norm creating character'; see North Sea Continental Shelf, 
Judgment, ICJRep. 1969,3, Para. 72), rather than to the existence of an opinio furls sive necessitatis; 
see Birnie, 'International Environmental Law: its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs', in Hurrell & 
Kingsbury (eds. ), The International Politics of the Environment (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 2, at 78; see 
also Birnie and Brownlie's comments in `The Protection of the Global Heritage', 75 ASIL Proc. (1981), 
32, at 33 et sequ., and 53 et sequ.; Gorove, ibid supra, at 394; Pardo & Christol, 'The Common 
Interest : Tension between the Whole and the Parts', in Macdonald & Johnston (eds. ), The Structure 
and Process of International Law : Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (Martins Nijhoff, (continued) 
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The 1994 UNCLOS Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI(75) implies 
a substantial scaling-down from the original `partnership-like' common heritage of 
mankind regime(76). It reflects the `co-operation-like' conception of common heritage of 
mankind advocated by developed States as a platform for a freely accepted co- 
operation, grounded both in liberal and free market economy principles(77) and in the 
1986), 643, at 656. Baslar reports also considerable variations of terms used to qualify the common 
heritage of mankind, referred as a doctrine, a concept, a regime, a notion or an idea, or even as a theory, a 
rule, a right, a principle or 'term of art'; The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in 
International Law (Kluwer Law International, 1998), Ph. D manuscript, at 10 et sequ. 
(75) The 1994 Agreement modifies the objectionable provisions of Part XI in a way that reflects interests 
of US and the other industrialised States; see US President's transmittal of the UNCLOS and the 
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI to the US Senate with Commentary, October 7, 
1994, in 34 ILM (1995), 1393. The Agreement, appropriately qualified of 'masterpiece of diplomatic 
ingenuity', was not presented as a formal amendment to the Convention, and could therefore be adopted 
with a mere vote at the General Assembly, instead of going through the whole amendment procedure; 
Koskenniemi & Lehto, supra n. 91, at 549. The 1994 Agreement is to be interpreted and applied 
together with 1982 UNCLOS Part XI, as one single document; in case of conflicting or inconsistent 
provision, the 1994 Agreement prevails; 1994 UNCLOS Agreement Relating to the Implementation of 
Part XI, Art. 2(1). 
(76) Biermann, "Common Concern of Humankind': the Emergence of a New Concept of International 
Environmental Law', 34 AVR (1996), 426, at 429 et sequ.; Koskenniemi & Lehto, supra n. 91, at 535 
etsequ. 
(77) Res. 48/263,17 August 1994, endorsing the 1994 UNCLOS Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI, justifies the radical changes and revaluation of the original regime entailed by 
the 1994 Agreement as necessitated by «political and economic changes, including in particular a 
growing reliance on market principles... » (Para. 6). Informal negotiations on the deep-sea bed regime 
were initiated by UN Secretary-General Javier Perez De Cuellar in the early 1990s, as the free market 
economy ideology was sweeping through Eastern Europe. Nine issues were soon singled out for further 
discussion, viz the distribution of the common exploitation costs between States parties, decision 
making procedures, the Review Conference, the transfer of technology, the productions ceilings, the 
compensation fund, the financial terms of contracts and environmental considerations; Larson, `An 
Analysis of the Ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea', 26 ODIL (1995), 287, at 291. 
Res. 48/263 was unanimously passed with 121 votes in favour, 7 countries abstained, mostly Latin 
American States (Colombia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela), as well as Thailand and the 
Russian Federation. The latter justified its opposition on the ground that the provisions on the 
exploitation of the deep seabed were too favourable to the US interests; Oxman, 'The 1994 Agreement 
and the Convention', 88 AJIL (1994), 687, at 687 n. 3. 
Generally on the negotiations leading to the 1994 Agreement and analysis thereof see Anderson, 'Further 
Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea', 43 
ICLQ (1994), 886; Anderson, 'Legal Implications of the Entry into Force of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea', 44 ICLQ (1995), 313; Brown, 'Neither Necessary Nor Prudent at this Stage: the 
Regime of Seabed Mining and its Impact on the Universality of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea', 17 Marine Policy (1993), 81; Brown, 'The 1994 Agreement on the Implementation of 
Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Breakthrough to Universality? ', 19 
Marine Policy (1995), 5; Dutt; 'UNCLOS and the New Deep Seabed Mining Regime: the Risk of 
Refuting the Treaty', 19 Suffolk Transnat. LR (1995), 1; Hayashi, 'The 1994 Agreement for the 
Universalization of the Law of the Sea Convention', 27 ODIL (1996), 31; Joyner, `The United States 
and the New law of the Sea', 27 ODIL (1996), 41, at 47 et sequ.; Kolossovskiy, 'Prospect for 
Universality of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea', 17 Marine Policy (1993), 4; Levi, 'Les bons 
offices du Secretaire General des Nations Unies en faveur de l'universalite de la Convention sur Ic droit de 
la mer: la preparation de l'accord adopte par 1'assemblee generale du 28 juillet 1994', 98 RGDIP (1994), 
871; Li, supra n. 58, Chap. VII and VIII; Law of the Sea Forum: The 1994 Agreement on the 
Implementation of the Seabed Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 88 AJIL (1994), 687. (continued) 
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necessity to assure the protection of existing interests and the economically profitability 
of the activity: 
(1) The deep seabed area is still qualified as the common heritage of mankind, under 
common ownership and common management of the Authority; but the decision- 
making procedures of the latter have been partly modified, to guarantee more 
influence and blocking power to major mining States(78). 
(2) The development of the resources of the area is to proceed for the common benefit 
of mankind `in accordance with sound commercial principles'(79) and Gatt/WTO 
Rules(80), without subsidisation of activities in the seabed area(81), production 
ceilings(82) or preferential access of terrestrial or seabed mining products to 
market'(83); the Enterprise is treated on the same level with private mining 
corporation(84). 
(3) The transfer of technology shall to take place either `on fair and reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions on the open market' or through joint-ventures 
arrangements(85), in any event in a way consistent with the effective protection of 
intellectual property rights(86). Express provision is made for the preservation of 
the `acquired rights' of pioneer investors(87). 
(4) States are, to a certain degree held responsible for the costs and losses incurred by 
the common exploitation of the deep seabed area; the common management, 
however, shall be operated in a cost effective way(88) and the financial burden be 
evenly shared(89). 
US official position towards the Agreement reviewed at 89 AJIL (1995) 112. 
(78) The Assembly policy-making power is qualified by the Council's power or recommendations on 
issues on which it is also competent (1994 UNCLOS Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part 
XI, Annex, Sect. 3, Paras. 1& 4). Besides, the voting-chamber procedure has been introduced in the 
Council, hereby securing States the possibility to block unwanted decisions (Annex, Sect. 3, Paras. 9, 
10 & 15); the US is, de facto, guaranteed a seat in the Council, being the largest economy in terms of 
gross national product when the Agreement was signed (Annex, Sect. 3, Paras. 15(a)); see Oxman, `The 
1994 Agreement and the Convention', 88 AJIL (1994), 687, at 689 et sequ. 
(79) Annex, Sect. 6, Para. 1(a). 
(80) Annex, Sect. 6, Para. 1(d). 
(81) Annex, Sect. 6, Para. 1(b). 
(82) Annex, Sect. 6, Para. 7. 
(83) Annex, Sect. 6, Para. 1(c). 
(84) Annex, Sect. 2, Para. 4. 
(85) Annex, Sect. 5. Para. 2 (emphasis added). 
(86) Annex, Sect. 5, Para. 1(b) 
(87) Annex to the Agreement, Sect. 1, Para. 6(a)(i) UNCLOS II res II & III 
(88) To preserve incentives, and avoid that the profit made from the exploitation of the deep seabed, (continued) 
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Whilst a universal or unanimous support for global environmental agreements is 
clearly neither feasible nor necessary, it is also obvious that the efficiency of the global 
regime depends on the support of the major economic powers as well as the support of 
otherwise `specially affected States' (host States, major users, major exporters 
... 
)(90). 
And indeed, one argument quite rightly put forward by the US government to undermine 
the importance of 1982 UNCLOS, Part XI, is the lack of support from industrialised 
States which, as a whole, contribute 60% of the UN budget, by contrast with the group 
of ratifying and acceding States representing a joint share of less than 5%(91). 
As Handl concludes, «[f]or whatever common approach may be necessary to redress 
the problems of North-South interdependence, remedial action will not succeed unless it 
is supported and adhered to by countries viewing it is in their national interest to do 
so»(92). The same conclusion was reached in relation to economic development in general 
by the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, in his Agenda for Development, 
«[e]ffective international cooperation for development cannot succeed unless the major 
economies make it their own objective»(93). 
The negotiations on deep seabed mining, taken in the general context of the new 
international economic order debate, offer no particular indications of the type and 
degree of `co-operation' States are ready to engage in, more particularly in the field of 
environmental protection. However, it clearly indicates two things: 
Firstly, States are not ripe yet for an effective (quasi) universal partnership modelled 
upon the domestic institution, considering (a) the persistent focus on national interest, 
as opposed to international/common interest, and (b) the serious disparity between the 
already largely undermined by the considerable investment required by such activity, is completely 
absorbed by mechanisms of common management; Beer-Gabel, 'L'exploitation du fonds des mers dans 
l'interet de l'humanitt : chimere ou rdalite? ', 81 RGDIP (1977), 167, at 175; Schmidt, Common 
Heritage or Common Burden? (Clarendon, 1989), Chap. 6. 
(89) Compensatory economic assistance to less developed countries is funded by (a) the income generated 
by the Authority mining activities and (b) voluntary contribution after the administrative expenses of the 
authority have been covered. A Finance Committee is established by the 1994 Agreement, inter alia 
against the risk of excessive attribution of resources to compensatory assistance; US and other major 
industrial powers are guaranteed a seat on this committee. The financial burden resting on private 
contractors and States whose nationals are involved in seabed mining is thus considerably reduced, and 
the deep seabed mining made a more economically profitable activity. 
(90) Joyner & Martel, 'Looking Back to See Ahead: UNCLOS III and Lessons for Global Commons 
Law', 27 ODIL (1996), 73, at 80 et sequ.; see also Shibata, 'International Law-Making Process in the 
United Nations: A Comparative Analysis of UNCED and UNCLOS III', 24 California ]Nestern ILI 
(1993), 17. 
(91) Koskenniemi & Lehto, 'The Privilege of Universality', 65 Nordic JIL (1996), 533, at 535. , 
(92) 
'Protection and Development in Third World Countries: Common Destiny 
- 
Common 
Responsibility', 20 New York UniversityJIL & Politics (1988), 603, at 607. 
(93) Para. 58; see also 1990 Strategy for the Fourth Development Decade, Para. 15. 
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`partner States' and consequent greater concession imposed upon part of them to enable 
the other partners to fulfil their share of responsibility as partners(94). 
Haas and Sundgren have appropriately stressed that «the "logic of collective action" 
suggests that individual countries will not cooperate on issues that seriously challenge 
their sovereignty and if they fear that their own costly actions will not be 
reciprocated»(95). It is very illustrative that the concept of common heritage, although 
finally not fully assimilated to a partnership-like institution, has been cautiously 
avoided in any subsequent global negotiation on common environmental issues, and was 
substituted by the classic res communis concept or by more innovative expressions 
such as common concern or common interest of mankind(96). 
The fear of establishing an undesirable `precedent with respect to systems of 
governance' underpinned the US opposition to a partnership-like conception ° of 
common heritage of mankind in the context of the law of the sea(97). On the other hand, 
as Caldwell optimistically suggests, it is not utopian to believe that «the environmental 
concerns of nations may induce their cooperation more rapidly than have the more 
conventional issues of international relations such as armaments, monetary exchange, 
trade, investment, and human rights»(98). 
Secondly, the deep seabed mining negotiations have revealed a number of parameters 
essentially related to the transfer of technology and to financial assistance within which 
States are ready to engage into co-operation, and which have clearly influenced the 
shaping of subsequent regime on global environmental issues(99). 
(94) Joyner & Martel, `Looking Back to See Ahead: UNCLOS III and Lessons for Global Commons 
Law', 27 ODIL (1996), 73, at 85; also Hossain, 'Natural Resources: Heritage of Nation and Mankind', in 
Grahl-Madsen & Toman (eds. ), The Spirit of Uppsala, Proceedings of the Joint UNITAR-Uppsala 
University Seminar on International Law and Organization for a New World Order (JUS 81), Uppsala, 9- 
18 June 1981, (Walter de Gruyter, 1984), 302, at 306. 
(95) 
'Evolving International Environmental Law T. in Choucri (ed. ) Global Accord (MIT: 1993), 401, 
at 403. Richardson further underlines that «[w]here a country is asked to do more or give up more than 
its self-interest would warrant, it must be afforded positive incentives to sacrifice for the larger good»; 
'Climate Change: Problems of Law-Making', in Hurrell & Kingsbury (eds. ), The International Politics 
of the Environment (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 6, at 176. In the same sense, Pardo & Christol, supra n. 
47, at 644 et sequ. 
(96) Infra 
iv. Common Concern, Common Interest of Mankind: Global Partnership or Global Bargain?. 
(97) Darman, 'The Law of the Sea: Rethinking the U. S. Interests', 56 Foreign Affairs (1978), 373. 
(98) International Environmental Policy, at 126-127. 
(99) See infra 3. The Parameters for Global Co-operation () 
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iv. Common Concern, Common Interest of Mankind: Global Partnership or Global 
Bargain? 
Despite the lack of agreement among States on the actual implications of common 
heritage of mankind, suggestions have been made to apply the concept to other global 
environmental issues. Hence, the designation of global climate as the common heritage of 
mankind was already contemplated by Pardo as a possible development on the basis of 
the law of the sea experience(100). Such suggestion was not followed by UNGA, 
however, which finally designated climate change as a `common concern of 
mankind'(101), a qualification endorsed by States in the 1992 Climate Change 
Convention(102). 
Biodiversity(103), and tropical forests(104) have also been candidates for the 
qualification of common heritage of mankind. Suggestions in this sense were rejected 
(100) See for instance, `The Emerging Law of the Sea', in Walsh (ed. ), The Law of the Sea: Issues in 
Ocean Resources Management (Praeger, 1977), 33. The 'common concern' approach had already clearly 
inspired the 1982 World Charter for Nature, drafted as a code of conduct to guide the activities of 
mankind towards the environment. In its discourse introducing the idea of a World Charter for Nature, 
delivered at that 12th General Assembly of the IUCN, held in Kinshasa, the former Zairian (now 
Republic of Congo) President General Mobutu Sese Seko stated: «The seas, the oceans, the upper 
atmosphere belong to the human community (... ) One cannot freely use [such] international resources 
(... ); quoted after Burhenne & Irwin, The World Charter for Nature, Legislative History, 2nd revised 
edn (Erich Schmidt, 1986), at 14. More generally on the atmosphere as common heritage%neern of 
mankind, see Birnie & Boyle, 112; Boyle, 'International Law and the Protection of the Global 
Atmosphere', in Churchill & Freestone (eds. ), International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham 
& Trotman/Martinus Nijhoi% 1991), Chap. 1; Westing, 'The Atmosphere as a Common Heritage of 
Humankind: its Role in Environmental Security', Scientific World (1994), 5; see further Ramakrishna, 
'North-South Issues, Common Heritage of Mankind and Global Climate Change', 19 Millennium 
(1990), 439; Redgwell, 'IntergenerationalEquity and Global Warming', in Churchill & Freestone (eds. ), 
International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham & Trotman-Nijhoff, 1991), Chap. 3. 
(101) See series of resolutions on the Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of 
Mankind, UNGA A/Res. /43/53,6 December 1988, Para. 1; A/Res. /44/207,22 December 1989, 
preambular Para. 1; A/Res. /45/212,21 December 1990, preambular Pam. 1; see also 1989 Langkawi 
Declaration of the Commonwealth Heads of Governments; 1989 Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric 
Pollution and Climate Change; UNEP Governing Council Decision 15/36 on Global Climate Change, 
25 May 1989, preambularPara. 6; Decision SS. II/3,3 August 1990, preambular Para. 1; all the above 
documents on climate are reproduced in Churchill & Freestone (eds. ), International Law and Global 
Climate Change (Graham& Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), Annexe. 
(102) Preambular Para. 1. Likewise, albeit not explicitly qualified as such by either the 1985 Vienna 
Convention on the Ozone Layer or by the original 1987 Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer, ozone 
layer depletion is clearly considered as a matter of common concern of mankind, part of the more general 
problem of climate change and global warming recognised to be of the common concern of mankind. 
Besides, it will be demonstrated that the applicable regime under the 1987 Montreal Protocol as modified 
in 1990, shares many of the characteristics of the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions. 
(103) See for instance IUCN Draft Convention for the Conservation of Biodiversity, 1989, commented in 
dc Klemm & Shine, Biological Diversity Conservation and the Law, Environmental Policy & Law 
Paper No. 29 (IUCN Environmental Law Center, 1993), 17 et sequ.; see also, Bell, `The 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity: the Continuing Significance of US Objections at the Earth 
Summit', 26 George Washington JIL & Economics (1993), 479, at 501 et sequ. 
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outright by developing States, as unsuited to natural resources located in great majority 
on national territory(105). Developed States, on the other hand, were more particularily 
resistant to the financial implications arising from the principle of conservation cost- 
sharing attached to the qualification common heritage of mankind, and to the transfer of 
biotechnology. Like climate change, the conservation of biodiversity was finally declared 
the common concern of humankind(106). Natural resources were already qualified as a 
`capital of vital importance to mankind' in the 1968 African Convention on Nature(107), 
and the marine environment and living marine resources that supported it were similarly 
(104) See for instance FAO draft proposal for a Forestry Convention; on which see Schally, 'Forests: 
Towards an International Legal Regime? ' 4 YbIEL (1993), 30; Dan Tarlock, 'Exclusive Sovereignty 
versus Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: the Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest 
Management', 32 TexasILl (1997), 37, at 41. See also generally Brunnee, 'A Conceptual Framework for 
an International Forests Conventions: Customary Law and Emerging Principles', in Canadian Council 
on International Law (ed. ), Global Forests and International Environmental Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 1996), Chap. 2; Myers, 'The Anatomy of Environmental Action: the Case of Tropical 
Deforestation', in Hurrell & Kingsbury, The International Politics of the Environment (Clarendon, 
1992), Chap. 16; Sands, Principles (Vol. I), 406 et sequ.; Saunders, 'Valuation and International 
Regulations of Forest Ecosystems: Prospects for a Global Forest Agreement', 66 Washington LR (1991), 
871; Szekely, 'The Legal Protection of the World's Forests afterRio '92', in Campiglio, et al. (eds. ), The 
Environment after Rio, International Law and Economics, (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 
Chap. 6; Yamin & Flint, '1992: the Year in Review 
- 
Forests', 3 Yb1EL (1992), 326. See also Yamin & 
Cameron, Convention for the Conservation and Wise Use of Forests Draft Text, (Center for International 
Environmental Law, 1991). 
(105) Burhenne-Guilmin & Casey-Lefkowitz, 'The Convention on Biological Diversity: a Hard Won 
Global Achievement', 3 YbIEL (1992), 43, at 47. Also supra, Chap. 2/iii. Sovereignty over 
Environmental Resources and Environmental Policies versus of Globalisation of Environmental 
Standards and Policies. 
(106) 1992 Convention ofBiodiversity, preambularPara. 3. The non-binding International Undertaking 
on Plant Genetic Resources, adopted at the Twenty-Second Session of the FAO Conference, 1983, and 
hitherto adhered to by over a hundred States, assimilates plant genetic resources to a heritage of mankind; 
on which see Yusuf, 'International Law and Sustainable Development: The Convention on Biological 
Diversity', 2 African YbIL (1994), 109, at 127 et sequ. The expression 'common interest' had 
previously been used in the 1946 Whaling Convention, preambular Para. 4, to qualify the preservation of 
whale stocks at an optimum level, without any reference being made however, to the 'holder' of the 
common interest. The 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species states that the 
earth natural system is to be conserved for the 'good mankind'; Preamble. The expression of 'common 
good of mankind' was also used in 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, albeit in 
the more general context of the protection of the environment; Princ. 18.1989 Resolution 44/229, on 
International Cooperation in the Field of the Environment, provides that «the conservation and 
utilization of biological diversity [is] a priority, and important element of the ecological balance and 
source of benefit to mankind; Para. 22. 
(107) Preambular Para. 1; see also Cocca, 'Environment as a Common Heritage of Mankind', 
Proceedings of the 32nd Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (1989), 71; Doyle, 'Legal and Policy 
Implications of Treating Natural Resources as the Common Heritage of Mankind', Proceedings of the 
32nd Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (1989), 31; Hossain, 'Natural Resources: Heritage of 
Nation and Mankind', supra n. 94,302. 
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recognised of `vital importance to humanity' in the 1972 London Convention on 
Dumping of Waste s(108). 
The negotiation of an internationally binding agreement on forestry management that 
would in a way 'legitimise' the `common concern' of all States in the conservation of 
forestry resources, was postponed in the process leading to the 1992 Rio Conference on 
Environment and Development, and the conservation of forests was finally declared to 
be of concern to `the Governments of the countries to which they belong'(109). The 
suggestion of an international Convention on the Protection of the Forests was reiterated 
by the European Union at 1997 UNCED + V, convened to review the progresses made 
in the implementation of the instruments adopted at the 1992 Conference on 
Environment and Development, but failed over the opposition of a majority of States, 
which perceived the elaboration of a new document as a vain effort if not accompanied 
by appropriate financial and institutional means. The possibility of a compromise 
solution was postponed, that would place the protection of forestry resources under the 
auspices of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention(110). Some other global environmental 
issues, such as preservation of the Antarctic environment(111), desertification and 
drought(112), or more generally current threats to the environment(113), have been 
declared the 'common concern of mankind'(114). 
(108) Preamble; see Boyle, `The Convention on Biological Diversity', in Campiglio et al (eds. ), The 
EnvironmentAßer Rio: International Law and Economics (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 
Chap. 8; Burhenne-Guilmin & Casey-Leikowitz, supra n. 105, at 47 et sequ., and 53 et sequ. 
(109) 1992 Forestry Principles, preambularPara. (I). 
(110) Le Monde, 28 June 1997,2. 
(111) 1991 Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protocol, preambularPara. 7. 
(112) 1994 Desertification Convention, preambular Para. 2, refers to the 'urgent concern of the 
international community'. 
(113) The 1990 Strategy for the Fourth Development Decade, states that «the current threat to the 
environment is a common concern of all»; Para. 96 (emphasis added). It was also suggested by IUCN in 
its 1995 Draft Covenant on Environment and Development; Art. 3 provides that «the global environment 
is the common concern of humanity. 
(114) Some authors draw a clear distinction between the common interest and common concern of 
mankind formula, construing the former as generic terms encompassing three related but distinct aspects: 
1) the coinciding interests, or the purely factual interest in not being impaired by the equal conduct of 
other States; 
2) the shared interests, or common interest over a shared issue, hence more stable and providing 
guidelines for the desired conduct of other States, but containing as such not legally binding obligations; 
3) the common concern of mankind, expressing a common interest 'so compelling that it alone 
formulates the rule and coincides with the rule's content'; Brunnee, supra n. 104, at 807. 
In. this sense, the common interest of mankind formula would go beyond the common concern of 
mankind, the latter being only a facet of the former. Such a distinction however, is largely rhetorical, and 
is not reflected in the legal regime attached to each formula; besides, the 1992 Biodiversity Convention 
contains both expressions of common concern (preambularPara. 3) and common interest (mutual interest, (continued) 
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The common concern and common interest" of mankind formulas hence emerged 
largely as an alternative formula to common heritage of mankind(115). Left undefined in 
the various international legal documents referring to it, common concern is broadly 
understood in the doctrine(116) as being of 'paramount importance to the international 
community', thus implying a general and common obligation of all States(117)" By 
contrast to common heritage of mankind and common property, applied exclusively to 
resources beyond domestic jurisdiction, common concern of mankind encompasses 
resources located within, or related to, domestic jurisdiction(118). Hence for instance, the 
loss of biodiversity is declared the common concern of mankind although the vast 
majority of biodiversity is situated within the state territorial jurisdiction. Likewise, 
most of the measures to be taken in the effort to address climate change and global 
warming concern activities performed within the territories of States(119). Issues are 
thus declared the common concern of mankind neither because the source originates in a 
common action of all States, nor because a potentially harmful action affects a common 
resource beyond national jurisdiction, but because the effect(s) would affect all States 
and is therefore the legitimate object of concern of all States: 
«'Common concern' is the term first used by the UN General Assembly 
to justify treating the global climate as a unity, regardless of national 
sovereignty over subjacent airspace and land territory. Its most important 
implication is that it places the protection of these areas or phenomena on 
the international agenda and makes them the legitimate object of 
international attention, overriding the reserved domain of domestic 
jurisdiction or the possible contention that they relates to matters within 
the exclusive sovereignty of individual states. » (120) 
Art. 5). Far more convincing is Boyle's four-fold classification Shared Resources, Common 
Interest/Concern of Mankind, Common Property, and Common Heritage of Mankind; see Birnie & 
Boyle, International Law and the Environment (1992), 112; Boyle, supra n. 100. 
(115) Boyle, supra n. 108, at 117. Kiss however, seems to consider the common heritage of mankind as 
«the complete territorial expression or at least the materialization of the common interest of mankind»; 
`Conserving the Common Heritage of Mankind', 59 Revista Juridica de la Univerisdad de Puerto Rico 
(1990), 773, at 774. 
(116) See Biermann, "Common Concern of Humankind': the Emergence of a New Concept of 
International Environmental Law', 34 AVR (1996), 426; Brunnee, supra n. 104; Kiss, 'The International 
Protection of the Environment', in Macdonald & Johnston (eds. ), The Structure and Process of 
International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy Doctrine and Theory (Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), 1069, at 
1084; Trindade & Attard, 'The Implications of the 'Common Concern of Mankind' Concept on Global 
Environmental Issues', in Iwama (ed. ), Policies and Law on Global Warming: International and 
Comparative (Environmental Research Center, 1991). 
(117) Burhenne-Guilmin & Casey-Lefkowitz, supra n. 105, at 48. 
(118) Boyle, supra n. 100. 
(119) On that distinction see Birnie & Boyle, at 123; Wolfrum, 'Purposes and Principles of International 
Environmental Law', 33 German YbIL (1990), 308, at 323. 
(120) Birnie & Boyle, at 85; see also Boyle, supra n. 100, at 11. 
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The extent to which an analogy can be drawn between the expression of common 
concern/interest of mankind, and the concern of all States criterion of the erga omnes 
obligation(121), the fundamental interest to the international community as a whole 
criterion of TLC's definition of international crimes(122), or indeed, the one and all 
common interests of all Contracting Parties criterion of peremptory norms of 
international law(123), remains an open question. 
Some authors have no hesitation in drawing such an analogy, and consider that the 
responsibility towards the issues declared to be the common concern of mankind, 
including global warming and ozone layer depletion (and probably loss of biodiversity), 
are erga omnes in essence and hence owed to the community of States, and not only to 
the high contracting parties(124). Certain scholars would even suggest that such 
obligations are part of the ius cogens and suffer no derogation and prevail over any other 
non mandatory obligation(125). States' repeated affirmation of sovereignty throughout 
the negotiations of a regime on biodiversity (and forestry resources), climate change or 
ozone layer, however, casts some serious doubts on the erga omnes character of related 
obligations. The common concern of mankind formula might legitimise some 
international regulations and the imposition of international obligations on issues or 
activities which are, prima facie, the object of domestic jurisdiction; it does not however, 
(121) ICJ defined erga omnes obligations as «... obligations of States towards the international 
community as a whole 
... 
» which are «[b]y their very nature, (... ) the concern of all States 
... 
»; Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1970,3, at Para. 33; and supra Chap. 2/4/II/c. Limits Arising from General Environmental Considerations. 
(122) The ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility define an international crime as «[a]n internationally wrongful act which results from the breach of an international obligation so essential for 
the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a 
crime by that community as a whole... »; see 1980 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, (Art. 19(2)). 
The Draft Articles explicitly mention `serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting 
massive pollution of atmosphere or of the seas; ibid., Art. 19(3)(d). Article 19 has been preserved 
unaltered in the 1996 version of Draft Articles on State Responsibility, see further supra Chap. 2/4/I1/c. Limits Arising from General Environmental Considerations. 
(123) In its Advisory opinion concerning Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, the ICJ held that 
«in such a convention the contracting States do not have any interest of their own; they merely have, one 
and all, a common interest... »; ICJRep. 1951,15, at 23; see supra Chap. 2/4/II/c. Limits Arising from 
General Environmental Considerations. 
(124) See Epiney, `Das "Verbot erheblicher grenzüberschreitender Umweltbeeinträchtigungen": Relikt 
oder konkretisienmgsfl hige Grundnorm? ', 33 AVR (1995), 309, at 333-334; Kirgis, 'Standing to Challenge Human Endeavours that Could Change the Climate', 84 AJIL (1990), 525, at 527. Sec also IUCN 1995 Draft Covenant on Environment and Development, commentary on Art. 3, at 33. 
(125) See 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53; see Biermann, supra n. 116, at 452 
et sequ. ; Bnnmee, supra n. 104, at 802 et sequ. See also Report UNEP Group of Legal Experts Meeting 
of Malta, 13-15 December 1990, on the Implications of Common Concern of Mankind', concept on 
global environmental issues; relevant extracts reproduced in Cancado Trindade (ed. ), Human Rights, Sustainable Development and Environment (Instituto Interamericanode Desarrollo, 1995), Annex V. 
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in the current state of international law(126), confer a genuine legal interest to any State 
in the protection of the domestic environment of other States. 
3. The Parameters for Global Co-operation(127) 
The main parameters of the debate on the common concern of mankind are the same 
as those related to the common heritage of mankind(128), and relate to financial 
assistance, compensation and transfer of technology. Financial assistance and transfer of 
technology were put on the agenda of the United Nations in the early 1960s('29) as part 
of the `development debate'. Whilst, as a matter of principle, these parameters are 
generally recognized to be necessary to assure an accelerated development of less 
developed States, their foundation, their nature, and their terms revealed to be 
particularly controversial. Developing States would consider any sort of assistance from 
the part of developed States as a matter of legitimate expectation, flowing from the 
principle of compensatory solidarity and substantive equality(130) enshrined in peoples' 
right to development(131). 
(126) Even though the ILC's progress on State Responsibility and State Liability for Acts not Prohibited 
by International Law is to be born in mind, the current international legal trend is still unsympathetic to 
«a right resident in any member of a community to take legal action in vindicating of a public interest; 
South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJRep. 1966,6, at Para. 88; further supra Chap. 2/4/II/c. 
Limits Arising from General Environmental Considerations. 
(127) The term `assistance' might be more appropriate with regard to the developed-to-developing States 
relationship, in the sense that, in the current state of their development, the latter remain largely 
dependant upon the former on funding and technology, and are not in a position to co-operate on equal 
footing, with developing States. To simplify, and also because the term 'co-operation' is increasingly 
preferred to that of assistance in international documents, co-operation will be used here, bearing in mind 
however that in certain cases, indeed, in the majority, co-operation will impose a heavier burden on 
developed States. 
(128) Except from the issue of controlled production policy, not considered in the context of common 
concern of mankind. 
(129) In the late 1960, UNGA, A/Res. /1522 (XV) was passed, urging the acceleration of the now of 
capital and technical assistance to developing States, to reach at least 1% of the combined national 
income of advanced economies; Para. 1. An Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and a Special 
Funds were set up the following year for the biennium 1961-1962; UNGA, A/Res. /1713 (XVI), 19 
December 1961, on the Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Under-developed Countries. 
(130) gouveresse, Droit et politiques du developpement et de la cooperation, Presses Universitaires dc 
France, 1990), Para. 280. The principle of 'solidarit6 compensatrice', inspired from Aristotle's idea of 
iustitia distributiva and equity, was developed into a basic principle of developmental law in the early 
1970s, to counter the classic rules and principles of 'European-international' law, strictly focused on the 
formal equality of States, hence perpetuating material inequities and preserving the subordinated status of 
formercolonies. 
(131) It falls well beyond the purpose of this thesis to enter to long-drawn controversy related to the so- 
called right to development. Apart from fundamental question of the very existence and legal foundations 
of this right, it remains unclear as to whether it is an individual (human) or/and a collective (peoples') 
right, the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development being worded both in terms of collective and 
individual rights, and what the precise content of the right is, although it is often associated to the claim 
for a New International Economic Order. The literature on the right to development is as diverse as (continued) 
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The principle of `solidarite compensatrice' stresses the need to enact new rules, inter 
alia with respect to financial and technical assistance, that would take into consideration 
the concrete conditions and the differences between States (etats situes). It would 
provide, when necessary, for temporary positive discrimination to correct the de facto 
inequality among developed and developing States, and enable the latter to achieve an 
`independence agissante' and `egalite effective'(132). The status of the principle of 
compensatory solidarity as a legally binding principle of developmental (and perhaps 
environmental) law has remained very controversial however(133). Some authors suggest 
that there might sufficient evidence, both in state practice and in treaty law, of the 
existence and necessity of a customary principle of international environmental 
solidarity(134). Other scholars are critical of an international legal principle of solidarity, 
and more particularly of the related duty to provide financial and technological 
abundant; see inter alia Abi-Saab, 'The Legal Formulation of A Right to Development', in Dupuy (ed. ), 
The Right to Development at the International Level, Workshop, 1979 (Sijthoff& Noordhoff, 1980) 159; 
Alston, 'The Short Comings of a 'Garfield the Cat' Approach to the Right to Development', 15 
California Western ILJ (1985), 510; Alston, 'Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the 
Right to Development', 1 Human Rights Yb (1988), 3; Barsh, 'The Right to Development as a Human 
Right: Results of the Global Consultation', 13 Human Rights Quarterly (1991), 322; Brownlie, The 
Human Right to Development, Study prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1989); Donnelly, 'In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to 
Development', 15 California Western ILJ (1985), 473; Espiell, 'The Right to Development as a Human 
Right', 16 Texas lLJ (1981), 189; M'Baye, 'Le Droit au developpement comme un droit de l'homme', 
5 Revue des Droits de l Homme (1972), 503; Pellet, 'The Functions of the Right to Development: A 
Right to Self-Realization', in International Third World Legal Studies Association, Human Rights and 
Development, (Third World Legal Studies, 1984), 129; Rich, 'The Right to Development as an 
Emerging Human Right', 23 Virginia JIL (1983), 287; Rich, 'The Right to Development: A Right of 
Peoples? ', in Crawford (ed. ), The Rights of Peoples (Clarendon, 1988), Chap. 3; Rojas-Albonico, Le 
droit au developpement comme un droit de l'homme (Peter Lang, 1984); Tomuschat, supra n. 130; de 
Vey Mestdagh, 'The Right to Development: From Evolving Principle to 'Legal' Right: In Search of its 
Substance', in International Commission of Jurists, Development, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 
Report of a Conference held in The Hague (Pergamon, 1981), 143. For a criticism on the 'internal' 
dimension of the right to development as a human right and more generally the so-called solidarity 
human rights (or human rights of the third generation), see Alston, 'A Third Generation of Solidarity 
Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law? ', 29 Netherlands 
LR (1982), 307; Alston, 'Conjuring New Human Rights: A Proposal For Quality Control', 78 AJIL 
(1984), 607. 
(132) See Beck, Die Differenzierung von Rechtsplichten in den Beziehungen zwischen Industrie- und 
Entwicklungsländern. Eine völkerrechtliche Untersuchung fur die Bereiche des internationalen 
Wirtschafs-, Arbeits- und Umweltrechts (Peter Lang, 1994), Chap V; Cassese, International Law in a 
Divided World (Clarendon, 1986), Chap. 13; Flory, 'Indgalite economique et evolution du droit 
international', in Societd Francaise pour le Droit International, Pays en voie de developpement et 
transformation du droit international Colloque d'Aix-en-Provence (Pbdone, 1974) 11 at 19 et sequ.; 
Flory, Droit international du developpement (Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), at 37 et sequ.; 
Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, § 626; Virally, 'La Charte des droits et devoirs Cconomiques des 
Etats: Notes de lecture', 20 AFDI (1974), 57, at 75 et sequ. 
(133) Fatouros, 'Developing States', in Bernhardt (ed. ), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Instal. 9 (North-Holland, 1986), 71. 
(134) Biermann, supra n. 116, at 465. 
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assistance, even though they recognise the actual necessity of such assistance, at least 
for issues qualified to be the common concern of mankind(135). 
Developed States on the other hand, have always considered technical and financial 
assistance as a matter of goodwill and co-operation, freely entered into with developing 
States(136), and have consistently refused to endorse any binding obligation that would 
commit them to increase development assistance or intensify technology transfer(137); 
they have more generallyobjected to the consideration of development as any more than 
a goal(138). The debate on technology transfer and financial assistance within the context 
of the negotiation on the deep seabed mining illustrates well these positions. 
The discussion on these issues seems to have taken a different turn in the context of 
environmental negotiations, most notably in the negotiations on climate change, 
(135) Beck, supra n. 132., Chap. IV, at 188 et sequ.; Tomuschat, 'Das Recht auf Entwicklung', 25 
German YbIL (1982), 85, at 90 et sequ.; Epiney harbours some serious reservation about the 
differentiation of environmental standards for developed and developing States; Epiney, 'Das "Verbot 
erheblicher grenzüberschreitender Umweltbeeinträchtigungen": Relikt oder konkretisierungsiähige 
Grundnorm? ', 33 AVR (1995), 309, at 344 et sequ. 
(136) See infra i. Financial Assistance: Additionality and Compensation and 
ii. Transfer of Technology. 
(137) See infra Chap. 2/2/ ii. Sovereignty over Economic Assets and Policy in a New International 
Economic Order. 
(138) The US has consistently expressed its opposition and other major donor States (Japan, FRG, UK) 
abstained from voting on the landmark Resolution endorsing the right to development, most notably 
UNGA A/Res. /34/46,23 November 1979, on Alternative Approaches and Ways and Measures within the 
United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and UNGA A/41/128,4 December 1986, Declaration on the Right to Development. The right 
to development was reaffirmed, albeit its content not clarified and the right holders not specify in the 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Princ. 3, the 1992 Forestry Principles, and the 
1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Paras. 10,11 and 72. IUCN 1995 Draft Covenant on 
Environment and Development, Art. 8, echoes 1992 Rio Declaration Princ. 3. The US reiterated its 
opposition at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development with the following statement: 
«The United States does not, by joining the consensus on the Rio 
Declaration, change its long-standing opposition to the so-called right to 
development'. Development is not a right. On the contrary, development is a 
goal that we all hold, which depends for its realization in large part on the 
promotion and protection of human rights (... ) The United States 
understands and accepts the thrust of principle 3 to be that economic 
development goal and objective must be pursued in such a way that 
development and environment needs of present and future generations are 
taken into account. » 
UNCED Report, Vol. II, at 17 and 19. The legally binding international documents to state the right to 
development have been signed by developing States only, viz. the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, Art. 22, and 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights 
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Preamble. Peoples' right to a certain development 
standards was acknowledged ('not contested') by the ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal in the Dispute Concerning 
the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary (Guinea v. Guinea-Bissau) (1985), as «the right of the 
peoples concerned to a level of economic and social development which fully preserve their dignity»; 25 
ILM (1986), 252, at Para. 123. 
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biodiversity and forestry(139). -Increasing concern for global environmental issues and 
the linking of environmental matters with development have provided developing States 
with some bargaining leverage, which they did not enjoy in the general debate on 
development and the new international economic and marine order(140). Developing 
States, as the hosts of nearly ninety percent of the world's genes, species and 
ecosystems(141), and well aware of the importance of their participation to assure the 
actual effectiveness of measures to reduce ozone layer depletion and global 
warming(142), have been in the position to negotiate their commitment on environmental 
(139) For an overview of the respective positions of the US, the EEC countries and the developing States 
at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, see Hajost, 'The Role of the 
United States', in Campiglio et al. (eds. ), The Environment after Rio, International Law and Economics (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), Chap. 2; Brusasco-Mackenzie, 'The Role of the European 
Communities', ibid., Chap. 3; and Mensah, 'The Role of Developing Countries', ibid, Chap. 4. 
(140) Haas qualifies, quite appropriately, UNCLOS negotiation and the parallel to set up a new 
international economic order as a case of 'premature issue-packaging' strategy, adopted by the weak 
against the mighty; 'Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes', 32 World Politics 
(1979-80), 357, at 367. 
(141) To mention some of them: the savannahs of Latin America; the Mangroves, characteristic of the 
tropical and subtropical coasts; the coral reefs, mostly found in tropical shallow water ecosystem; tropical 
rain forests of Tropical America, Asia and Africa; see Groombridge (eds. ), Global Biodiversity, the Status 
of the Earth's Living Resources, A Report Complied by the World Conservation Monitoring Centre 
(Chapman& Hall, 1992). 
Besides, in a general way, biological resources tend to be more at risk in less developed countries, partly 
due to the strong reliance of a booming population on these resources to assure its survival, and partly 
due to the leniency of domestic authorities, more concerned with attracting foreign investments and 
promoting development than protecting the environment. Quite understandably, with developmental 
needs competing directly with environmental requirements for funding, developing States are very 
unlikely to prioritise the latter over the former. Hence for example, the Nigerian government has been 
widely accused of failing to apply appropriate environmental standards on the Oil exploiting Companies, 
mostly the Dutch/British giant Shell, operating in Ogoniland, in the Niger Delta, South Nigeria since 
the 1950s. Environmental activists, most famously the Nigerian writer Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa, have 
denounced the extremely poor conditions of the pipelines that criss-cross Ogoniland, which cause leaks 
that seriously disrupt the natural environment and contaminate the fresh water resources; see Guardian 
Weekly, 15 January 1995,7; The Guardian, 11 November 1995,3/4; 14 November 1995,11; Financial 
Times, 16 November 1995,4; Le Monde, 10 November 1995,5; 12/13 November 1995,1/2; 16 
November 1995,13. In an article questioning the unethical behaviour of multinationals in less developed 
countries to maximise profits, Martin Woollacott suspects the worst: «... corporations have gone beyond 
any neutrality over political conditions to develop an attachment to a particular level of bad government; 
not so bad as to create chaotic conditions for business, but tough enough on its citizens to ensure a 
combination of public order, cheap labour and low environmental and safety costs»; The Guardian, 
Outlook, 18/19 November, 1995,27. 
(142) As Prime Minister of Britain Tony Blair declared at the UN Environmental Earth Summit, 
convened to review the progress on sustainable development achieved five years after the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED + V) «we are all in this together. No 
country can opt out of global warming or fence in its own private climate; International Herald 
Tribune, 24 June 1997, at 6; also Beck, supra n. 130, at 136. Whilst developing States' contribution to 
the ozone layer depletion might (still) be marginal but is expected to rise considerably in the normal 
course of their development, developing States' contribution to greenhouse gases is fair more substantial, 
due to (1) their strong reliance on coal and other fossil fuel, (2) extensive livestock (producing methane), 
and (3) deforestation more particularly in Latin America, hence reducing the 'sink capacity' of the 
environment; Sell, 'North-South Environmental Bargaining: Ozone, Climate Change and Biodiversity', (continued) 
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issues with the commitments of industrialised countries to provide them with 
technological and financial assistance(143). The stage was set, ((for an exercise of linkage 
politics in which developing countries seek to use access to plan genetic resources as a 
bargaining leverage on the industrialised countries regarding technology transfer>>(144). 
Effective financial and technological support for developing States is no longer 
perceived as matter of charity to promote their development in their own interests; it 
has become a matter of necessary solidarity to address a common concern of mankind, 
in the interest and for the benefit of both developed and developing States. As Haas 
underlined, «issue-linkage will not succeed if States with a strong stake in the existing 
distribution of benefits, and the capability to control it, prefer to keep things as they 
are»(145). Such global bargain negotiating behaviour, also called (tactical) linkage 
strategy(146), was followed, inter alia, in the context of the amendment of the ozone 
layer regime, and during the negotiations on climate change, biodiversity, and forestry 
resources. 
The adequacy of such global bargain strategy to effectively reduce climate change, 
ozone layer depletion, and loss of biodiversity and forestry resources remains to be 
proved; nevertheless, such strategy had a clear influence on the terms of financial and 
technological co-operation between developed and developing States on issues of 
common concern of mankind. 
i. Financial Assistance: Additionality and Compensation 
In a context of constantly dwindling financial flow to development assistance(147), 
emerging of environmental concerns appeared to developing States as competing 
2 Global Governance (1996), 97. 
(143) See Robertson, 'The Global Environment: Are International Treaties a Distraction ? ', 13 World 
Economy (1990), 111, at 124. The linkage of environmental protection and conservation, and economic 
development was a central argument in WCED Report; Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 
1987), at 67. 
(144) porter & Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics (Westview, 1991), 131; for an extremely 
clear review of the elements and arguments in a global bargain approach, see Porter & Welsh Brown, 
ibid., at 148 et sequ.; on the advantages and disadvantages of the linkage strategy, Susskind, 
Environmental Diplomacy, Negotiating more Effective Global Agreements (Oxford University Press, 
1994), Chap. 5. More generally on the linkage strategy in world politics, see Haas, supra n. 140; Gupta 
& Hisschemöller, 'Issue Linkage as a Global Strategy Towards Sustainable Development. A 
Comparative Case Study of Climate Change', 9 International Environmental Affairs (1997), 289. 
(145) mss, supra n. 140, at 371. 
(146) porter & Welsh Brown, supra n. 144; Haas, supra n. 140, at 372. 
(147) A minimum of 0.7 % of the Gross National Product (GNP) of the aid-giving country was 
introduced in the 1961 Strategy for the First Development Decade, despite the oppositions of most donor 
countries, and has since been recurrently reiterated as the 'accepted United Nations' target since then; see 
1970 Strategy for the Second Development Decade, Para. 43; 1980 Strategy for the Third Development 
(continued) 
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elements for already scarce financial resources necessary to satisfy people's basic 
needs(148). The dilemma of developing States vis-ä-vis the environment is best 
summarised by the following statement of Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi at the 
1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment: 
«[H]ow can we speak to those who live in villages and in slums about 
keeping the oceans and the air clean when their own lives are contaminated at 
the sources? ) )(149) 
To minimise the diversion of existing funds earmarked for development purposes, 
developing States insisted on having the principles of additionality and compensation 
enshrined in environmental documents(150). The first principle implies that new 
Decade, Para. 24; 1990 Strategy for the Fourth Development Decade, Para. 40; it was reaffirmed in 1992 
Agenda 21, Chap. 33, Para. 33.13. However, the 0.7% threshold has not only been reached by a very 
small number of States, mostly Nordic Countries, with the majority of States well under 0.3%, and a 
record of only 0.1% for the US in 1995; the real percentage of GNP affected to Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), the major source of concessionary aid, has declined from an average of 0.34% of donor 
countries' gross national product in 1992,, to 0.27% in 1995; Le Monde, 28 June 1997,2. 
Besides, a majority of European States, most notably Germany and the United Kingdom, have declared 
themselves in favour of a reduction of the aid conceded to the ACP via the European Fund for 
Development (financial instrument of Lome Convention), and a parallel increase in the support to the 
development in Eastern Europe. Though it was eventually increased of 20% as compared to the seventh 
EFD for the period 1990-1995, the eighth EFD, set for the period 1996-2000, means actually a status 
quo, if not a reduction of the financial contribution in real terms of the members of European Union, 
considering the enlargement in EU memberships to three new States (Austria, Sweden and Finland, in 
1994). The strategy of liberalisation of exchanges, within the frame of the WTO, might have a serious 
impact on some ACP countries the production of which benefits of a preferential access to the EU market. 
Concerned with the safeguard of the interests of their multinationals, the US indeed already questions the 
banana preferential trade system, as incompatible with the sound commercial principles; tomorrow, it 
might well be the sugar. Le Monde, 7 November 1995,5. On the other hand, the US, other major donor, 
is now influenced by the Republican majority in the Federal Congress, and active defender of a strategic 
rather than humanitarian aid strategy-, the losers are African States, and the winners are Israel, Egypt and 
the Republics of the former Soviet Union. Le Monde, 5/6 February 1995,2. 
France has so far emerged rather isolated, in this general relaxing of financial support to African 
Hemisphere. And while Candidate Chirac promised increased contributions to a series of programmes of 
aid to Third-World countries, President Chirac was soon to announce drastic reductions thereof, in 
furtherance of Balladure's programme of rehabilitation of French public budget. Are namely - affected: 
UNICEF, the World Food Programme, UNDP and the WHO; Le Monde, 11 October 1995,5, and 30 
November 1995,5. 
(148) Biswas, 'Environment and the Law: A Perspective from Developing Countries', in Dupuy (cd. ) 
The Future of International Law of the Environment', Workshop, (Martinus Nijhoif, 1984), 389, at 391. 
(149) Quoted after Ramakrishna, 'North-South Issues, Common Heritage of Mankind and Global 
Climate Change', 19 Millennium (1990), 439, at 439. Since 1989, there have been a clear'redirection' of 
funds for development, then exclusively allocated to 'satellite' Third World countries to assure their 
'alignment' with one side or another in the Cold War, towards Eastern European States to support their 
transition from planned economy to a capitalist model; this diversion of funds is particularly clearly 
reflected in the series of comparative tables on the financial flows and official development assistance to 
Eastern States before and after 1989; see Lacoste & Sgard, L'Europe, La France et la Mediterranee: vers 
de nouveaux Partenariats, Rapport de I'Atelier `Mediterrandc/Moyen-Orient' du Groupe 'Monde- 
Europe', (La Documentation Francaise, 1993), at 50 et sequ. (tables 5-7). 
(150) Morgan, 'Stockholm : the Clean (but Impossible) Dream', 8 Foreign Policy (1972), 149, at 153 et 
sequ. 
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environmental initiatives are to be funded with an increase in financial inflows or new 
funds, rather than with the redistribution of existing funds so far allocated to 
development assistance. The first expression of the principle of additionality was 
contained in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment: 
«Resources should be made available to preserve and improve the 
environment, taking into account the circumstances and particular 
requirements of developing countries and any costs which may emanate from 
their incorporating environmental safeguards into their development planning 
and the need for making available to them, upon requests, additional 
international assistance for this purpose. » (151) 
The principle of compensation allows for some indemnification of a State for the 
sacrifice imposed vis-ä-vis its domestic resources in the interest of the entire 
international community(152). Both principles were reaffirmed by developing States 
throughout the debate on sustainable development, as necessary enable them to cope 
with the new environmental costs without sacrificing their developmental 
perspectives(153). 
The major donor States on the other hand, have always considered development 
assistance as a matter of goodwill(154) and have strongly resisted any attempt to have 
(151) prin. 12; likewise, 1972 Stockholm Action Plan for the Human Environment, Recommend. 109 
provides that it should be ensured that «the preoccupation developing countries with their own 
environmental problems should not affect the flow of assistance to developing countries, and that this 
flow should be adequate to meet the additional environmental requirements of such countries. 
(152) See 1972 Stockholm Action Plan for the Human Environment, Recommend. 103. The principle of 
compensation for sacrifice (supra n. 130) was also invoked (and endorsed), albeit in a developmental 
rather than environmental context, during the negotiations on the deep seabed, to minimise the loss 
incurred from land-based mining (developing) States, due to the emergence of deep seabed mining 
activities; see supra II/iii. Common Heritage of Mankind under the 1982 UNCLOS: Attempt to Set up a 
Marine Partnership. 
(153) See 1989 Resolution 44/229, on International Cooperation in the Field of the Environment, 
preambular Para. 8; 1989 Resolution 44/228, on United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Preambular Para. 20. See also 1989 Brasilia Declaration on the Environment, Para. 7; 
1989 Belgrade Declaration of the G77. No reference however is made in 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development to the principles of additionality and compensation; on the other hand, 
the whole implementation of 1992 Agenda 21 actually primarily rests on the financial contribution by 
developed States, either through the ODA (direct assistance), or through their contribution to multilateral 
institutions or funds dealing with development and environment (indirect assistance). Additionality and 
compensation were particularly at stake during the negotiation on the 1990 Amendments to Montreal 
Protocol on the Ozone Layer, the 1992 Climate Change Convention and the 1992 Biodiversity 
Convention; see infra 4. The Terms of the Bargain. 
(154) The US, FRG, Japan, France and the UK have always contested the UN 0.7 % of GDP target for 
development assistance; see Flory, 'La troisi8me d6cennie pour le ddveloppement', 26 AFDI (1980), 
593, at 599. The socialist bloc resisted any mandatory development assistance on the ground that the 
duty to provide assistance was linked to the responsibility of former colonial powers for 
underdevelopment, and could not be imposed upon States having no such responsibility, Virally, 'La 
deuxieme decennie des Nations Unies pour le developpement, essai d'interprdtation para-juridique', 16 
AFDI (1970), 9, at 14. The absence of an historical colonial link was also invoked very recently by Germany, Austria, Sweden and Denmark, at the debate concerning the aid granted to the ACP (Lomb 
Process); see le Monde, 5/6 February 1995,2. 
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the obligation to provide assistance for development and fixed targets enshrined in any 
international document. The US issued the following statement with regard to the ODA 
target expressed in Agenda 21: 
«The United States is not among those countries that have affirmed an 
overseas development assistance target. Such a target would detract from the 
more important issues of the effectiveness and quality of aid and the policies 
in the recipient country (... ) The United States has traditionally been the 
largest aid donor in volume terms and will continue to provide high-quality 
aid on a case-by-case basis, in a way that encourages reform efforts in 
developing countries. » (155) 
Likewise, the major donor States have systematically opposed the recognition of the 
principles of additionality and compensation as legally binding in the context of 
international environmental law(156); they argued that such principles constitute a 
'disincentive to environmental responsibility, as well as a hidden attempt to impose a 
mandatory duty to provide development assistance. Donors States rather favour the 
reallocation of existing funds(157) and the creation of a climate favourable to foreign 
investment. In 1972 already, the US clearly stated, in relation to the Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment, Principle 12, that : 
«[She] does not regard the text of [Principle 12 ], or any other language 
contained in the Declaration, as requiring it to change its aid policies or 
increase the amounts thereof. The United States of America accepts the idea 
that added costs in specific national projects or activities for environmental 
protection reasons should be taken into account. » (158) 
(155) UNCED Report Vol. II, at 19. 
(156) Developed States recognise however that as a matter of principle, extra funds are needed to enable 
developing States to fulfil their environmental obligations; see for instance 1989 Paris Economic 
Declaration of the G7, Para. 38; 1989 Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate 
Change, Para. 26. See further referencesand relevant extracts in Sands & Bulatao, Financial Mechanisms 
for the Climate Change Convention, CIEL/AOSIS Background Paper 3/1991, at 2 et sequ. 
(157) particularly illustrative in that respect is the isolated position of the US during the debate on the 
funding of initiatives to protect the ozone layer and financing of alternative ozone friendly technology. 
Against the position of most European States, the US argued against a new special fund, and in favour of 
a reorientation of some of the World Bank's funds; Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (Harvard University 
Press, 1991), at 160 et sequ. 
(158) UN Doc. A/CONF. 48/14, at 118 (1972) (emphasis added); quoted after Sohn, ' The Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment', 14 Harvard IIJ (1973), 433, at 471; see also Morgan, 
'Stockholm: the Clean (but Impossible) Dream', 8 Foreign Policy (1972), 149, at 151 et sequ. In his 
address to the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development, President Bush declared that the US 
«stand to [voluntarily] increase US international environmental aid by 66% above the 1990 levels, on 
top of the more than $ 2.5 billion that we provide through the world's development banks for Agenda 21 
projects; 3 Department of State Dispatch (1992), 461. 
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ii. Transfer of Technology 
In the same way developing States consider financial assistance as a legitimate 
expectation flowing from the principle of compensatory solidarity and equality, not to 
say a right stemming from the right to development(159), they perceive the 
`redistribution' of such technological and scientific knowledge on concessional or 
preferential basis as a right held essentially (albeit not exlusively) against former colonial 
powers(160) Technological and scientific progress has even been qualified as common 
heritage to be developed for and in the interest of the whole mankind, accessible to 
mankind as a whole. The most significant step in that direction was made by the G77 in 
their draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology; the draft 
provides in its Preamble that «technology is part of universal human heritage and (... ) all 
countries have the right of access to technologies to improve the standards of living of 
their people»(161). A particularly strong rejection of commercial terms on technology 
transfers is contained in the 1989 Amazon Declaration in these terms: 
(159) Supra n. 138. 
(160) Hence for instance, 1975 Economic Charter, Art. 13(1) provides that «Every State has the right to 
benefit from the advances and development in science and technology for the acceleration of its economic 
and social development. 
(161) Doc. TD/AC. 1/9 Annex II, 17 ILM (1978), 462; see also draft International Code of Conduct on the 
Transfer of Technology, 6 May, 1980, Doc. TD/CODE TOT/33,12 May 1981; for a review of the drafts 
codes by various group of countries at UNCTAD, see Roffe, `International Code of Conduct on Transfer 
of Technology', 11 JWTL (1977), 186. On the progresses and obstacles to the drafting process in 
UNCTAD, see Cousin, `Le projet de la CNUCED de Code international de conduite pour le tranfcrt des 
techniques', 19 German YbIL (1976), 199; Graham, `The Transfer of Technology: A Test Case in the 
North-South Dialogue', 33 JIA (1979), 1; Miller, 'Panacea or Problem? The Proposed International 
Code of Conduct for Technology Transfer', 33 JIA (1979), 43; Thompson, 'The UNCTAD Code on 
Transfer of Technology', 16 JWTL (1982), 311; also Bouveresse, Droit et politiques du developpement 
et de la cooperation, (Presses Universitaires dc France, 1990), Para. 288. The work on the draft code of 
conduct in UNCTAD was suspended in 1993; see UNGA, A/Res. /48/167,21 December 1993, on 
International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology. A parallel is sometimes drawn between the 
UNCTAD drafting process of the code on the transfer of technology, and UNCLOS III negotiations on 
deed seabed mining regime, and the cautious position of technologically advanced States justified on the 
ground their delegation were eager not to set a precedent at UNCLOS that could 'inspire' UNCTAD 
negotiations; see Treves, `Le transfert de technologic et la Conference sur le droit de la mer', 104 JDI 
(1977), 43, at 55 et sequ. As seen, although the concept of common heritage of mankind in the context of 
the law of the sea qualifies the deep seabed area and does not formally encompass deep seabed mining 
technology, one purpose of such qualification of the Area was to ensure free access to the appropriate 
technology, see supra 2/iii. Common Heritage of Mankind under the 1982 UNCLOS: Attempt to 
Set up a Marine Partnership( 
. 
Some authors however, undermine the importance of the linkage and 
mutual influence of UNCTAD and UNCLOS negotiations, underlining that the UNCTAD process had 
long been considered as sui generis, and was unknown to most UNCLOS negotiators until the late 1979; 
Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden?, Clarendon, 1989, at 165. 
The qualification of scientific and technological progress as common heritage of mankind was also 
contained in 1978 Algiers Declaration universelle des droits du peuple, Art. 9; the Declaration was 
adopted by the Conference of Lawyers, Sociologists, Political Analysts, Philosophers and Economists, 
convened by the `Fondation Internationale LELIO BASSO pour le droit et la liberation des pcuples' and (continued) 
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We expect the establishment of conditions to allow free access to 
scientific knowledge, to clean technologies and to technologies to be used in 
environmental protection and we reject any attempts made to use ecological 
concerns to realize commercial profits. »(162) 
Although the US, alongside other technologically advanced States such as FRG, UK 
and Japan, agreed in principle that technology transfer is necessary to the promotion of 
more sustainable practices in developing countries(163), they disagree on the terms 
thereof. They have, inter alia, systematically resisted all attempts to have the sharing 
oflrnowledge and technology at below commercial market or preferential or 
'subsidiarised' terms embodied in a legal obligation. It was clearly stated at the 1972 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment that any new obligations upon 
developed States can only result from a voluntarily accepted commitment(164). 
Two major reasons are invoked to justify such opposition: 
1. The great part of technology has been developed and is owned by the private sector; 
the decision as to its transfer lies with the private sector; it is therefore far beyond 
the prerogative of a liberal free-market State to force private enterprises to sell their 
patents and knowledge at below market conditions(165). 
the `ligue internationale pour le droit et la liberation des peuples', Algiers, 1978, reproduced in Cassese 
& Jouve, Pour un droit des peuples, Essais sur la Declaration d'Alger (Herger-L. evrault, 1978). 
UNESCO made a similar statement, without drawing any conclusion however as to the implication; see 
Bedjaoui Towards a New International Economic Order (UNESCO, 1978), at 237-238. 
(162) Para. 8. 
(163) The principles of technical assistance for environmental matters was already enshrined in 1972 
Stockholm on the Human Environment, Princ. 12 and 20; by contrast however, an entire chapter (Chap. 
34) of 1992 Agenda 21 is devoted to the issue of technology transfer. The Seven Leading Industrial 
Nations identified the transfer of technology among the specific initiatives necessary to promote 
sustainable development in the 1989 Paris Economic Declaration of the G7, Para. 35, and in 1990 
Houston Economic Declaration of the G7, Para. 72. 
(164) See for instance the US position on 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Princ. 12, in Sohn, supra n. 
158, at 472. The Economic Charter accommodates technologically advanced States opposition to a 
mandatory transfer of technology, and words the articles on technical (and financial) assistance as a matter 
of desirability (should), abandoning the language of necessity (shall) or even duty (have the duty) used 
throughout the document« see Articles 13(3), and 20 to 23; technical assistance is hence construed as an 
option left to developing countries, and not as a duty of developed States. These provisions were adopted 
by consensus, without abstention; see voting record in 141LM (1975), 262, at 264-64. Technical and 
financial assistance were equally regarded as two central principles the NIEO should be founded upon; see 
Princ. 4 (1), (k), (o) and (p). A similarly cautious (non mandatory) language was adopted in 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development: 
«States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for 
sustainable development, by improving scientific understanding, through 
exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhancing the 
development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new 
and innovative technologies» (Prin. 9, emphasis added) 
This principle was accepted without real controversy. 
(165) porter & Welsh Brown, supra n. 144, at 132. See US position during the deep scabcd regime, 
supra 2/iii. Common Heritage of Mankind under the 1982 UNCLOS: Attempt to Set up a Marine (continued) 
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2. A compulsory transfer of technology and scientific knowledge would put too heavy 
a burden on the private sector. The lack of appropriate consideration and protection 
of patent and intellectual property rights, and would seriously reduce the benefit 
derived by their authors from innovative technology(166). It would, in the long run, 
suppress any incentives for scientific and technological progress and threaten, or at 
least slow down, scientific development(167). The statement delivered by the US with 
regards to Agenda 21 and the 1992 Forestry Principles illustrates this point 
particularly well: 
- 
«The United States strongly believes that adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual property rights is an essential component of any 
international technology cooperation effort aimed at environmental protection 
and/or development assistance. Such protection is essential to provide 
incentives for innovation in the development of environmentally sound and 
appropriate technologies, and facilitates access to, and transfer and 
dissemination of such technologies. 
The United States understands the provisions of the forest principles and 
Agenda 21 regarding access to and transfer of technology to mean that, in the 
case of technologies and know-how subject to intellectual property rights, 
such access and transfer shall be on freely negotiated, mutually agreed terms 
that recognize and are consistent with the adequate and effective protection of 
those rights. » (168) 
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(166) Ownership rights to technology are grounded in the various national intellectual property 
legislation, largely reflected at the international level by the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, the Convention has been signed today by over 100 States, including US, Japan and 
formerUSSR. In parallel to the attempt to draft a code on the transfer of technology (see supra), intended, 
at least for developing States, to supersede 1883 Paris Convention, a procedure of revision of that 
Convention was opened in 1974, inter alia to take more into consideration the needs of developing 
States; the process of revision is still not concluded; Bouveresse, Droit etpolitiques du developpement et 
de la cooperation (Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), Para. 282. The establishment of a 
comprehensive system of protection of intellectual property rights satisfying international agreed minima 
of protection is now required under the TRIPs Agreements which are part of the 1994 Gatt package; see 
Tarasofsky, 'The Relationship Between the TRIPs Agreement and the Conventions on Biological 
Diversity: Towards a Pragmatic Approach', 6 RECIEL (1997), 148. 
(167) See US position during the deep seabed regime, supra n. 165. See also Yamin, Biodiversity 
Conservation and Intellectual Property Rights, Position Paper for the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(FIELD, 1994), at 21 et sequ., partly reproduced under the title `The Use of Joint Implementation to 
Increase Compliance with the Climate Change Convention', in Cameron et al. (eds. ), Improving 
Compliance with International Environmental Law (Earthscan, 1996), Chap. 11. 
(168) US statement is reproduced in UNCED Report Vol. II, at 18. Intellectual property rights were also 
behind the US reticence to sign the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, eventually signed by the Clinton 
Administration on 4 June 1993; see US declaration at UNEP Conference for the adoption of the agreed 
text of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, 31 ILM (1992) 848; statement released by the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary Spokesman on 29 May 1992, in 3 Department of State Dispatch (1992), 423; 
Wirth's Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12 April 1994, and Annexed 
Statements of Understanding and the Relationship of the Convention to the TRIPs Agreement, 5 
Department of State Dispatch (1994), 215. 
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Accordingly, provisions on the transfer of technology are usually expressed in terms 
of desirability(169); where worded in mandatory terms, they have so far been opposed 
by technologically advanced States, and hence rendered practically inoperable(170). 
iii. Common But Differentiated Responsibility 
Another contentious parameter of co-operation equally relates to the principle of 
solidarity and compensatory equality, and pertains to the shared responsibility 
assumed by all States. Developing States, while acknowledging that the protection of 
the environment is in the common interest of the international community as a whole, 
tend to shift the burden of environmental protection onto industrialised States, invoking 
two main grounds(171): 
a) the larger share of responsibility of developed States for the present alarming rate of 
pollution and depletion of the environment (the 'main responsibility principle')(172); 
b) developed States' greater technical and financial capabilities to protect the 
environment. 
Although certain developed States, mostly the Nordic States, have been sympathetic 
to the argument of a particular obligation of industrialised States to assist developing 
States ((which will be very negatively affected by changes in the atmosphere although 
(169) States were unanimous to recognise that the transfer of technology to developing States was, as a 
matter of principle, necessary to the acceleration of their development; the transfer of technology 
nonetheless was expressed in terms of desirability, and not in mandatory terms; see for instance UNGA, 
A/Res. /2091 (XX), 20 December 1965, on Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries; 1970 
Strategy for the Second Development Decade, Sect. 7 (Paras. 63 and 64); 1974 NIEO Declaration, Art. 
4(p), and NIEO Programme of Action, Sect. IV; UNGA, A/Res. /3362 (S-VII), 16 September 1975, on 
Development and International Economic Cooperation, Sect. III, Pam. 3; 1980 Strategy for the Third 
Development Decade, Sect. G; 1990 Strategy for the Third Development Decade, Paras. 56 et sequ. No 
particular reference is made to the transfer of technology in 1961 Strategy for the First Development 
Decade, which stresses rather generally upon the «exploitation of scientific and technological 
potentialities of high promise for accelerating economic and social development >; UNGA, A/Res. / 1710 (XV), 19 December 1961, Para. 4(f). 
(170) See supra, 2/iii. Common Heritage of Mankind under the 1982 UNCLOS: Attempt to Set up a 
Marine Partnership ( ). 
(171) Chowdhury, 'Common But Differentiated State Responsibility in International Environmental Law. 
From Stockholm (1972) to Rio (1992)', in Ginther et al. (eds. ), Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance (Martinus Nijhofl; 1995), Chap. 20, at 333 et sequ. Such position is particularly clearly 
reflected in the respective declarations issued by the various regional preparatory meetings organised in 
the process leading to the Earth Summit; see for instance 1991 Tlatelolco Platform on Environment and 
Development, 1990 Bangkok Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, and 1991 Beijing 
Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Development, respectively Paras. 6-6-8; see also 1989 
Brazilia Declaration on the Environment, Princ. 12 in fine. 
(172) Hence for instance, industrialised States produce an estimated 85 % of the total greenhouse gases; 
Beck, supra n. 130, at 138. See also Report UNEP Group of Legal Experts Meeting of Malta, 13-15 
December 1990, on the Implications of Common Concern of Mankind', concept on global environmental 
issues; relevant extracts reproduced in Cancado Trindade (ed. ), Human Rights, Sustainable Development 
and Environment (Instituto Interamericano de Desarrollo, 1995), Annex V, at 26, Pam. 9. 
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the responsibility of many of them in the process may only be marginal today) )(173), the 
general attitude of developed States towards the reference to the common but 
differentiated responsibility formula in a legally binding document has been extremely 
lukewarm(174). 
The US were been frankly hostile to the idea that industrialised States would assume 
a greater share of responsibility than developing States with respect to certain 
environmental issues. Ever since the idea of common but differentiated responsibility 
was put forward, at the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, it has 
constantly asserted that new obligations upon developed States can only result from 
voluntarily accepted commitments(175). The US issued the following declaration of 
understanding of the formula othe developed 'countries acknowledge the responsibility 
that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development» used in the 1992 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 7 (partnership and co- 
operation): 
(([highlighting] the special leadership role of the developed countries, 
based on our industrial development, our experience with environmental 
protection policies and actions, and our wealth, technical expertise and 
capabilities. (... ) The United States does not accept any interpretation of 
principle 7 that would imply a recognition or acceptance by the United States 
(173) 1989 Hague Declaration on Environment, Para. 8; see also 1989 Resolution 44/229, on 
International Cooperation in the Field of the Environment, Para. 6. Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, 
but also New Zealand have been particularly supportive, inter alia, of the creation of an international fund 
to support and compensate the action taken by developing States in the implementation of 1987 Montreal 
Protocol on the Ozone Layer; Benedick, supra n. 157, at 126. 
(174) The principle of differentiated responsibility is yet enshrined in the 1992 EU Treaty, Art. 130R. 2, 
providing for the application of different standards for different economic conditions. Art. 130R. 2 was 
invoked by developing States to support their claim in favour the legal status of the principle in 
international law; Porras, 'The Rio Declaration :A New Basis for International Cooperation', in Sands 
(ed. ), Greening International Law (Earthscan, 1993), Chap. 2, at 30 n. 17.1988 Directive 88/609/EEC, 
on the Limitation of Emission of Certain Pollutants into the Air from large Combustion Plants, as 
amended provides another example of differentiated obligation, laying down country-by-country time 
schedule forthe reduction of sulphur dioxide emissions; [1988] OJ L336; see Sand, Lessons Learned in 
Global Environmental Governance (World Resource Institute, 1990), at 8. It is also applied within the 
context of greenhouse gases reduction, with less developed States exemption, that dates back from the 
first Conference of the Parties to 1992 Climate Convention held in Berlin during 1995, and enshrined in 
the Protocol negotiated at Kyoto; Rowlands, 'The Climate Change Negotiations: Berlin and Beyond', 4 
JED (1995), 145; Le Monde, 11 December 1997, at 4. The US reiterated their opposition to the principle 
at Kyoto although it finally consented to the exemption of developing States from binding commitments 
(not without stating however that it would not ratify the protocol before such commitments are spelt out); 
Le Monde, 5 December 1997, at 5; Cameron, 'The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 Framework 
Climate Change Convention', Paper presented at the Institut Universitaire des Hautcs Etudes 
Internationales, Geneva, 16 March 1998. 
(175) See US position on 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Princ. 12, in Sohn, ' 
The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment', at 472. 
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of any international obligations or liabilities, or any diminution in the 
responsibilities of developing countries. » (176) 
Similar interpretation of the special responsibility of developed States as a 
responsibility of leadership was endorsed by the seven leading industrial States. 
«Environmental challenges such as climate change, ozone depletion, 
deforestation, marine pollution and loss of biological diversity require closer, 
and more effective international cooperation and concrete action. We as the 
industrialized countries have an obligation to be leaders in meeting these 
challenges. »(177) 
4. The Terms of the Bargain 
The regimes respectively adopted for the ozone layer as amended in 1990(178), 
climate change and biodiversity illustrate, in a very similar fashion, the `global bargain 
approach', whereby developed and developing States have striven to negotiate and keep 
(176)uNCED Report Vol II, at 17-18. 
(177) 1990 Houston Economic Declaration of the G7, Para. 62 (emphasis added). 
(178) The original regime of scientific, technical and legal co-operation under the 1985 Vienna 
Convention on the Ozone Layer and original 1987 Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer was couched in 
extremely general and largely oratory terms (1985 Vienna Convention, Arts. 4,6(4)(d), and Annex II; 
original 1987 Montreal Protocol, Arts. 5(2), (3), 10(1) and (2)), with no reference made to additionality 
(see 1987 Montreal Protocol, Art. 10); the only concession made to developing low CFCs consuming 
States is a 10 year grace period (original 1987 Montreal Protocol, Art. 5), and a very general recognition 
of the 'circumstances and particular requirements' of developing countries (1985 Vienna Convention, 
preambular Para. 3); see further Tripp, 'The UNEP Montreal Protocol: Industrialized and Developing 
Countries Sharing the Responsibility for Protecting the Stratospheric Ozone Layer', 20 New York 
UniversityJIL & Politics (1988), 733, at 742 et sequ. As a result of the lack of real commitment from 
industrialised States to provide financial and technical assistance to developing States, only two 
developing States became parties to the 1985 Vienna Convention by 1987; and despite substantive 
contribution from certain developing States to the deliberation leading to the original 1987 Montreal 
Protocol, most developing States, including China and India, representing 1/3 of the population, and 
currently the second and sixth world's larger emitters of carbon dioxide, abstained from ratifying it. Only 
five developing States ratified the 1987 Montreal Protocol before it was first amended in 1990, namely 
Egypt, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria and Uganda; and indeed, no substantial exchange of technology has taken 
place in two years between the entry into force of the Protocol and its the 1990 Amendments; Drogula, 
'Developed and Developing Countries: Sharing the Burden of Protecting the Atmosphere', 4 
Georgetown IELR (1992), 257,271 et sequ. The 1990 London Amendments to the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol on the Ozone Layer were hence motivated in part by the necessity to provide more incentives to 
encourage developing States to join the common effort to protect ozone layer. Some developing States, 
which contribution to global CFCs emission was modest at the time but was expected to rise 
substantially in the 'normal course of their development', pointed out that at their stage of development, 
«the costs of committing to a phase out of CFCs were much greater than the benefits to be provided by 
protecting the ozone layer, made it clear they could and would act only unless a fund was created to 
finance introduction of substitute technologies for CFCs; Sell, supra n. 142, at 100; see further Beck, 
supra n. 130, at 135 et sequ.; Benedick, supra n. 157, Chap. 12, and comparative table of original 
Montreal Protocol and 1990 Amendment at 190 et sequ.; Biermann, "Common Concern of 
Humankind': the Emergence of a New Concept of International Environmental Law', 34 AVR (1996), 
426, at 436 et sequ.; Drogula, supra, at 269 et sequ. 
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their respective commitments and obligations within the limits of the parameters 
mentioned above(179). 
1) The principle of additionality is endorsed(180) and, in all three cases, the burden 
rests essentially upon industrialised States to provide for additional funds. No reference 
is made, on the other hand, to compensation, which has remained politically 
unacceptable to many States: 
1987 Protocol on the Ozone 11992 Climate Change 11992 Biodiversity Convention 
Layer as amended in 1990 Convention 
«The Parties shall establish 
a mechanism for the purposes of 
providing financial and technical 
cooperation, including the 
transfer of technologies, to 
[developing countries Parties 
qualifying under Art. 5 of the 
Amendment] to enable their 
compliance with the control 
measure (... ) The mechanism, 
contributions to which shall be 
additional to other financial 
transfers [to developing States 
Parties] shall meet all agreed 
incremental costs of [those 
States] in order to enable their 
compliance with the control 
measures of the Protocol. » (181) 
«The developed country 
Parties (... ) shall provide new 
and additional financial 
resources to meet the agreed full 
costs incurred by developing 
country Parties in complying 
with their obligations under [the 
Convention]. They shall also 
provide such financial resources, 
including for the transfer of 
technology, needed by the 
developing country Parties to 
meet the agreed full incremental 
costs of implementing measures 
[that are expressly covered by 
the Convention] and that are 
agreed between a developing 
country Party and the 
international entity or entities 
[appointed to operate the 
financial mechanism of the 
Convention]. »(182) 
The developed country 
Parties (... ) shall provide new 
and additional financial 
resources to enable developing 
country Parties to meet the 
agreed full incremental costs to 
them of implementing measures 
which fulfil the obligations of 
this Convention and to benefit 
from its provisions and which 
costs are agreed between a 
developing country Party and 
the institutional structure 
[appointed to operate the 
financial mechanism of the 
Convention]»(183) 
(179) As a result, the commitments flowing from the `bargain' are inevitably worded in more moderate (and acceptable) terms than the far reaching commitment under the original 1982 UNCLOS Part XI; some 
authors however feel that legal substance of the commitment has been sacrificed for the sake of 
acceptability, «compared with UNCLOS, the [1992 Convention on Biodiversity] provisions are vague 
and almost devoid of commitment and from this view point disappointed, given that the [Convention] 
was adopted ten years later); Johnston, 'Sustainability, Biodiversity and International law', in Bowman 
& Redgwell (eds. ), International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity (Kluwer Law 
International, 1996), Chap. 3, at 54. 
(180) The US made it clear however throughout the negotiation on the 1990 Amendment to the 1987 
Ozone Layer Protocol, that it understood the term of additionality as implying «the allocation of more 
funds specifically to ozone protection, but not necessarily allocation of funds in addition to overall foreign 
assistance flows; Benedick, supra n. 157, at 156. 
(181) Art. 10(1). 
(182) Art. 4(3) and Annex II; see also 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention, Art. 11 
(2) (a) and (b); on the contrary to the Ozone regime, eastern European States are not included in that 
category of States; they are also exempted from the obligation to contribute to the fund under the 1992 
Biodiversity Convention; Art. 20; for a critics of such differential treatment, see Beck, supra n. 130, at 
176 et sequ. 
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Additional assistance required by the implementation of the various documents is to 
be mutually agreed, on the basis of the evaluation of the costs generated from the shift 
to environmentally friendly technology, or 'incremental costs'(184); it is conveyed 
principally via a financial mechanism proper to each treaty, supplied by industrialised 
States and operated according to fair and representative voting procedures. Hence the 
1987 Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer, as amended in 1990, provides for the 
creation of a new Multilateral Fund to finance its implementation(185); an interim US $ 
200 million Multilateral Ozone Fund, co-administered by UNEP, UNDP and WB, was 
set up in January 1991 pending the establishment of the new Multilateral Fund(186). 
Despite the US declaration that the financial mechanism under the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol as amended «was not considered as a precedent for dealing with other 
international aid programs»(187), and in spite of the resistance of the US and other 
industrialised States (Japan, UK and Canada) to the creation of special finds, similar 
financial mechanisms were adopted under the 1992 Climate Change Convention and the 
1992 Biodiversity Convention(188). In both instances, the Global Environment Facility 
(183) Art. 20(2) 
(184) Jaitly & Khanna, 'Liability for Climate Change: Who Pays, How Much and Why', 1 RECIEL 
(1992), 453, at 458; Jordan & Werksman, 'Additional Funds, Incremental Costs and The Global 
Environment', 3 RECIEL (1994), 81. The decision-making procedures described below ensure to both 
developed and developing States a certain control over the funds allocated for additional or compensatory 
assistance; one of the main requirement of the US during the renegotiation the 1982 UNCLOS Part XI 
was indeed the appointment of a financial committee (and guarantee of a sea) to control the amount of 
fund devoted to assistance; see supra 2/iii. Common Heritage of Mankind under the 1982 UNCLOS: 
Attempt to Set up a Marine Partnership. The anticipation incremental costs, however, raises serious 
problems of valuation of environmental resources, particularly difficult in the context of biodiversity, see 
on that aspect Burhenne-Guilmin & Casey-Leikowitz, supra n. 105, at 55. 
(185) Art. 10(2). 
(186) UNEP, Twenty Years Since Stockholm, 1992 Annual Report (UNEP, 1993), at 83. 
(187) Sell, supra n. 142, at 103. The US was particularly unwilling to adopt a similar mechanism 
under the Climate Convention, the implementation of which would be far more costly than the Ozone 
regime. For the US alone, it was estimated that the cost of implementation of the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol would be of US$ 2.7 billions, as compared to the estimated US$ 800 billions to 3.6 trillions 
required to cut greenhouse gases back to a reasonable degree; Sell, ibid., 106; Beck, supra n. 130, at 
150. 
(188) Respectively Art. 21(3), and Arts. 21 & 31. Bilateral projects or assistance remain possible, albeit 
marginal, source of funds; see 1987 Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer as amended in 1990, Art. 
10(6); 1992 Climate Change Convention, Art. 11(5). Mexico's proposal to establish a special fund was 
abandoned however. The creation of a 'green fund' to support the implementation costs of the 1992 
Climate Change Convention and its future protocols was contemplated again at 1997 Kyoto meeting of 
the States Party to the Convention, at the initiative of Brazil; it was temporally abandoned for a 'clean 
development mechanism', combining project-financed models, and multilateral trading system; Cameron, 
'The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 Framework Climate Change Convention', Paper presented at the 
Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva, 16 March 1998. The 'special fund' 
approach to provide for additional resources to developing States was also followed inter alia in the 1994 
Tropical Timber International Agreement (Art. 21, Bali Partnership Fund) and 1995 Straddling Fish 
(continued) 
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(GEF) was entrusted with the mechanism on an interim basis(189). Developing States, 
disfavoured under the original GEF decision-making procedure, made their consent 
conditional upon the reform of the GEF decision-making procedure(190). 
Stocks Agreement (Art. 26); a Wetland Conservation Fund was also created in 1990, to support the 
implementation of 1971 Ramsar Convention. 
(189) GEF was created in November 1990 by an group of 14 industrialised State and 7 developing 
States, for an initial three-year period (1991-1994). The US $ 1.3 billion pilot scheme was construed as a 
`green window' that would provide additional funding on concessionary terms to developing States for 
economically viable environmental projects; it was initially to focus of four areas: global warming, 
biodiversity, pollution of international waters and stratospheric pollution; activities concerning land 
degradation, primarily deforestation and desertification, were also eligible for funding insofar as they relate 
to the four focal areas; see Instrument for the Establishment of the Global Environmental Facility, 30 ILM (1991), 1758. Theoretically managed via a tripartite arrangement that involved the World Bank, UNEP 
and UNDP, it soon became the `monopoly' of the World Bank, although its secretariat is functionally 
independent from the implementing agencies. The association of the World Bank to GEF was 
particularly criticised, in the light of the notable poor environmental record of the former, but also due to 
its undemocratic voting procedures, largely detrimental to developing States. Despite the global 
arrangement reached on the voting procedure and the replenishment of its trust fund with US $2 billions 
in 1994, GEF is still under current reorganisation in the view of becoming a permanent structure. 
For a presentation of GEF activities and structure, see WB/UNEP/UNDP, The Pilot Phase and Beyond, 
Working Paper Series No. 1, May 1992; also Beck, supra n. 130, at 180 et sequ.; Gupta, The Climate 
Convention and Developing Countries: From Conflict to Consensus? (Kluwer Academic, 1997), at 101 
et sequ.; Sands, Principles, Vol. I, at 736 et sequ. Werksman, supra n. 184, at 48 et sequ. For a review 
of the pros and cons of GEF as a funding mechanism for global Environmental initiatives, see Sharma, 
`Building Effective International Environmental Regimes: The Case of the Global Environmental 
Facility', 5 Journal of Environment & Development (1996), 73. For a more extensive review of the 
various trust funds set up in international law, see Sand, Trusts for the Earth, New Financial 
Mechanisms for International Environmental Protection, Occasional Paper (Hull University Press, 
1994), and Sand, 'Trusts for the Earth, New Financial Mechanisms for Sustainable Development', in 
Lang (ed. ), Sustainable Development and International Law (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 
1995), Chap. 11. 
(190) See 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Art. 39; and further Biermann, supra n. 178, at 459; Gupta, 
supra n. 189, Chap. 5; Pulvenis, `The Framework Convention on Climate Change', in Campiglio et al (eds. ), The Environment After Rio: International Law and Economics (Graham & Trotman/Martinus 
Nijhoil; 1994), Chap. 7, at 107 et sequ.; Sands, Principles, Vol. I, at 739 et sequ. Developing and 
developed States are granted an equal representation and equal voting power in the Executive Committee 
that operates the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (1987 Montreal 
Protocol on the Ozone Layer as amended in 1990, Art. 10(5). The Executive Committee is composed of 
14 parties, 7 from developing States qualified under the original 1987 Montreal Protocol, Art. 5, and 7 
from the remaining States. Decisions are taken by consensus, or with a 'double-weighted majority', that 
is an affirmativevote representing the 2/3 majority of `Art. 5 countries', and the majority of remaining 
countries; see Sands & Bulatao, Financial Mechanisms for the Climate Change Convention, 
CIEL/AOSIS Background Paper 3/1991, at 16-17. An agreement on GEF decision making procedure 
modification was reached in 1994 between the 63 participating States; see Instrument for the 
Establishment of the Restructured Global Environmental Facility, Geneva, 16 March 1994,33 ILM (1994), 1278, and preceding Introductory Note by N. van der Praag, at 1273. The revised decision 
making procedure of GEF II is very similar to the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol; 16 seats of the 32 seat GEF Council are attributed to developing States, 14 to 
developed States and 2 to former socialist countries. Decisions are also taken by consensus, and if no 
consensus can be reached, with a `double-weighted majority' representing the 60% of the total number of 
participating States (in favour developing States, composing the 2/3 or GEF participants) and the 60% or 
the total contributions (in favour developed States). 
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2) Provision is made for the transfer of technology to developing States under 'fair 
and most favourable terms', as necessary to enable them to implement of the various 
provisions of the conventions. 
1987 Protocol on the Ozone 11992 Climate Change 11992 Biodiversity Convention 
Layer as amended in 1990 Convention 
«Each Party shall take every 
practical step, consistent - with 
the programmes supported by 
the financial mechanism, to 
ensure: 
(a) That the best available, 
environmentally safe substitutes 
and related technologies are 
expeditiously transferred to 
[developing States Parties]; and 
(b) That the transfers referred 
to in subparagraph (a) occur 
under fair and most favourable 
conditions. » (191) 
«The developed country 
Parties (... ) shall -- take -- all 
practicable steps to promote, 
facilitate and finance, as 
appropriate, the transfer of, or 
access to, environmentally 
sound technologies and know- 
how to other Parties, 
particularly developing country 
Parties, to enable them to 
implement the provisions of the 
Convention. »(192) 
«Access to and transfer of 
technology [that are relevant to 
the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity, including 
biotechnology] to developing 
countries shall be provided 
and/or facilitated under fair and 
most favourable terms, 
including on concessional and 
preferential terms where 
mutually agreed, and, where 
necessary, in accordance with 
the financial mechanism [established by the Convention]. 
In the case of technology subject 
to patents and other intellectual 
property rights, such access and 
transfer shall be provided on 
terms which recognize are 
consistent with the adequate and 
effective protection of intellectual 
property rights. » (193) 
The `fair and most favourable terms' formula used in the three conventions above, 
albeit falling short of the `fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions on the 
open market' formula adopted in the 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of 
1982 UNCLOS Part XI(194), leaves a certain margin of action to industrialised States. In 
a statement of understanding joined to its statement before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee urging the ratification of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Timothy Wirth 
specified that «'fair and most favourable terms' in Article 16(2) mean terms that are 
agreed to by all parties to the transaction» (195). Such flexibility is reinforced by the 
`desirable but not mandatory technology transfer'. formula adopted in both Ozone and 
(191) Art 10A. 
(192) Art. 4(5); also ). 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention reiterates the necessity 
to transfer technology but keeps silent on the terms on which such transfer is due to take place, referring 
instead to the relevant provisions of the 1992 Climate Change Convention; Art. 1 l(2)(b), and Art. 11(1). 
(193) Art. 16(2). 
(194) see supra 2/iii. Common Heritage of Mankind under the 1982 UNCLOS: Attempt to Set up a 
Marine Partnership. 
(195) 5 Department of State Dispatch (1994), 216. 
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Climate documents. Extension of the latter expression to biotechnology was dismissed 
as unacceptable by developing States; as Yusuf puts it, «Eilt appeared unfair [to 
developing States] for the basic source materials to be regarded as freely available while 
derived improved materials were subject to proprietary protection»(196). 
Along the same line, Ethiopia issued the following statement at the close of the 
Biodiversity Convention negotiations: 
«Where a technology, an organism or genetic material which is patented or 
legally protected in any other way as an intellectual property has incorporated 
an organism or organisms, a genetic material or materials, a technology or 
technologies or any other traditional practice or practices originating in 
another country or countries, the patent or other intellectual property right 
shall not be valid in the country or countries of origin of any one of its 
component parts; and the benefit accruing from the application of the patent or 
other intellectual property right in other countries shall be equitably shared 
between the holder or holders of the protected right and the country or 
countries of origin of those components. » (197) 
On the other hand, the transfer of biotechnology shall only take place on 
concessional and preferential terms `where mutually agreed'(198). In all three cases, 
royalties and licences for the acquisition of new technologies in developing countries are 
assimilated to incremental costs, paid for via the financial mechanism(199). Technology 
transfer should thus take place without adversely affecting the private sector or 
suppressing the incentive for further technological development. 
(196) yusuf 'International Law and Sustainable Development: The Convention on Biological 
Diversity', 2 African YbIL (1994), 109, at 127. 
(197) Quoted after Chandler, `The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the 
International Lawyer', 4 Colorado JIELP (1993), 141, at 163, n. 72. The Convention partly remedy to 
this unequal treatment of biodiversity and biotechnology by linking the access to genetic resources and 
access to biotechnology using those resources (Art. 16(3)). See also McConnell, The Biodiversity 
Convention: A Negotiating History (Kluwer Law International, 1996), 87. 
Express referenceto the transferof biotechnology was the object of lengthy debates throughout the drafting 
process of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention; and the following anecdote illustrates well the bargaining 
strategy of developing States. As the issue of biotechnology was being discussed at the drafting 
committee, the US representative stood up and suggested that, considering the fact that biotechnology 
were still in process of being developed or at a purely experimental stage, it would be premature to even 
make any referencein the text of the Convention. The delegate of some developing country then took the 
floor and suggested that the very concept of biodiversity was still blurred, and that consequently, at this 
stage, it was premature to refer to biodiversity at all. The American delegate retracted, and eventually 
accepted to negotiate the provision on transfer of biotechnology as part of the overall policy of 
biodiversity preservation; informal discussion with Mr Bendahmane, INFOTERRA UNEP, Nairobi, 
February 1996. Further on the US position at the negotiations on the Biodiversity Convention, see Bell, 
`The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity: the Continuing Significance of US Objections at the 
Earth Summit', 26 George Washington JIL & Economics (1993), 479, at 517 et sequ. 
(198) Similar formula adopted in the 1994 Desertification Convention, Arts. 6(e) and 18, and Annex I, 
Art. 5. 
(199) 1987 Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer as amended in 1990, Art. 10(1), 1992 Climate Change Convention, Art. 4(3), 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Art. 20(2); quoted above. 
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Whilst the 1992 Climate Change Convention is the only binding instrument to refer 
explicitly to the common but differentiated responsibility principle(200), the 
categorisation of States parties and the imposition of certain obligations such as transfer 
of financial and technological resources upon the one category for the benefit of the 
other category are clearly based on that principle. So are too the extensive reference 
made to the necessity to consider the specific needs of developing States(201). It is also 
probably justified to understand the 'contextual' qualification of environmental 
obligations of a State with such expressions as 'according to its resources' or 'insofar as 
possible', as contained for instance in the 1972 World Heritage Convention, Arts. 4 and 
5, in 1973 CITES Art. 8(3), in 1979 ECE Transboundary Air Pollution Convention, 
Arts. 2,4 and 7, and in 1985 Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer, Art. 2(2), as 
allowing a certain degree of differentiated treatment for less developed countries(202). 
3) The clearest expression of the bargaining strategy followed by developing States 
however, lies with the general and innovative clause linking the duties of developing 
States to those of developed States (contingent obligations). 
(200) Preambular Para 6; Art. 3(1), Art. 4(1); see also generally 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Climate 
Change Convention. The principle is also acknowledged in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, Princ. 7; 1992 Agenda 21, Para. 31. 
(201) See 1992 Climate Change Convention, preambular Paras. 20 and 22, Arts. 3 and 4(3); 1992 
Biodiversity Convention, preambularParas. 16 and 17, Arts. 11 and 20(7); 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
the Ozone Layer as amended in 1990, Art. 5 and preambular Para. 7 and 9. Reference to the specific needs 
of developing States in relation to environmental provisions was already contained in the 1982 
UNCLOS, preambular Para. 5, Arts. 61(3), 82(3), 119(1)(a) and throughout Part XI, and even before in 
1972 Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment, inter alia at Princ. 12 and 20; it is increasingly 
common in recent environmental documents; see for instance 1989 Basel Convention on Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Arts. 4(2)(e), 4(13), 10(4) and 11(1); 1992 Forestry Principles, Princ. 
9(a); 1994 Desertification Convention, inter alia Arts. 3(d), 5,6; 1995 Straddling Fish Stocks 
Agreement, preambular Para. 8, and Part VII; 1996 Protocol to 1972 London Convention on Dumping of 
Wastes, providing for the possibility of differential time schedule for certain provisions (Art. 26). The 
principle of differentiation was recently endorsed at 1997 Kyoto Conference, with the imposition cf 
differenttargets of reduction of greenhouse gases upon different groups of States; 1997 Kyoto Protocol to 
the Climate Change Convention, Art. 10 and Annex B. This move was particularily criticised in the US 
by oil, power and manufacturing groups, as putting the US at severe competitive disadvantage in relation 
to developing nations, subjected to less stringent obligations; B. Clark, 'Yellen Upbeat on Cost of 
Kyoto', Financial Times, Mamh 5,1998, at 8. 
(202) Magraw, 'Legal Treatment of Developing Countries : Differential, Contextual, and Absolute 
Norms', 1 Colorado JIELP (1990), 69, at 89 et sequ. On the consideration of special interests of 
developing States in the environmental context, see Magraw, ibid.; also Chowdhury, 'Common But 
Differentiated State Responsibility in International Environmental Law: From Stockholm (1972) to Rio 
(1992)', in Ginther et al. (eds. ), Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1995), Chap. 20, at 332 etsequ.; and more generally Slinn, 'Implementation of International Obligations 
towards Developing States : Equality or Preferential Treatment 7', in Butler, (ed. ), Control over 
Compliance with International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 165. 
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1987 Protocol on the Ozone 1992 Climate Change 1992 Biodiversity Convention 
Laver as amended in 1990 Convention 
<(Developing the capacity to «The extent to which «The exten to which 
fulfil the obligations of [of developing country Parties will developing country Parties will 
developing States Parties] (... ) effectively implement their effectively implement their 
will depend upon the effective commitments under the commitments under this 
implementation of the financial Convention will depend on the Convention will depend on the 
co-operation as provided by effective implementation by effective implementation by 
Article 10 and transfer of developed country Parties of developed country Parties of 
technology.. »(203) their commitments under the their commitments under this Convention related to financial Convention related to financial 
resources and transfer of resources and transfer of 
technology 
... 
» 
(204) technology... »(205) 
Based on a realistic assumption that developing States do not have sufficient 
technical and financial means to comply fully with the duties assumed under the 
Conventions, the above provisions make the implementation of those duties 
«contingent upon the fulfilment on the part of the industrialized countries of their 
obligations relating to financial resources and technology transfer>>(206). It has been 
argued that such clauses express a financial and technological conditionality, under 
which «developing parties need only implement their conservation and sustainable use 
obligations under the Convention to the extent that the developed countries meet their 
commitment related to financial resources and transfer of technology»(207). 
Under such view, developing States would not be held liable for their failure to 
honour their commitment under the conventions, or at least would be justified to 
suspend their own compliance with international obligations, as long as developed 
States have failed to honour their commitments (inadimplenti non est adimplendum 
principle)(208). Such reasoning is faulty, however, in the sense that international 
(203) Art. 5(5). 
(204) Art. 4(7); the principle of contingent obligation was reiterated at the 1997 Kyoto Conference on 
climate change; 'A Kyoto, les points derivent et se rapprochent entre les pays du Nord et ceux du Sud', 
Le Monde, 5 December 1997, at 5; see 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention, Art. 
11(1), cross-referringto 1992 Climate Change Convention, Art. 4(7). 
(205) Art. 20(4). 
(206) UNSG Report to the Commission on Sustainable Development on Rio Declaration on the 
Environment and Development: application and implementation, E/CN. 17/1997/8,10 February 1997, 
Para. 41. It is very interesting to note that 1992 Agenda 21 does not reiterate the 'contingent formula' 
with respect to biodiversity, forestry, ozone and atmosphere, but uses it in the context of oceans 
management and protection; see Para. 17.2. 
(207) Burhenne-Guilmin & Casey-Leikowitz, supra n. 105, at 56. In favour of the thesis cf 
conditionality, see Bell, supra n. 196, at 513; Biermann, supra n. 178, at 436. 
(208) The principle ofinadimplenti non est adimplendum, rooted in domestic law, finds application in 
international law in case of substantial violations exclusively, see 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law (continued) 
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environmental obligations, in the same way as international human rights 
obligations(209), tend increasingly to transcend national interests and serve a community 
interest(210). They have thus to be fulfilled by each State independently from the other 
States' fulfilment of their own obligations, and the non-compliance by one State with its 
obligations does not in any way legitimise other States' non compliance, as it would do 
in the case of synallagmatic obligations(211). Riedel rightly underlines that nature as such 
of Treaties, Art. 60; see also inter alia Tacna Arica arbitration (Chile v. Peru) (1922), II RL4A, 921, at 
943-44; The Diversion of Water from the Meuse, PCIJ Ser. A/B, Fascicule No 70, Judgment of June 
28th, 1937, Judge Anzilotti (diss. op. ), at 50; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJRep. 1971,16, at 47; Case Concerning the Air ServicesAgreement, of 27 
March 1946 Between the United Sates of America and France (1978), XVII RL4A, 417; see further 
Oppenheim'sInternational Law, Vol. 1, § 649; Brownlie, Principles, at 618 et sequ.; Quoc Dinh: Droit 
International Public, § 203. The possibility for a State «not to comply with one or more of its 
obligations towards a State (... ) in order to induce it to comply with its obligations (... ) as long as it has 
not complied with those obligations» is equally enshrined in 1996 ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, Art. 47; on which see Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report on State Responsibility, 
A/CN. 4/425 and Add. 1,1991 YbILC Vol. II Pt. 1, Paras. 33 et sequ. 
(209) The particular characterof human rights treaties was most notoriously acknowledged by the ICJ in 
its advisory opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on Genocide; the Court underlined that 
«... in such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, 
one and all, a common interest, namely the accomplishment of those high [humanitarian and civilizing] 
purposes, which are the raison d'etre of the convention 
... 
»; 1CJ Rep. 1951,15, at 23. Similar statement 
was issued with regard to 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights; ECHR 
Commission declared, in an early decision, that «... the purpose of the High Contracting Parties in 
concluding the convention was not to concede to each other reciprocal rights and obligations in pursuance 
their individual national interests but to realize the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe with the 
object of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law»; 
decision of the Commission as to the admissibility of Applic. 788/60, lodged by the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Austria against the Government of the Republic of Italy, 11 January 1961, in Yb 
European Convention on Human Rights (1961), 116, at 138 and 140. See also Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82,24 September 1982, on the effects of reservations on the 
Treaty into Force of the American Convention (Articles 74 and 75), in 22 ILM (1983), 37, at Paras. 27- 
30. 
(210) This remark applies more particularily to the three regimes considered here. See Birnie & Boyle, at 
85; Kiss & Shelton, International Environmental Law, Chap. 1 (at 16 et scqu. ). See also supra Chap. 
1/4/ii/c. Limits Arising from General Environmental Considerations. 
(211) The application of the principle of inadimplenti non est adimplendum is explicitly excluded in 
relation to treaties of a humanitarian character, which are not synallagmatic in essence; see 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 60(5); also 1996 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 
Art. 50(d). No reference is made in either document to environmental treaties, but such would seem 
consistent with the spirit and purpose of both provisions, to extend them to multilateral treaties that 
express norms in the common interests of States; Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, § 203. Picone 
is among the few authors who explicitly referto Art. 60(5) in relation to those environmental obligations 
that are'unconditional ; 'Obblighi reciproci cd obblighi erga omnes degli stati nel Campo della protezione 
internazionale dell'ambiente marino dall' inquinamento', in Staraue (ed. ), Diritto internazionale e 
protezione dell'ambiente marino (GiufTr8,1983), 15, at 34. For a brief review of the rationale and drafting 
history of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 60(5), see Schwelb, 'The Law of Treaties and 
Human Rights', 16 AYR (1974/75), 1, at 14 et sequ.; Barile, 'The Protection of Human Rights in Article 
60, Paragraph 5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties', in Il diritto Internazionale al tempo 
della sua codifrcazione. Studi in onore di Roberto Ago, Vol. II (Giuffre, 1987), 3. On the other hand, a 
State could under certain circumstances take some countermeasures, in the form for instance of trade 
restrictions, against a State failing to fulfil its environmental obligations; see 1973 CITES, Art. 8; 1987 (continued) 
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and global environmental concerns are protected by international environmental law, 
independently from member States and transcending States altogether. States only retain 
the function of triggering off a new protection regime»(212). 
aaa The general reticence of developed States to pledge themselves to assist 
developing States further undermines such an understanding of contingent obligations. 
Yusuf suggests more convincingly that the principle of reciprocity reflected in the 
clause flows from the factual circumstances and the subject matter - of the treaty 
-a 
`statement of the obvious'(213)- rather than from the legal provision of the treaty 
itself(214). In any case, such clause reserves the opportunity for developing States «to 
put pressure on developed States to ensure they have the necessary means to comply 
with the Convention»(215), using the environment as «leverage to secure commitments 
of technology and resource»(216). 
In addition to the transfer of funds and technology resulting from `ordinary 
assistance' to developing States `to help them achieve the objectives of the 
Convention', funds and technology will, incidentally, be provided via the joint 
implementation procedures. The system of joint implementation was introduced only 
recently in international environmental law(217), essentially upon the request of 
Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer, Art. 4(1); 1989 Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement 
of Hazardous Wastes, Art. 9(5). On the use of trade sanctions to achieve environmental purposes, see 
further Jenkins, 'Trade Sanctions: Effective Enforcement Tools', in Cameron et al. (eds. ), Improving 
Compliance with International Environmental Law (Earthscan, 1993), Chap. 10; Sand, 'International 
Economic Instruments for Sustainable Development: Sticks, Carrots and Games', 26/2 Indian JIL (1996), 
1. 
(212) Riedel, 'International Environmental Law 
-A Law to Serve the Public Interest? - An Analysis of 
the Scope of the Binding Effects of Basic Principles (Public Interest Norms)', in Delbrück (ed. ), New 
Trends in International Lawmaking 
- 
International 'Legislation' in the Pubic Interest (Duncker & 
Humblot, 1997), 61, at 91. In the same sense, Kiss, 'The International Protection of the Environment', 
in Macdonald & Johnston (eds. ), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal 
Philosophy Doctrine and Theory (Martinus NijhofI 1983), 1069, at 1085-86; Picone, supra n. 211, at 
25 et sequ. 
(213) Boyle, `The Convention on Biological Diversity', in Campiglio et al (eds. ), The Environment 
after Rio (Graham & Trotman / Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), Chap. 8, at 122. The author underlines 
however that such prerogative is seriously undermined by the fact that, except for the case of `ozone 
regime', where the Conference of parties is competent to deal with complaints of failure to transfer 
resources (1987 Protocol on the Ozone Layer as amended in 1990, Art. 10(1)), there is no such procedure 
whereby developing States could complain from developed States' failure to abide by their duty of 
assistance. 
(214) yam, 'International Law and Sustainable Development: The Convention on Biological 
Diversity', 2 African YbIL (1994), 109, at 134 et sequ. 
(215) Boyle, supra n. 213, at 122. 
(216) Sell, 'North-South Environmental Bargaining: Ozone, Climate Change and Biodivcrsity', 2 
Global Governance (1996), 97, at 105. 
(217) The system originates in fact in US domestic law mechanism of 'tradable emission permits' or 
'credits' schemes to control the emission of sulphur dioxide (1990 Amdts to US Clean Air Act, 42 USC, (continued) 
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developed States(218); it provides that «substantive binding commitments taken on by a 
State can be fulfilled either in cooperation with another State and/or by measures taken 
in the territory of another State) )(219). This means in practice that a State can, under 
certain conditions and within certain limits(220), discharge its allocated share of 
commitment to address an environmental issue, either by taking abatement measures on 
its own territory or by investing, financially or/and technologically, low-cost abatement 
activities in other countries(221). Such a system, associated to tradable permits, equates 
S. 7651 et sequ. ); see Yamin, 'The Use of Joint Implementation to Increase Compliance with the 
Climate Change Convention: International Legal and Institutional Questions', 2 RECIEL (1993), 348. 
The 'tradable emission permit' or 'credit' allows its holder to emit a stated quantity of pollutant; holders 
exceeding the quantity allocated can achieve the legally binding reduction standards by «reducing their 
own emission or by buying emission 'credits' from other [holders] which are in a state of overcompliance 
with the standards and have spare credits [or permits not used] to sell, of by 'offsetting' them against any 
previous credits banked' with the regulatory agency through their own earlier compliance efforts; Arts et 
al., 'Joint Implementation from an international Law Perspective', in Kuik, et al. (eds. ), Joint 
Implementation to Curb Climate Change: Legal and EconomicAspects (Kluwer Academic, 1994), at 14. 
On the desirable legal nature of such arrangements, ibid at 56 et sequ. 
Provision for joint implementation is made in 1992 Climate Change Convention, Arts. 3(3), 4(2)(a), (b) 
and (d), and 12(8); Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer as amended in 1990 and 1993, Arts. 2,2A to 
2E, 2(5) and 2(8)(a) and (b), and 7(4); unmodified 1987 Montreal Protocol would already allow parties to 
'jointly fulfil their obligations respecting CFC consumption as long as their combined consumption was 
kept within the limits imposed under the Protocol. See also 1994 Protocol to the 1979 ECE 
Transboundary Air Pollution Convention, on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, Art. 2(7). Joint 
implementation was a cornerstone of the negotiation and final agreement on an international protocol to 
the 1992 Climate Change (Framework) Convention, on the reduction of greenhouse gases at the Climate 
Conference held in Kyoto, 1-13 December 1997; see 'Effet de Serre: accord en vue A Kyoto sous la 
pressions des Europdens, Le Monde 11 December 1997, at 4; 'Two Issues Hold Up Break Through to a 
Climate Treaty', International Herald Tribune, 11 December 1997,1 and 4. The principle was finally 
enshrined in the final version of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention, Arts. 3,4. 
and 6. 
(218) For an overview of States' position on joint implementation, more particularily in the context of 
climate change negotiation, see Gupta, supra n. 189, Chap. 6; King, 'The Law and Practice of Joint 
Implementation', 6 RECIEL (1997), 62; Mason, 'Joint Implementation and the Second Sulphur 
Protocol', 4 RECIEL (1995), 296; Oberthür, 'Discussions on Joint Implementation and the Financial 
Mechanism', 23 EPL (1993), 245, at 246 et sequ.; Yamin, supra n. 217. 
(219) Yuen, The Climate Change Convention and Joint Implementation: Legal, Institutional and 
Procedural Issues, (Field Working Paper, 1993), at 2; see also Sands, Principles (Vol. I), 132-133; and 
Arts et al., supra n. 217, Chap. 1. 
(220) All three Convention/Protocols referred to above, which provide for a joint implementation, set 
forth a number of criteria and conditions to the joint implementation, inter alia regarding the minimum 
each State is to achieve individually. Besides, despite the lack of clarity of the relevant provisions in the 
Convention and Protocols, Sands stresses that (a) parties with specific targets and timetables assorted to 
their own commitments, may not implement their commitment with parties having no such 
target/timetable, to avoid State parties to restore to joint implementation to by-pass their own target; and (b) joint implementation purposed to promote cost-effective implementation of the Convention 
provisions, hence should not be allowed in absence of criteria established by the Conference of the 
Parties; Sands, Principles (Vol. I), 133. 
(221) It remains unclear however, at least in the context of the Climate Convention which 'categorise' 
States according their level of development (see Annexes I and II), whether joint implementation can take 
place only between Annex I (developed) States (1992 Climate Convention, Art. 4(2)(a), and 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol to the Climate Change Convention, Arts. 3,4. and 6 referonly to Annex I States), or whether it (continued) 
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in sum to the commercialisation of the 'right to pollute', in exchange for clean technology 
and foreign currency; its prime purpose is to reduce the 'total cost of meeting aggregate 
environmental standards(222). The procedure of joint implementation is feasible only in 
those cases where the source of environmental degradation, or the endangered natural 
resources, are not country-specific, and the requested environmental measures are not 
exclusively dependent upon the attitude/action of a `host' or `source' State(223). 
5. Conclusions: Regional Environmental Partnerships, Global Bargain, and 
International Co-ordination 
The first evaluation of the actual efficiency of these `bargained' environmental 
strategies is extremely limited. At the Earth Summit Review Conference, convened in 
New York in June 1997, the terms of `failure' and `broken promises' and `ecran de 
fumee' were commonly used to qualify the progress achieved on the environmental 
protection five years after UNCED. The lack of serious commitment to the reduction of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases both in developed and developing States, was 
the object of serious concem(224). The G77 felt let down by the industrialised world, 
which largely failed to bring in the promised additional financial resources to help them 
protect the environment. As the British Environment Minister summarised, «[t]he only 
new money that has flowed has been from the private sector and the profits have been 
repatriated to the rich world»(225). The US was put `on the hot seat' on more than one 
may involved Annex II States. 1997 Protocol however seems to restrict joint implementation to Annex I 
States (see Art. 6(1)). Developing States were originally hostile to joint implementation, which they 
consider would only benefit to developing States at least on a financial point of view. They also feared 
that joint implementation projects would constitute a way for developed States to evade the financial and 
technology transfer mechanisms set up under the relevant Conventions; see Arts, supra n. 217, Chap. 1; 
Mason, supra n. 218, at 298; Oberthür, supra n. 218, at 246 et sequ. 
(222) On the cost-effectiveness argument, see Mason, supra n. 218, at 297. 
(223) No provision for joint implementation is made for instance in the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, 
as, although the preservation of biodiversity is a common concern of mankind, its preservation involves 
primarily the actions from host States, whilst non host State are expected to support them by providing 
them technological and financial assistance. It is likewise very doubtful that the clauses providing for the 
taking of individual or joint appropriate measures, contained inter alia in 1985 Nairobi Convention on 
the Marine Environment in East Africa, Art. 4; 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature, 
preambularPara. 5; 1986 Noumea Convention on the Environment in the South Pacific, Art. 5 are to be 
construed as allowing for' joint implementation' in the sense considered above. The same is probably true 
of the reference to 'individual or joint measures' to combat marine pollution from land-based sources; 
1974 Paris Convention on Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, Arts. 1,2, and 4. 
(224) At UNCED + V, the US has reiterated its opposition to the establishment of any specific target, 
timetable or binding cutbacks for greenhouse gases emission reduction, supported inter alia by the EC.; 
the whole debate was finally postpone until the International Conference on Climate, to be held in Japan 
in December 1997; International Herald Tribune, 24 June 1997,6; International Herald Tribune, 28/29 
June 1997,3; Harrison, 'Turning a blind eye to a plague of pollution', Guardian Weedy, 29 June 1997, 
at 12. 
(225) The Guardian, 28 June 1997, at 2. 
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occasion, for failing to go far enough both at the national and international level: it was 
accused of being the world's largest polluter, including the world's single largest emitter 
of greenhouse gases(226), and the poorest supplier of development assistance. US 
President Clinton left the Summit with the promise of US $1 billion to be given on a 
five year period to support developing States in their effort to reduce the emission of 
greenhouse gases(227). The overall assessment appears to indicate that States are not 
more committed today to a global bargain strategy than they were in 1982 to a global 
partnership. 
Neither partnership nor global bargain, the terms of an international co-operation 
towards sustainable development have, in fact, never gone beyond the classic 
parameters of financial and technological assistance. The individual and collective 
advantages of a potential partnership are too intangible to outweigh the individual 
sacrifices it would incur. Besides, the substantial difference in the means and resources 
of States would imply, at least temporarily, a substantial differentiation in the 
contribution and responsibility of each partner. 
Against the conclusion that a partnership between developing and developed States 
is utopian in the light of the difference in their means and in the degree of solidarity 
implied, one could argue that the Action Plan for the Protection of the Mediterranean is 
an example of regional partnership-like relation to protect a `common heritage'(228), that 
brings together States from the first, second and third worlds(229). The Action Plan for 
the Protection of the Mediterranean (Med Plan) was set up in mid 1975, as UNEP's 
first Regional Seas Programme(230), in response to the growing concern about the 
pervasive pollution of the Mediterranean(231). 
(226) US alone emits 22% of the greenhouse gases, as much as the total emission by all developing 
States without China and India; van Beukering & Vellinga, Climate Change: From Science to Global 
Politics, Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 1993, at 23. 
(227) Le Monde, 28 June 1997, at 2. A similar commitment of US$ 75 millions was already made by 
the US in 1992; it was then largely considered as «an attempt to buy off developing nations or, at best, a 
public relations manoeuvre to avoid the necessity of making painful commitments to reduce [domestic] 
greenhouse gases emissions; Drogula, `Developed and Developing Countries: Sharing the Burden of 
Protecting the Atmosphere', 4 Georgetown IELR (1992), 257, at 295. 
(228) 1976 Barcelona Convention on Mediterranean Sea, preambular Para. 2. 
(229) Birnie & Boyle, 261. The Mediterranean countries are Albania, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, 
Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Spain, the Syrian Arab Republic, 
Tunisia, Turkey, and at the time of the signature of the 1976 Barcelona Convention, Yugoslavia. Albania 
and Israel did not originally ratified the 1976 Barcelona Convention had observer status in the Mcd Plan 
activities until they joined as full member and ratified and related Protocols in 1984 for Israel, and in 
1990 for Albania. The European Community joined in 1976, and, so did Croatia in 1991, and Slovenia 
and Bosnia Herzegovina in 1993; The World Bank & The European Investment Bank, The 
Environmental Program for the Mediterranean (WB/EIB, 1990), 14. 
(230) Sands, Principles (Vol. I), 297. Even though the Med Plan is, functionally, part of UNEP's (continued) 
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Apart from the classic law-making dimension(232), not necessarily characteristic of a 
partnership-like relation, the Med Plan entails joint monitoring and research, integrated 
management, and administrative and budgetary support. Under the Mediterranean 
Pollution Monitoring System, the various national scientific centres are networked 
together, and operate according to standardised analytical and data collection 
procedures, so as to facilitate the exchange of information relevant to the Mediterranean 
protection and avoid unnecessary duplication of research(233). The major focus hence 
still lies in the co-ordination of national actions, and there is no provision obliging 
France or any other `technologically advanced' Mediterranean States to supply the 
necessary technology on `free or concessionary terms' to enable other Mediterranean 
States to implement the 1976 Barcelona Convention on Mediterranean and its 
regional seas programme 
-it was conceived as a prototype for subsequent regional seas plans- and was 
initially funded by UNEP, it operates in an autonomous may. Generally on Med Plan, see Bliss-Guest, 
`A Review of the Mediterranean Action Plan', 10 Ocean Management (1987), 315; Caldwell, 
International Environmental Policy, 2nd edn (Duke University Press, 1990), 159 et sequ.; Dcjcant-Pons, 
La MJditerranee en droit international de I'environnement (Economics, 1990), 85 et sequ. 
(231) On the sources and level of degradation of the Mediterranean, see Haas, Saving the Mediterranean 
(Columbia University Press, 1990), Chap. 1, at 27 et sequ.; Hinrichsen, Our Common Seas: Coasts in 
Crisis (Earthscan, 1990), Chap. 3; Ravenel, Mediterranee: V impossible mur (L'Harmattan, 1995), Chap. 
VI; The World Bank & The European Investment Bank, The Environmental Program for the 
Mediterranean (WB/EIB, 1990), Chap. 2. Generally on the mechanism of protection of the 
Mediterranean, see Boxer, `Mediterranean Pollution: Problem and Response', 10 ODIL (1981/82), 315; 
Chircop, `The Mediterranean Sea and the Quest for Sustainable Development', 23 ODIL (1992), 17; 
Dejeant-Pons, La Mediterranee en droit international de l'environnement (Economica, 1990); Kiss, 'La 
Convention pour la Protection de la Mer M6diterranee contre la Pollution', Revue Juridique de 
1 Environnement (1977-2), 151; Leanza, ` Le regime juridique international de la mer mcditerrandc', 236 
RdC (1992-V), 127; see also collection of essays in Leanza, (cd. ), Il regime giuiridico internazionale del 
mare Mediterraneo (Giuffr8,1987). 
(232) A series of rules have been adopted under the aegis of the Action Plan, intended to reduce the 
environmental impact of the activities in the Mediterranean basin, namely the 1976 Barcelona 
Convention on Mediterranean Sea, a framework convention supplemented with the 1976 Barcelona 
Dumping Protocol, the 1976 Barcelona Emergency Protocol, the 1980 Athens Protocol for the Protection 
of Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources and the 1982 Geneva Protocol 
concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas. The 1976 framework Convention was substantially 
modified to reflect the new tendencies of international environmental law and policy after the 1992 
Conference on Environment and Development, with the adoption of the Amendments to the 1976 
Convention on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, 10 June 1995 (not yet in 
force). 
For a thorough review of the legal regime applicable to the Mediterranean Sea, including rules not 
specific to the Mediterranean, see Leanza, 'Le regime juridique international de la mer mcditerranEc', 236 
RdC (1992-V), 127, at 179 et sequ. For an analysis of the Mediterranean Sea specific regime, see D6jcant- 
Pons, La Mediterranee en droit international de I'environnement (Economics, 1990), Part II; Kiss, 'La 
Convention pour a Protection de la Mer Mediterran6e contre la Pollution', Revue Juridique cie 
l'environnement (1977-2), 151; Leanza, ibid., at 385 et sequ. 
(233) On the various phases and achievements of the Med Pol, see Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (Columbia University Press, 1990), at 103 et sequ.; Hinrichsen, Our Common Seas: Coasts in Crisis (Earthscan, 1990), Chap. 3. The major impact was of Med Pol was the so-called Med X Report, which 
clearly demonstrated the necessity to address the issue of land-based pollution and pollution conveyed by 
rivers; Haas, ibid., 101. 
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Protocols(234). The integrated Management component on the other hand, intended to 
«concilier environnement et developpement dans un monde profondement 
inegalitaire» (235), falls short of a genuine international management of the 
Mediterranean; it has mostly consisted in the adoption of a socio-economic plan, the 
1979 Blue Plan, worded in a very general and programmatic way(236). Finally, a Trust 
Fund was set up in 1979 to finance the Med Plan Activities(237), partly funded with 
contributions from the States Parties proportionally to their respective overall 
contribution to the United Nations (hence to their GDP)(238), and partly with 
contributions from UNEP, other UN Agencies and the European Union. The fund is 
operated by a small bureau of four representatives of Mediterranean States, appointed 
according to fair representation; each representative enjoys the same voting'power, 
regardless of the importance of the financial contribution of States(239). 
The `internal' funding mechanism is supplemented with funds external to the 
Mediterranean system. The Environmental Program for the Mediterranean is jointly 
(234) With the noticeable exception of the 1980 Athens Protocol for the Protection of Mediterranean Sea 
Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, initiated on the basis of the Med X Report mentioned 
above, and hailed as a major achievement of the Med Plan. Developing States particularly insisted on the 
necessity of technology transferand due consideration fortheir developmental needs, to limit the influence 
of the measures of coastal control pollution upon their industrialisation policies, and risks of inhibition of 
their development in general. Hence, whilst the previous documents made no particular mention to the 
specific needs of developing States or technology transfer, the 1980 Athens Protocol explicitly recognises 
the differential level of development of Mediterranean States and underlines the necessity to duly consider 
developmental imperatives (preambularPara. 5), and provides for some technical assistance to developing 
States in implementing the Protocol. See Bliss-Guest, 'The Protocol Against Pollution from Land- 
Based Sources: A Turning Point in the Rising Tide of Pollution', 17 Stanford JIL (1981), 261; Haas, 
Saving the Mediterranean (Columbia University Press, 1990), at 67 et sequ. and 110 et sequ. 
(235) Ravenel, M9diterranee: 1'impossible mur (L'Harmattan, 1995), 25; also D4jeant-Pons, La 
Mediterranee en droit international de 1'environnement (Economica, 1990), at 206 et sequ. 
(236) Haas considers the integrated management component as the least successful dimensions of 1976 
Mediterranean Action Plan; Haas, supra n. 234, at 118. In 1992, the Ministers of the Environment of the 
Countries of the Mediterranean Basin and a Member of the E. C. Commission undertook to draft a long 
term strategy to achieve sustainable development in the region; see 1992 Declaration on Euro- 
Mediterranean Cooperation. No such strategy has been adopted yet, although 1976/95 Barcelona 
Convention on Mediterranean Sea is significantly more specific than 1976 Barcelona Convention on 
Mediterranean Sea. 
(237) Before 1979, the financial aspect of the Plan was assume by UNEP, with some additional financial 
support from France; Haas, supra n. 234, at 120. 
(238) Which means that, in theory, France is to assume the lion's share of governmental contributions (nearly 40%); in practice however, France has seriously failed to honour its financial commitments. 
(239) Such system was, expectedly, strongly opposed by France, which feared that its interests would not 
be assured due consideration under such procedure; it favoured instead, an all States body to manage the 
fund and allocate resources; Haas, supra n. 234, at 125 et sequ. An Interests Guarantee Fund was also set 
up on the proposal of Morocco, to compensate the cleaning up costs in case of emergency. Due to 
France's opposition, the Fund was adopted (with the French reservation) in a Resolution of the 
Conference of the Parties, rather than directly embodied in the 1976 Barcelona Convention on 
Mediterranean Sea; Haas, supra n. 234, at 109. 
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administered by the World Bank and the European Investment Bank, «to add impetus 
to this regional movement»and support short and long term objectives(240). One major 
achievement has been the launching of a Multi-Year Environmental Technical 
Assistance Program in 1990, with the initial funding of UNDP, the World Bank, the 
European Investment Bank and the European Union, to assist States Parties to 1976 
Barcelona Convention on Mediterranean Sea in the implementation process. The 
Environmental Technical Assistance Program provides direct assistance in the form of 
grants, and focuses on those countries with high resources constraints; the funds 
attributed are additional to the already existing loans for environmental programmes of 
all four institutions. (241) 
When assessing the importance of the Mediterranean initiative as an example of 
regional partnership, a number of elements have to be taken into account: 
1) Regional initiatives are often better targeted and more adapted to the needs and means 
of each State that universal or quasi universal ones. Besides, the bond of solidarity is 
undoubtedly stronger between neighbouring States, or between a small circle of 
States; «cooperation is easier in small groups, where mutual verification is easier and 
less expensive»(242). 
2) Furthermore, the importance of the Mediterranean Sea pertains essentially to its 
navigational, and to a lesser extent, recreational functions, more than to its scarce 
mineral and fishery resources. Accordingly, the negotiations on the Mediterranean 
Sea have revolved mostly around the issue of protection against pollution derived 
from intensive navigation and urbanisation of its shores(243), and did not stumble 
over the issue of equitable sharing of mineral resources and transfer of appropriate 
technologies for the extraction of mineral resources, as UNCLOS III did. On the other 
hand, as long as the major focus lay on pollution, France, and in some respect Italy, 
had most to gain from this regional cooperative effort as the major polluters of the 
Mediterranean, at least at the early stage of the process, and considering that most of 
(240) The World Bank & The European Investment Bank, The Environmental Program for the 
Mediterranean (WB/EIB, 1990), at 59. 
(241) On these additional funding mechanisms, see generally The World Bank & The European 
Investment Bank, The Environmental Program for the Mediterranean (WB/EIB, 1990), Chap. 5. 
(242) Haas & Sundgren, 'Evolving International Environmental Law', in Choucri (ed. ), Global Accord 
(MIT, 1993), 401, at 403. 
(243) The problem of pollution is further aggravated by the facts that the Mediterranean Sea is a semi- 
enclosed sea with particularly low tide, hence extremely slow self-regenerative processes; the geo-physical 
particularities of the Mediterranean sea have also been invoked to substantiate the assertion that general 
rules on the law of the sea were inappropriate to adequately address the specific characteristic and needs of 
the Mediterranean sea; Leanza, 'Le regime juridique international de la mer m&iitcrrandc', 236 RdC (1992-V), 127, at 137 et sequ. and 144 et sequ. 
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the obligations under the Mediterranean regime did not commit them further than 
they already were committed under international and EC laws(244). 
The need to preserve the sea against pollution undoubtedly provides a better 
incentive for partnership-like relations than the common exploitation and equitable 
sharing of the benefit derived from the common exploitation of marine resources(245). 
There has been an increasing tendency however, within the frame of the `Rio-isation' of 
the convention, to stress the issues of common but differentiated responsibility, and 
transfer of technology and fund to enable developing States to implement the 
Mediterranean regime(246). Even though the Mediterranean Action Plan represents «an 
incipient new order of international cooperation for environmental protection, based on 
more comprehensive patterns of national and international environmental policy 
making, it benefited from a degree of solidarity and real common goals, and various 
converging interests lacking at a more global level. 
1'x 
(244) ich is either not binding upon or not ratified by the other developing Nations Parties to the 
Med Action Plan; Haas, supra n. 234, at 199. The major duty extending beyond existing international 
obligations under international and European environmental law, related to the financial obligation to 
contribute to the trust fund, was largely neglected by those more heavily burdened; and indeed, had it not 
been for external sources of funding, Med Plan would have run into serious financial difficulties. 
(245) It is interesting to note indeed that the Mediterranean States were farfrom unanimously in favour of 
1982 UNCLOS; apart from France, strongly reticent to the original Part XI, Albania, Israel (two 'late- joiners' of the Mediterranean initiative) and Turkey abstained from even signing by 1992 UNCLOS. 
(246) See 1976/95 Barcelona Convention on Mediterranean Sea, Arts. 4 and 13; and 1994 Tunis 
Declaration for Sustainable Development in the Mediterranean Basin, emphasising the necessity to 
promote and develop North-South solidarity. 
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1. Introduction 
A remarkable characteristic of recent international environmental law instruments lies 
in the importance attached to public participation. Express reference to public 
participation, or individuals or groups' interests, now a common feature in the context 
of international development process('), is a fairly new phenomenon in the area of 
(1) Whilst no particular reference is made to peoples participation in the 1961 Strategy for the First 
Development Decade, subsequent strategies reflected an ideal of human development hence emphasising 
the need for the full participation of human beings in the development process. Some of the major groups 
referred to in 1992 Agenda 21 Section III had already been identified in 1970 Strategy for the Second 
Development Decade, namely children and youth, and women; see Paras. 18(1), (g), and (h), and Paras. 
70,78 and 84; see also 1980 Strategy for the Third Development Decade, Paras. 8,46,50,51 and 163; 
1990 Strategy for the Fourth Development Decade, Paras 74 and 76 (farmers), Para. 94 (elderly people). See also 1994 Agenda for Development, Para. 87. One can also mention the doctrinal debate on a so- 
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international environmental protection(2) and one which has been amplified since the 
1992 Conference on Environment and Development(3). By contrast with the previous 
global environmental `agenda'(4), 1992 Agenda 21 abundantly acknowledges the 
importance of the participation(5) and involvement(6) of, and partnership(s)(7), with all 
sectors of society, and indeed dedicates an entire section to the major social groups 
playing a critical role in its implementation(8). Similar references to the participation of 
called human right to development, initiated in the 1970s; see references supra Chap. 5, Principle of 
Partnership, n. 131 et sequ. (CR). 
(2) Sporadic references to the need to increase popular environmental awareness were made in previous 
documents, such as 1968 African Convention on Nature, Art. X III; 1972 World Heritage Convention, 
Art. 27; and 1979 Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife, Art. 3; 1985 ASEAN 
Agreement on the Conservation of Nature, Art. 16. No referenceto public participation is contained either 
in 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species, or in 1973 CITES. 
(3) See further mention of public information and/or participation in 1992 ECE Industrial Accidents 
Convention, Art. 9; 1992 ECE Watercourses Convention, Art. 16 (public information only). 1994 
Timber Agreement contains similar referenceas the 1992 Forestry Principles, supra n. 11, and the 1994 
Desertification Convention, preambularPara. 20, Arts. 5(d), 10(2)(f), 11 and 19. Whilst the importance 
of public awareness and active participation, and the specific role of certain groups were duly 
acknowledged by the WCED (inter alia 1987 WCED Report at 38,64, Chap. 4), no specific reference to 
public participation, public awareness or the participation of specific groups was included in 1986 
WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development, although the first Article 
recognises a right to 'adequate environment' for peoples' health and well being; see infra n. 58. On the 
other hand, the 1995 IUCN Draft Covenant on Environment and Development makes extensive reference 
to indigenous peoples and local communities needs, interests and participation (Arts. 44(1) and 12 (6)), 
and stresses the importance of public information and participation (Art. 12(3)). 
(4) 1972 Stockholm Action Plan on the Human Environment, albeit purporting to be a plan for 'human 
development', was strictly worded in terms of joint and individual State action, and contains no 
particular referenceto popular participation, nor to major groups. On the other hand, the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment states that human development must be promoted in a common 
effort from governments, peoples, enterprises and various regional and national institutions; preambular 
Para. 7. 
(5) See Paras. 2.6; 1.3; 3.2; 3.7(d); 5.12; and consistent referencein Chap. 7,8,11,12-15,17,18, and 
throughout Section IV (Implementation). 
(6) Whilst the French version is essentially worded in terms of 'participation', the English version 
occasionally refers to 'involvement' of people for no apparent reason, since there is no clear difference of 
meaning between participation and involvement; see Paras. 3.4; 5.46; 6.4; 6.5(b)(i); 8.3(c); 8.39; 
12.14(b); 12.57(d); 14.14(a) and (b). Other terms are used apparently as synonymous with participation 
(as the French version reveals), such as 'incorporation' of people (Para. 11.27), and 'attendance' or 
peoples (Paras. 6.12 and 6.27(c)(ii)). 
(7) See supra Chap. 5/1. Introduction. As seen, at the inter-state level, partnership appears to express 
ideals of co-operation and assistance; at the state to individual level, it is essentially used as synonymous 
to participation and involvement. In no case does the term partnership appear to be construed as a 
transposition in international law of the domestic legal institution of partnership. 
(8) Section III. It is important to make a clear distinction between the expression 'major groups' to be 
actively involved in sustainable development, as used in Section III, and the expression 'vulnerable 
groups', also used in the Agenda, this time to qualify those sectors of the society whose needs and 
interests need to be duly considered and satisfied in strategies towards sustainable development. There are 
two major differences in these formula: (1) the participation of the major groups is active, whilst 
vulnerable groups remain passive (consideration of interests); (2) the expression 'major groups' refers to a 
defined set of 'social entities', whilst 'vulnerable groups' refers to different social groups according to the 
dimension of sustainability considered, bearing in mind that the not all social groups are necessarily 
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peoples, groups of people, and individuals are contained, inter alia, in the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development(9), the 1992 Biodiversity Convention(10), 
the 1992 Forestry Principles(11), and, to a lesser extent, in the 1992 Climate Change 
Convention(12). 
As a matter of fact, non-state actors, and more particularly NGOs(13), have always 
been closely involved in the elaboration and implementation of international 
environmental law and policy. Among the most obvious examples, one can mention the 
leading role assumed by NGOs in the formative stages and implementation of the 1973 
affected by development and environmental degradation as a whole and to the same degree. Hence for 
instance, the vulnerable groups to be particularly considered in the context of demographic policies 
encompass inter alia rural landless workers, ethnic minorities, refugees, migrants, displaced peoples and 
women heads of household; Para. 5.21. In the context of anti-poverty policies, the vulnerable groups 
identified are women, youth, indigenous peoples, and local communities; Para. 3.2. In context of human 
health policies, the vulnerable groups include infants and children, youth, women, indigenous people and 
their communities; Paras. 6.18 et sequ. See also vulnerable groups in the context of human settlement 
(Para. 7.4), protection of global atmosphere (Para. 9.11), management and planning of land resources 
(Para. 10.10), desertification and drought (Paras. 12.26 et sequ. and 12.45 et sequ. ), sustainable 
mountain management (Para. 13.13 and 13.14), sustainable agriculture (Para. 14.17), and protection of 
biodiversity (Para. 15.4). 
(9) The terms 'major groups' was coined at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, and testifies of States' recognition of «both the unprecedented number and diversity of 
social and economic actors that contributed to the UNCED process, and the significant role they would 
continue to play in the follow-up phase; UN Secretary-General's Concise Report on Chapter 23-32, 
Agenda 21, on The Role and Contribution of Major Groups, E/17. CN/1997/2, Addendum 22, at 2-3. 
The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development does not use the expression of major 
groups and refers more restrictively to women (Princ. 20), youth (Princ. 21), indigenous peoples and 
local communities (Princ. 22), and people under oppression (Princ. 23); see references infra n. I and 168. 
(10) Preambular Para. 12 acknowledges the particular relation of dependence binding indigenous and local 
communities to their environment, whilst Para. 13 recognises the vital role played by women in the 
conservation of the environment; and Art. 13 relates to public awareness and education. The importance 
of integrating indigenous knowledge is underlined throughout the convention. 
(11) The importance of the participation of 'interested parties, including local communities and 
indigenous people, industries, labour, non governmental organisations and individuals, forest dwellers 
and women' is acknowledged in Princ. 2(d), and the necessity to recognise the identity, culture and right 
of those same groups is expressed in Princ. 5(a). Further reference is made to women's participation in 
Princ. 5(b) and to local communities' needs for alternatives options in the light of their particular 
dependency on forestry resources for their survival (Prin. 9(b)). 
(12) Art. 6. 
(13) On the leading role of NGOs in international environmental law and policy, see Burhenne, 'The 
Role of NGOs', in Lang (ed. ), Sustainable Development and International Law (Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijhog 1995), Chap. 13; Cameron, 'Future Directions in International Environmental 
Law: Precaution, Integration and Non-state Actors', Paper presented at the Read Memorial Lecture for 
1995,19 Dalhousie LJ (1996), 122, at 134 et sequ.; Lindborg, 'Future Role of Non Governmental 
Organisations in International Environmental Negotiations', in Susskind et al. (eds. ), Environmental 
Treaty Making (Program Negotiations at Harvard Law School, 1992), 1; Sands, 'The Role of Non- 
Governmental Organizations in Enforcing International Environmental Law', in Butler (ed. ), Control 
over Compliance with International Law (Martinus Nijhof, 1991), 61; Stairs & Taylor, 'Non- 
Governmental Organizations and the Legal Protection of the Oceans: A Case Study', in Hurrell & 
Kingsbury (eds. ), The International Politics of the Environment (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 4. 
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CITES(14) and the 1971 Ramsar('5), and the role attributed to NGOs in the monitoring 
process of 1987 Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer(16), the 1992 Climate Change 
Convention(17), the 1992 Biodiversity Convention(18), in the revised GEF 
mechanism(19). One should also acknowledge the contribution of NGOs to the drafting 
of an international covenant on development and environment(20). NGOs have also 
proved an important lobbying force in international political fora, capable of influencing 
indirectly the formal legal process; they have been particularly active, for instance, 
throughout the process leading to, and during the 1992 Conference on the Environment 
and Development, the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women. As already 
mentionned, NGOs had observer status at the 1997 International Ministerial 
Conferences on the Protection of the North Sea(21). Clearly, as a matter of political fact, 
((the time is long past in which states alone acted as 'subjects' of international law) )(22). 
On the other hand, the recognition of a political role to non-state actors in 
international environmental affairs, and indeed the apparent urgent necessity to involve 
the public, individuals, groups of individuals and NGOs in international environmental 
(14) heron, ibid supra n. 13 
(15)See inter alia An. 8; Bowman, 'The Ramsar Convention comes of Age', 42 Netherlands ILR (1995), 
1, at 35 et sequ. 
(16) Art. 11(5). 
(17) Art. 7(6). 
(18) Art. 23(5). 
(19) See 1994 Instrument Establishing the Global Environmental Facility, Art. VI. 
(20) See for instance IUCN's Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development; see also 
IUCN/UNEP/WWF, World Conservation Strategy (IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1980); IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 
Caring for the Earth (IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1991), supra Chap. 1/3. Evolutionary Perspective of 
Sustainable Development. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
was set up in 1948 on the initiative of the French Government, is an NGO composed of conservation 
groups, States and public law entitled such as universities and research institutes, which purpose is to 
evaluate the status of natural resources, encourage the taking of conservation measures, and educate and 
inform about conservation issues. It was renamed the World Conservation Union in 1988, on the 
occasion of its 40th anniversary. IUCN/WCN played a particularily active role in the drafting of several 
conventions related the conservation of nature and natural resources, and most particularly, the 1968 
African Convention on Nature, 1973 CITES and 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of 
Migratory Species, as well as in the elaboration of the 1982 World Charter for Nature; see Maffci, La 
protezione internazionale delle specie animal! minacciate (CEDAM, 1992), at 262 et sequ. 
(21) Supra Chap. 3, Prevention and Precautionary Principles, n. 50 (CR). See also the impact of NGOs 
via legal action, like in the American Cetacean Society et al. v. Malcolm Bladridge et a!., 1985,604 F 
Supp 1398 (DC 1985); confirmed in Appeal, 768 F 2d 426 (1985); reversed by US Supreme Court, 
Japan Whaling Association & Japan Fisheries Association v. American Cetacean Society et a!., 29 L Ed 
2d 166. 
(22) Sands, 'The Environment, Community and International Law', 30 Harvard IIJ (1989), 393, at 
400; also Mansbach et al., The Web of World Politics, Nonstate Actors in the Global System (Prentice- 
Hall, 1976), at 39 et sequ. 
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law contrast sharply with the rigid stance of the doctrine on the formal legal status of 
these'political actors' in international law. This raises the question of the 'raison d'etre' 
of public participation clauses in international environmental law, and their implications 
for the 'recipients' of such clauses. 
It is argued here, that `public interest' or `public participation' clauses in 
international environmental law instruments reflect in fact a more holistic conception of 
the various branches of international law(23). It is denied, on the other hand, (a) that 
such clauses indicate a fundamental reorganisation of the international legal order 
towards so-called a people-centred order(24) and (b) that they bring a reconsideration of 
the formal status of individuals and other non-state entities in international law(25). 
Public participation involves a wide range of non-state entities apart from NGOs, 
including individuals and groups of individuals such as farmers, children, women and 
indigenous populations, but also other entities such as industries and scientific 
communities(26). This Section focuses, in a first stage, on the involvement of individuals 
qua individuals (rather than as members of a particular group), and in a second stage, on 
women. This latter focus is essentially justified in the light of the original objective of 
the thesis to contemplate the role of women in sustainable development(27). The author 
is aware, however, that a consideration of the role of NGOs would have been probably 
more approriate in a thesis devoted to the protection of the environment. Our focus 
could also be explained by the scant legal literature on women and sustainable 
development, by contrast with the substantial literature dedicated to NGOs' 
participation(28). 
(23) Infra 3. Towards a More Holistic Approach to International Environmental Law: the Environment- 
Human Rights Law Dimension. 
(24) See contra, Grossman & Bradlow, 'Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centred 
Transnational Legal Order?, 9 American University JIL & Policy (1993), 1. 
(25) Infra 
2. Individuals in General International Law. 
(26) See for instance the various majors groups referred to in 1992 Agenda 21, Section III; supra n. 1. 
For some background references on various other 'categories' of individuals, see Craig & Ponce Nava, 
`Indigenous Peoples' Rights and Environmental Law', in UNEP (ed. ), UNEP's New May Forward: 
Environmental Law and Sustainable Development (UNEP, 1995), Chap. 8; Pevato, 'Do Children Have a 
Role to Play in Environmental Protection ? ', 2 IJ Children's Right (1994), 169; Shutkin 'International 
Human Rights Law and the Earth: the Protection of Indigenous Peoples and the Environment', 31 
Virginia JIL (1991), 479. See also various country specific studies in Ghai & Vivian, Grassroots 
EnvironmentalAction, People's Participation in Sustainable Development, (Routledge, 1992). 
(27) See Chap. 1/2/ii. Approach and Methodology, second point 
(28) See inter alia referencessupra n. 13 to 21. 
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2. Individuals in General International Law 
A striking feature of the literature on the position of individuals (and other non-state 
actors) in the international legal order relates to the immutability of the arguments and 
positions through time, and the lack of innovative arguments offered even in most recent 
contributions(29), despite a clear evolution in the 'international political role' assumed 
inter alia by individuals and NGOs. The doctrinal debate on the position of individuals 
in international law revolves essentially around two issues: (1) the definition of the 
subjects of international law, and (2) the formal status of non-state entities, and more 
particularly of individuals, in international law. 
A first controversy with regard to the definition of the international subjects pertains 
to the source of such definition. For a minority of authors, the quality of subject of 
international law depends directly on the definition of international law itself. Hence, 
the only subjects of international law are per definitionem States or individuals, 
depending on whether international law is construed as an inter-state law(30) or as the 
crystallisation of behavioural rules inferred from the relations between two or more 
distinctive groups of human beings(31). 
(29) In fact, the most remarkable contributions on the issue, with some exceptions, date back from the 
1950s-1960s, if not earlier, as indicated even by the most recent bibliographies on the issue; see for 
instance referencesin Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. 1, Chap. 8 (§§ 347 et sequ. ); also Menon, 
'States, International Organizations and Individuals as Subjects of International Law', 20 The Korean 
Journal of Comparative Law (1992), 97; Partsch, 'Individuals in International Law', in Bernhardt (ed. ), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Instal. 8 (North-Holland, 1985), 316. 
(30) Anzilotti, Cours de Droit International Vol 1 (Recueil Sirey, 1929), 121; Bourquin, 'Regles 
generales du droit de la paix', 35 RdC (1931-1), 5, at 42; Spiropoulos, 'L'individu et le droit 
international', 30 RdC (1929-V), 195. Spiropoulos already recognised however that the definition of 
international law needed to be adapted to accommodate the factual involvement of individuals in the 
international sphere, stressing that «[o]n pent retarder l'8volution sans pouvoir ä la longue l'entraver»; 
ibid., at 247; see suggested alternative definition of international law at 228. The First three editions of 
Oppenheim'slnternational Law also expressed the view that States only are subjects of international law, 
as underlined (yet dismissed) in Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. 1, §7, at n. 1. The inter-State 
conception of international law as excluding per definitionem the international subjectivity of individuals 
generally prevailed among the Soviet authors; for a review of that doctrine, see Feldman, 'International 
Personality' 191 RdC (1985- II), 343, at 351-363; Mullerson, 'Human Rights and the Individual as 
Subject of International Law: A Soviet View', 1 EJIL (1990), 33. 
(31) Duft was most eminent representative of this school of thought; Traits de Droit Constitutionel, 
Tome I: La Regle de droit, le Probleme de 1'etat, 3rd edn (E. de Boccard, 1927), Chap. 1 (more partic. § 
17 on 'la norme juridique intersociale); see also Scelle, Precis du Droit des Gens, Tome I, Introduction, 
Le Milieu Intersocial, (Sirey, 1932), at 6 et sequ.; Scelle, 'RBgles gdnerales du droit de la paix', 46 RdC 
(1933-IV)), 327, at 343. Politis is sometimes associated with this current of thought, even though he 
recognised that international law is in a transitional stage on this point, and that in practice, individuals 
are not treated as real subjects of international law; Politis, The New Aspects of International Law, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1928), Chap. II. Likewise, Kelscn stated that «comme tout 
droit, le droit international est bien lui aussi, une reglementation de la conduite humaine», although he 
generally recognised a limited capacity to the individuals; 'Theorie gCnCrale du droit international public: 
probl6mes choisis', 42 RdC (1932-IV), 118, at 142. 
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For the majority of the 'contemporaneous' doctrine, however, the qualification as a 
subject implies a number of functional qualities, namely the substantive capacity to hold 
international rights and bear international obligations, and the procedural capacity to 
invoke these rights and to be held responsible in case of non-fulfilment of these 
obligations. A certain consensus exists among authors regarding the minimum 
requirements of the substantive capacity to hold rights and bear duties(32). Some 
scholars consider that these minimum requirements are sufficient to confer international 
personality(33). Others on the contrary contend that the procedural capacity(34), or the 
capacity to be held responsible for the breach of international duties(35), or both(36), or 
(32) See Kelsen and Verdross, infra n. 34; Lauterpacht, infra n. 33; Guggenheim, infra n. 36. ' See 
however Eustathiades, `Les sujets du droit international et la responsabilite internationale, nouvelles 
tendances', 84 RdC (1953-III), 401, at 410 et sequ.; Eustathiades argues that the quality of subject of 
international law does not necessarily imply a 'coincidence quo ad material entre `droits internationaux' 
et `obligations internationales" and concludes that the international personality implies alternatively, but 
not necessarily cumulatively, the capacity to hold international rights and the capacity to invoke them, or 
the capacity to bear international duties and to be held responsible in case of non fulfilment. This 
viewpoint seems to be endorsed by Barberis, although this author links the quality of subject of a right or 
obligation to the effective exercise of the related procedural capacity, rather than the mere formal 
attribution of a right or imposition of obligation. In other words, the subject of a right/obligation is the 
entity/person who actually invokes that right or is held responsible, and not necessarily the entity/person 
formally entrusted with the right/obligation; Barberis, `Nouvelles Questions Coneernant la Personnalite 
Juridique Internationale' 179 RdC (1983-1), 145. 
(33) Lauterpacht, 'The Subjects of the Law of Nations', Part I, 63 LQR (1947), 438, and Part II, 64 LQR 
(1948), 97; Lauterpacht, International Law, Collected Papers Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 
1970), at 279 et sequ.; Lauterpacht stresses that the procedural handicap is not a particularity of 
international legal system, and does not deprive the entity or person concerned of the quality of subject of 
international law. The PCJI's dictum in the Peter Pdzmany University case has often been referred in this 
context, whereby the Court stated that «the capacity to possess civil rights does not necessarily imply 
the capacity to exercise those rights oneself. No argument against the University's personality in law can 
therefore be deduced from the fact that it did not enjoy the free disposal of the property in question; 
Appeal From a Judgment of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, (The Peter PhzmAny 
University v. the State of Czechoslovakia), PCIJ Ser. A/B, Fascicule No 61, Judgment of December 15th, 
1933, at 231. See also Korowicz, `The Problem of International Personality of Individuals', 50 AJIL (1956), 539. Korowicz recognises however that without procedural capacity, individuals remain purely 
potential subjects of international law. 
(34) Brownlie, Principles, Chap. III; Kelsen, 'Theorie generale du droit international public: problCCmes 
choisis', 42 RdC (1932-IV), 118, at 141 et sequ.; Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, Transl. Hartney 
(Clarendon, 1991), at 52-55 & 89-91; Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, § 424; Oppenheim's 
International Law, Vol. 1, at § 374; Verdross, 'RBgles g6nCrales du droit international de la Paix', 30 
RdC (1929-V), 271, at 347-9; Verdross, VÖlkerrecht, 4th edn (Springer, 1949) at 127-131 & 155-161. 
Verdross considers however that the procedural capacity does not need necessarily to be exercised in front 
of an international tribunal, and can also be exercised in front of a domestic Court acting as an 
international Court and taking decisions on the basis of international law (theory of the `dCdoublement 
fonctionel' of municipal tribunals); see in the same line Brownlie, Principles, at 580. 
(35) See Barberis and Eustathiades, supra n. 32. 
(36) Daes (Special Rapporteur), Study on the Status of the Individual and Contemporary International 
Law, Promotion, Protection and restoration of Human Rights at National, Regional and International 
Levels, UN Center for Human Rights, Study Series No 4, (UN Publications, 1992), Para. 489; 
Guggenheim, Traite de droit international public, Tome I (Librairie de l'Universitb, Georg & Cie, 
1953) Chap. IV; Menon, supra n. 29, at 98. Like Verdross and Scelle, Guggenheim subscribes to the 
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indeed the capacity to assume an active position in international relations and take part 
in the law-creating process(37), are also necessary. It is widely recognised that the 
attributes of the subject of law in any legal system need not necessarily be «identical in 
their nature or in the extent of their rights, and that «their nature depends upon the 
needs of the community; an international person needs not possess all the international 
rights, duties and powers normally possessed by states»(38). Still, the undisputed 
instances where international personality is recognised for individuals are limited, in the 
light of their procedural handicap(39). 
No consensus exists either regarding the international legal qualification of non-state 
actors that would duly reflect their political role on the international stage. The most 
radical approach, reducing individuals to mere objects of international law(40), has now 
been abandoned for 'intermediate' qualifications such as `destinataires' (recipients) of 
international law(41), beneficiaries(42), `sujets mediats/derives'(43), `sujets artificiels'(44), 
or material subjects(45). Some authors dismiss the qualification of subject of 
argument that procedural capacity can be exercised in front of a domestic court acting as an international 
court. See also Ross, A Textbook of International Law, General Part (Longmans, Green & Co., 1947), § 
2; Ross however denies that individuals can ever be capable of an international obligation, hence 
dismissing individuals as potential subjects of international law. See also Norgaard, The Position of the 
Individual in International Law (Munksgaard, 1962); strongly inspired by Ross' theory, Norgaard 
admits nonetheless that individuals held the position of subjects of international law in a limited number 
of cases, and notes that vas the international legal order has increasingly developed from a primitive to a 
more advanced stage, the closer the contact has grown between international law and the individual; 
Norgaard, supra, at 310. 
(37) Mosier, `Subjects in International Law', in Bernhardt (ed. ), Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, Instal. 7 (North-Holland, 1984), 442, at 443; Partsch, supra n. 29, at 317. See also Menon, supra 
n. 29, at 121; Leary's remarks in ASIL, 'Are Indigenous Populations Entitled to International Juridical 
Personality ? ', 77 ASIL Proc. (1985), 189, at 194. 
(38) Oppenheim'sInternational Law, § 33; in the same sense, see Mosier and Menon, supra n. 37. 
(39) For a detailed review of the instances where individuals have held (and sometimes still hold) the 
position of subject of international law, see Dominice, 'L'emergence de l'individu en droit international 
public', 16 Annales d etudes internationales (1987-88), 1; Menon, supra n. 37, at 135 et sequ.; Quoc 
Dinh: Droit International Public, §§ 425 et sequ.; Norgaard, supra n. 36; Oppenheim's International 
Law, Vol. 1, at § 375, n. 1 and 2. 
(40) The object theory is often attributed to Helborn, Das System des Völkerrechts (1986); quoted after 
Manner, 'The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law', 46 AJIL (1952), 428; see also 
Redslob, Traite de droit des gens, (Sirey, 1950), 71; Schwarzenberger & Brown, A Manual of 
International Law, 6th edn (Stevens & Sons, 1976), Chap. 3. 
(41) Boris, supra n. 32, at 181 et sequ.; Dominic6, n. 39; Guggenheim, ibid. supra n. 36; Kelsen, 
Theorie generale du droit international public: probl8mes choisis', 42 RdC (1932-IV), 118, at 141 et 
sequ.; Virally, 'Panorama du Droit International Contemporain, Cours GenCral dc Droit International', 
183 RdC (1983-III), 9, at 133 et sequ. 
(42) O'Connell, International Law, 2nd edn, Vol. 1, (Stevens & Sons, 1970), at 107 et sequ. 
(43) Quoc Dinh: Droit International Public, §424. 
(44) Rousseau, Droit international public Tome II (Sirey, 1974), 692 et sequ. 
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international law altogether, and count individuals among the various categories of 
`participants' of international law(46). 
By focusing on the formal status of the individual (and non-state actors in general) in 
international law, the on-going scholarly debate has remained essentially rhetorical. It is 
difficult to identify in the numerous writings discussing the status of individuals in 
international law, (a) how the recognition of a full or functional international personality 
to individuals would bring any concrete advantages to these new subjects, and (b) 
whether these concrete advantages are contingent upon the recognition of the quality of 
subjects of international law, or whether they could be gained otherwise. 
Clearly, the question of the factual role and positions of individuals and non-state 
actors in international law is not reduced to that of international personality; 
international personality is neither necessary, nor sufficient to secure due consideration 
of the needs and interests of non-state entities, including individuals, in the negotiation 
and implementation of international rules which affect them directly or indirectly. On 
the other hand, the recognition of certain prerogatives at the supranational level 
associated with even a limited capacity for individuals to avail themselves of these 
prerogatives constitutes a worthy tool to include individual environmental concerns in 
inter-state environmental policy and law. The use of human rights procedures, is a 
perfect illustration thereof. 
3. Towards a More Holistic Approach to International Environmental Law: 
the Environment-Human Rights Law Dimension 
More than a reflection of a fundamental breakthrough in the old debate on the 
international legal personality in relation to non-state actors, the multiplication of 
`public participation', `individual/group rights and interests' clauses in international 
environmental instruments should be attributed to a two-fold evolution of international 
environmental law: 
(1) The reorientation and broadening of the scope of `modern' international 
environmental law. The original inter-state nature of international environmental law 
reflected in fact the primarily inter-state nature of the issues it addressed, such as 
(45) Whose interests determine the content of the law, as opposed to formal subjects; Sperduti, 
`L'individu et le droit international', 90 RdC (1956-11), 727. 
(46) Namely States, international organisations, multinational corporations, and NGOs; Higgins, 
`Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law' 24 New York School LR (1978), 11; 
also Problems and Process: International Law and blow to Use it (Clarendon, 1994), Chap. 3. Higgins 
bases her theory on the premise that international law is not inter-state in essence, but its inter-state 
characterand related structure is the product of States' decision, which can be modified by a decision of 
States. Lauterpacht seemed also in favour the qualification of participant, albeit not to a degree similar to 
Higgins; Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 1970), Title II, at 287. 
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transboundary pollution or equitable utilisation of shared, or common resources(47). 
The progressive `intrusion' of international environmental law in the domestic 
sphere(48) has led not only to the enlargement of the circle of States having a 
legitimate concern in prima facie domestic issues(49); it has also broadened the circle 
of the parties having a legitimate interest in the formulation of international law and 
legitimate expectation in its implementation, to encompass non-state entities in 
general, and more particularly individual human beings(50). Obviously, the 
progressive development of international concern for specific environmental issues 
does not eclipse, exclude or otherwise undermine the concern of individuals and 
other non-state entities for these issues; on the contrary, it enhances it. 
(2) The adoption of a more integrated perspective on environmental matters, as a result 
of the recognition of the inter-relatedness of economic, social and environmental 
issues(51). The protection and preservation of the environment is no longer 
(47) Boyle, 'The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of the Environment', in 
Boyle & Anderson (eds. ), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon, 1996) 
(hereafterBoyle & Anderson), Chap. 3, at 54; this original nature of environmental law, inter alia as a 
law of allocation of natural resources, is particularity clearly reflected supra throughout Chap. 2. 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Chap. 3, Precautionary Principle. 
(48) See supra Chap. 2/2/iii. Sovereignty over Environmental Resources and Environmental Policies 
versus of Globalisation of Environmental Standards and Policies; Chap. 5/1, Introduction. 
(49) A parallel can be drawn with the progressive erosion of the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction 
under Art. 2(7) of the 1945 UN Charter with respect of the protection of basic human rights, now 
considered as an issue of `legitimate concern of the international community' (1993 Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action on Human Rights, Para. 4) or 'the concern and interest of all States' 
(Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1970,3, Paras. 33 & 
34); Cancado Trindade, 'The Parallel Evolutions of International Human Rights Protection and of 
Environmental Protection, and the Absence of Restrictions upon the Exercise of Recognized Human 
Rights', 13 Revista del Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (1991), 35; Sands, Principles 
(Vol. I), 220. On the emergence and evolution of international human rights law, see excellent synthesis 
by Sohn, 'The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States', 32 
American University LR (1982), 1, and for further references, Harris, Cases & Materials, Chap. 9; 
Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. 1, at § 431. On the position of individuals with respect to 
international human rights, see more particularly Daes, Study on the Status of the Individual and 
Contemporary International Law, Promotion, Protection and Restoration of Human Rights at 
National, Regional and International Levels (UN Publications, 1992); Mullerson, 'Human Rights and 
the Individual as Subject in International Law, A Soviet View', 1 EJIL (1990), 33. In a very interesting 
immigration case, the High Court of Australia found that «Australia's accession to the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (The Convention) had given rise to a legitimate expectation in 
the respondent's children that the respondent's application for resident status would be treated in 
accordance with the terms of the convention; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, [1995] 128 Australian Law Reports 353, at 353 (emphasis added). 
(50) Grossman & Bradlow, 'Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centred Transnational Legal 
Order?, 9 American University JIL & Policy (1993), 1, at 15; see supra n. 13 and 20, on the 
contribution of NGOs in particular. 
(51) The problems of poverty, overpopulation and urbanisation are rather obvious illustration of primarily 
social issues having an 'environmental' dimension. It will be later argued that the same can be said 
about the advancement of women and their integration into the economic development process; infra 4. Women Participation and Women Interests Clauses in Environmental Documents: Desirable or 
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perceived in isolation, but as interrelated with other issues addressed by other 
branches of international law, and most notably international trade(52), economic 
development(53), and human welfare and social development(54). Sustainable 
development represents in many respects the `culmination' of the shift away from 
a `single sector' or'fragmentary approach' towards a more `holistic approach'(55), 
and provides for a global perspective on environmental, social and economic 
issues(56). International environmental law has thus become increasingly concerned 
with peoples' welfare and interests as a result of linkage with international human 
rights law, in the same way as it has become more closely associated to 
developmental issues as a result of its connection with developmental law. 
Likewise, there is a tendency to express environmental concerns and environmental 
values in development or human rights law instruments. 
Regrettable Evolution?. 
(52) On the use of trade to enforce environmental regulation, see supra Chap. 2/2/iii. Sovereignty over 
Environmental Resources and Environmental Policies versus of Globalisation of Environmental 
Standards and Policies. 
(53) On the `global bargain' strategy, and the linking of environmental and developmental issues to 
provide some incentive to developing States to protect their environment, and to industrialised States to 
transfer funds and technologies, see supra Chap. 5/2/iv. Common Concern, Common Interest cf 
Mankind: Global Partnership or Global Bargain?, and Chap. 5/4. The Terms of the Bargain Principle cf 
Partnership. The linking of development and human rights predated the linking of environment and 
development, and was more particularly illustrated by the human development paradigm, and later the 
various attempts to obtain recognition of a (human) right to development; supra n. 1 and references 
contained therein. In a report on the Question of the Realisation of the Right to Development, 
E/CN. 4/1990/Rev. 1,26 September 1990, UN Secretary General reiterated that «a development strategy 
that disregards or interferes with human rights is the very negation of development»; § 145. The Secretary 
General repeatedly stressed the 'non dissociability of human rights in general in his periodical reports on 
the right to development; see for instance E/CN. 4/1334 at 63 et sequ., and E/CN. 4/1421, Pam. 25(b); 
further reference on the right to development supra Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership, n. 131 et sequ. 
(CR). 
(54) Cancado Trindade, 'Relations Between Sustainable Development and Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Recent Developments', in Al-Nauimi & Meese (eds. ), International Legal Issues 
Arising Under the Decade of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 1051. 
(55) Cameron, 'Future Directions in International Environmental Law: Precaution, Integration and Non- 
state Actors', Paper presented at the Read Memorial Lecture for 1995,19 Dalhousie LJ (1996), 122, at 
132. On the originally sectorial approach of international environmental law, see for instance Kiss, 'The 
International Protection of the Environment', in Macdonald & Johnston (eds. ), The Structure and 
Process of International Law : Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (Martinus Nijhoil', 
1986), 1069, at 1070 et sequ., and referencessupra Chap. 1/3/iii. Sustainable Development. 
(56) See McGoldrick's thesis on the 'pillared, temple-like structure' of sustainable development, inspired 
by EU law, and reminiscent, in some respect, of the so-called three CSCE/OSCE's baskets (although in 
that case, the last 'basket' relates to disarmament rather than environment); 'Sustainable Development 
and Human Rights: An Integrated Conception', 45 ICLQ (1996), 796. Hence for instance, the WCED 
Report links, albeit not always in a coherent way, various contemporary problems such as international 
economy, world resources, population, food security, urbanisation, industrialisation, energy and peace. 
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The various references to human rights(57), to a right to an adequate 
environment(58), and to major groups, including women(59), in international 
environmental instruments or documents, and to the environment in human rights 
instruments(60) or documents otherwise concerned with human rights(61) and social 
development(62) are clear illustrations of such trend. 
(57) See the numerous reference to human rights in 1992 Agenda 21; see reference to human rights 
abuses, 25.8; right to the protection of the law, 8.18; individual rights, 2.32; human rights and fireedom, 
26.1; people's right to subsistence, Paras. 17.82; housing rights, 7.6; right of access to resources, 40.8; 
land rights (and associated duties), 14.18(c); 32.6(d) and 32.14(a); 14.16; property rights, 10.5,12.28(c), 
14.9(c); 24.2(f); women human and civil rights, 3.2,5.17,5.48(a), 14.18(b); 24.4,29.7; rights related to 
family planning, 3.8(j), 5.50,6.25,24.2(g); workers' rights, 29.4; farmers' rights, 14.60(a); children's 
rights, 25.14; rights of indigenous populations, 3.7,10.5,26.2,26.4(a), 26.8,36.5; rights and 
responsibilities of NGOs, 27.10(a), 27.13; rights of small-scale fish workers and local communities, 
18.81(b). By contrast, the rights (and obligations) of States are only referred seven occasions; see 17.1, 
17.44,17.47,17.49,17.69,17.75, and 39.5. 
The close interrelation between human rights and the environment was also particularily illustrated with 
the qualification of the Sardar Sarovar project was qualified by the Independent Review as a human right 
violation, in addition of being environmentally non acceptable, because of the massive forcible 
resettlement of people generated by the project, in violation of ILO Convention 107, on Involuntary 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation, signed by India in 1985. See letter to the President of the World Bank, 
L. T. Preston, 18 June 1992, in Morse (Chairman) & Berger (Deputy Chairman), Sardar Sarovar, the 
Report of the Independent Review, (Resource Futures International, 1992), XX and XXV. 
(58) The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment already acknowledged the essential 
importance of both the natural and man-made environment to the enjoyment of basic human rights 
(preambular Para. 2) and stated that man has the «fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well being... )); Princ. 
1. Although the need to ensure a healthy environment for the well-being of individuals was recognised by 
the General Assembly in Res. A/45/94,14 December 1990, on the Need to Ensure a Healthy 
Environment for the Well-Being of Individuals, the human rights terminology was cautiously avoided 
both in that Resolution and in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which 
provide, in similar terms, that human beings are «entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony 
with nature»; 1992 Rio Declaration, Princ. 1; fora brief review of reasons behind such cautious wording, 
see Shelton, 'What Happened in Rio to Human Rights? ', 3 YbIEL (1992), 75, at 89 et sequ.; 
Pallemaerts, 'La Conference de Rio: Grandeurou decadence du droit international de l'environncment ? ', 
28 RBDI (1995), 175, at 129 et sequ. See also 1989 Hague Declaration on the Environment, Para. 5; 
1991 ECE Draft Charter on Environmental Rights and Obligations, Princ. 1. Both 1986 WCED-EG 
Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development and 1995 IUCN Draft International 
Covenant on Environment and Development advocate a right to an adequate level of environment; 
respectively Art. 1 and Art. 12(1), although WCED-EG recognised that such right remains an 'ideal 
which must still be realized'; see Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development (Graham & 
Trotman/Nijhoff, 1987), at 42. 
(59) Supra n. 8 and 9. 
(60) The right to environment is only exceptionally referred to as a human right on its own; see 1981 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Art. 24; 1988 Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 11. See also 
DraftUnited Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Art. 28; the Draft was adopted by 
the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1994, and was 
considered by a Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights in late 1995 and again in late 
1996, without any substantial progress being made. At the time of writing, the declaration is still a draft; 
informal discussion with Prof. D. J. Harris, Nottingham University, 28 August 1997. See also Draft Inter- 
American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Art. 13(3), which states indigenous peoples' 
right to `conserve, restore and protect their environment, and the productive capacity of their lands, 
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The adoption of a more integrated approach to contemporaneous problems, however, 
does not meet the unanimous support of the doctrine, and some authors harbour certain 
reservations about the legal aspects of these new `linkages'(63). The most serious issue 
territories and resources'; the first draft was adopted by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights in September 1995, and the latest revised version in February 1997. The 1997 Draft is posted on 
the Commission's Website @ <http: //www. oas. org/EN/PROG/indigene. htm>; see further Hannum, 
`The Protection of Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American System', in Harris & Livingstone (eds. ), 
The Inter American Human Rights System (Oxford University Press, forthcoming), Chap. 7. The 1989 
ILO Convention on Indigenous Peoples, whilst short of recognising a clean environment as right, 
provides that measures must be taken for safeguarding inter alia the environment of the peoples 
concerned; Art. 4(1). More often however, references to the environment are made in relation to, or 
inferred from, provisions on health (1961 European Social Charter, and 1996 European Social Charter 
(revised), Art. 11; 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 12(1) and 
(2)(b); 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 24(2)(c)), to the general welfare of individuals 
(1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 4) and to appropriate 
standards of living (1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 11(1)) 
and safe and healthy working conditions (1996 European Social Charter (revised), Art. 3). 
The right to environment is also enshrined in the Constitutions of an increasing number of States, and 
indeed the majority of State Constitutions adopted since the mid 1970s recognise such right, the latest 
example being the 1994 South African Constitution; Glazewski, 'Environmental Rights and the new 
South African Constitution', in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 9. See reproduction of a number of 
constitutional provisions on environmental rights and duties in Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future 
Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (United Nations 
University Press/Transnational Publisher, 1989), Appendix B. The utility of the various constitutional 
provisions varies however, from purely formal and 'toothless' guarantee in some countries, to effective 
tool to protect environmental interests in others; for a comparative review of the impact of such right in 
Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Brazil, see Brandl & 
Bungert, 'Constitutional Entrenchment of Environmental Protection: A Comparative Analysis of 
Experiences Abroad', 16 Harvard ELR (1992), 1; and more generally Dolzer, 'Individual Freedom and 
Environmental Protection', in Bothe (ed. ), Trends in Environmental Policy and Law (IUCN, 1980), 29. 
More specially on the meaning of the environmental rights enshrined in some US States constitutions, 
see Fernandez, 'State Constitutions, Environmental Rights Provisions and the Doctrine of Self- 
Execution :A Political Question ? ', 17 Harvard ELR (1993), 333, at 136 et sequ. For an analysis of 
international human rights, and constitutional provisions relevant to the protection of environmental 
interest, see Ksentini's Human Rights and the Environment: Preliminary Report (1991), Progress Report 
(1992), and Second Progress Report (1993), referredto infra n. 61. 
(61) See most notably the series of reports commissioned by Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, on the relationship between human rights, and the 
environment; Ksentini, Special Rapporteur for the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities; Human Rights and the Environment: Preliminary Report, UN 
Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1991/8,2 August 1991; Human Rights and the Environment: Progress Report, UN 
Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1992/7,2 July 1992; Human Rights and the Environment: Second Progress Report, 
UN Doe. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1993/7,26 July 1993; Human Rights and the Environment: Final Report, UN 
Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1994/9,6 July 1994. The possibility of an internationally recognised human right to 
a healthy environment was outlined in Ksentini's Preliminary Report (1991), Para. 8. For a brief 
discussion of the competence of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
ofMinorities on environment-related issue, see Thorme, 'Establishing Environment as a Human Right', 
19 DenverJILP (1991), 301, at 305 et sequ.; for a short account of the Ksentini Reports, see Fabm 
Aguilar & Popovic, 'Lawmaking in the United Nations: The UN Study on Human Rights and the 
Environment', 3 RECIEL (1994), 197. 
(62) See inter alia 1995 Beijing Platform for Action for the Advancement of Women, Chap. III, inter 
alia Sect. K; 1995 Copenhagen Programme for Social Development, Chap. 1, inter alia Para. 8 in fine. 
(63) See for instance Sieghart, 'Economic Development, Human Rights and the Omelette Thesis', 1 
DenverPolicy Review (1983), 1. 
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in that respect relates to the risk of broadening the mandate of the institutions in charge 
of the one or the other dimension as a direct result of such link. To the one extreme, a 
holistic approach might entail risks of unnecessary overlapping mandates and actions; to 
the other extreme, too strict a interconnection of the issues might in fact paralyse any 
action, due to the difficulty in satisfying, in the same time, economic, environmental and 
human requirements. Shihata for instance, considering the linkage from a perspective of 
international funding agencies, reminds us that despite the factual link between economic 
development, human rights and environment, «all international organizations have to act 
within the limitations of their respective constituent instruments»(M). Shihata's remark 
is more directly concerned with the World Bank and the debated issue of the adverse 
environmental and social impacts of its lending policy. Whilst the World Bank has now 
adopted a more `human and environmentally sound' lending policy(65), it has long 
argued (and still does) that its Articles of Agreement precluded it from grounding its 
lending policy on non economic considerations; Art. IV, §10 states as follows: 
«The Bank (... ) shall not be influenced in [its] decisions by the political 
character of the member or members, concerned. Only economic 
considerations shall be relevant to [its] decisions (... )»(66) 
The World Bank reviewed its lending policy in late 1985, after its particularly 
controversial decision to fund the Sardar Sarovar irrigation projects, on the Narmada 
River, India, against the recommendation a Committee of Independents Experts 
commissioned by the Bank itself(67). The recent decision of the Bank to decline China's 
application for financial assistance in relation to the no less controversial US $ 20 billion 
Three Georges Dam project, on the Yangtze River, constitutes a first step towards a 
more holistic approach to economic development as related to environment and human 
welfare(68). 
(64) ASIL, 'Environment, Economic Development and Human Rights: A Triangular Relationship? ', 82 
ASIL Proc. (1988), 40, at 42. 
(65) See supra Chap. 3/4/iii. Prior Environmental Impact Assessment. 
(66) See further Shihata, 'The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and 
Record of Achievements', 17 DenverJIL (1988), 39. 
(67) Supra n. 57. See the Bank's self-criticism: World Bank Information Center (cd. ), Funding 
Ecological and Social Destruction: The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (World Bank, 
1989). See also Esteva & Prakash, 'Grassroots Resistance to Sustainable Development: Lessons from the 
Banks of the Narmada', 22 The Ecologist (1992), 45; Huyser, 'Sustainable Development: Rhetoric and 
Reformat the World Bank', 4 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems (1994), 253; McAllister, 
`The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: An Opportunity to Forge a New 
Unity in the World of the World Bank Among Human Rights, the Environment, and Sustainable 
Development', 16 Hastings ICLR (1993), 689. 
(68) The Three Georges Dam project has been widely criticised for its enormous and poorly assessed 
social and environmental impacts: 1.13 billion of people displaced, and 632,000 square kilometres of land immersed (by comparison, the Sardar Sarovar entailed 'only' the displacement of 200,000 persons, 
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Regardless of individuals' formal status in international law, a more holistic approach 
to environmental issues, and most importantly the integration of environmental values 
in human rights instruments and of human rights values in environmental law 
instruments, provides individuals with certain means to have their own environmental or 
non environmental interests duly considered and respected via the existing channels of 
human rights law(69). 
A clear distinction needs to be drawn at this stage, between (a) the increasing use of 
human rights to preserve the environmental interests of individual human beings against 
unsustainable measures and policies, and (b) the more controversial recognition of a new 
(collective) human right to a clean and safe environment(70). 
i. Use of Human Rights Procedures to Preserve Individual Environmental Interests 
With most of the `general' human rights documents drafted before the 1970s, when 
environmental issues were still low, on international, regional and national agendas, it is 
not surprising that the `classic' human rights documents do not expressly contemplate 
such values as possible objects of protection(71). A limited range of environmental 
and the flooding of 1,000 square kilometres of lands). Serious reservations have also been expressed with 
regard to the necessity, and indeed the viability of the dam (a) in a seismic region, and (b) in the light of 
high concentration of silt carried by the Yangtze water; see Kwai-cheong, `The Three Georges Project of 
China: Resettlement Prospects and Problems', 24 Ambio (1995), 98; Sullivan, 'The Three Georges Dam 
Project: The Need fora Comprehensive Assessment', 8 Georgetown IELR (1995), 109. A private study 
made by the Swiss firm Metron Bern AG, in 1996, shows that the energy desperately needed by China to 
meeting soaring needs of the population could be provided via the development of alternative and 
renewable sources of energy at a cost ofFRS 30 millions; Metron Bern AG, Alternativen des Bundes zu 
wahrscheinlichen Abschreibungen der ERG, 14 November 1996. We are indebted to Mr T. Pellet, 
Permanent Secretary of the Swiss NGO Erklärung von Bern for providing us with a copy of the above 
report. 
(69) It was even suggested that the procedures and mechanisms developed for the protection of human 
rights could constitute a valuable precedent and serve as a model in the area of the protection of the 
environment; see Canrado Trindade, 'Environmental Protection and the Absence of Restrictions on 
Human Rights', in Mahoney & Mahoney, Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century, A Global 
Challenge (Martinus Nijhof, 1993), 561, at 586. 
(70) A similar bi-dimensional approach is implicitly endorsed by Sands, Principles (Vol. I), 224 et 
sequ., and Boyle, supra n. 47. Boyle refers to the first category of rights as environmental rights. 
(71) See most notably 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 1948 American Declaration of 
Rights and Duties of Man; 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, and Protocols I and 4 securing 
certain Rights and Freedoms other than those included in the Convention; 1961 European Social Charter, 
1966 International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Civil and Political Rights; 
1969 American Convention on Human Rights. See also Declaration on the Aims and Purposes of the 
International Labour Organization, adopted by the International Labour Conference at its Twenty-sixth 
Session, Philadelphia, in April-May 1944, and later incorporated in the 1946 ILO constitutive Charter, 
Philadelphia declaration provides that individuals have the right «to pursue both their material well-being 
and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal 
opportunity; Principle 11(a). 
Various attempts failed in the 1970s and early 1980s to have the right to a natural environment 
'favourable to human health' enshrined in an additional Protocol to the Convention; see Dupuy, 'Le Droit 
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values have been subsequently read into various `classic' substantive human rights 
provisions by the institutions in charge with implementing or supervising the 
implementation of the various human rights instruments inasmuch as they were 
necessary to a reasonable enjoyment of those rights(72). The rights to the peaceful 
enjoyment of privacy and home(73), and private property(74) have been the most 
commonly raised, in relation to noise pollution(75), fumes(76) and to the environmental 
ä la santd et la protection de 1'environnement', in Dupuy (ed. ), The Right to Health as a Human Right, 
Hague Academy of International Law Workshop 1978 (Sijthof& Noordhoff 1979), 340, at 407 et sequ. ; 
Steiger (Rapporteur), The Right to a Human Environment: Proposal for an Additional Protocol to the 
European Human Rights Convention (Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1973). The ECHR Commission explicitly 
ruled out on three separate occasions that a right to the preservation of nature was protected as such or in 
relation to other provisions of the Convention; see Dr S. v. FRG, Applic. 715/60,5 August 1960 
(unpublished); quoted afterDejeant-Pons, 'Le droit de I'homme ä 1'environnement, droit fondamental an 
niveau europeen dans le cadre du Conseil de 1'Europe, et la Convention europeenne de sauvegarde des 
droits de l'homme et des libertes fondamentales', Revue Juridique de I'Environnement (1994-4), 373, at 
375); X& Y v. FRG, Applic. 7407/76,5 D&R (1976), 161; Assoc. X v. UK, Applic. 7154/75,14 D&R 
(1979), 31. The issue of the recognition of a right to an environment conducive to good health, well- 
being and full development of human personality was considered again in 1990, and even enshrined in a 
Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; Recommend. 1130 (1990) 
(1), on the Formulation of a European Charter and European Convention on Environmental Protection 
and Sustainable Development, 28 September 1990, reprinted in 1 YbIEL (1990), 484. There is still no 
report of any action of the Committee of Ministers taken on the recommendation. A major step was also 
taken with the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the 
Environment, prepared by the Council of Europe and concluded at Lugano on June 21,1993; on which 
see Bowman, 'The Convention on Civil Liability for Damages Resulting from Activities Dangerous to 
the Environment', 2 Environmental Liability (1994), 11. 
(72) For a concise review of the environment-related case-law under human rights procedures, see 
Churchill, 'Environmental Rights in Existing Human Rights Treaties', in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 5; 
Shelton, 'Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to the Environment', 38 Stanford JIL 
(1991), 103; Sands, Principles (Vol. I), at 224 et sequ.; more particularly on environmental values in the 
ECHR context: Dejeant-Pons, 'Le droit de l'homme ä 1'environnement, droit fondamental au niveau 
europeen dans le cadre du Conseil de 1'Europe, et la Convention europEcnne de sauvegarde des droits de 
l'homme et des libertes fondamentales', Revue Juridique de 1'Environnement (1994-4), 373, at 416 et 
sequ.; Desagne, `Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights', 89 
AJIL (1995), 263; Kley-Struller, 'Der Schutz der Umwelt durch die Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention', 22 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (1995), 507; Sands, 'Human 
Rights, Environment and the Lopez-Ostra case: Context and Consequences', 6 EIIRLR (1996), 597, at 
607. For a brief account of domestic environment-related cases in Latin America, sec Aguilar, 'Enforcing 
the Right to a Healthy Environment in Latin America', 3 RECIEL (1994), 215. 
(73) 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Art. 12; 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Art. 17; 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 8(1); 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights, Art. 11. 
(74) 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Art. 17; 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights, First Protocol, Art. 1; 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, Art, 21; 1981 African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Art. 14. 
(75) See ECHR Commission's decisions in E. A. Arrondelle v. UK, Applic. 7889/77,19 D&R (1980), 
186 (admissibility), and 26 D&R (1982), 5 (friendly settlement); Braggs v. UK, Applic. 9310/81,44 
D&R (1985), 13 (admissibility) and 52 D&R (1987), 29 (friendly settlement). In both cases, the 
Commission held that the noise generated by Gatwick Airport resulted in 'intolerable stress thereby 
affecting the right to privacy'. The Commission denied however that military shooting ranges used net 
time over week days amounted to such violation; Vearncombe et at. v. UK and FRG, Applic. 1281/87, 
59 D&R (1989), 186. Following the same approach, the ECHR Court upheld that the noise disturbances 
from an airport (in that case Heathrow) can amount to an interferencewith the right to privacy and family 
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impact of energy-related projects(77). The right to life(78) was invoked in the context of 
radioactive wastes(79) and nuclear tests(80), nuclear energy(81) and in relation to the 
life, but considered nonetheless that, in the specific circumstances of the case, a fair balance had been 
struck between individual and common interest, and that the infringement to the individual right was 
therefore proportionate to the common interest; Powell & Rayner v. UK, Ser. A, No. 172 (1990). 
(76) See ECHR Court's judgement in Lopez Ostra v. Spain, Ser. A, No 303-C (1995); on which see 
Sands, 'Human Rights, Environment and the Lopez-Ostra Case: Context and Consequences', 6 EHRLR (1996), 597. 
(77) See ECHR Commission's decisions in G. &Ev. Norway, Joined Applic. 9278/81 and 9415/81, 
35 D&R (1984), 30, concerning the flooding of grazing lands as a result of the realisation of an 
hydroelectric project; S. v. France, Applic. 13728/88,65 D&R (1990), 250, concerning the nuisance 
related to the exploitation of a nuclear power station, and the first decision of the Commission related to 
pollution other than noise. Weber stresses that the Commission in the latter case did not make a 
difference between actual and potential environmental harm, hereby implying that both environmental 
harm and environmental risk may constitute an interference under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, providing that the potential human right violation meets the criteria of forseeability and 
seriousness set forth by the Court in the Soerings v. UK, Ser. A, No 161, Para. 90. See Weber, 
`Environmental Information and the European Convention on Human Rights', 12 HRIJ (1991), 177, at 
181. 
(78) 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Art. 3; 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Art. 6(1); 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 12; 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights, Art. 4; 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Art. 4. 
(79) See UN Human Rights Committee's decision in Port Hope Environmental Group v. Canada, 
Communic. No. 67/1980, reprinted in Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. 2 (Seventeenth to Thirty-second sessions), 20; although the Committee recognised that the storage of 
radioactive wastes raises serious issues under the duty of States to protect life, it dismissed it on the 
grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
(80) An early attempt was made in 1960, to have is reported to have nuclear tests and disposal of 
radioactive wastes at sea declared contrary to the right to life and environment under the European 
Convention on Human Rights; Dr S. v. FRG, Applic. 715/60,5 August 1960 (unpublished). In that 
case, a medical doctor, relying on the studies of very prominent scientists and on detailed statistics, 
claimed that by dumping radioactive wastes in the North Sea, storing of atomic materials on German 
territory, and purchasing atomic armament, FRG violated his right to security and freedom (Art. 5) and 
the right to life and environment (Art. 2). ECHR Commission dismissed the case as manifestly ill- 
founded. A similar applications based inter alia on the right to health, life and healthy environment, were 
brought under EU law, 1966 ICCPR, and the European Convention on Human Rights, against the 
resuming of French nuclear testing in Mururoa in 1995; see EC Case T-219/95R, Danielsson and Others 
v. European Commission; [1995] ECR 11-3052; Bordes & Temeharo v. France, Communic. No 
645/1995, Human Rights Committee decision 39 July 1996, reproduced in 18 HRLI (1997), 36; Tauira 
et al. v. France, Applic. 28204/95, ECHR Commission 4 December 1995,18 Revue Universelle de 
Droits de I'Homme (1996), 315. All three decisions were against the applicant(s), dismissed as manifestly 
ill-founded for lack of locus standi on the basis a strict interpretation of quality of victim. The 
Commission has recently rejected on similar ground an application based inter alia on inhuman and 
degrading treatment against nuclear testing conducted by the UK back in 1958 over Christmas Island; 
McGinley & Egan v. UK, Applic. 21825/93 and 23414/94,28 November 1995,21 EURR (1996), Commission Suppl., 56. Other applications in the same sense have been reported by Bothe, 'Challenging 
French Nuclear Tests: a Role for Legal Remedies? ', 5 RECIEL (1996), 253; see also Decaux, 
'Commission Europdenne des droits de 1'homme, decision du 4 decembre 1995 sur la recevabilite de la 
requ&epresent6e par MM. Tauira et al. contre France', 100 RGDIP (1996), 741; Dommen, Bordes & 
Temeharo c/France, Une tentative de faire proteger I'environnement par le Comite des droits de 1'homme', 
RevueJuridique de L'Environnement (1997-2), 157. 
(81) See Greenpeace Schweiz et al. v. Switzerland, Applic. 27644/95 to ECHR Commission concerning 
the health and environmental effects of a nuclear power plant on residents. The application was declared 
admissible for some of the applicants on 7 April 1997; reproduced in 18 HRIJ (1997), 164. 
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failure to take `timely and effective measures' to prevent the irreparable deterioration of 
lands vital to the survival of indigenous peoples(82), or to curb toxic release from an 
industrial plant(83). The rights of minorities were relied upon in relation to the 
environmental impact of gas and oil exploitation(84). On the other hand human rights, in 
particular property rights(85), have also been used, albeit with a limited success only, to 
challenge the necessity and reasonableness of various environmental measures. 
A number of environmental values can also be inferred from various economic and 
social rights(86). Such rights confer no immediate and directly enforceable individual 
prerogatives but require nonetheless «progressive realization in accordance with 
available resources, but in priority to other non-rights-based objectives) )(87). The 
(82) See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' decision in Yanomami Indians v. Brazil, No. 
7615,5 March 1985, reprinted in Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights (1985), 264. The 
Commission found that the Brazilian Government, by approving development in the Amazon region that 
threatened the life and culture of indigenous Indians, namely the construction of the Trans Amazonia 
highway, had acted in violation of the right to life, liberty and personal security, the right residence and 
movement, and the right to the preservation of health and well-being of the Amazonian Indians, and had 
disrupted their social unity and organisation. The decision was taken under the 1948 American 
Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, as Brazil had not at the time ratified the American Convention 
on Human Rights; on that case see Hannum, `The Protection of Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American 
System', in Harris & Livingstone (eds. ), The Inter American Human Rights System (Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming), Chap. 7, manuscript at 9 et sequ.; Davis, Land Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The 
Role of the Inter American Commission on Human Rights (Cultural Survival, 1988), 41-62. 
(83) Anna Maria Guerra and 39 Others v. Italy, Applic. 14967/89; the right to life argument was 
declared inadmissible by the ECHR Commission on the ground of non exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
(84) See Human Rights Committee's decision in Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Band v. Canada, Communic. No. 167/1984, July 1987, (admissibility), and March 1990 (merits), reprinted in 
11 HRIJ (1991), 305; see also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Huaorani People v. 
Ecuador, 1 June 1990, noted in 1 Yb1EL (1990), 275, and commented in Fabra, `Indigenous Peoples, 
Environmental Degradation, and Human Rights: A Case Study', in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 12. 
(85) The ECHR Court has consistently found so far that individual property right can be limited by an 
overriding environmental interest of the community at large; see Fredin v. Sweden, Ser. A, No. 192 (1991); Oerlemans v. the Netherlands, Ser. A, No. 219 (1991); Pine Valley Developments et al. v. 
Ireland, Ser. A, No. 222 (1991); de Geouffre de la Pradelle v. France, Ser. A, No. 253-B (1992). See 
also ECHR Commission in Herrick v. UK, Applic. 11185/84,42 D&R (1985), 275; N. v. Austria, 
Applic. 10395/83,48 D&R (1986), 65. 
(86) See the brief review of the most relevant socio-economic rights in the context of environmental 
issues in Sands, Principles (Vol. I), 224-225; see further Churchill., 'Environmental Rights in Existing 
Human Rights Treaties', in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 5, at 98 et sequ. The Committee of Experts of the 
European Social Charter expressed the (non-binding) opinion that the right to health (Art. 11) entails, 
inter alia, an obligation for the State to prevent environmental degradation that could have serious health 
effects, although it did not elaborate further on the concrete measures to be taken in that context, nor did it establish any minimum threshold of protection; see Handl, 'Human Rights and Protection of the 
Environment: A Mildly 'Revisionist' View', in Cancado Trindade (ed. ), Human Rights, Sustainable 
Development and the Environment, Seminärio de Brasilia de 1992 (Instituto Interamericano de Derechos 
Humanos, Banco Interamericanode Desarrollo, 1995), 117, at 126. 
(87) Boyle, ibid supra n. 47, at 46; see also Goodwin-Gill, `Obligations of Conduct and Result', in 
Alston & Tomasevski (eds. ), The Right to Food (Stichling Studie-en Informatiecentnun Mensenrechten, 
1984), 111. The US has consistently refused to consider economic and social rights as anything more 
than broad societal goals; Alston, 'US Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Public Participation 296 Chapter 6 
mechanisms available to secure the proper implementation of social, cultural, and 
economic rights are essentially based on reporting procedures, hence offering individuals 
no opportunity to avail themselves directly of such rights at the supranational level(88). 
For this reason, social and economic rights are of less interest for the purpose of the 
present Chapter. 
A first evaluation of the actual contribution of international human rights in 
protecting individual environmental interests remains extremely modest and in many 
respects disappointing. The modest number of cases(89) where a breach of human rights 
was found as a result of environmental nuisance might not be a sufficient criteria to 
evaluate fully the efficiency of human rights legal systems and procedures at protecting 
Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy', 84 AJIL (1990), 365, at 374. On the disputed human 
rights status of economic and social rights, see for instance Henkin, `Economic-Social Rights as Rights', 
2 HRLJ (1981), 223; van Hoof, 'The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: a Rebuttal 
of Some Traditional Views', in Alston & Tomasevski (eds. ), The Right to Food, ibid., 97. 
(88) On the enforcement mechanism under the 1966 International Covenants on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights see Alston, `The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', in Alston (ed. ), 
The United Nations and Human Rights (Clarendon, 1992), Chap. 12. Compare with the implementation 
mechanism under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, combining reporting 
system (Art. 40), inter-State complaint system (Art. 41), and individual complaint system (1966 
Optional Protocol); see Opsahl, 'The Human Rights Committee', in Alston (ed. ), The United Nations 
and Human Rights, ibid., Chap. 10. 
The original supervision procedure under the 1961 European Social Charter, limited to the programmatic 
provisions set forth in the second Part of the Chapter to the exclusion of the human right formulated 
Articles of the first part, is also based on national reports (Arts. 21-21) to the exclusion of a right of 
individual or State petition. Provision is made however for (a) the comments of national employers 
organisations and trade unions on States reports directly to the Committee of Independents Experts in 
charge of the legal review of those reports (at the legal stage of the supervisory process), and (b) the 
consultation of NGOs by the Governmental Committee, at the political stage of the supervisory process. 
The latter opportunity has never been used however. The system would be seriously modified with the 
1991 Protocol Amending the 1961 European Social Charter, which provides inter alia for an extended 
involvement of NGOs, and a system of collective complaints. The ratification of all parties to the 1961 
European Social Charter is however necessary before the 1991 Protocol enters into force. The 1991 
Protocol would also apply to the undertakings under the 1996 European Social Charter (revised), albeit 
only for the States having ratified the Protocol (Part. IV, Art. D. ); the 1996 European Social Charter 
(revised) has not yet entered into force however. On the mechanism of implementation of the Social 
Charter, see Harris, The European Social Charter (University Press of Virginia, 1992), Chap. III; more 
particularly on the revision of the Charter, see Harris, `A Fresh Impetus for the European Social Charter', 
41 ICLQ (1992), 659. See however recent attempt to rely on the right to health to challenge the resuming 
of French Nuclear tests in Mururoa atolls, EC Case T-219195R, Danielsson and Others v. Commission; 
supra n. 80; see also Yanomami People v. Brazil, and Huaorani People v. Ecuador, supra n 82. 
(89) Under the ECHR system, only one case of substantive human rights violation as a result of 
environmental interference was admitted by the Court; see Lopez Ostra v. Spain, supra n. 76. Some other 
cases passed the stage of admissibility in the Commission, but ended up with friendly settlements; see 
E. A. Arrondelle v. UK; Braggs v. UK, supra n. 75. At the inter-American level, on the other hand, a 
human rights violation was found in both Yanomami People v. Brazil and Huaorani People v. Ecuador, 
supra n. 82. At the international level, a prima facie recognition of violation of human rights can be read 
in Port Hope Environmental Group v. Canada, supra n. 79. 
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environmental values(90); it indicates nonetheless their potential contribution thereto. 
Such modest contribution can be accounted for the following three major factors: 
1) The limited number of applications in relation to environmental values under the 
various human rights mechanisms(91). 
2) The traditional reserve displayed by human rights bodies when it comes to 
considering highly subjective and relative values(92) and balancing subjective 
individual values with the more objective collective interest of the community at 
large(93). Environmental values are expressed in a generic way and hence per 
definitionem subjective therefore hardly susceptible of universal definition and 
evaluation(94). They are left to the broad margin of appreciation and balancing power 
of the States(95). This is particularly well summarised by Boyle as he writes: 
(90) Due consideration should to be paid to the cases having been resolved with a agreement of friendly 
settlements, or have been dismissed on procedural grounds. 
(91) As Churchill rightly points out, African and Latin American Human Rights systems are still focused 
on more 'straightforward' human rights violations primarily related to basic civil and political rights. 
Besides, the 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, so far signed by none of the two northern American States and 
ratified only by Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, and Surinam, needs a further seven ratification before entry 
into force. Besides, the Protocol does not allow petition in front of the Inter-American Court for the 
violation of its provisions. And finally, the enforcement mechanism under the 1981 African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights is notoriously weak; Churchill, 'Environmental Rights in Existing Human 
Rights Treaties', in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 5, at 104 et sequ. See also Fabra, 'Indigenous Peoples, 
Environmental Degradation, and Human Rights: A Case Study', in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 12, at 
260; Gormley, 'The Legal Obligation of International Community to Guarantee a Pure and Decent 
Environment: The Expansion of Human Rights Norms', 3 Georgetown IELR (1990), 85. Various 
mechanisms exist in developed States, to ensure the protection of the environment independently from 
human rights; Churchill, ibid., at 108. 
(92) Whilst more technical rights, such as the right to a fairtrial, or civic rights, are rather straightforward 
and allow for well-defined international standards, other rights, such are those related to morals or 
religion, are more specific to each State. Accordingly, whereas human rights institutions would apply 
strictly the more technical international standards, they tend to show considerable reserve with regard to 
the more 'relative' human rights, leaving it to States to appreciate the specific needs and interests of their 
own population; on the so-called margin of appreciation doctrine under the ECHR system, see 
Macdonald, 'The Margin of Appreciation', in Macdonald et aL(eds. ), European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights (Kluwer Academic, 1993), Chap. 6; Harris et al., Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Butterworths, 1995), 12; Van Dijk & Van Hoof, Theory and Practice of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edn. (Kluwer Law & Taxation, 1990), 583. 
(93) Waldron, 'Can Communal Goods be Human Rights?, 28 European Journal of Sociology (1987), 
296. 
(94) Considerable variations exist for instance between the individuals forwhom environment is a source 
of subsistence and work, such as farmers or indigenous people, and those for whom the environment has 
an essentially aesthetic value. Not to mention the intra-state tensions related to the different uses of 
environmental resources; infra iii. Strength and Weakness of the Human Rights Mechanisms in 
Protecting Environmental Interests. On the other hand, highly technical environmental targets, such as 
emission limits, whilst susceptible of strict enforcement, cannot necessarily be transposed into human 
rights language. 
(95) Sands, 'Human Rights, Environment and the Lopez-Ostra Case: Context and Consequences', 6 
EHRLR (1996), 597, at 616 et sequ. In the majority of the ECHR cases referred above, the ECHR Institutions held that, whilst the arguments put forward in the application were not deprived of any 
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« What constitutes sustainable development and an acceptable 
environment is in the end a matter for each society to determine 
according to its own values and choices 
... 
>>(96) 
This is true about environmental values considered in relation to other substantive 
rights, such as the right to life, home, privacy and private property; it is a fortiori 
true about environmental values considered per se as part of a right to 
environment(97). It is clear indeed, that «[i]f an environmental right is to be more than 
rhetorical slogan, its advocates must address (... ) the definition of healthy and 
balanced environment to provide a yardstick against which infringements can be 
measured 
... 
» 
(98). In the light of (a) the lack of normative determinacy of a right to 
environment, as distinguished from the `dimensions' already covered by other human 
rights provisions, and (b) the uncertainty with respect of its beneficiaries(99) and its 
grounds, a fair balance had been stuck between the individual interest, including the environmental 
interest, and common interest of the community at large; see Powell & Rayner v. UK; Vearncombe et al. 
v. UK and FRG, supra n. 75; S. v. France; G. & E. v. Norway, supra n. 77; Fredin v. Sweden, supra 
n. 85; Oerlemans v. the Netherlands and Pine Valley Development et al. v. Ireland, supra n. 85. Neither 
organ however has established any minimum environmental quality standards, nor even set out criteria to 
guide States in the balancing power, Desagnd, supra n. 72, at 365, 
(96) Boyle, ibid supra n. 47, at 64 (emphasis added). Likewise, Kiss & Shelton, proponents of a 
generic human rights to environment, recognise that such right still needs further clarification as far as its 
implications are concerned to be fully operational; Kiss & Shelton, International Environmental Law, at 
23 ; Shelton, `Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to the Environment', 38 Stanford 
JIL (1991), 103; Kiss, 'Concept and Possible Implications of the Right to Environment', in Mahoney & 
Mahoney, Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century, A Global Challenge (Martinus Nijhog 1993), 
551. 
(97) Although the right to environment is more often stated in relation to one or the other rights 
mentioned before; 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment refers to an `environment of 
quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being' (Prin. 1); 1981 African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights provides for a `right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to [peoples'] 
development' (Art. 24); 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the other hand refers to a right to a healthy environment (Art. 11); see also 1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection, 1991 ECE Draft 
Charter on Environmental Rights and Obligations, and Development and 1995 IUCN Draft Covenant on 
Sustainable Development, stating a `fundamental right to an environment adequate for [human beings'] 
health and well-being' (1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles, Art. 1; 1991 ECE Draft Charter, Princ. 1) and 
`dignity' (1995 IUCN Draft, Art. 12). The 1994 Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights cf 
Indigenous Peoples adopts the most general wording and refer to the `the right to the conservation, 
restoration and protection of the total environment... ' (Art. 28). 
(98) Chapman, `Symposium Overview', Earth Rights and Responsibilities: Human Rights and 
Environmental Protection, 18 Yale JIL (1993), 215, at 225; also Boyle, ibid supra n. 47, at 50 et sequ. 
See contra Nickel, `The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on its Scope 
and Justification', Symposium on Earth Rights and Responsibilities: Human Rights and Environmental 
Protection, 18 Yale JIL (1993), 281, at 285; the author considers that the inherently imprecise content of 
the right to environment is not a `significant' problem in the international human rights context, 
considering the fact that international human rights law can be, per definitionem, no more than a set of 
`broad normative standards'. 
(99) It is a collective right under the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the 1994 
Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and an individual human right 
under the 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human, 1986 WCED-EG Legal 
Principles for Environmental Protection and Development and 1995 IUCN Draft Covenant on Sustainable 
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nature(l00), both environmental(1o1) and human rights lawyers(102) question the 
practical utility and desirability, if not the very existence(103), of a, substantive 
generic right to environment(104). 
Development. Besides, as Shelton rightly points out, the right to environment contrasts with existing 
human rights in that it implicates the rights of both current and future generations; Shelton, `Human 
Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to the Environment', 38 Stanford JIL (1991), 103,133- 
134. Hence Port Hope Environmental Group v. Canada communication, supra n. 79, was concerned 
with the right to life, health and property of both present and future generations in relation to the 
dumping of nuclear wastes; see also decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in the matter 
Minors Oposa and Lujan cases, infra n. 152. See also 1986 WCED-EG Legal Principles for 
Environmental Protection and Development, Art. 2. See furthersupra Chap. 4. Intergenerational Equity. 
(100) As a consequence of disagreement on the content of the right to environment; some authors 
consider such right as a social and economic right exclusively, see for instance Krämer, Focus on 
European Environmental Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1992), 4 et sequ. Others assimilate a potential right 
to environment to a solidarity right, but hesitate to qualify solidarity rights as human rights; Boyle, 
supra n. 47, at 48 et sequ. 
(101) Birnie & Boyle, 190 et sequ.; Handl, supra n. 86. 
(102) Alston, 'A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of 
International Human Rights Law? ', 29 Netherlands LR (1982), 307; Alston, 'Conjuring New Human 
Rights: A Proposal For Quality Control', 78 AJIL (1984), 607; Brownlie, 'The Rights of Peoples in 
Modem International Law', in Crawford (cd. ), The Rights of Peoples (Clarendon, 1988), Chap. 1; 
Kooijmans, 'Human Rights 
- 
Universal Panacea ? Some Reflections on the So-called Human Rights of 
the Third Generation', 37 Netherlands JLR (1990), 315; Leighton Schwartz, 'International Legal 
Protection for Victims of Environmental Abuse', Symposium on Earth Rights and Responsibilities: 
Human Rights and Environmental Protection, 18 Yale JIL (1993), 355, at 374-375; McGoldrick, 
`Sustainable Development and Human Rights: An Integrated Conception', 45 ICLQ (1996), 796, at 810 
et sequ. More generally against the 'generational' classification and ranking of human rights, see Meron, 
'On Hierarchy of International Human Rights', 80 AJIL (1986), 1. 
(103) See for instance Handl, supra n. 86, at 125 et sequ. 
(104) A still important number of authors however conclude in favour such generic right. A early case in 
favour such right was made by Gormley, Human Rights and the Environment: The Need for 
International Cooperation (Sijthoff, 1976); see more recently Gormley, 'The Legal Obligation of the 
International Community to Guarantee a Pure and Decent Environment: The Expansion of Human Rights 
Norms', 3 Georgetown IELR (1990), 85; also Brown Weiss' planetary (collective) rights approach, in in 
Fairness to Future Generations, supra n. 59, Chap. IV; Spiry, Protection de 1'environnement et droit 
international des droits de 1'homme 
- 
de la dialectique ä la symbiose', 74 Revue de droit international de 
sciences diplomatiques & politiques (1996), 169. Thorme disagrees with Handl's conclusion that no 
right to environment can be inferred from States practice at the international or the national level, and 
contends on the contrary that there is sufficient evidence in States' practice to support the existence of a 
generic right to environment. Thorme's approach, however, is very theoretical, based on the premise that 
«establishing environment as a human right will make the right to environment as justiciable as other 
previously defined human rights»; the definitional difficulties inherent in the right to environment remain 
pretty much unresolved; 'Establishing Environment as a Human Right', 19 Denver JILP (1991), 301 at 
301. Berat follows a similar approach, and even argues that the right to environment should be 
recognised as a peremptory and overriding rule of international law, «because the survival of the planet 
depends on it»; 'Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Towards a Crime of Geocide in 
International Law', 11 Boston University ILl (1993), 327, at 338. For a more ethical perspective on such 
right, see Blacktone, 'Ethics and Ecology', in Blackstone (cd. ), Philosophy and Environmental Crisis (University of Georgia Press, 1974), 16, at 30 et sequ. Kiss & Shelton share the view that there is a 
value in recognising an independent right to a healthy environment, inter alia in that it would strengthen 
and complement other human rights secured; International Environmental Law, at 22; see however the 
reservation expressed with regards to the clarification of a generic right to environment, Shelton, and Kiss 
supra n. 96. 
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3) Human rights mechanisms have been used essentially in a `remedial way'(105), hence 
confined to those `extreme' cases where human rights violations have already 
occurred as a result of environmental nuisance, without any real attempt being made 
to use those same mechanisms to avoid the violation to take place. 
ii. Towards a More Effective Exploitation of Human Rights Mechanisms to 
Preserve Individual Environmental Interests 
Taking into consideration the above remarks, it appears that a more effective use of 
human rights mechanisms to preserve environmental interests might pass by a more 
extensive use of procedural human rights to complement existing substantive rights. 
More `objective' in their content(106) and more `preventive' in essence, procedural 
human rights might not guarantee a substantive right to a clean environment; but it 
invests individuals with the procedural means to have their interests considered, and 
influence the national decision-making process where such substantive attributes are at 
stake. 
There is no such right to participate in the elaboration of programmes and polities 
recognised in international law in general(107) and in international human or 
environmental law in particular(108). On the other hand, the right to take part in the 
(105) Shelton, `Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to the Environment', 38 Stanford 
JIL (1991), 103, at 136. 
(106) Hence less susceptible to be left to the appreciation of the State as it is often the case for 
substantive rights. From the various individual applications made in relation to nuclear activities, only 
that based on procedural guarantees 
-in that case, the right to a decision reviewed by an independent 
authority- has reached the stage of a consideration on the merits (see Greenpeace Schweiz et al. v. 
Switzerland, supra n. 81) whilst those motivated on violation of substantive rights were all dismissed as 
obviously ill-founded; see cases reviewed supra n. 80. 
(107) See Rqjas-Albonico, Le droit au developpement comme un droit de 1 komme, Ph. D dissertation (Peter Lang, 1984), 159 et sequ. Such a right is only recognised in non-binding documents; see for 
instance 1994 Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Art. 19. The 
importance of public participation in the context of development was particularly acknowledged in the 
1970 Strategy for the Second Development Decade, Paras. 78 and 84; see also 1980 Strategy for the 
Third Development Decade, Para. 51. 
(108) People's right to participate `in the formulation of decisions (or policy) of direct concern to their 
environment' has been recognised in non-binding or draft documents only, 1982 World Charter for 
Nature, Princ. 23; 1995 IUCN Draft Covenant on Environment and Development, Art. 12(3) and (6). 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development avoids once again human rights terminology, 
and states simply that `environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level'; Princ. 10. Some EC Directives establish a certain degree of participation 
in relation to specific issues; see most importantly Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects 
of certain public and private projects on the environment, [19851 OJ L175/40, as amended by Council 
Directive 97/11/EC; Art. 6, requests any public or private projects susceptible of having an impact on the 
environment to be made public and the opportunity left for public comments before the realisation of the 
projects; on which see Douglas-Scott, 'Environmental Rights in the European Union: Participatory 
Democracy or Democratic Deficit? ', in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 6, at 120. It is noteworthy that the 
European Commission has recently rejected as too far reaching further extension of public involvement in 
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direction of public affairs, directly, via freely chosen representatives or through the 
exercise of other civic rights(109) secures a certain degree of participation at a political 
level to individuals (110). The extent to which such human rights provisions apply to 
environmental policy, however, remains unclear(i11)" 
The freedom of expression and the freedom to receive and impart information(112) 
impose a general duty upon States, `not to obstruct access to information which is 
available'(113). It is yet to be decided the extent to which the freedom of information 
under any of the human rights instruments mentioned, guarantees a genuine right of 
access to environmental information. 
The ECHR Court has so far recognised a right of access to certain information related 
inter alia to health and public safety(114) and to privacy(115), upon the restricted 
condition that the exercise of such right would not affect equally important interests of 
other people(116); it denied that the right of information confers a general right of access 
to any requested information(117). A recent application filed by a group of Italian 
women over the failure of Italian authorities to provide information about the risks 
presented by a chemical factory and about the safety measures foreseen in the event of 
an accident raised the more general question of what environmental information is to be 
disclosed under the Convention. The ECHR Commission declared the application 
the scoping phase of impact studies; reported in Sweet & Maxwell's Environmental Law Bulletin, Man~h 
1997,2. In Kramer's view however, EC law falls short of conferring a genuine right to consultation; 
Focus on European Environmental Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1992), 22. 
(109) 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Arts. 19 and 21; 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Arts. 19 and 25; 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, First 
Protocol, Art. 3; 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 23; 1981 African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, Art. 13(1). 
(110) See further Steiner, `Political Participation as a Human Right', 1 Harvard Human Rights 
Yearbook (1989), 77. 
(111) Some authors invoke civic rights to legitimise their claim of a `right of democratic governance', 
including in environmental matters; Tolentino, 'Good Governance Through Popular Participation in 
Sustainable Development' in Ginther et al. (eds. ), Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Martins Nijhof 1995), Chap. 9. 
(112) 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Art. 19; 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Art. 19; 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 10; 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights, Art. 13; 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Art. 9. 
(113) Harris et aL, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Butterworths, 1995), at 379 et 
sequ.; Weber, `Environmental Information and the European Convention on Human Rights', 12 HRIJ (1991), 177, at 179 etsequ. 
(114) Sunday Times v. UK, Ser. A, No 30, Para. 66. 
(115) Gaskin v. UK, Ser. A, No. 160, Para. 49. 
(116) See 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 10(2). 
(117) See ECHR Court in Leander v. Sweden, 1987, Ser. A, No. 116, Para. 74; ECHR Commission in 
Z. v. Austria, Applic. 10392/83,56 D&R (1988), 13. 
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admissible on this ground, but reserved its' opinion on the issue to the decision on the 
merits of the case(l 18)_ 
Outside the strict confines of human rights law, a right of access to environment- 
related information is also recognised in the European Community context(119). The 
need to improve public access to information on the environment was underlined in the 
Fourth Action Programme (1987-1992)(120). A directive was subsequently adopted(121), 
setting general rules and principles which guarantee free access to environmental 
information largo sensu(122) detained both by national Governments authorities and by 
certain private entities supplying public services, regardless of any specific interest(123). 
No similar clear-cut guarantee applies, however, to the Community institutions 
themselves(124) 
(118) Anna Maria Guerra and 39 Others v. Italy, Applic. 14967/89. 
(119) See also 1991 ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, Art. 2(6), committing 
States to establish procedures to allow for the effective participation of the people likely to be affected in 
the impact assessment process. It must be stressed however that, unlike human rights provisions, the 
1991 ECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment commits States not only in respect of their 
own nationals, but also in respect of nationals of potentially affected States. See also information clause in 
Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Art. 7, and the 1993 Convention on Civil 
Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment (arts 14 & 15). See further 
Sands & Werksman, 'Procedural Aspects of International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: 
Citizens' Rights', in Ginther et al. (eds. ), Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Martinus 
Nijhof 1995), Chap. 12, at 180 et sequ.; Bowman, 'The Convention on Civil Liability for Damages 
Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment', 2 Environmental Liability (1994), 11. 
(120) Fourth Action Programme 1987-1992, [1987] OJ C328/1, at 4. 
(121) Directive 90/313/EEC on the Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment, [1990] OJ 
L158/56; reprinted in 1 YbIEL (1990), 492; on which see Hallo, 'Directive 90/313/EEC, on the Freedom 
of Access to Information on the Environment: Its Implementation and Implications', in Hallo (ed. ), 
Access to Environmental Information in Europe (Kluwer Law International, 1996), Chap. 1; Kramer, 'La 
Directive 90/313/CEE sur 1'acc6s ä l'information en matiere d'environnement : genese et perspectives 
d'application', 353 Revue du Marche Commun (1991), 866; Wheeler, The Right to Know in the 
European Union', 3 RECIEL (1994), 1. Similar requirements to provide access to information were made 
with respect to particularenvironmental issues; henceinstance Directive 67/548/EEC, [1967] OJ L196/1, 
as amended by Directive 92/32/EEC on the Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Preparations [1992] 
OJ L154/15, requires the labelling of a range of products to inform product users of risks; Directive 
82/501/EEC, on Major Accidents Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, or Seveso Directive, [ 1982] OJ 
L230/25, Art. 8, that requires firms to inform both national and local officials or risks of accidents and 
safety measures in place to facilitate emergency planning; see further Jans, European Environmental Law, 
(Kluwer Law International, 1995), 288 et sequ. Shelton notes that the wording of Art. 8 of the Seveso 
Directive is sufficiently clear and unconditional, and defines rights that individuals can assert against the 
EC States, and therefore concludes to direct effect of the provision; 'Environmental Rights in the 
European Community', 16 Hastings ICLR (1993) 557, at 578. 
(122) See definition in Directive 90/313/EEC, Art. 2(a). The access is not confined to the information on 
the state of the environment of EC States, and encompasses access to information on exported products 
and installations, as well as information on global environmental issues, such as the ozone layer 
depletion, climate change, or even deforestation; Krämer, supra 121, at 869-70. 
(123) A very similar wording is used in 1995 IUCN Draft Covenant on Environment and Development, 
Art. 12(3). 
(124) Krämer, Focus on European Environmental Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1992), 19 et sequ.; Kramer, 
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The guarantee of access to information might appear, prima facie, more extensive in 
the European Community context than in human rights instruments like the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights(125), in the sense that the access guaranteed is 
independent from any specific legal interest and is not related to any substantive right. 
A closer look at the conditions under which such right can be derogated or limited, 
however, tends to suggest otherwise. Unlike human rights instruments, which usually 
subordinate any derogation to their provisions to the double requirements of necessity 
and proportionality, the EEC Directive 90/313 on the Freedom of Access to 
Information on the Environment, and other Directives providing for a limited access to 
information, require no weighing of interests when applying one of the exhaustively 
listed causes of restriction of such right(126). Whilst some of these EEC Directives could 
be interpreted as conferring a human right to environmental information(127), there are 
serious discrepancies among States in the degree of transposition of such 'right' in the 
domestic legal order. Some States recognise no general right to environmental 
information(128), whilst others secure limited rights(129), or indeed full-fledged rights to 
environmental information(130) 
supra 121, at 869. 
, (125) Despite the fact that the 1992 EU Treaty explicitly provides that «The Union shall respect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms recognised by the Convention on the Safeguard of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the EC is not per se a party to the 1951 European Convention on Human 
Rights, and the extent to which ECHR standards are'incorporated' into the European Community legal 
order remains a controversial issue; the European Court of Justice however makes references to the 
Convention, although not explicitly to the case-law of ECHR organs; see further on that question, 
Shelton, `Environmental Rights in the European Community', 16 Hastings ICLR (1993) 557, at 558 et 
sequ.; Weatherill & Beaumont, EC Law, 2nd edn (Peguin, 1995), 254 et sequ. 
(126) Exhaustive list of exceptions to the principle of freeaccess in Directive 90/313/EEC, Art. 2(2); see 
however restrictive reading of the exception in EC Case T-194, John Carvel and Guardian Newspapers 
Ltd V. Council of the European Union, reported in 5 EELR (1996), 23. 
(127) See Krlmer, supra n. 121, at 871 et sequ.; Shelton, `Environmental Rights in the European 
Community', 16 Hastings ICLR (1993) 557, at 573; Wheeler, ibid. supra n. 121; Weber, 
'Environmental Information and the European Convention on Human Rights', 12 HRLJ (1991), 177, at 
183; Weber only refersto a right of access to environmental information, although his way of presenting 
such right tends to suggest that he regards it as a human right. Shelton seems to endorse the view that (a) 
the right to information provided under the various EEC Directives mentioned above, n. 124, must be 
interpreted `in the sense of a human right', and (b) the relevant provisions of the EC Directives have a 
direct effect, and could give rise to a right to compensation by a State in case of failure to duly implement 
the Directives at the domestic level, as provided by the European Court of Justice in the Francovich case; 
Shelton, ibid., at 578 et sequ., and EEC Joined Cases C-6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v. Italy, [1991] ECR 
1-5987. 
(128) For instance Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the UK. 
(129) For instance Denmark, France, Italy and the Netherlands. 
(130) Greece, Portugal and Spain; see Douglas-Scott, `Environmental Rights in the European Union: 
Participatory Democracy or Democratic Deficit? ', in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 6, at 117; Wheeler, 
supra n. 121, at 2 et sequ. See also detailed review of the regime of access to environmental information 
in the 'EU of the 12' in Hallo (ed. ), supra n. 121, Part II, in the new European States (Austria, Finland 
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Finally, the right to a fair trial, interpreted by the ECHR Court as securing anyone 
the right to challenge a decision (131) that would affect his/her rights under private 
law(132) before an independent and impartial tribunal, offers a certain guarantee of taking 
into consideration individual environmental (or non environmental) interests in the 
decision-making process, insofar as those interests are related to some other human 
rights guaranteed under the Convention(133). The fair trial provision has both preventive 
and remedial functions, but remains purely procedural. As rightly underlined by 
Churchill, the fair trial provision «does not provide any substantive criteria for 
adjudication and would not, for example, require the tribunal «to weigh the proposed 
development against environmental interests in a particular way, but would merely 
require it to adjudicate on the basis of whatever national law was applicable»(134). 
An increasing number of scholars argue that, should a right to environment be 
recognised, it would be `procedural' or `participatory', rather than substantive. Under 
this view, environmental rights would complement `classic' procedural human rights 
provisions and secure access to environmental justice and participation in environmental 
decision-making (including access to information)(135). Such an approach was reflected 
and Sweden), ibid. Part III, and in selected central and east European States, ibid. Part IV. 
Access to environmental information was considerably enlarged in the US after December 1984 Bhopal 
tragedy, with the enactment of the 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 
codified at USC Sect. 11001-11050; see a very brief review in Robbins, 'Doing Business in the 
Sunshine: Public Access to Environmental Information in the United States', 3 RECIEL (1994), 26. 
(131) It exists no right to challenge a policy in general, but only decisions, probably including plans or 
projects, taken on the basis of a given policy. 
(132) Ringeisen v. Austria, 1971, Ser. A, No 13, Para. 94; KÖnig v. FRG, 1978, Ser. A No. 27, Para 
95; see further on the definition of civil rights, Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Butterworths, 1995), at 174 et sequ. 
(133) A breach of the fair trial provision was found for instance by the ECHR Courtin Zander v. Sweden, 
1993, Ser. A, No. 279B; Fredin v. Sweden, supra n. 85; de Gcoufre de la Pradelle v. France, 1992, 
Ser. A, No. 253-B. The fair trial argument was dismissed by the ECHR Court in Oerlemans v. the 
Netherlands, supra n. 85; and by the ECHR Commission in Braggs v. UK, Applic. 9310/81 see Sands 
& Werksman, 'Procedural Aspects of International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: 
Citizens' Rights', in Ginther et a!. (eds. ), Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Martinus 
Nijhofg 1995), Chap. 12, at 197 et sequ. 
(134) Churchill, 'Environmental Rights in Existing Human Rights Treaties', in Boyle & Anderson, 
Chap. 5, at 96. 
(135) Birnie & Boyle, 194 et sequ.; Boyle, 'The Role of International Human Rights Law in the 
Protection of the Environment', in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 3, at 59 et sequ.; Douglas-Scott, 
'Environmental Rights in the European Union: Participatory Democracy or Democratic Deficit? ', in 
Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 6; Kiss, 'Environnement et D6veloppement ou Environnement de Survie7', 2 
JDl (1991), 263, at 267; McGoldrick, 'Sustainable Development and Human Rights: An Integrated 
Conception', 45 ICLQ (1996), 796, at 810 et sequ.; Sands & Werksman, 'Procedural Aspects of 
International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Citizens' Rights', in Ginther et al. (eds. ), 
Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), Chap. 12; See also Handl, 
supra n. 86; Handl firmly reasserted his position in a paper on 'Human Rights and the Environment', 
which he delivered at the Spring Conference of the International Law Association, British Branch, on 
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in the most recent draft and non-binding statements of the right to environment, which 
focus on its procedural implications without elaborating further on its potential 
substantive implications(136). 
iii. Strength and Weakness of the Human Rights Mechanisms in Protecting 
Environmental Interests 
Human rights mechanisms could, to a certain extent, make up for the failure of classic 
environmental rules to duly integrate the environmental values and interests of 
individuals. First and foremost, it endows individuals with locus standi to take action 
against their national State for failing to respect or protect the domestic environment, 
thereby closing a loophole of classic `transboundary' environmental rules, and 
introducing a certain degree of environmental accountability from States(137): 
«Where [the argument a right to a decent environment] is likely to have 
most impact is in those cases where protection of a state's own environment 
is affected, since in general states have greater freedom under existing law to 
`Transnational Environmental Litigation and International Perspective', held in Nottingham, on 9-10 
May 1997. He suggested that the `right to environment' had to be construed as a functional right, as a 
'right to raise concern'. 
(136) See for instance 1992 Rio Declaration on the Environment, Princ. 10, which underlines that 
«[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens at the relevant 
level», and further recalls the importance of information, public awareness and effective access to judicial 
and administrative proceeding, 1992 Agenda 21 provides nowhere for a right to environment, but 
extensively refers to the active involvement of people in general, and specific groups in particular; supra 
n. 1 and n. 168. See also the Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, proposed by the 
Special Rapporteur for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities in her Final Report on Human Rights and the Environment, supra; the Draft Principles are 
appended to Boyle's contribution in Boyle & Anderson, at 65. Likewise, 1995 IUCN Draft Covenant on 
Environment and Development, Art. 12, only briefly states that everyone is bestowed with the right to an 
healthy environment (Para. 1) and the correlated duty to preserve the environment (Para. 2), and, without 
giving further indications of the standards to be applied to assess such substantive rights and obligations, 
apart from the necessity to «... respect and ensure (... ) the satisfaction of basic human needs, in particular 
the provision of potable waten»; (Para. 5). On the other hand, Art. 12 elaborate on the procedural 
dimensions of a right to environment, and refers to informational rights (Para. 3), access to judicial and 
administrative proceedings (Para. 4), and generally the involvement of indigenous peoples and local 
communities (Para. 6). Likewise, the draft Covenant on Global Environmental Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Natural Resources, prepared by environmental law experts of 43 States attending the 
World Conference of environmental law associations, Limoges, 1990, provides for a human right to a 
clean environment, yet a) elaborates the substance of the right referring exclusively to States' correlative, 
and b) stresses more the participative aspect of such `right' than the substantive subjective aspects 
thereof. The Draft Covenant, which otherwise follows closely the recommendation put forwards by 
WCED-EG, is reproduced in Declaration de Limoges, Rapport de la Reunion mondiale des associations 
de droit de 1'environnement, 13-15 November 1990, Limoges (Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), 
at 119 et sequ. See also 1982 World Charter for Nature, Princ. 23. 
(137) One should underline however that such loophole has already been addressed in certain 
environmental treaties, for instance with the introduction of the environmental impact assessment 
requirement (supra Chap. 3/4/iii. Prior Environmental Impact Assessment) or with the endorsement of 
the principle of national treatment for claims brought by the citizen of another State, as it is for instance 
under the 1974 Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment. 
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manage their internal problems as they please. »(138) 
States' competence with respect to their own environment, albeit still largely 
unrestricted under international environmental law, finds some limits in international 
human rights law, which can, in certain instances, be enforced by individuals directly. 
Secondly, contrary to environmental responsibility or liability mechanisms, the 
resort to human rights procedures is'not conditioned by the complex demonstration of 
the relation of causation between a given risk, action or product, and the actual or 
potential harm to the environment(139)_ Human rights procedures imply a demonstration 
that the potential or actual environmental harm infringes a protected interest of the 
applicant(140). 
The use of human rights mechanisms is also associated with a number of 
disadvantages, all related to the predominantly individualistic approach characteristic of 
the most human rights instruments and often inappropriate in the context of 
environmental protection(141). Conceived originally to'' protect discriminated 
groups(142), international human rights have evolved into predominantly individual 
prerogatives; the protection of collective rights and interests has become the exception 
rather than the rule(143). The fundamental characteristics of groups, such as race, 
(138) Birnie & Boyle, at 189; also Boyle, ibid supra n. 135, at 53; Handl, 'Human Rights and the 
Environment', paper delivered at ILA British Branch, 'Transnational Environmental Litigation and 
International Perspective', Spring Conference, Nottingham, 9-10 May 1997; Shelton, 'Human Rights, 
Environmental Rights, and the Right to the Environment', 38 Stanford JIL (1991), 103, at 138. On the 
failure of 'old' environmental rules to apply to `domestic' environment, and the difficulty to adopt more 
intrusive rules see supra Chap. 2/2/ iii. Sovereignty over Environmental Resources and Environmental 
Policies versus of Globalisation of Environmental Standards and Policies. 
(139) Anderson, ` Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview', in Boyle & 
Anderson, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon, 1996), Chap. 1. On the 
difficulty inherent in the demonstration of such causality link in environmental responsibility and 
liability cases, see supra Chap. 3/3/ iii. Causality Link Between the Object and the Harm/Risk; see also 
the concrete illustrations in Harding, 'Practical Human Rights, NGOs and the Environment in 
Malaysia', in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 11. 
(140) Desagne, supra n. 72, at 285. 
(141) Handl, supra n. 138. Waldron considers more generally that the individualistic language of human 
rights is inappropriate to preserve communal (viz. collective) aspirations enshrined in third generation 
rights and that include the right to environment; supra n. 93, at 314 et sequ. 
(142) On the origins and development of human rights as collective rights, see inter alia Dinstein, 
'Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities', 25 ICLQ (1976), 102; Ermacora, 'The Protection 
of Minorities Before the United Nations', 182 RdC (1983-IV), 247; Lerner, 'From Protection of 
Minorities to Group Rights', 18 Israel Yb Human Rights (1988), 101; and Group Rights and 
Discrimination in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), Chap. 1; Muldoon, 'The Development of 
Group Rights', in Sigler (ed. ), Minority Rights, A Comparative Analysis (Greenwood Press, 1983) 
Chap. 3; Thornberry, 'Is There a Phoenix in the Ashes ?- International Law and Minority Rights', 15 
Texas ILI (1980), 421. 
(143) The 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, often mentioned as an example of 
protection of collective rights, is worded both in terms of individual and peoples' rights, and it remains 
unclear how farpeoples' rights are implemented qua group rights, or in their individual component; see 
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religion, language, origin or culture, are most frequently considered and preserved on an 
individual basis, via general non-discrimination clauses(144). Consequently, 
implementing organs have systematically reasoned in terms of conflict of individual 
versus collective interests, thereby preserving a large margin of appreciation to States in 
the balancing of those interests. On the other hand, the organs have rarely sought to 
balance conflicting collective interests. Yet, as stressed by one author, environmental 
`conflict' cannot necessarily be reduced to a matter of individual interest versus 
society's interest: 
«[J]ust as there are rights which are essentially individual, i. e. that can 
be protected only in the individual himself, there are also rights that can be 
best protected through a group', particularily in the case of 'group 
victimization'. Environmental interests are clearly group interests inasmuch 
as individual interests. ) )(145) 
On the contrary, environmental conflicts often arise as a result of a tension between 
society's (collective) interest versus state (collective) interest, or between two 
conflicting collective interests of the society, such as the economic or social interest 
versus environmental necessity. In this context, classic human rights mechanisms 
appear prima facie ill-suited to secure due consideration for environmental interests for 
the following reasons: 
First of all, only those entities or individuals whose protected individual interest has 
been, or could be, adversely affected by environmental degradation or pollution for 
instance, have the locus standi to bring a claim under existing human rights enforcement 
procedures. There can be no human rights action based on pure environmental grounds 
Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples In Modern International Law' and Crawford, 'The Rights of Peoples: 
Teoples' or'Governments'?, in Crawford (ed. ), The Rights of Peoples (Clarendon, 1988), Chap. I and 4. 
More particularily of indigenous peoples as a 'group': Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particularily 
Indigenous Populations)', and Nettheim, "Peoples' and 'Populations': Indigenous People and the Rights 
of Peoples', in Crawford (ed. ), ibid., Chap. 2 and 7; Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in 
International Law, supra n. 142, Chap. V. For a catalogue of possible group rights, see Lerner, ibid., at 
34 et sequ. Even the right to self-determination, prima facie a clearly collective right, has not been 
clearly qualified as such; the Human Right Committee has remained undecided on the question, see A. D. 
v. Canada (1984), Communic. No R19/78, Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. 2 
(Seventeenth to Thirty-second sessions), 23. The Arbitration Commission of the Conference on 
Yugoslavia (so-called Badinter Commission) apparently construes the self-determination as an individual 
prerogative; see Opinion No. 2,11 January 1992; 921LR (1993), 167, at 168-69. 
(144) See 1945 UN Charter, Art. 1(3); 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Art. 2(1) and Art. 
7; 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts. 2(1) and 26; 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights, Art. 14; 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, Arts. 1 and 24; 
1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Arts. 2,3 and 19. On the rule of non 
discrimination, see Lerner, supra n. 142, Chap. 2 (at 24 et sequ. ). 
(145) Cancado Trindade, The Contribution of Human Rights Law to Environmental Protection, With 
Specific Reference to Global Environmental Change', in Brown Weiss (ed. ), Environmental Change and 
International Law: New Challenges and Dimensions, United Nations University Press, 1992), Chap. 9. 
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brought forwards regardless of, or even against, individual interests(146), nor can there 
be an action to vindicate the collective interests of society as a whole(147). The 
possibility of actio popularis is ruled out under most human rights mechanisms; 
individual applications under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are 
reserved to the actual victim(148); the Human Rights Committee, however, have shown 
some flexibility in its interpretation of this requirement, and does not request from the 
applicant to prove the alleged violation at the admissibility stage, contenting itself with 
prima facie evidence of the violation(149). Likewise, only the actual victim, and under 
strict conditions prospective victim, may act under the ECHR system(150). Under the 
(146) On the inherent ` antropocentricity' of human rights mechanism to protect the environment, see 
Birne & Boyle, at 193; Boyle, ibid supra n. 135, at 51; Redgwell, 'Life, the Universe and Everything : 
A Critique of Antropocentric Rights' in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 4. 
(147) Handl, supra n. 86, at 133 et sequ. 
(148) See 1966 Optional Protocol Additional to the Covenant. The Human Rights Committee 
underlined that the main characteristic of the actio popularis does not pertain to the number of applicants, 
but to the lack of individual interest of the applicants; see E. W. et al. v. Netherlands (1993), Communic. 
No. 429/1990, CCPR/C/47/429/1990, Annexe. The application was filed by a group of 6588 Dutch 
citizens, and alleged that the decision of the Netherlands to consent to the deployment of nuclear missiles 
on the national territory amounts to a violation of 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Art. 6. 
(149) SeeAumeeruddy-Cziffravv. Mauritius (Mauritius Women case) (1981), Communic. No 35/1978, 
SelectedDecisions of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. 1 (Second to Sixteenth sessions), 67; Lovelace 
v. Canada (1986), Communic. No 112/1981, SelectedDecisions of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. 
2 (Seventeenth to Thirty-second sessions), 28; Broeks v. Netherlands (1987), Communic. No. 172/1984, 
Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. 2 (Seventeenth to Thirty-second sessions), 
196; extracts of the three cases reprinted in Harris, Cases and Materials, at 467 et sequ. The Committee 
equally displayed a certain degree of open-mindedness to Canada's application on the behalf of 'represent 
and future generations, although it did not directly decided on the locus standi of persons acting 
exclusively on behalf of future generations as some authors of the applications were living persons; Port 
Hope Environmental Group v. Canada, supra n. 79. The Committee however returned to a strict 
interpretation of quality of victim in the case of Bordes & Temeharo v France, Communic. No 645/1995, 
supra n. 80. See also A. D. v. Canada, supra n. 143; the application of the representative of a tribal 
community was dismissed for failure to demonstrate that the applicant was 'personally victim' of the 
alleged violation. 
(150) ECHR Court's Rules of Procedure; also Klass v. Germany, Ser. A, No 28 (1978), Para. 34. The 
Court however has constantly stressed that the existence of a violation was conceivable even without an 
actual prejudice, as long as the prospective or potential victim can demonstrate the risk of being injured; 
Marckxv. Belgium, Ser. A, No 31 (1979), Para. 27; Soeringsv. UK, Ser. A, No 161 (1989), Para. 85. In 
the Tauira case, supra n. 80, the Commission explicitly stated the Convention does not allow for actio 
popularis, and requests for the exercise individual right of action that «le requerant se pr6tende de 
maniere plausible lui-meme victime directe ou indirecte d'une violation dc la convention 
... 
w, the 
Commission defined 'plausible' as allegation made «de manic defendable ou circonstanci6e, que faute de 
precautions suffisantes prises par les autorites, le degrr de probabilitC de survenance d'un dommage est tel 
qu'il puisse titre considCr6 comme constitutif d'une violation, A condition que l'acte incriminC n'ait pas 
des repercussions trop lointaines»; in 18 Revue Universelle de Droits de I'Homme (1996), 315, at 322. In 
the recent Balmer-Schafroth & Others V. Switzerland application, that concerned the increase in the 
activity of the very controversial Muhleberg nuclear power station, the Court recognised the quality of 
prospective victims to a group of citizen who lived nearby the station but had not been actually affected 
(yet) by the running thereof. The Court however dismissed the allegation of the violation of article 6(1) 
ECHR on the ground that the applicants had failed to demonstrate 'personal exposure' to imminent 
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African mechanism only the alleged victim is admitted to file an application(151). The 
Inter-American system is more liberal in that respect and provides for a compulsory 
individual petition procedure and admits anonymous application or actio popularis(152). 
At the domestic level, certain legal systems know an actio popularis for environmental 
matters(153), whilst others adopt a restrictive interpretation of the actual injury 
component of the locus standi(154). Of particular interest to international environmental 
lawyers is the Philippine Supreme Court's recent decision to grant a certiorari to an 
application filed by a group of children, acting on their own right as well as in the 
interest of both present and future generations, against the decision of the Government 
to renew timber license agreements leading in the long term, to the over exploitation of 
danger, applic. No 67/1996/686/676, judgement of 26 August 1997; noted at EHRLR (1998), 94. 
(151) Rules of Procedures of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. 
(152) 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 41. 
(153) See for instance public interests litigation under the Swiss Federal Law on the Protection of Nature 
and Landscape (Art. 12), 1 July 1966, Recueil Syst6matique des Lois Federales 451; Swiss Federal Law 
on the Protection of the Environment (Art. 55), 7 October 1983, Recueil Systematique des Lois 
Federales 841.01; this provision is not affected by the proposed amendments to the Law on the 
Protection of the Environment, submitted to the Federal Chambers in 1996; draft amendments reproduced 
in Feuille F6derale 1996 1237. See also public interest litigation in India; review of relevant case-law in 
Anderson, 'Individual Rights to Environmental Protection in India', in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 10. 
See also brief reference to relevant provisions in Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Portugal in Shelton, 'Environmental Rights in the European Community', 16 Hastings 
ICLR (1993) 557, at 580, n. 112. 
(154) See for instance the US. In a leading environmental case, dating back from 1972, US Supreme 
Court, without rejecting the right to conservation of the environment per se, denied locus standi to a 
well-known environment conservation group, to oppose, on environmental grounds, the realisation of a 
recreational complex in the Mineral King Valley, Sierra Nevada Mountains, in California. The Court 
considered that the Club, though committed to conservation of natural heritage, did not have an actual 
interest that would be affected should the development plan be realised; Sierra Club v. Morton (Secretary 
of the Interior of the US), 405 US 727,19 April 1972. See Stone's famed article on the legal rights of 
natural objects inspired on that case, 'Should Trees Have Standing 7', 45 Southern California LR 
(1972), 450. Soon after, the US Congress passed the 1973 Endangered Species Act, which bestows upon 
`any person' the right and capacity to enforce the Act. Yet recently, US Supreme Court, in a much 
publicised decision in the case Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, reversed the ruling of the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and advocated a narrow interpretation of the actual-injury component of the standing 
requirements under the Act mentioned above, and decided that the actual injury must be, cumulatively, 
(1) current or imminent, (2) affectthe applicant personally, Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 91 F 2d 117 
(8th Cir. 1990); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), 119 L Ed 2d 351; on which see Just, 
'Intergenerational Standing under the Endangered Species Act: Giving Back the Right to Biodiversity 
after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife', 71 Tulane LR (1996), 597. US restrictive interpretation of the 
actual injury component is based on a no less restrictive interpretation of the separation of powers under 
US Constitution Art. III, Sect. 2, which provides that judicial powers extend to cases and controversies. 
For a detailed comparative examination of the legal means of public interest action opened to 
environmental NGOs in Switzerland and the US, see Tanquerel, Les voies de droit des organisations 
ecologistes en Suisse et aux Etats-Unis (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1996). See further examples of 
restrictive interpretation of locus standi in Sands, 'Applying EC Environmental Law: Obstacles to 
Citizen Enforcement', A Report from the Dicey Conference, Oxford, 15-16 March 1994; Ormond, 
'"Access to Justice" for Environmental NGOs in the European Union', in Deimann & Dyssli (eds. ), 
Environmental Rights, Law Litigation and Access to Justice (Cameron May, 1995), Chap. 6. 
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Philippine rainforests. The Supreme Court, drawing directly upon the 'highest law of 
mankind', supported the view that (a) the right to a clean environment was a substantive 
and operable right, specific enough to be enforced into court, and (b) that the children 
had the locus standi to act for themselves, for their generation and for future generations. 
It was already mentioned that the case was finally not decided on the merit(155). Human 
rights protection of environmental value remains partial in every meaning of the term; 
clearly, «not all issues can be resolved in the simple language of rights»(156), neither can 
every right be conceived in purely individual terms(157). 
Another reasons for human rights mechanisms being sometimes ill-suited to ensure 
full consideration of all environmental interests pertains to the fact that the well- 
founded character of individual application depends on the weighing of the individual 
interests of the applicant versus the collective interests or common interests of the 
society. Apart from the fact that such an approach rests upon an over-reductive and 
individualistic conception of environmental conflicts and focuses only on one possible 
source of tension, human rights bodies are quite understandably reluctant to favour 
individual interests over the common interest(158). 
It is also clear that whilst an individual environmental interest might not be 
sufficiently compelling, or indeed in certain cases even relevant, to override a conflicting 
collective interest, the common environmental interest of the society or part of the 
society could be so. Yet in classic human rights mechanisms, such `common' interest is 
not taken into consideration to support individual application but only to oppose it(159), 
as if individual and collective interests were inherently antithetical(160). Paraphrasing 
Waldron, it could be argued that the integrity of the environment is not only a condition 
predicated of individuals; it also and essentially applies to entire societies or groups and, 
(155) Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, July 30, 
1993; 33 ILM (1994), 173; on which see Allen 'The Philippine Children's Case: Recognizing Legal 
Standing for Future Generations', 6 Georgetown ILR (1994), 713; La Vifia, 'The Right to a Sound 
Environment in the Philippines: The Significance of the Minors Oposa Case', 3 RECIEL (1994), 246; 
see further supra Chap. 4/3/ii. Legal Basis for a Planetary Trust: Intergenerational Equity as a 
Fundamental Principle Deeply Rooted in International Law. 
(156) Anderson, 'Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview', in Boyle & 
Anderson, Chap. 1, at 22. 
(157) Triggs, The Rights of Peoples' and Individual Rights: Conflict or HarmonyT in Crawford (ed. ), 
The Rights of Peoples (Clarendon, 1988), Chap. 9, at 145-46. This is particularily well epitomised by 
the position of the ECHR Court in the Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium (Merits), Ser. A, No 6 (1968), 1 E11RR (1979/1980), 252. 
(158) See supra 3/i. Use of Human Rights Procedures to Preserve Individual Environmental 
Interests. 
(159) Waldron, supra n. 93, at 309 et sequ. 
(160) For a demonstration of the contrary, se Triggs, ibid. supra n. 157. 
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in certain cases, to the entire world(161). Classic human rights mechanisms might thus 
appropriately preserve environmental values insofar as predicated of individuals, whilst 
they are ill-suited to protect environmental values predicated of an entire group(162). 
The recognition of a right to a clean and healthy environment as a group right would be 
of little avail to preserve collective environmental interests, considering that, as it is, 
group rights are preserved essentially on an individual basis, that is in terms of 
individual interest of the members of the group, rather than on a genuine collective basis, 
in terms of the collective interest of the group(163). As to procedural human rights, they 
offer, as such, no guarantee as to weight attributed to environmental considerations(164). 
Thirdly, human right mechanisms introduce some elements of accountability from the 
State to individuals under its jurisdiction, but provide no real remedy to individuals who 
are not under the source state jurisdiction with respect to the transboundary effects of 
the source state action. Unless of course it is agreed that human rights instruments bind 
States beyond their national borders(165). 
4. Women Participation and Women Interests Clauses in Environmental 
Documents: Desirable or Regrettable Evolution? 
As alluded to in the introduction of this Chapter, express reference to women's needs 
or/and interests (women clauses) have become an increasingly common feature of recent 
environmental documents. 1992 Agenda 21 is perhaps the most striking example: it 
devotes an entire Chapter to women alone(166), and contains as a whole over 140 
(161) Waldron, supra n. 93, at 297-97. 
(162) Waldron, supra n. 93, at 314-15. 
(163) See supra n. 144. This is without mentioning the difficulty to identify the 'group' holder of a right 
to a clean environment, which could reveal even more complex than the identification of the individual 
holders. For the purpose of the distinction between collective and individual right, Van Boven defines the 
group as «une collectivite de personnes qui ont des caracteristiques particulibres et distinctes et/ou qui se 
trouve dans une situation ou des conditions particuli6res». These special and distinct characteristics can 
be «d'ordre racial, ethnique, national, linguistique ou religieuxo, and the specific situation or particular 
conditions could result from «facteurs politiques, 6conomiques, sociaux et culturels»; 'Crit&res de 
distinction des droits de l'homme', in Vasak (ed. ), Les dimensions internationales des droits de 1'homme 
(UNESCO, 1978), at 60. 
(164) See supra 3/ii. Towards a More Effective Exploitation of Human Rights Mechanisms to 
Preserve Individual Environmental Interests. 
(165) Chapman, 'Symposium Overview', Symposium on Earth Rights and Responsibilities: Human 
Rights and Environmental Protection, 18 Yale JIL (1993), 215, at 225; see however 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2(1); 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 1; 
1969 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 1(1); no such 'jurisdiction' or 'nationality' clause is 
contained in African Charter on Human and Peoples'Rights. 
(166) Chapter 23 
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references to women(167) both in relation to environmental and developmental 
issues(168). 
Scholars have carefully avoided addressing the issue of the legal justification for 
`women clauses' in international environmental law; the general analyses of the one or 
the other instruments containing a women clause remain remarkably cautious and 
superficial, if not completely silent on the issue(169). On the other hand, great focus is 
(167) According to Bretherton, `Gender and Environmental Change, Are Women the Key to 
Safeguarding the Planet? ', in Vogler & Imber (eds. ), The Environment & International Relations 
(Routledge, 1996), Chap. 6, at 100. 
(168) Women are particularly referredto in relation to poverty eradication (see Paras. 3.2 to 3.9); change 
in consumption patterns (Para. 4.27); demography and population control (Paras 5.12,5.16,5.17,5.21, 
5.28,5.33,5.34,5.37,5.44 to 46,5.48 to 5.53,5.62); promotion and protection of human health 
(Paras. 6.8,6.11,6.13,6.18,6.21,6.23,6.24,6.27,6.29 to 31,6.33); human settlement (Paras. 7.4, 
7.16,7.20,7.26,7.28,7.30,7.45,7.51,7.76,7.77); decision-making process on social, economic and 
environmental issues (Paras. 8.5,8.10,8.25,8.45,8.49); management of land resources (Paras. 10-5, 
10.10,10.11,10.16); deforestation(11.1,11.3,11.13,11.18,11.27); desertification and drought (Paras. 
12.14,12.24,12.28,12.37,12.56 to 58); mountain ecosystems (Paras. 13.11,13.16,13.17,13.21); 
agriculture and rural development (Paras. 14.14,14.17,14.18,14.27,14.81,14.91); biodiversity (Paras. 
15.4,15.5); biotechnology (Paras. 16.13,16.14); protection of seas and oceans (Paras. 17.15,17.81, 
17.93,17.94); freshwater resources (Paras. 18.9,18.12,18.19,18.22,18.33,18.34,18.44,18.45, 
18.48,18.50,18.53,18.54,18.59,18.62,18.68,18.76,18.80); management of toxic chemicals (Para. 
19.22), hazardous wastes (Paras. 20.20,20.26 to 28), and solid wastes (Paras. 21.19,21.25,21.46). 
Women are also referred to in sections devoted to other major groups, namely children (Paras. 25.5, 
25.8,25.9,25.14); indigenous people (Para. 26.9); local authorities (Para. 28.2); workers (Paras. 29.7); 
business and industry (Paras. 30.1,30.17,30.24); scientific and technological community (Para. 31.4); 
farmers (Paras. 32.2,32.4 to 32.6,32.8,32.14). See also Paras. 33.8 (financial resources and 
mechanisms), 34.3 and 34.14 (transfer of environmentally sound technology and capacity building), 
35.21 and 35.25 (science), 36.4,36.5,36.10,36.13 (education and training), 37.5 (national mechanism 
and international cooperation for capacity-building in developing countries), 38.14 and 38.19 
(international institutional arrangements), 38.25 and 38.42 (UNDP), and 40.8 and 40.11 (information for 
decision-making). 
See also references made in 1992 Biodiversity Convention, 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, 1992 Forestry Principles, and 1994 Desertification Convention, supra n. 3. No reference to 
women is made in 1995 IUCN Draft Covenant on Environment and Development, nor in 1986 WCED- 
EG Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Development. 
(169) See for instance Bekhechi, 'Une nouvelle dtape dans le developpement du droit international dc 
1'environnement: La convention sur la desertification', 101 RGDIP (1997), 5; Burhenne-Guilmin & 
Casey-Lefcowitz, `The Convention on Biological Diversity: A Hard Won Global Achievement', 3 
Yb1EL (1992), 43; Chandler, 'The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the 
International Lawyer', 4 Colorado JIELP (1993), 141; Kovar, 'A Short Guide to Rio Declaration', 4 
Colorado JIELP (1993), 119; Panjabi, 'From Stockholm to Rio: A Comparison of the Declaratory 
Principles of International Environmental Law', 21 Denver JILP (1993), 215; Porras, 'The Rio 
Declaration: A New Basis for International Cooperation', in Sands (ed. ), Greening International Law 
(Earthscan, 1993), Chap. 2; Yusuf, 'International Law and Sustainable Development: The Convention on 
Biological Diversity', 2 African YbIL (1994), 109. Handl tried very cautiously to reflect upon women 
clauses in environmental documents at the recent ILA/UK Conference on 'Transnational Environmental 
Litigation and International Perspective', but confined his presentation to generalities, admitting 
subsequently his great perplexity with regard to the legal justification and implications of such clauses; 
'Human Rights and the Environment', paper delivered at ILA British Branch, 'Transnational 
Environmental Litigation and International Perspective', Spring Conference, Nottingham, 9-10 May 
1997. An enlightening contribution generally to the issue of women's role in environment and 
development was made by Housman, 'The Muted Voice: The Role of Women in Sustainable 
Development', 4 Georgetown IELR (1992), 361, more particularly 373 et sequ. 
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often laid on factual evidence of the involvement of women in environment-related 
matters both at the national and international levels(170). 
A series of detailed studies and surveys made since the mid 1970s(171) show that a 
majority of women in developing countries assume most of the vital functions to assure 
the daily sustenance of the household and the community. These functions traditionally 
attributed to women, such as water(172) and fuelwood(173) collection, and subsistence 
(170) Housman for instance, focused his article on US policy towards the empowerment of women in 
development, and did not try to provide legal justifications on women clauses in environmental law 
instruments, relying rather on the `factual' relationship between women and the environment briefly 
described above in the main text. Likewise, Bretherton focuses on social facts and needs, and gender 
relations theory, without trying to identify the real message of the 147 clauses she has identified in 1992 
Agenda 21; ibid supra n. 167, Chap. 6; no further indication is given by Pevato, 'Women's Rights, the 
Environment and Agenda 21', 2 Development (1994), 17. Joyner & Little on the other hand, seem to 
attribute the referenceto women in international environmental law to the emerging feminist perspective 
of international environmental law, `It's Not Nice to Fool Mother Nature! The Mystique of Feminist 
Approach to International Environmental Law', 14 Boston University ILI (1996), 223. Joyner & Little 
raise but fail to answer the central question whether 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Princ. 20, «genuinely and sufficiently endorse[s] equal gender participation in `sustainable 
development' ? or are these 'soft' legal principles mere rhetorical aspirations which male- dominated 
governments have little actual intention of achieving? »; ibid., at 258. 
(171) The first real comprehensive data desegregated by sex were collected to review and appraise the 
achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985), at the occasion of the 1985 Third 
World Conference on Women, held in Nairobi; the data collected have been since then regularly updated. 
A first document was published in 1985 by the Division for the Advancement of Women (at the time, a 
division of the Center for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs), to appraise the role of women in 
development, the factors enhancing them or impede them; whilst the original document remained 
essentially descriptive, the subsequent updates are more analytical; 1989 World Survey on the Role of 
Women in Development (UN, 1989) (hereafter, 1989 World Survey). Two compendiums oileringa detailed 
perspective on the status of women world-wide were also prepared by UN Department of International 
Economic and Social Affairs after the 1985 Third World Conference on Women, which both cover the 
period 1970-1990; Compendium of Statistics and Indicators on the Situation of Women 1986, Series K 
No. 5 (UN, 1989) (hereafter, 1986 Compendium on the Situation of Women). The World's Women 1970- 
1990, Trends and Statistics, Series K No. 8 (UN, 1991) (hereafter, The World's Women 1970-1990). An 
updated version of the latter compendium was prepared for the 1995 Fourth World Conference on 
Women; The World's Women 1995, Trends and Statistics, Series K No. 12 (UN, 1995) (hereafter, The 
World's Women 1995). All the above studies disclose, with figures, the importance of women's 
contribution to social development, including the management of the environment, and provide more 
generally enlightening details on the status of women at the national and world-wide levels. 
(172) A series offragmentary data collected between 1970 and 1995 shows that rural women spend daily 
a median time of 0.6 hours (viz. 36 minutes) in the wet season for drawing and carrying water, and up to 
thrice that time during the dry season; The World's Women 1995, at 50, Chart 2.13. Whereas in Burkina 
Faso, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nepal, or Pakistan for instance, women devote `no more than' 5 hours weekly 
for water collection, women in what was Yemen Arab Republic, or Nigeria might need as much as 17 
hours per week; in some part of Zimbabwe, in the dry season, the same task might require up to 57 hours 
each week. The World's Women 1970-1990, at 75. 
(173) Women devote a median time of 1.5 hours per day to collect fuelwood; The World's Women 1995, 
at 55, Chart 2.15; The World's Women 1970-1990, at 75. Indian women bear the sole responsibility to 
collect wood for cooking, smoking, heating, and consecrate a weekly average of 7.5 hour to that activity; 
in those more deforested areas, like in some parts of Uttar Pradesh, they might need up to 5 hours every 
day. Nepalese and Bangladeshi women would need 2,5 hours per week, and those in Indonesia, 
Guatemala or Burkina Faso, ` only' one hour each week. Women are occasionally helped in that task by 
men, as for instance Tanzania. Small children and teenage girls are often engaged in both water and wood 
collection. WCED Report revealed that 70% of the population in developing countries rely on wood as 
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agriculture(174), involve a close interaction with, and dependence upon, the environment. 
A parallel reading of early and more recent data on women in developing States clearly 
reveals that the combined pressures of population increase and unsustainable 
exploitation of natural resources, most notably for cash crop production, make these 
daily activities more time consuming, and leave women, especially in rural areas, 
particularily vulnerable to further environmental degradation(175). An increase in the 
time percentage devoted to subsistence activities means a reduction in the time reserved 
for other essential, but maybe not vital, activities: 
«To the extent that there is no possibility for substitution of women's 
labour in child care or subsistence agriculture, their time constraints in 
agricultural activities will reduce production and may also affect their 
children's health and education. » 076) 
Due to their roles in the society(177), the realisation of which depends on the quality 
of their natural environment, women are more aware than men of the necessity to 
the major fuel source; Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 1987), at 187. 
(174) Subsistence agriculture, reserved for indigenous consumption, as opposed to modern, cash-crop, 
capital-intensive agriculture, for export trade; The World's Women 1970-1990, at 92. 
(175) The majority of the women considered by the above surveys recognise more time spent 'now', and 
walking 'longer distances' than they used to `before'; yet any precise point of reference is lacking. It has 
proved extremely difficult to put a year on 'then' and 'before', and to quantify the measure of the increase 
in the time spent on water and wood collection. An estimated 80% of women in 18 Asian countries are 
already seriously affectedby fuelwood scarcity, 60% of rural women in 32 African countries, and 40% in 
Latin America and the Caribbean; The World's Women 1995, at 54, Chart 2.14. See also UNEP, Poverty 
and the Environment, Preparatory Report to the 1995 World Summit on Social Development, (UNEP, 
1995), 94. 
(176) The World's Women 1995, at 50; also 1989 World Survey, at 98. 
(177) And not necessarily, as a result of natural unity, as the proponents of the ecofeminist movement 
tend to argue; Jackson, 'Doing What Comes Naturally? Women and Environment in Development', 21 
World Development(1993), 1947 The term t cofeminisme was first used in 1974 by the French feminist 
writer Francoise d'Aubonne «to call attention to women's potential to bring about an ecological 
revolution>> to save the planet; Francoise d'Aubonne, Le Feminisme ou la Mort (Pierre Horay, 1974), 
213 et sequ., quoted after Warren, 'Introduction to the Special Issue on Ecological Feminism, 6 Hypatia 
(1991), 1. It has developed into a theoretical paradigm and a movement in the late 1970s, essentially on 
the inspiration of American and European feminists, inspired by grassroots women-led environmental 
activism both in the US (Gibbs infra n. 184) and abroad (infra n. 188,189, Chipko movement, and n. 
193 and 194, Green Belt movement). Originally essentially a discourse of 'first world' feminists, 
ecofeminism has spread only recently to less developed countries' scholars, with authors like Shiva and 
Agarwal (India). Although Agarwal is, in fact a critic more than of a proponent of ecofeminist theory. 
Agarwal, `The Gender and Environmental Debate: Lessons from India', 18(1) Feminist Studies (1992), 
119. 
As implied in its appellation, ecofeminism is inspired by both ecological concepts (such as the principle 
of interdependence of life on earth, and the need to respect diversity) and feminists concepts (like for 
instance the analysis of women's subordinated status as tied together with other sources of oppressions. 
Feminist Mies and ecologist Shiva's joint study illustrates perfectly well the cross-cutting nature of the 
movement(s); Mies & Shiva, Ecofeminism (Zed Books & Fernwood, 1993). On the mutual influence of 
ecology and feminism: Rosser, 'Eco-Feminism: Lessons from Feminism form Ecology', 14(3) Women's 
Studies International Forum (1991), 143. 
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protect and preserve natural resources(178). World-wide, women, motivated by food 
security, health, and ecological concerns, have been widely involved in movements for 
the preservation of the natural environment(179). West German women have been 
seriously committed to the European women's peace and anti-nuclear movements. The 
`Peasant Women in the Whyl Movement'(180), set up to protest against the 
construction of a nuclear power plant at Whyl (South West Germany), was one of the 
first German anti-nuclear movement. Petra K. Kelly, co-founder of Die Grünen(181) and 
a keen advocate of environmental and women's issues, personifies German women's 
commitment to peace and a safe environment(182). 
In the USA, Rachel Carson's ground-breaking book on the effects of indiscriminate 
use of technological progress, and more particularily pesticides and other chemicals(183), 
is frequently quoted as an early demonstration of women's particular environmental 
awareness. Even more often referred to as an example of the concern of American 
women for environmental (and health) safety(184) is Lois Gibbs' campaign against the 
dumping of hazardous wastes in the late 1970s. Inspired by the article - of a local 
reporter about buried chemicals and the potential health effects they could cause, Gibbs 
came to draw a link between the mysterious and alarming increase in health problems 
(blood diseases, cancer, birth defects and miscarriage) in her middle class community, 
and past activities at the site. It was eventually revealed that the previous owner of the 
site, a chemicals and plastics factory, had dumped more than twenty thousands of tons 
(178) UNEP/PNUE, Le Public et I'Environnement, l'Etat de 1'Environnement 1988, 
UNEP/GC. 15/17/Add. 1 (UNEP, 1988) at 27. 
(179) Further references on the active involvement of women in environmental protection initiatives in 
Caldecott & Leland (eds. ), Reclaiming the Earth: Women Speak Out for Life on Earth (The Women 
Press: 1983); Dankelman, & Davidson, Women and the Environment in the Third World: Alliance for 
the Future (Earthscan & IUCN, 1988), Chap. 3; Environment Liaison Centre International, Women and 
the Environmental Crisis, Forum '85 (ELCI, 1985), Chap. 6; Ghai & Vivian, Grassroots 
Environmental Action, People's Participation in Sustainable Development (Routledge, 1992). Rodda 
(ed. ), Women and the Environment (Zed Books, 1991); Women's Environmental Network & War on 
Want, Women, Environment and Development, Seminar Report, March 7,1989 (WEN, 1989). 
(180) Mies & Shiva, ibid supra n. 177, at 13-15; Gladitz, Lieber Heute Aktiv als Morgen Radioaktiv (Wagenbach, 1979). 
(181) On the influence of women in (West) German's Greens, see Mellor, 'Green Politics: Ecofeminist, 
Ecofeminine, or Ecomasculine', 1(2) Environmental Politics (1992), 229, at 230-35. Although not to the 
same extent as in (West) Germany, women appear to have always been largely represented in the Swedish 
Green Party, the Mi jopartiet, see Peterson & Merchant, `"Peace with the Earth": Women and the 
Environmental Movement in Sweden', 9 Women's Studies International Forum (1986), 465. 
(182) Kelly, Um Hoffnung kämpfen: Gewaltfrei in eine grüne Zukunft (Lamuv, 1983). 
(183) Carson, Silent Spring (Hanish Hamilton, 1963; Penguin Books, 1991). 
(184) Account of the facts in Patton-Hulce, Environment and the Law: a Dictionary, (ABC-CLIO, 1995), 
at 193; Gibbs, Love Canal, My Story (State University of New York, 1982); Mies & Shiva, ibid. supra 
n. 177, at 82 et sequ. 
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of toxic wastes over a period of 10 years (1942-52), before selling the property for the 
symbolic sum of US $1 to a New York School district (1953). Housing development 
and schools had subsequently been built over the site, which became known as Love 
Canal. Housewives and mothers joined Gibbs' fight to raise and keep the issue alive, and 
created the `Love Canal Parents Movement'(185). The perseverance of the movement led 
the New York Governor to declare a state of emergency in the region on August 2,1978, 
and to order the evacuation of the whole contaminated area. Love Canal was declared a 
federal emergency area in 1980. 
In Italy and Switzerland, women have led demonstrations against La Roche- 
Guivaudan in the aftermath of Seveso accident(186), and in Japan, women played a 
leading role in a collective boycott of `commercial products' and in the promotion of 
organic and natural products, as well as the ecological farming techniques of local 
farmers(187) 
Indian women have often been associated with the Chipko Andolan, born at Mandal 
in the Himalayas in March 1973(188), out of a spontaneous popular move to preserve 
Uttar Pradesh Himalayan forests from logging and auction(189). The movement has 
(185) Later renamed Love Canal Homeowners' Association; Gibbs later co-founded the Citizen's 
Clearinghouse forHazardous Wastes; Mies & Shiva, ibid supra n. 177, at 85. 
(186) Howard-Gordon (Transl. ), 'Seveso is Everywhere', in Caldecott & Leland (eds. ), Reclaiming the 
Earth: Women Speak Out for Life on Earth (The Women Press, 1983), Chap. 4. 
(187) The Seikatsu Club Consumers' Cooperative, one of the earliest consumer liberation movement 
world-wide, was created in the early 1970s, aftera large-scale food poisoning due to the contamination of 
fish with methyl mercury, discharged in the Minamata bay by a Chemical Factory over a period of thirty 
years; Ekins, A New World Order (Routledge, 1992), 131. 
(188) March 1973 was not the very first dispute between indigenous people and governmental authorities 
regarding massive exploitation of Himalayan forests; such disputes have been recurrent, also under the 
colonial administration. However, the Mandal Forest action is traditionally considered as the starting 
point of the Chipko Andolan itself, as the Gandhian-style, peaceful, embracing-the-trunk technique was 
used for the very first time, to physically prevent tree cutting. Loosely translated, Chipko is the Hindi 
word for'hug', andAndolan for 'movement'. For an overview of previous conflicts between lodgers and 
local people, see Weber, Hugging the Trees, The Story of the Chipko Movement (Vicking, 1987), Chap. 
1-3; Barthelemy, Chipko: Sauver les Forets de 1'Himalaya (L'Harmattan, 1982); Jain, 'Women and 
People's Ecological Movement; a Case Study of Women's Role in the Chipko Movement in Uttar 
Pradesh', 19(41)Economic& Political Weekly (1984), 1788. 
(189) This first Chipko action lead to green felling official ban in the Himalayan forests over a 15 year 
period (1980). Chipko actions are also reported to have inspired the 42th Amendment to the Indian 
Constitution (1977), which introduces, among other things, two environmental provisions, enjoining 
both State and citizens 'to endeavour to protect and improve the environment and safeguard the forests 
and wild-life of the country'; Weber, ibid supra n. 188, at 51-52. Originally confined to Uttar Pradesh, 
Chipko has spread the message along Himalayan chain and to other parts of India, as well as to 
neighbouring countries (Nepal, Buthan... ); Mies & Shiva, ibid supra n. 177, Chap. 16. Some authors 
regard Chipko' actions as «historical landmarks because they have been fuelled by the ecological insights 
and political and moral strengths of women»; Shiva, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development (Zed Books, 1989), at 67. It has yet to be underlined that, although widely supported by a large number 
of 'hill women', Chipko Andolan had not originated in women's initiative to preserve their vital 
environment, and that their subsequent support for the movement was originally motivated more by 
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broadened its field of activities beyond anti-tree-felling actions, to raise more global 
environmental awareness among local people. It has also intervened against chalk-mining 
operations performed in violation of Indian environmental law, and in 1983, Chipko 
Andolan went all the way up to the Supreme Court of India in order to obtain the 
closure of limestone mines in Dehra Dun (Uttar Pradesh) on conservation grounds 
(fissured limestone is essential for storing water)(190). The Narmada Bachao Andolan's 
campaign, launched to denounce the insufficiency of appropriate measures envisaged to 
tackle the social and environmental costs of Narmada Valley Project (Madhya Pradesh), 
was also strongly supported by women(191)_ In the Philippines, in the mid 1970s, the 
project of a dam on Chico River, in Cordillera, had to be abandoned after indigenous 
women launched an active campaign against it. Women in the same region have also 
strongly, and so far successfully, opposed the resuming of mining activities by the 
biggest national mining company, the Benguet Corporation(192). 
In Africa, best known is the Kenyan Green Belt Movement(193). The idea of tree-belt 
planting arose in the mid 1970s, within the more general context of a global initiative to 
survival than altruistic concern. Women were originally not particularly active in Chipko interventions, 
and there involvement involved preserve the Reni Forest (1974), on the Indo-Tibetan border. On that 
occasion indeed, women had face alone the axemen and tie themselves to the trees to be cut, as all the 
men of the villages had been tactically tricked away by the lodgers to avoid any resistance. Other 
`women-only actions' have taken place after the Reni Forest episode, such as in Gopeshwar, and Advani 
and Ranichauri forests; the two latter actions had been justified under individuals' constitutional duty to 
preserve the forests; Jackson, 'Doing What Comes Naturally 7 Women and Environment in 
Development', 21 World Development (1993), 1947; Weber, ibid supra n. 188, at 49 et sequ. 
(190) Environment Liaison Centre International, ibid supra n. 179, at 12; see also Anderson, 
`Individual Rights to Environmental Protection in India', in Boyle & Anderson, Chap. 10, at 216 et 
sequ. 
(191) Although in that case, attempts failed to have the acceptability of the project reviewed under 
environmental ground by Indian Courts. The movement's fears have subsequently revealed to be wholly justified, as resettlement and rehabilitation plan has been wholly unsatisfactory, as have been the 
measures to preserve threatened environmental resources; Ekins, A New World Order (Routledge, 1992), 
Chap. 5; Mies & Shiva, ibid supra n. 177, at 306-7. Since the experience of Narmada project, the 
World Bank, the major funding agency of the project, requests 'a comprehensive, detailed and feasible' 
plan for the project affected persons before approving any loan for projects involving involuntary 
displacement; supra n. 60. 
(192) Tauli-Corpuz, 'Indigenous Women, and Sustainable Development', in 4/92 
- 
1/93 Women in 
Action, Women in Sustainable Development, 56. 
(193) A leading figure of the Green Belt movement, Wangari Muta Maathai, has assumed a central part in 
the realisation and success of the politics of afforestation. In parallel with her concrete tree planting 
actions, Maathai has also led the fight against massive deforestation in Kenya on a more political level, 
without being affiliatedto any political party. In 1990, she strongly opposed the allotment of one of the 
few public parks in central Nairobi to the construction of a skyscrapers to provide offices to the 
presidential party. Although Maathai's fight ended up being dismissed by the domestic Court, it had a 
dissuasive effect on the foreign donors supposed to financethe project, which was eventually dropped, for 
lack of sufficient funding. She also denounced corruption and abuses in the sales of public plots to private 
societies 'close to the government'; Nzomo & Staudt, 'Man-Made Political Machinery in Kenya: 
Political Space for Women 7', in Nelson & Chowdhury (eds. ), Women and Politics Worldwide (Yale 
University Press, 1994), 424. 
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improve the environmental quality in some urban areas of Nairobi(194). Conceived «to 
meet the needs of the communities by harnessing local capabilities, expertise and 
resources and engagingthe community to be the main driving force»(195), the grassroots 
tree-planting campaign was focused on women from start(196) «because women are the 
largest users of wood»(197), to help them produce and maintain their major source of 
energy. In less than a decade (1974-1985), over six hundred tree nurseries have been 
created throughout Kenya, not to mention the numerous private mini green belts; on the 
whole, approximately seven millions of trees were planted over that period of time(198). 
Examples of women's environmental `activism' abound in Latin America; to mention 
only two of them: the Brazilian Acäo Democrätica Feminina Gaücha (Democratic 
Feminist Action of Rio Grande do Sol) has been leading a constant fight against the 
maximisation-based export-oriented agricultural system imposed by the government and 
multilateral development banks, and has been trying to promote a more sustainable 
agriculture(199). Ecuador's Women have been particularly involved in the grassroots 
effort to save dwindling mangrove forests(200). 
The factual importance of women's involvement in/with the management of the 
environment alone does not mean that the contribution and needs of women are so 
particular that they must be specially reflected in international environmental strategies 
and legal frameworks; nor does it imply that women's special needs and interests would 
be better served if specially reflected in international environmental strategies and legal 
frameworks. Indeed, there seems to be a great deal of confusion in the doctrine on the 
legal justification, actual implications and importance to be attributed to women clauses. 
For States, these clauses probably have essentially a political value, but are deprived 
of any substantial legal meaning. The absence of reservation, or interpretative statement 
with respect to women clauses, some of which are spelt out in detail, or indeed, to 1992 
Agenda 21, Chap. 24, contrasts with States' extreme caution and numerous reservations 
with respect to other less 'peripheral' but equally controversial issues of Agenda 21(201), 
(194) Maathai, The Green Belt Movement (ELCI, 1988), at 6. 
(195) Maathai, ibid supra n. 194, at 9. 
(196) Although men and children are also involved, the latter through schools' programmes. 
(197) Maathai, ibid supra n. 194, at 13 
(198) By 1993, these figures are reported to have more than doubled, and approximately over 50,000 
people, mostly women, got involved the initiative; Katumba & Akute, 'Greening Takes Root', in 4/92- 
1/93 Women in Action, Women in Sustainable Development (1993), 49. 
(199) Mies & Shiva, ibid. supra n. 177, at 88. 
(200) Mies & Shiva, ibid supra n. 177, at 3. 
(201) Such as technology transferand financial assistance; supra Chap. 5, Principle of Partnership. 
Public Participation 319 Chaptcr 6 
and with regard to certain disputed provisions of the (hard law) 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women(202). 
A close look at the origins of women clauses in the various environmental 
instruments tend to suggest that such clauses are not any more than general public 
participation clauses the by-product of a dramatic evolution of international 
environmental law towards a more people and women-centred legal order. Nor are they 
a `spontaneous' creation of the 1992 Conference on Environment and 
Development(203). 
In the same way as reference to the participation of people and individuals in general 
reflects the interrelatedness of social needs, human rights and the protection of the 
environment, women clauses reflect the evolution in the perception of women's roles, 
status and interests in society, and acknowledge the interrelation inter alia between the 
advancement of women, the promotion of development and the protection of the 
environment. In other words, women clauses in international environmental law 
constitute a 'cas d'application' (with some of its own specificity) of human rights 
clauses, and illustrate the necessity of considering human (women's) rights and 
environmental issues as interrelated but nonetheless clearly distinct issues. 
i. Origins of Women Participation and Women Interests Clauses: Evolution in the 
Perception of Women's Role at the International Level: Recognition of Women's 
Roles in Economic Development 
Women's needs and interests at the international level(204) have originally been 
appraised exclusively in the light of women's reproductive role and their aspiration to 
legal equality. They were consequently addressed with a combination of welfare 
measures(205) and the recognition of `women's' human rights(206). A substantial shift in 
(202) On which see Clark, `The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on 
Discrimination Against Women', 85 AJIL (1991), 281. It is interesting to note in that context that the 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women refers nowhere to 
women's special relationship to the environment. 
(203) The first references to women in environmental documents date back to the process leading to the 
1992 Conference. 
(204) And to a certain extent, at the national level, yet with considerable discrepancies among the various 
States and cultures. All the United Nations documents and instruments referred below in relations to 
women are reproduced in The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1995, The United 
Nations Blue Books Series, Vol. VI (Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1995), unless 
explicitly indicated otherwise. 
(205) Such as measures to improve health, family planning and nutrition, or to promote education and 
the acquisition of home-based appropriate technologies to enhance women's traditional skills; Moser, 
`Gender planning in the Third World: Meeting Practical and Strategic Needs', 17 World Development (1989), 1799. A particularly explicit example of the `welfare' approach to women's need is offered by A 
UNGA A/Res. /1920 (XVIII), 5 December 1963, on Participation of Women in National Social and 
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the perception of women's roles and status has taken place over the course of the 
United Nations Decade for Women 1976-1985(207), with the international recognition of 
women's active role inter alia in economic development(208). 
The major impact of recognition of women's economic role was the reorientation of 
the strategy for the advancement of women away from the classic welfare approach 
toward an approach based on empowerment(209). Another essential but less mentioned 
Economic Development. Despite its title, the Resolution is focused on women's social role, and affirms 
«the importance [a] participation at all levels of social and economic development by means of 
appropriate programmes in the economic and social fields, including in the fields of education, vocational 
training, eradication of illiteracy, nutrition, public health, public administration, housing, social welfare, 
and urban and rural development; see also 1969 Declaration on Social Progress, focused on the 
reproductive role of women. 
(206) The Sub Commission on the Status of Women, was created in 1946, and promoted almost 
immediately to a full commission, and vested with the overall mandate to «submit proposals, 
recommendations and reports to the Commission on Human Rights regarding the status of women>; see 
ECOSOC Resolution establishing the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub Commission on the Status of Women, E/Res/5(I), 16 February 1946, and ECOSOC Resolution establishing the Commission on the Status of Women, E/Res/2/11,21 June 1946. The Commission on the Status of 
Women's prime concern was originally the equal status of women before the law, as illustrated by the 
drafting of the 1952 Convention on the Political Rights, and of the 1979 Women of the Convention on 
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women. The First World Conference on Women, held in Mexico in 1975, was also primarily concerned with women's welfare and equality, although the Conference Agenda (see Paras. 8,9,22), and indeed the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women 
and Their Contribution to Development and Peace, already reflects a change in the perspective of 
women's role, and related needs and interests, in society. The Conference Agenda was once described as 
«a shopping list of desirable changes in the status of women», the implementation of which is left 
exclusively to the piecemeal action of individual States; Maguire, Women in Development, an Alternative Analysis, mimeo (Center for International Education, University of Massachusetts, 1989), 12. And 
indeed, the largely rhetorical tone of the Agenda has seriously undermined its whole credibility and 
affected its actual impact on women. 
More generally, the focus on equality was strongly criticised by most second and third world women 
who, for different reasons, felt less concerned by what they considered to be typically capitalist society 
women's interest; Goetz, 'Feminism and the Claim to Know', in Grant & Newland (eds. ), Gender & 
International Relations (Open University Press, 1991), Chap. 9. 
(207) The Decade was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly only months after the 1975 First World Conference on Women; see UNGA A/Res. /3520 (XXX), 15 December 1975, on the World Conference on the International Women's Year. 
(208) Boserup's Woman's Role in EconomicDevelopment(St Martin's Press, 1970; new edn: Earthscan 
Publications, 1989) constitutes one of the earliest comprehensive study that highlights both the 
importance of women's contribution 
-mostly Third World women- to agricultural economy, and the 
marginalisation of women in modernising agricultural societies. Boserup's study paved the way for an 
abundant literature on women and development. Extensive references in Townsend, Women in 
Developing Countries: a Selected Bibliography for Development Organisations, Development 
Bibliographies I (Institute of Development Studies, 1988); White, Women in Development: An Annotated 
Bibliography for the World Bank (Overseas Development Council, 1976); African Training & Research 
Center for Women, African Women in Development: Annotated Bibliography, Bibliographic Series No. 
11/1991 (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 1991); United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Annotated Bibliography on Women in Development In Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP, 1986). See also World Bank, Recognizing the 'Invisible' Women in Development: 
The World Bank Experience (World Bank, 1979). 
(209) See UNGA A/Res. /3010 (XXVII), 18 December 1972, proclaiming 1975 International Women's Year, which already pays some tribute to the part of women in the development process; UNGA 
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effect was the emergence of women's interests and women participation clauses in 
development agendas and strategies(210), and a multiplication of `women in 
development' offices in development agencies(211). In sum, women clauses in 
A/Res. /3020 (XXX), 15 December 1975, on the World Conference of the International Women's Year. 
Since 1975, the General Assembly has regularly adopted a Resolution on the integration of women in 
development process; see for instance UNGA A/Res. /3505 (MCK), 15 December 1975, on Integration of 
Women in the Development Process; UNGA A/Res. /31/175,21 December 1976, on Effective 
Mobilization of Women in Development; UNGA A/Res. /33/200,29 January 1978, on Effective 
Mobilization and Integration of Women in Development; UNGA A/Res. /34/204,19 December 1979, 
ibid.; UNGA A/Res. /35/78,5 December 1980, ibid. 
(210) No reference to women is made in the 1961 Strategy for the First Development Decade, as 
women's participation in the development process was not clearly established yet. 1970 Strategy for the 
Second Development Decade inaugurated the movement and cautiously stated that «the full integration of 
women in the total development effort should be encouraged>> Para. 18(h) (emphasis added); the 1980 
Strategy for the Third Development Decade, is more assertive, urging all States «to pursue the objective 
of securing women's equal participation both as agents and as beneficiaries in all sectors and at al levels 
of the development process, Para. 51; see also Paras. 8,95,122 and 168; 1990 Strategy for the Fourth 
Development Decade, Paras. 76,83 and 95. No explicit reference to women could be traced in the 1974 
NIEO Declaration and Programme of Action, the 1975 Economic Charter, and the 1975 Resolution on 
Development and International Economic Cooperation, all essentially focused of inter-State equity, 
despite suggestions in that sense by Ahooja Patel, `Women, Technology and Development', 14 
Economic& Political Weekly (1979), 1549, at 1550. 
In the World Bank, the first comprehensive operational policy statement on women (in that case, gender) 
and development was made only in 1994, although the Bank had already integrated gender consideration 
in most of its country projects since the late 1980$; see further Collier, Women in Development: Defining 
the Issues, Working Paper (World Bank, 1988); World Bank, Enhancing Women's Participation in 
Economic Development, A World Bank Policy Paper (World Bank, 1994). 
Likewise, most donors States introduced an express reference to women's needs and interests on their 
agenda of foreign assistance. The US was the first State to put gender concern on its foreign assistance 
agenda, afteran active lobbying campaign of women's groups in Congress, with the 1973 Amendment to 
US Foreign Assistance Act. Under the so-called Percy Amendment 1961 (also known as the Women in 
Development Directive), US development assistance must help 'integrate women into the national 
economies of foreign countries, thus improving their status and assisting the total development effort', 
1973 Amendment to US Foreign Assistance Act, codified at 22 USC 2151K, Sect. 113, With the 
exception of Sweden that introduced women on its development agenda even before the US, in 1972, the 
majority of other donor States did so after 1975 First World Conference on Women (Norway, 1975; 
Australia, 1976; Germany and UK, 1978) or 1980 Second World Conference on Women (The 
Netherlands, Finland, 1980; New Zealand and Belgium, 1981; EEC, 1982; Switzerland, 1983; Canada, 
1984), and even more after the 1985 Third World Conferences on Women (Italy, 1985; Ireland, 1986; 
Japan, Denmark and Austria, 1987; Spain, 1990; France, 1992; Portugal, 1993); see Jahan, Assessment 
of Policies and Organizational Measures in Women in Development Adopted by DAC Member 
Countries, Theme 2 of the Assessement of WID Policies and Programs of DAC Members (Directorate for 
Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, Switzerland, and United States Agency For 
International Development, November 1994), Table 1, and more detailed review of the concrete measure 
taken in Table in Annex. In 1983, OECD laid the foundation for the integration of women in mainstream 
development agendas of the members of its development assistance committee (DAC), with its Guiding 
Principles to Aid Agencies for Supporting the Role of Women in Development; the Guiding Principles 
were reviewed in September 1989; W. 8831D/Arch. 1940D; see further Weckes-Vagliani, The Integration 
of Women in Development Projects (Development Centre Papers, OECD, 1985). 
(211) The majority of States and entities referred above set up a special office or bureau in the 
development agencies to ensure the integration of women in their development projects; hence for 
instance, USAID's Officeof Women in Development, set up in 1974; a Women in Development office 
within the US Bureau for Research and Development is responsible for report to US Congress on the 
progress of women in development policies, and serve as a focal point for technical assistance and rah 
on gender issues. See also Sweden's Gender Office; Norway's Unit for Women in Development; 
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international and national development agendas and related developments find their base 
in documents concerned with the advancement of women, and not in general documents 
concerned with economic development per se. They have been developed and elaborated 
upon via documents concerned with the advancement of women, and most importantly 
the 1985 Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women(212). The 
Australia's Women in Development Coordination Group; Germany's Division for Women, Family and 
Youth; The Netherlands's Special Programme for Women in Development; Belgium's Unit for the 
Promotion of Women; Canada's Women in Development Directorate; Italy's Women in Development 
Bureau; Japan's Headquarters for the Planning and Promoting Policies Related to Women. In Portugal, 
the responsibility for implementing and co-ordinating women in development policy lies with the 
Cabinet of the State Secretary for Cooperation, and in the UK (before the change of Government in 1997), 
with the Social Development Department. For the time being, France's women in development policy is 
co-ordinated only by 'part time people'. No special organisational structure was set up, apart from 
workings groups, in EC, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Spain, New Zealand. A minority of countries, like 
Ireland and Switzerland, have not even a working group devoted to women in development; Jahan, 
Assessment of Policies and Organizational Measures in Women in Development Adopted by DAC 
Member Countries, Theme 2 on the Assessement of WID Policies and Programs of DAC Members 
(Directorate for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, Switzerland, and United States Agency 
For International Development, November 1994), Annex. Similar women's bureaux or offices were set up 
in a number of developing States essentially after the 1985 Third World Conferences on Women to 
implement the 1985 Forward Looking Strategies or the Advancement of Women agreed at the 
Conference; but as a whole, their efficiency has been seriously affected for two sets of reasons: (a) these 
bureaux have often been created within the ministries or departments of social and cultural affairs, rather 
than in the department of Agriculture (in the light of the number of women involved with agriculture in 
most developing States), economy, or development, and have been this way marginalised in the 
decision-making process; (b) women's offices generally experience a lack of funding to take any concrete, 
even small-scale action, or to hire well-trained personnel, as a consequence of their affiliation to 
notoriously under-funded ministries and departments; see in this respect the review of the progress of the 
women's bureaux in several Caribbean Countries: Gordon, Ladies in Limbo, The Fate of Women's 
Bureaux, Six Case Studies from the Caribbean (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1984), and updated Ladies 
in Limbo Revisited, Record of a Workshop held in Belize, 11-15 November 1985 (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1985). The same is true in fact, fora majority of the offices in developed countries, which am 
often marginalised from mainstream decision-making process, and appear at best a public relations 
exercise, at worst, a supplementary layer to the existing bureaucracy of development agencies; see 
Himmelstrand, 'Can an Aid Bureaucracy Empower Women? ', in Staudt (cd. ), Women, International 
Development, and Politics, the Bureaucratic Mire (Temple University Press, 1990), Chap. 4. More 
specifically on the very moderate impact of US Women in Development policy, see US General 
Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance, US Has Made Slow Progress in Involving Women in 
Development, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO/NSIAD-94-16 (USGAO, Washington, D. C., 
1993). A number of WID offices, most notably in the Nordic countries, have been particularily active. 
At the international level, UNDP set up Women In Development focal points in 1976, promoted to a full 
Division for Women in Development in 1987; UNDP was confirmed in its function of 'promoting and 
strengthening the role and involvement of women, youth and other major groups in recipient countries in 
the implementation of Agenda 21»; 1992 Agenda 21, Para. 38.25. Since 1984, UNDP counts the UN 
Fund for the Development of Women (UNIFEM) among its associated (but autonomous) funds; sec 
UNGA Res. A/39/125,14 December 1984. The World Bank established a special division on Women 
in Development in 1987, within the Department of Population and human Resources of the Bank's 
Policy, Panning and Research Complex; World Bank, Annual Report-Fiscal Year 1989 (World Bank, 
1989), at 58 et sequ. For a more general assessment of the effort of various agencies to integrate women 
and gender issues into their activities, see Razavi & Miller, Gender Mainstreaming: A study of Efforts 
by UNDP, the World Bank and the ILO to Institutionalize Gender Issues, Occasional Paper 4 (UNRISD, 
1995). 
(212) More particularly Paras. 93-271; a system-wide medium-term plan for women and development for 
the period 1990-1995, E11987/52,7 April 1987, was endorsed by ECOSOC, that translate the relevant 
aspects of the 1985 Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women in a consistent 
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same clauses were only superficially 'operationalised' by development agencies, to add 
more than integrate women in mainstream development projects via general guidelines 
and checklists. 
H. Women and the Environment 
Likewise, the emergence of clauses referring to women in environmental instruments 
and agendas can be attributed to the increasing recognition of the close interrelation 
between the status and advancement of women and the preservation of the 
environment, within the general context of the advancement of women. In 1986, the UN 
Secretariat for the Advancement of Women designated the United Nations Environment 
Programme, the institutional output of the `gender-neutral' 1972 Stockholm Conference 
on the Human Environment, as the lead agency on women and environment(213). In 
some ways, the choice of UNEP, the environmental consciousness of the whole UN 
system, as the focal point for women was an assurance of a valuable source of support 
from inside the United Nations. 
The original terms of UNEP's mandate was to «safeguard and enhance the human 
environment for the benefit of present and future generations of Man»(214). The 
institution was thus not concerned with the protection of the environment in its purest 
and most disinterested form, but as an element «essential to [man's] well-being and to 
the enjoyment of basic human rights... »(215). UNEP's Governing Council had made it 
clear at its very first session, that the quality of life 
-not the protection of the 
environment- ought to be the primary concern of the programme(216). No particular 
attention was paid, however, to women's specific situation and contribution, either at 
Stockholm Conference(217), or in UNEP's founding Resolution(218). 
and efficient way and to provide a framework the UN system-wide implementation of the strategy; a 
system-wide medium-term plan for women and development for the period 1996-2001 was by ECOSOC 
E/Res/1993/16; neither documents is reproduced in The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 
1945-1995. 
(213) Referred after Braidotti, et a! (eds. ), Women, the Environment and Sustainable Development: 
Towards Theoretical Synthesis (Instraw & Zed Books, 1994), at 87; Dankelman & Davidson, Women 
and the Environment in the Third World: Alliance for the Future, (Earthscan & IUCN, 1988), at 164. 
(214) See A/Res/2997 (XXVII), 15 December 1972, Institutional and Financial Arrangements for 
International Environmental Cooperation, preambular Para. 1. 
(215) Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Para. 1 in 
fine. 
(216) gyp, Report of the Governing Council on the work of its first session, 12-22 June 1973, GAOR, 
28th Session, Suppl. No. 25 (A/9625), Annex I, Decision 1(I), Sect. III, Para. 3; the decision was 
subsequently endorsed by ECOSOC, E/Res/1820 (LV), 9 August 1973, and UNGA, A/Res/3131 (XXVIII), 13 December 1973. 
(217) No referenceis made to women in 1972 Stockholm Declaration on and Action Plan for the Human 
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UNEP developed a certain sensitivity about the role and importance of women in the 
protection of the environment essentially during the preparation stage of 1985 Third 
World Conference on Women(219). In a speech delivered at the outset of the 
Conference, Mostafa Tolba called upon all women to join the environmental effort: «I 
look to you, women from all walks of life, to join us in defining and, most crucially, 
redirecting the course of development to prevent further environmental 
catastrophes) )(220). An outreach programme on Women and the Environment was set 
up in 1984, to raise awareness and mobilise women's participation in environmental 
management(221). 
Gender issues had been channelled inside the organisation and integrated in UNEP's 
internal and external policy through a series of formal and informal working groups on 
women, which eventually lead to the appointment of the first focal point for women's 
issues within the agency(222). A group of seventeen women was also convened from 
around the world, all involved in environmental protection and management in their own 
countries as ministers, parliamentarians, or senior government officials. The role of this 
group, initially called the Committee of Convenors(223), was essentially instrumental; it 
Environment. And it is but a coincidence that the General Assembly decided in 1972 to dedicate the 
decade 1976-1985 to women. 
(218) UNGA, A/Res/2997 (XKVII), 15 December 1972, ibid. supra n. 214. 
(219) On UNEP activities on gender issues, see generally. 1992 Annual Report of the Executive Director, 
Twenty Years since Stockholm (UNEP, 1993), 57; UNEP, `Background Paper on UNEP's Work in 
Gender and Environment', 1995; UNEP, `Implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for 
the Advancement of Women', Report of the Branch for the Advancement of Women, Center for Social 
Development and Humanitarian Affairs, 27 May 1987. 
(220) Excerpts from `An Alliance with Nature - Women and the Earth's Traditions, Statement to the 
World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nation Decade for Women, 
Equality, Development and Peace, Nairobi, July 1985. 
(221) UNEP, 1992 Annual Report of the Executive Director, Twenty Years since Stockholm (UNEP, 
1993), at 57. 
(222) UNEP, `Implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of 
Women', Report of the Branch for the Advancement of Women, Center for Social Development and 
Humanitarian Affairs, 27 May 1987. 
(223) After the 1985 Nairobi Third World Conference on Women, UNEP Committee of Convenors was 
established as a standing committee of UNEP, and renamed the Senior Women's Advisory Group on 
Sustainable Development. The twenty-women strong group has been actively acting as voluntary 
advocates for women and their crucial role in key sectors of the environment, such as food production, 
preservation of biodiversity, wastes disposal, protection of forests at national and international levels; 
more generally, UNEP Senior Women's Advisory Group on Sustainable Development's mandate 
consisted in advising the UNEP Executive Director on means and strategies to integrate. women into all 
sectors and at all stages of UNEP plans and policies. A mechanism internal to UNEP, was also set up to 
enhance the effort of the Programme in the field of women and the environment; UNEP Internal Task 
Force on Women was created at the occasion of the 1985 Third World Conference on Women (held in 
Nairobi, where UNEP is headquartered), and consolidated and renamed Ad Hoc Group on the 
Advancement of Women in 1987. This institutional arrangement was altogether modified in the run up 
to 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, and a new Gender Issue Board and Gender Focal Point set 
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was, among other things, to structure the input of UNEP at the 1985 Third World 
Conference on Women(224), and lobby for the passing of a resolution calling for women 
to support sound environmental practices(225). The Committee of Convenors played a 
decisive role inter alia in the adoption of the `environmental provisions' of the 1985 
Nairobi Forward Looking Strategy for the Advancement of Women(226). Another 
source of influence was the international workshop on Women and the Environmental 
Crisis, convened in Nairobi, concurrently with the 1985 Third World Conference on 
Women(227). The workshop gathered women from around the world involved in 
environmental actions, and relied on case studies to identify the needs of women with 
regards to the various interrelated dimensions of environmental crisis. 
The first real initiative to integrate women's environmental and developmental 
concerns into the process leading to the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development was taken with the 1991 Symposium `Women and 
Children First'(228), convened to examine the impact of poverty and environmental 
degradation on children and women. Three months after the Symposium was held, a 
decision was taken at UNCED Third Preparatory Committee meeting, requesting 
UNCED Secretary-General `to ensure that women's critical economic, social and 
environmental contributions to sustainable development be addressed at the Conference 
as a distinct, cross-cutting issue) )(229). 
up. 
(224) In its background paper for the 1985 Third World Conference on Women, UNEP reiterates the call 
for women «to join in defining and redirecting the course of development to prevent further environmental 
catastrophes; UNEP, Sustainable Development and Peace (UNEP, 1985), at 11. 
(225) See UN (draft) Resolution on women and the environment, proposed at the 1985 Third World 
Conference on Women, urging women «to be more conscious of the crucial role they play in 
environmental and natural resources». The draft also recommends that «in addition to economic criteria 
for evaluation of projects, societal benefits must also be included, specifically assessment of the 
participation of and impact upon women; Document A/CONF. 116/C. 1/L. 71, Paras. 1 and 5; the drall 
Resolution is annexed to the Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements 
of the United Nations Decadefor Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Nairobi, 15-26 July 1985, 
UN/A/CONF. 116/25/Rev. 1, at 222. No further action was taken by the Conference on that Resolution. 
No particular mention was made of a link between women and the environment in the First (1975) and 
Second (1980) World Conferences on Women. 
(226) It had a decisive influence upon IUCN/UNEP/WWF's updated strategy for a sustainable living. 
Whereas the original World Conservation Strategy (IUCN/UNEP/W WF, 1980) kept silent about women 
and the environment, Caring for the Earth (IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1991) fully recognises and advocates 
the extending role of women in the community, see Caring for the Earth, at 23 and 59. 
(227) See workshop report: Environment Liaison Centre International, ibid supra n. 179. 
(228) UNEP/UNFPA/UNICEF, Geneva, 27-30 May 1991, A/45/625 Annex; excerpts of the Workshop's 
conclusions in Robinson, (ed. ), Agenda 21 and the UNCED Proceedings (Occana Publications, 1993), 
Vol. IV, at 992. 
(229) Decision 3/5, August 1991. 
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No recommendation in that sense had been made at the two previous UNCED 
Preparatory Committee meetings, and no reference to women was contained in the 
resolution that convened the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development(230). Following UNCED Preparatory Committee's decision, the first 
General Assembly Resolution dedicated to women, environment, population and 
sustainable development was passed without a vote; it recognises « the critical role that 
women, both in the informal and formal sectors, play in primary environmental care, 
(... ) and achieving sustainable development» (231) 
Two nearly simultaneous initiatives represented another major breakthrough in the 
process of integration of women's issues in 1992 Agenda 21 as a priority theme(232). A 
Global Assembly of Women and the Environment was convened in Miami in November 
1991 under the co-chairmanship of UNEP Senior Women's Advisory Group on 
Sustainable Development and WorldWIDE Network, an environmental NGO, to 
demonstrate and stimulate, through success stories, «women's capacities in 
environmental management in the areas water, waste and energy, and the potential of 
environmentally-friendly systems, products and technologies [as valuable contribution] 
to locally environmental management» (233) 
Material from the Global Assembly of Women and the Environment was expressly 
incorporated in a UN Secretary-General report documenting the linkages between the 
role and status of women and the environment, which was cmplied in preparation for 
the 1992 Conference of Environment and Development(234). The UN Secretary- 
General's conclusion conforms with the Global Assembly's message(235): 
(230) 1989 Resolution 44/228, on United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(231) A/Res/46/167,19 December 1991, Women, Environment, Population and Sustainable 
Development, at Para. 3 
(232) One could mention numerous initiatives in that sense, which had only a marginal impact; thus for 
instance, the Citizen's Action Plan for the 1990s (Agenda Ya Wanachi), drafted by the global NGO 
Conference `Roots of the Future', convened by ELCI in Paris, in December 1991, wholly endorse the 
Women's Action Agenda 21; likewise, Planeta Femea, a Women's Conference within the NGOs forum 
of UNCED, has revealed disappointing in terms of "strategising" for the actual integration of women in 
development. The above information were obtained on the occasion of a three-month internship at UNDP 
Regional Office for Africa, Nairobi, March 1996-May 1996. 
(233) Ofosu-Amaah& Philleo, Women and the Environment: An Analytical Review of Success Stories, (UNEP-WorldWIDE Network, 1992) at 3; excerpts of Global Assembly's conclusions in Robinson, (ed. ), Agenda 21 and the UNCED Proceedings (OceanaPublications, 1993), Vol. IV, at 989. 
(234) ECOSOC, Commission on the status of women, Priority Themes 
- 
Development: Women and the 
Environment, Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN. 6/1992/9,21 January 1992, at 3. 
(235) In anticipation of the Global Assembly on Women and the Environment, an ad hoc Inter-Agency 
Working Group on Women, Environment and Development, co-chaired by UNEP and UNIFEM, was set 
to co-ordinate the actions between the relevant UN agencies (UNEP, UNDP, UNIFEM, UNICEF) and 
departments, and Bretton Wood institutions. The working group has prolonged its efforts after the Assembly, to assure that due consideration for the Assembly's outcome in the preparatory process to 
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«As a result of their role in society, women have interacted daily with 
natural ecosystems and have become skilled and knowledgeable 
environmental managers (... ) The role of women in society makes them 
significant contributors to efforts to protect the environment, and the 
improvement of the status of women is vital to the enhancement of their 
contribution (... )On international agendas the status of women and the state 
of the environment have been treated as distinct issues although they am 
relevant and related to all other issues (... ) Empowering women to deploy 
their skills and experience should become a major policy goal. » (236) 
The second initiative of relevance in the process of elaboration of 1992 Agenda 21 
Chapter 24 was the World Women's Congress for a Healthy Planet(237) convened in 
Miami only days after the first event to structure women's input `in the formulation of 
policies that will affect the future of our planet in next century'(238). 
«As caring women, we speak on behalf of those who could not be with 
us, the million of women who experience daily the violence of environmental 
degradation, poverty, and exploitation of their work and bodies. As long as 
Nature and women are abused by so-called "free market" ideology wrong 
concepts of "economic growth", there can be no environmental 
security. » (239) 
Women's Action Agenda 21 was meant to reflect the work, ideas and values of the 
participants to the congress; it was built upon the recognition of the 
"interconnectedness of women, the environment, economic policies, development 
strategies, social justice and the survival of all species"(240). Departing from previous 
attempts to isolate women and environment, the Agenda advocates a holistic (and 
sometimes utopian) model of a healthy planet, whereby environmental and women's 
issues are linked with other general issues such as military expenditures, foreign debts 
and trade, poverty, land rights, population and health biotechnology, nuclear and 
alternative energy, science and technology transfer, information and education. 
Presented to UNCED Secretary-General, Mr Strong as the contribution of the congress 
UNCED. The group, now formally known as the UN and Financial Institutions Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Women, Environment and Development, pursues its collective effort to implement chapter 24 of 
Agenda 21; Ofosu-Amaah & Philleo, Women and the Environment, op. cit., 84. 
(236) Priority Themes 
- 
Development: Women and the Environment, Report of the Secretary-General, 
supra n. 234, Paras. 4,5,13 and 41. 
(237) Miami, November 8-12,1991. The Congress has been organised by the American-based Women's 
Environment & Development Organization (WEDO), and chaired by Women's International Policy 
Action Committee (IPAC), a body of 54 women from 31 countries, specially set to co-ordinate and 
structure women's input into UNCED; see Braidotti et a! (eds. ), Women, the Environment and 
Sustainable Development: Towards Theoretical Synthesis (Instraw & Zed Books, 1994), at 91. 
(238) World Women's Congress for a Healthy Planet, Official Report (WEDO, 1992), at 8; see excerpts 
of Women's Action Agenda 21 in Robinson, (ed. ), Agenda 21 and the UNCED Proceedings (Occma 
Publications, 1993), Vol. IV, at 1023. 
(239) Women's Action Agenda 21, reproduced in World Women's Congress for a Healthy Planet, 
Official Report, supra n. 238, Sect. 3, at 16. 
(240) Women's Action Agenda 21, supra n. 238, at 17. 
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to the preparatory process to the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development, 
Women's Action Agenda 21 has undoubtedly been a valuable source of inspiration in 
the drafting of 1992 Agenda 21 Chapter 24. 
iii. Advancement of Women to Protect the Environment, or Protection of the 
Environment to Enhance the Advancement of Women? 
We have tried to demonstrate that the roots of women clauses in international 
environmental document lie in the process of the advancement of women (per se a 
socio-economic issue), and reflect the changing conception of women's role in society. 
Earliest references to a link between women and environment were made in `women 
documents', viz. in documents concerned with the advancement of women; they were 
only subsequently inserted as some sort of 'clauses de style' in environmental (and 
previously, in developmental) documents. These clauses have been developed and 
elaborated upon via documents concerned with the advancement of women(241), but 
have been only superficially 'operationalised' in the strict context of protection and 
management of the environment. 
A particularily striking example is UNEP Gender Issue Focal Point's repeated 
attempts to elaborate gender impact assessment criteria to 'test' the gender sensitivity of 
UNEP plans, policies and projects(242). The first two drafts articles, circulated only 
internally to UNEP, paraphrased in fact various 'women in development criteria' 
developed by various development agencies, to ensure that women are duly integrated 
in, and not adversely affected by, development projects. It was in any case extremely 
(241) Apart from the main environmental provisions (Paras. 221-226), thirty other paragraphs in the 1985 
Forward Looking Strategies embrace environmental considerations of concern to women, namely with 
regard to employment (Para. 139), health (Paras. 151,162,164), food, water and agriculture (Paras. 174- 
186), industry (Paras. 187,189), trade and commercial services (Paras 194 et sequ. ), science and 
technology (Paras. 197 et sequ. ), energy (Paras. 215-217) and shelter (Paras. 206-210). The provisions of 
the 1985 Nairobi Forwards Looking Strategy for the Advancement of Women were largely reiterated in 
1992 Agenda 21, Chap. 24, and in 1995 Beijing Platform for Action adopted by the Fourth World 
Conferenceon Women, Chap. IV, Sect. K. No real plan of action was set forth during the First (1975) 
and Second (1980) World Conferences on Women, to substantiate the declarations of good intent made 
by State representatives; the lack of comprehensive strategy was a major factor in the limited contribution 
of both Conferences to enhance women's status. Women and the environment was put as added to the 
list of priority themes to be dealt with by the Commission the status of women by an ECOSOC decision 
in 1990 already, E/1990/213. 
(242) See UNEP Gender Impact Assessment Criterion (sic), Guidelines and Checklist, proposed by P. 
Murthi, Consultant, December 1995; another set of guidelines were developed previously by another 
Consultant, although it appeared that part of the Gender Focal Point was unaware of the first set, and the 
other part was unaware of the second set; only two persons were working at the focal point at the time. 
The second set did not substantially depart from the first one. Both were dangerously similar to the 
principles developed to integrate women in development, most notably OECD Guiding Principles on 
Women in Development, developed by OECD Development Assistance Committee, supra n. 210, and 
those elaborated by Overholt in the first Chapter of Case Book on Gender Roles in Development Projects (Kumarian, 1985). 
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difficult to see how such guidelines would in any way improve the efficiency of 
international environmental action. Whilst it was clear that the prime purpose lay in the 
promotion of women's role and their advancement. Far from providing helpful guidelines 
to 'operationalise' women's clauses in environmental documents, UNEP draft guidelines 
epitomise on the contrary the risk of confusion of the promotion of women and the 
protection of the environment(243). 
UNEP draft guidelines requested inter alia a detailed "baseline study" on the status 
of women and a comprehensive analysis of "key gender characteristic relations in the 
project area", that would contain data such as social, economic and legal status of 
women at the domestic and state level. It would also include a rubric on the division of 
labour within the family, within the group and within the state, with a special focus on 
the productive and reproductive roles of women and women's access to financial and 
natural resources. 
The relevance of such information to environmental protection projects or policies is 
highly questionable. Quite clearly, more than an operational instrument to assist policy- 
makers to pay more attention to gender issues in the design of an environmental policy, 
project or convention, the guidelines would lead to a comprehensive study about the 
conditions of women in a given area, the compilation of which is the responsibility of 
bodies such as the Division for the Advancement of Women, or the Commission on the 
Status of Women, but not that of an environmental body such as UNEP. The 
advancement of women is a praiseworthy goal to which UNEP might incidentally 
participate; it is not, however, TJNEP's main function(244). Likewise, environmental law 
and policy incidentally contribute to the advancement of women, but this does not mean 
that the advancement of women is a 'new' objective of environmental law and policy. 
Women clauses, inter alia in environmental law documents, could represent a victory 
of the cause of women on the international level, a mark of credibility and of 
importance. It is contended here that such clauses, and the confusion surrounding them, 
are in fact harmful both to the advancement of women and to the protection of the 
(243) Another illustration is probably offeredby 1992 Agenda 21, Chap. 24, which has more of a 'mini- 
agenda' for the advancement of women, than of a section of an agenda for the promotion of development 
and protection of the environment. It is interesting to note for instance, that the Chapter urges States to 
ratify `all relevant conventions pertaining to women whilst no reference is made to the ratification of 
environmental documents; Para. 24.4. More generally, there is clearly an unnecessary repetition between 
1995 Beijing Platform for Action adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women, Chap. IV, Sect. 
K, which can be legitimately considered as restating the relevant provisions of the 1985 Nairobi Forwards 
Looking Strategy for the Advancement of Women, supra n. 241, and 1992 Agenda 21, Chap. 24. 
(244) The above comments on UNEP gender impact assessment criteria, and more generally on UNEP's 
activities on women draw from the author's experience during a three-month internship at UNEP Gender 
Issue Focal Point, Nairobi, December 1995-February 1996. 
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environment. They convey a simplistic and over-reductive conception of two related 
issues, viz. the advancement of women and the protection of the environment, and entail 
a serious risk to trigger overlapping efforts from the various competent bodies. On the 
other hand, if clarified in their content and properly interpreted, women clauses in 
environmental law documents could play an extremely important pivotal role, and 
assure proper co-ordination and compatibility between advancement of women and 
protection of the environment. 
5. Conclusions: Satisfaction of Human Rights, Advancement of Women, 
Promotion of Development, and Protection of the Environment: Related, 
Parallel but Distinct Processes 
The now common references to individuals, groups, human rights or women (among 
others) in international environmental law represent a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, the rapprochement of human and women rights, and environmental issues reflects 
appropriately the factual interrelation existing between them. The importance to 
consider duly this interrelatedness pertains both to the efficiency and the adequacy of 
environmental law itself. The resolution of contemporaneous environmental matters 
rests indeed upon environmental factors as much it does upon social and economic 
factors, which include the needs, interests and behaviour of individuals and groups of 
individuals, the eradication of poverty and the advancement of women. 
Pushed to its extreme however, such association of issues could be counter- 
productive and undermine altogether human rights, advancement of women and 
environmental protection, by conveying an over-reductive conception of the issues at 
stake. The advancement of women is not only about sustainable development and the 
protection of the environment; conversely, the protection of the environment and more 
generally the promotion of sustainable development do not primarily or exclusively 
hinge upon women. Bretherton's perception of the issue is caricatured to the absurd, 
and makes her point difficult to believe as she affirms that 
«[i]n the absence of solution [to the problem of lack of women's 
empowerment in a generally male-biased social and economic system], 
women's struggle to safeguardthe planet will remain confined to clearing up 
men's messes. » (245) 
Human rights law might incidentally contribute in a certain way to the protection of 
the environment, and the protection of the environment might incidentally contribute to 
the satisfaction of human rights. As seen, international human rights law, the law for the 
advancement of women and international environmental law overlap on certain issues, or 
(245) Ibid supra n. 167, Chap. 6, at 114. 
Public Participation 331 Chaptcr 6 
on certain aspects of certain issues. They remain nonetheless distinct laws, geared to 
(related but) distinct objectives and implemented by distinct authorities according to 
distinct parameters. To argue otherwise would be a clear misconception of the 
interrelation between human rights, economic and social development, and the 
preservation of the environment(246). 
9)(-Q 
(246) In this respect, the experience of the 1975 First World Conference on Women and 1980 Second 
World Conference on Women should serve as a lesson when it comes to link women issues to other 
general (and more controversial) issues. Hence, whilst there was a general consensus on the necessity, in 
principle, to 'integrate women in development', the focus of the Conferences' debates did not lie on how 
to proceed to achieve such goal, but was indeed diverted to more 'political' and seriously controversial 
(and not directly relevant) issues unfortunately referred to in the course of the Conferences, and most 
notably the equation of zionism with racism (expectedly firmly opposed by US), the issue of apartheid 
and sanctions against South Africa (resisted inter alia by the UK), the non compensation for the 
nationalisation of foreign investment (resisted by US, FRG, UK, France, Netherlands), the right to seek 
development financial and technological assistance (resisted by most technologically advanced States and 
major donor countries), and some specific women-related issues culturally and strategically important 
(such as family planning, opposed by Arabic countries and the Vatican); see 1975 First World Conference 
on Women, Decision 29, on Women's Participation in the Strengthening of International Peace and 
Security and in the Struggle against Colonialism, Racism, Racial Discrimination and Foreign 
Domination, and Decision 15, on Family Planning; in Report of the World Conference of the 
International Women's Year, Mexico City, 19 June to 2 July 1975, E/CONF. 66/34, at 87 et sequ., and 
107 et sequ. Similar decisions were passed at the 1980 Second World Conference on Women; Report of 
the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, 
Copenhagen, 14 to 30 July 1980, A/CONF. 94/35, Decisions 1 and 11, at 60 et sequ. and 72 et sequ.; 
see also 1980 Second World Conference on Women Dec. 16, on an International Conference on 
Sanctions against South Africa, and Dec. 45, on Apartheid and women in South Africa and Namibia; 
Dec. 26, on the Right of all Countries to seek development Assistance from any and all Sources, fite 
from Threats and Attacks. 
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1. Introduction 
The first ambition of this thesis was to elaborate a general picture of sustainable 
development from the restricted perspective of international environmental law, and to 
set the basis for its operationalisation in this area of the law. Such task proved 
impracticable considering (a) the open-texture of the expression of 'sustainable 
development' per se, and (b) the absence of generally agreed guiding elements that could 
inspire the identification of such picture(s). 
Preference had therefore to be given to a more deductive approach, whereby the 
concrete meaning and the legal significance of sustainable development are inferred from 
the recent evolution of selected basic principles of environmental law commonly 
associated with sustainable development(2). 
To allow for a certain degree of comparison, each principle has been studied from its 
inception through its most recent development. More particular emphasis was put on 
the period contemporaneous with the 1992 Conference on Environment and 
(1) Chap. 1/1. Introduction. 
- (2) For a justification of the choice of the principles, see supra Chap. 1/2/i. Conceptual Framework, and Chap. 1/2/ii. Approach and Methodology. 
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Development, when references to sustainable development in international 
environmental law instruments became the rule rather than the exception(3). 
2. Sustainable Development from the Perspective of International 
Environmental Law: Synthesis of the Research 
Overall, the contribution of this research is extremely circumscribed, not to say 
disappointing, insofar as the revelation of innovative distinctive features of sustainable 
development is concerned. No dramatic change has emerged from the evolution of the 
principles considered, which might be attributed to the influence of a principe 
inspirateur called sustainable development. Rather, the research denotes a regular 
evolution of the basic rules of international environmental law as a result of their 
adaptation to the continuous improvement in the understanding of their subject matters. 
1) It was first noted that, whilst permanent sovereignty over natural resources has 
remained a constant factor of international environmental law(4), its conception has 
changed considerably over the years. Originally exclusively contemplated in its 
geographical dimension, permanent sovereignty over natural resources has long been 
assimilated to a rule of coexistence and non-interference among States that is, to a 
territorial concept deprived of any particular environmental implications. 
Over the past twenty-five years, however, it has evolved into a more functional 
principle that defines less the geographical extent and limits of States' sovereign 
prerogatives, and more the competence, functions and responsibilities inherent in 
sovereignty in relation to domestic and transboundary environmental resources. Such 
shift away from territoriality towards functionality came as a response to both the 
dramatic increase in cross-border and global environmental problems (or better 
understanding of the full geographical implications of prima facie purely domestic 
environmental problems), and to the realisation of the interrelatedness of various 
environmental issues. A growing number of environmental problems transcend political 
boundaries and are the common concern of several, or indeed of all, States. 
2) It was further considered that the evolution of the principle of prevention 
epitomises a wider transformation of international environmental law from a passive law 
of allocation of natural resources and reactive law of reparation, into a more proactive 
(3) Chap. 1/3. Evolutionary Perspective of Sustainable Development and Chap. 1/2. General Framework ei 
Research; it must be born in mind that the expression 'sustainable development' is by no means a 
creation of the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development, but predated it as illustrated by 
sporadic references in earlier instruments; Chap. 1/3. Evolutionary Perspective of Sustainable 
Development. 
(4) Supra Chap. 2/3. The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: a Principle of 
Customary Law. 
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tool of protection of natural resources. It reflects a general recognition that (a) natural 
resources are not solely objects of exploitation, but are equally objects of protection, 
and that (b) the natural assimilative, self-regenerating and self-perpetuating capacity of 
ecosystems is not unlimited. The real development of the protective function of 
international environmental law thus coincides with the recognition of environmental 
limits. 
The increase in complexity of 'modern' environmental pollution and the 
intensification of the actual and potential human impact on the environment, particularly 
over the past fifteen years, have demonstrated, with respect to certain critical 
environmental situations, the necessity to intervene and take environmental measures at 
an early stage, even where a degree of scientific uncertainty persists on the causal link 
between the object of environmental regulation and the subject of environmental 
protection (precautionary approach). 
3) The third evolution considered is related to the development of the dimension 
ratione temporis of international environmental law, via intergenerational equity. A great 
majority of issues addressed in recent international environmental law, such as loss of 
biodiversity and forestry resources, ozone layer depletion and climate change transcend 
not only space but also time boundaries. They need to be contemplated and acted upon 
both in the light of their present day conditions, and in the intergenerational perspective 
of their hypothetical future evolution and impact. 
4) The thesis also denoted a certain intensification in technical and economic co- 
operation between States in relation to environmental issues. It emerged that a number 
of new parameters for technical and financial co-operation have been formally enshrined 
into environmental conventions, in exchange for developing States' commitment to take 
appropriate measures to preserve certain environmental resources located within their 
national boundaries. The principle of common but differentiated responsibility, the 
principle of additionality and the principle of contingency of certain environmental 
obligations were more particularly considered(5). 
5) Particular attention was finally paid to the development of a 'participatory' 
environmental law, and to the proliferation of 'public participation', 'public interest' and 
human or women's rights clauses in international environmental law instruments(6). A 
detailed analysis suggests that, from the perspective of international environmental law, 
such clauses, and more generally the so-called 'participatory dimension' of international 
(5) Supra Chap. 5/3. The Parameters for Global Co-operation. 
(6) Less consideration has been paid to the parallel multiplication of environmental clauses in human 
rights instruments. 
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environmental law, reflect the close interrelationship existing between environmental 
issues, and social and human rights matters. 
The various principles have thus each evolved in an autonomous way, in different 
circumstances, to fulfil distinct objectives. Beyond these differences and peculiarities, 
however, a common trend, or general framework, stands out quite clearly, which one 
may call sustainable development. 
This common framework can be expressed in four points: 
(1) As a premise, there is a due recognition and proper consideration of the 
interrelatedness of environmental issues and the natural interdependence of 
States; 
(2) There is also a general reorientation of international environmental law from 
a 'law of coexistence' into a 'law of co-operation'(7), with the general 
tendency to depart from the synallagmatic structure of classic international 
law, to address more global and common concerns; 
(3) A general reorientation of international environmental law from a law of 
allocation of natural resources into a law of preservation and protection of 
these resources (paradoxical 'greening of international environmental law'). 
(4) A shift from a fragmented approach towards a more holistic and integrated 
approach. Various environmental problems are increasingly addressed as 
part of a wider environmental context, and indeed as part of an even wider 
socio-economic context. 
This latter feature evidences best the partiality of our research. We underlined in 
the introductory Chapter the paradox of isolating one dimension only of a notion which 
is essentially about the interrelation and integration of science, politics, economics and 
law, and, in law, of human rights law, economic law and environmental law. Such focus 
was justified as commanded by pure reason of manageability of the research(8). This 
fundamental characteristic of sustainable development predominates the conclusion: 
sustainable development is not about environmental protection; it is not about human 
rights; it is not about economic development and fair international trade. Sustainable 
development is about a combination and co-ordination of all these objectives. 
It was also underlined in the introduction that the conclusions reached in this research 
apply only to the environmental dimension of sustainable development viewed under 
the environmental law perspective, and would not necessarily apply by analogy to the 
other dimensions. Although it is probable that different conclusions would have been 
(7) See supra Chap. 5/1. Introduction. 
(8) See supra Chap. 1/2/ii. Approach and Methodology. 
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reached under a different perspective, the specific element of integration is, 
undoubtedly, common to all dimensions of sustainable development, whatever the 
perspective these dimensions are appraised from. 
As for the rest, the four points listed above tend to confirm that sustainable 
development considered in the area of international environmental law has not the 
revolutionary status that some try to attribute it(9); it is not about new rules, new 
principles, nor is it about new solutions. In fact, in certain respects(10), sustainable 
development appears more as a reflection of the evolution of international environmental 
law, than it seems to be the trigger of such evolution. Sustainable development in sum, is 
not the by-product of a sudden revolution of international law in general and 
international environmental law in particular; it is the outcome of a constant evolution of 
these laws. 
Sustainable development reorganises, and where necessary sets, the framework 
within which existing and emerging or future rules and principles of international 
environmental law are to be construed. To quote Dupuy, sustainable development 
represents a «matrice conceptuelle, definissant la perspective generale dans laquelle les 
principes dejä etablis de bonne gestion de 1'environnement doivent eire restitues» (11). 
And indeed, sustainable development is most commonly referred to in the preambular 
(9) See for instance Hohmann, 'Environmental Implications of the Principle of Sustainable Development 
and their Realization in International Law', in Chowdhury et al. (eds. ), The Right to Development in 
International Law (Martinus Nijho$ 1992), Chap. 3.4; Hossain, 'Evolving Principles of Sustainable 
Development and Good Governance', in Ginther et al. (eds. ), Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance (Martinus NijhoIl 1995), Chap. 1; Hossain, 'Sustainable Development: A Normative 
Framework for Evolving a More Just and Humane International Economic Order', in Chowdhury et al. 
(eds. ), The Right to Development in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), Chap. 3.2; Jositsch, 
'Das Konzept der nachhaltigen Entwicklung (Sustainable Development) im Völkerrecht und seine 
innerstaatlicheUmsetzung', 11 Umweltrecht in der Praxis (1997), 93, at 114; Panjabi, 'From Stockholm 
to Rio :A Comparison of the Declaratory Principles of International Environmental Law', 21 Denver 
JILP (1993), 215; Singh, 'Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law', in De Waart et 
al. (ed. ), International Law and Development (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), Chap. 1.1; see also Judge 
Weeramantry, quoted above. For a more moderate view, see Bekhcchi, 'Le droit international A 1'epreuve 
du d&veloppement durable', 6 Hague YbIL (1993), 59; Epiney & Scheyli, 'Le concept de developpcment 
durable en droit international public', 7 Schweizerisches Zeitschrift 
, 
stir Internationales & Europäisches 
Recht (1997), 247; Luff, 'An Overview of International Law of Sustainable Development and A 
Confrontation Between WTO Rules and Sustainable Development', 29 RBDI (1996), 90; Riedel, 
'International Environmental Law 
-A Law to Serve the Public Interest? - An Analysis of the Scope of the 
Binding Effects of Basic Principles (Public Interest Norms)', in Delbriick (ed. ), New Trends in 
International Lawmaking 
-International 'Legislation' in the Pubic Interest (Dunker & Humblot, 1997), 61. 
(10) See more particularly Chaps. 2,3 and 5. 
(11) Dupuy, 'Oü en est le droit international dc 1'environnement A la fin du siLcle? ', 101 RGDIP (1997), 
873, at 886. 
Conclusions 337 Chapter 7 
part of international instruments which is purported to set the general framework, the 
spirit and the goal of the provisions it prefaces(12). 
3. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case : Judicial Consecration of Sustainable 
Development? 
The opportunity to consider the operational character of sustainable development 
arose recently in the International Court of Justice, with the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
case(13). In their respective pleadings to the Court, Hungary and Slovakia both 
contended that the principle of sustainable development 'as formulated in the 
Brundtland report, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21' was 'applicable to the 
dispute'(14). 
The case arose from Hungary's decision to withdraw from a treaty with former 
Czechoslovakia relating to the joint construction and exploitation of a dam system over 
the Danube river, on the ground that the environmental impact of such project had not 
been sufficiently evaluated (plea of environmental necessity). The Slovak Federation, on 
the other hand, rejected Hungary's plea of environmental necessity as a sufficient ground 
to terminate the treaty in general(15), and denied the existence of any such environmental 
necessity in this particular case. 
This long-standing dispute has been widely commented upon in the doctrine(16), with 
much speculation concerning the importance the ICJ would attribute to environmental 
(12) See supra Chap. 1/21iii. Legal Framework. 
(13) We are indebted to Professor Alain Pellet and to his assistant, Celine Negre, in Paris, for allowing 
us unlimited access to the entire oral and written pleadings for that case. For the sake of clarity, we shall 
referto the various documents of the pleadings with the following abbreviations: CR = Verbratim record 
of the oral pleadings (uncorrected); H/M = Memorial of the Republic of Hungary, S/M = Memorial of the 
Slovak Republic; H/CM = Counter-Memorial of the Republic of Hungary, S/CM = Counter-Memorial of 
the Slovak Republic; H/R = Reply of the Republic of Hungary; S/R = Reply of the Slovak Republic; 
S/CR = Comments on Hungarian Reply sumitted by the Slovak Republic. 
(14) See H/R Vol. 1§1.45 and 1.47; S/CM § 9.53-9.50. 
(15) See Special Agreement between Hungary and the Slovak Federation for Submission to the 
International Court of Justice of the Dii%rences between them Concerning the Gabclkovo Nagymaros 
Project, 32 ILM (1993), 1293; see also Prof. Pellet's pleading on the confusion underpinning the 
Hungarian's argumentation between the grounds for termination of a treaty and the grounds of exoneration 
of state responsiblity, CR 97/9, p. 40 et sequ. and references contained therein. 
(16) For a presentation of the factual elements and political dimension of the dispute, see Assetto, & 
Bruyninckx, 'Environment, Security and Social Conflict: Implications cf the Gabclkovo-Nagymaros 
Controversy', in Blake et al. (eds. ), International Boundaries and Environmental Security: Frameworks 
for Regional Cooperation (Kluwer Law International, 1997), Chap. 20; Galambos, 'Political Aspects of 
an Environmental Conflict: The Case of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam System', in Kakbnen (od. ), 
Perspectives on Environmental Conflict and International Relations (Pinter, 1992), Chap. 6; Liska, 
'Development of the Slovak-Hungarian Section of the Danube', in Blake et a!. (eds. ), The Peaceful 
Management ofTransboundary Resources (Graham& Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), Chap. 12. For a 
legal analysis of the environmental dimension, see Eckstein, 'Application of International Water Law to 
Transboundary Groundwater Resources, and the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute Over Gabcikovo-Nagymaros', 
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values. In many ways, the dispute constituted a genuine'test case' for environmental law 
at the international level in general, and for some emerging environmental law principles 
in particular(17). The parties, more particularly Hungary, resorted to novel arguments, 
most of them considered in this research in relation to sustainable development. It 
invoked for instance the principle of precaution «generalement reconnu par le droit 
internationab (18), the related obligation to prepare a serious environmental impact 
assessment study(19), and the argument of intergenerational equity(20). It also relied 
upon more classic arguments such as the principle of equitable utilisation of shared 
natural resources(21) and that of co-operation(22). Slovakia, on the other hand, did not 
deny the evolution of customary international environmental law in the past three 
decades and emergence of new environmental rules since the conclusion of the 1977 
Czechoslovakia-Hungary Treaty Concerning the Construction and Operation of the 
Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks. It contented, however, that the general legal 
context had not so dramatically changed, most notably in terms of new international 
environmental rules, to justify a termination of the 1977 Treaty. It argued in fact that a 
great majority of the rules invoked by Hungary are «de simples propositions de normes 
dont on doit constater qu'elles sont tout juste en gestation)) and hence not part of the 
corpus juris as such(23). 
19 Suffolk TLR (1995), 67; Robert, 'L'affaire au projet Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie/Slovaquie), un 
nouveau conflit en mati8re d'environnement devant la Cour internationale de justice ? ', XLVII Studia 
Diplomatica (1994), 17; Williams, 'International Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Dispute 
Between Slovakia and Hungary Concerning Construction of the Gabcikovo and Nagymaros Dams', 19 
Columbia JEL (1994), 1. More specifically on Hungary's perspective, see Nagy, Divert or Preserve the 
Danube? Answers'in Concrete' 
-a Hungarian Perspective on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Dispute', 5 RECIEL (1996), 138. 
(17) See Eckstein, Robert and Williams, supra n. 16, and Sohnle, infra n. 38. 
(18) CR 97/2 at p. 18 § 10 and p. 48 § 23; CR 97/12, p. 68 § 12; H/M §§ 6.46-6.69,8.31; H/CM §§ 
4.29,6.14,6.18,7.30; H/R §§ 1.48,1.51-1.58. The whole idea of precaution undcrpinns Hungary's 
conception of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine and the notion of emergence of new environmetnal needs. 
Hungary takes the view that environmental damage need not be actually have oecured to justify invoking 
the fundamental change of circumstances doctrine, and held that «the appreciation of a genuine 
environmental risk can be sufficient to warrant termination, provided that the damage if it were to occur 
would be significant and not within the realms originally envisaged by the Parties»; Sands, CR 97/6, p. 
16 § 57; H/M §§ 6.57 etsequ.; H/R §§ 1.41,1.52,1.53. See by contrast the opinion of Slovakia, CR 
97/9, p. 30 et sequ., and the opinion of the Court infra. in the text. 
(19) CR 97/2 at p. 29 § 27; M/M §§ 3.48,3.71-3.72; H/R §§ 1.64 et segu. See frutchr on the standards 
to be applied in EIA studies: Ms Gorove, CR 97/3, p. 57 et sequ. 
(20) Hungary invoked 'la responsabilit6 de la Hongrie et de la Tch6cholsovaquie envers les gdndrations 
pr6sentes et futures ; Prof. Dupuy, CR 97/3, p. 77 § 2; H/M §§3.78-3.93. 
(21) CR 97/2 at p. 49 § 26; H/M §§ 7.72-7.82. 
(22) CR 97/2 at p. 49 § 25; H/M, §§ 6.70-6.75. 
(23) Prof. Pellet, CR 97/10, p. 28; see also S/R, §§ 3.25 et sequ.; S/CR §§ 1.41 et sequ. and §4 et 
sequ. 
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The ICJ acknowledged more than it genuinely endorsed the alleged 'new rules' of 
international environmental law. The Court was most notably cautious with regards to 
arguments such as intergenerational equity(24), which it referred to but did not expand 
upon, and the principle of precaution. With regards to the latter argument, the Court's 
narrow conception of an 'imminent peril' in the sense of a component element of a state 
of necessity is not particularly indicative of a 'precautionary approach'. In the view of 
the Court, a peril is imminent as soon as it is established, at the relevant point in time, 
that the realisation of that peril, however far off it might be, is not thereby any less 
certain and inevitable. » (25). 
More generally, however, the judgement of the ICJ in the Gabcfkovo-Nagyºnaros case 
illustrates the extreme complexity of the argument of sustainable development, and the 
related risk of adopting conflicting perspectives thereon. The following conclusion of the 
Slovak Representative after the first round of oral presentation expresses all too well the 
inherent difficulty of conciliating the various dimensions of sustainable development in 
casu: 
«... en ecoutant, il ya trois semaines, les plaidoiries de la Partie 
Hongroise, j'ai eu le sentiment que, dune certain maniere, deux 
conceptions de 1'environnement s'opposaient devant [la Cour]. La Slovakie 
atttache (... ) autant d'importance que la Hongrie [ä la protection de 
l'environnement], ninon plus; mais je pense aussi que nous avons dc la 
protection de 1'environnement une conception que je crois plus responsable, 
plus positive, et je dirais surtout plus 'humanste' que la Hongrie. Cc qui 
importe ä nos yeux, c'est la protection de 1'environnement humain. Comme 
le dit avec force le premier principe de la declaration de Rio de 1992: «Les 
titres humains sont au centre des preoccupations relatives au developpement 
durable. Its ont Ic droit ä unc vie same et en harmonic aver la nature». La 
protection contre les innondations, l'amClioration de l'irrigation et des 
conditions de navigation, la recherche dune meilleure qualite des eaux de 
surface et souterraines participent evidemment ä cet objectif, et par la 
realisation conjointe du projet de Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros les Parties auraicnt 
fortement contribue ensemble ä sa mise en oeuvre, en meme temps qu'elles 
auraient utilise une source d'Cnergie propre et renouvelable dans l'intCrcts 
des deux peuples, slovaques et hongrois. »(26) 
Hungary adopted a rather narrow perspective of sustainable development, insisting 
more particularly on the environmental dimension of sustainable development(27). 
Slovakia, by contrast, relied on a broader understanding and exploited the economic, 
(24) Case concerning the Gabclkovo NagymarosProject (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 37 JIM (1998), 
67, at Para. 140; see also 35, Para. 53, and 58, Para. 112. 
(25) Case concerning the Gabcikovo NagymarosProject (Hungary/Slovak-la), Judgment, 37 IL1f (1998), 
162, at Para. 54 (emphases added). 
(26) CR 97/11, p. 55. 
(27) H/R §§ 1.39 and 1.48. 
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social and environmental dimensions of the same argument(28). It was the task of the 
Court to reconcile those conflicting interests and by doing so, to give its own view of 
sustainable development. 
To one learned scholar and sitting ICJ judge in that case, sustainable development 
constituted a'principle crucial to the resolution of the case' and played 'an essential role 
in the Court's balancing the competing demands of environmental protection and 
development'(29). Judge Weeramantry regards sustainable development as more than a 
mere concept. In his view, it is 'a genuine principle with normative value', part of 
modem international law by reason of both 'its inescapable logical necessity', and its 
'wide and general acceptance by the global community'(30). Apart from being a principle 
of modem international law, sustainable development is also 'one of the most ancient 
ideas in the human heritage'(31). 
In its final judgement, however, the Court, made only one very cautious express 
acknowledgement of sustainable development(32), worded in the following generic terms: 
«[The] need to reconcile economic development with the protection of 
the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable 
development. » 
No implicit or explicit recognition of the legal significance nor of the substantive 
meaning and normativity attributed to sustainable development can be found in the final 
judgement. The Court confined itself to acknowledging, in a very general way as it had 
already done on previous occasions, the importance of the protection and preservation 
of the environment(33), whilst cautiously avoiding further elaboration. 
At the outset, it would seem fair to say that the Court approached the dispute 
essentially from a treaty law perspective, with some environmental considerations 
added more than genuinely integrated in its reasoning(34). After a closer look, however, 
(28) CR 97/9, p. 29. 
(29) Judge Weeramantry, supra n. 30, at 204. 
(30) Case concerning the Gabcikovo NaSymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakla), Judgment, Judge 
Weeramantry (sep. op. ), 371LM (1998), 162, at 204-207. See also Hungary's claim that 'international 
law in the field of sustainable development is sufficiently well established' to apply to the case; quoted by 
Judge Weeramantry, ibid., at 205. 
(31) Supra n. 30. 
(32) Case concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 37 ILAf (1998), 
162, at Para. 140 in fine. Apart from Judge Weeramantry, none of the Judges appending a separate or 
dissenting opinion even mention sustainable development. 
(33) Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons In Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 
1996,66, Para. 29; Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of 
the Court's Judgement of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, ICJ 
Rep. 1995,288, at Para. 64. 
(34) See in that sense Judge Herczegh's dissenting opinion, not yet reproduced in ILAI but posted on the 
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it appears obvious that the Court's reasoning was not exclusively based upon the law of 
treaties, but was influenced by some other external 'factors'. On the one hand, the Court 
concludes (a) that Hungary has not lawfully departed from the 1977 Treaty, and that (b) 
that Slovakia is the legitimate successor of Czechoslovakia in that same treaty. The 1977 
Treaty is consequently still binding upon the Treaty, and the principle of pacta suns 
servanda would command both parties to fulfil their respective treaty obligations. 
Which means for Hungary the construction of the dam at Dunakiliti. Yet no such 
obligation is spelled out by the Court. On the contrary, the Court invites both States to 
'look afresh at the effects of the environment of the operation of the Gabcikovo power 
plant' and that the various parts of the project which have already been built should be 
jointly operated(35). This conclusion, interpreted against the background of the oral and 
written pleadings, may be an implicit recognition that a strict application of the law of 
the treaties in that case, hence a full application of the 1977 Treaty, would entail 
unacceptable environmental consequences in the light of modern environmental 
standards and the general spirit of'sustainable development'. 
Albeit perhaps a step in the right direction, this recent decision of the ICJ in 
Gabdkovo-Nagymaros case testifies nonetheless of a certain quandary with regard to 
recent developments in the field of international environmental law, and most 
particularly with respect to sustainable development. It echoes the wider tendency 
prevailing in the doctrine(36) and in international environmental law instruments(37), to 
refer generically to sustainable development without attempting to elaborate on its legal 
significance, or even clarify its role and status(38). 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The use of the term 'sustainable development' in various fields as different as 
architecture and law, and in relation to many different issues such as health or natural 
resources management, in political, legal, economic, scientific or sociological fora, has 
web @ <http: //www. icj-cij. org>. 
(35) ICJRep. 1995,288, at Paras 140-141. 
(36) Some scholars writing on sustainable development adopt a technique similar to that used here, and 
approach sustainable development through more specific principles of international environmental law. An 
even more widespread practice consists of 'illustrating' sustainable development with an essentially 
descriptive explanation of the outcome of the 1992 United Nation Conference on the Environment and 
development; see references supra Chap. 1, Introduction, n. 1. 
(37) See references supra Chap. 1, Introduction, n. 1. 
(38) This is also the conclusion taken by Sohnle, who appeared to have had extensive access to the 
Court's pleadings; 'Irruption du droit de l'environnement dans l'afaire de la C. I. J.: 1'affairc Gabcikovo- 
Nagymaros', 102 RGDIP (1998), 885. 
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made it a term difficult to ignore. Everybody seems to talk about sustainable 
development, to write on sustainable development, to work towards sustainable 
development, to set agendas for sustainable development. And yet, it is astonishing to 
note that few are those who seem to know exactly what sustainable development is all 
about, and what it involves in practice, if anything. 
To States, and to a large extent, to the private sector and local political groupings, 
sustainable development represents a very convenient slogan, that suggests much, but 
commits to nothing. It is a 'principle' which can easily attract 'wide and general 
acceptance by the global community', as long as it does not imply anything concrete. In 
such context, sustainable development is legitimately qualified as 
«a simplistic formula, if not euphemism, which, from a policy- 
oriented point of view, more likely conceals conflicts rather than resolves 
them: conflicts between environment and development, present and future 
generations, north and south, national and international jurisdiction, self- 
interest and community interest. »(39) 
Sustainable development has shown itself to be a multi-faceted expression extremely 
frustrating to concretise, as complex as a cobweb. Study of one facet reveals new ones, 
and the research process soon becomes endless. Everything appears to be about 
sustainable development, and sustainable development appears to be about everything. 
To offer a complete understanding of sustainable development -if any such 
understanding is realistically feasible and practically useful- would be the work of a 
whole team of experts from various fields and many horizons(40). 1992 Agenda 21, the 
dynamic program for'a new global partnership for sustainable development'(41), is but a 
sample of what such global perspective might be. In fact, the contemplation of the legal 
environmental aspects proved more complex than anticipated. 
It is feared however, whilst fully appreciating the importance of addressing the 
various contemporaneous issues in their interrelation with one another, that perhaps too 
much sense is being put in one single expression, with the risk that at the end, the 
expression would mean everything but in fact nothing. Paul Valery once said that «ä 
(39) Primrosch, The Spirit of Sustainable Development within Authoritative Decision-Making 
Processes', 47 Austrian JPIL (1994), 81, at 82. 
(40) As mentioned in introduction, ILA sub-division of its International Committee on Legal Effects of 
Sustainable Development into three sub-committees respectively on sustainable development and the 
environment, Sustainable Development and Good Governance (that includes human rights) and 
sustainable development and international economic order, epitomises particularly clearly the complexity 
of sustainable development and its relevance in the area identified in the text; see ILA, Report of the sixty- 
sixth Conference, Buenos Aires, 1994,111, at 113. See also McGoldrick, 'Sustainable Development and 
Human Rights : An Integrated Conception', 45 ICLQ (1996), 796, for a particularly clear, temple-like 
presentation of the three main legal dimensions of sustainable development and their close inter-relation. 
(41) 1992 Agenda 21, Para. 1.6. 
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trop y vouloir rattacher de valeurs, un mot peut perdre tout son sens» (42). As this thesis 
has demonstrated, there is considerable value in the further articulation and development 
of principles evolving in support of, and within the frame of sustainable development, 
but also autonomously from it. 
1GX 
(42) Quoted after Prof. November, 'Les Applications du ddveloppement durable et l'Agenda 21 local', 
paper delivered at a seminar organised by the Centre d'Ecologie Humaine et des Sciences de I'Environnement/Geneva University, Developpement durable, First Part, Geneva, 12-13 March 1998. 
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